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  • Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure.
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  • Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant in the second appeal) filed O.S. No. 107 of 1982 in the court of the District Munsif, Mettur, seeking a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants in respect of two described portions of land (1 acre 10 cents in Survey No. 4/10 and 2 acres in Survey No. 12/1). The plaintiff's pleaded case was that the suit properties belonged to one S. G. Shanmugam, who leased the properties to the plaintiff on 20.1.1979 for Rs. 300 per year and later entered into an agreement of sale dated 29.6.1981 for Rs. 15,000. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants obstructed his peaceful enjoyment of the land.

The defendants denied the plaintiff's possession and the agreement of sale. They traced title/possession to antecedent owners (Kandappa Chettiar and Kuilammal), asserted ancestral enjoyment by the forefathers of the first defendant, and contended that the plaintiff's claim could not be sustained.

The trial Court framed issues, heard oral and documentary evidence, and dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession. The plaintiff appealed (A.S. No. 17 of 1984) to the District Court, Salem and also filed I.A. No. 213 of 1984 to admit additional documents; the District Judge confirmed the trial Court's decree and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff then filed the present second appeal in the High Court challenging the concurrent findings of the two Courts below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Courts below erred in law in declining to go into the question of title even though the suit is one for injunction?
  2. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in not admitting the additional evidence asked for by the plaintiff?
  3. Whether there has been a misconstruction of or omission to construe the material evidence on record by the courts below when the plaintiff was non-suited?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff produced oral evidence (P.W.s 1 to 4) and documentary evidence (Exhibits A.1 to A.10) to prove possession; these were acceptable and should have led to a decree for permanent injunction.
  • The trial and appellate Courts erred in refusing to go into title incidentally in a suit for injunction when the plaintiff had sufficient proof; therefore this Court should interfere in the second appeal.
  • The plaintiff sought admission of additional documents in I.A. No. 213 of 1984 during the first appeal (point raised in the procedural history).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Both Courts below made concurrent findings rejecting the plaintiff's claim and the plaintiff failed to establish possession; thus there is no merit in the appeal and it should be dismissed.
  • The respondents relied upon authority (Velayudham Pillai v. Sandhosa Nadar) for the proposition that grant of patta or payment of kist is not conclusive as to title or possession, arguing that documentary entries are not determinative.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Krishnan v. Lakshmi Ammal, 1989 (2) L.W. 76 Where possession must be shown lawful to be protected; title may be gone into incidentally to determine whether possession is lawful. The Court adopted this view to hold that an injunction suit may lead courts to consider title incidentally if sufficient proof exists; the court agreed with the cited passage and rejected the lower courts' contrary approach.
Kochu Kakkada Aboobacker v. Attah Kasim, 1996 (7) S.C.C. 389 Where lower courts fail to consider relevant documents in proper perspective, the High Court can reconsider evidence and draw inferences from admitted documents. Invoked to support the High Court's power under Section 100 C.P.C. to re-evaluate documentary evidence when lower courts neglected or misapplied it.
Seeni Ammal v. Veerayee Ammal, 1997 (I) CTC 360 (1996 (2) L.W. 461) The High Court can interfere in a second appeal if the findings of the Courts below are not supported by evidence or are perverse/erroneous. Used to justify interference with concurrent findings that the High Court found unsupported by the record.
Major Singh v. Rattan Singh, 1997 (3) S.C.C. 546 When courts below reject evidence as not properly discharged, the High Court must test whether the reasons given are sustainable in law and may examine the question. Applied to examine whether the lower courts' rejection of the plaintiff's documentary evidence was legally sustainable; supported overturning perverse findings.
A. Irudayasamy v. V. Perumal Naidu, 1997 (1) L.W. 474 Under Section 100 C.P.C. the High Court may consider whether material evidence and relevant circumstances were considered by the lower Courts and whether findings were based on evidence or on surmise. Reinforced the Court's power to re-examine the documentary and oral evidence and to interfere where findings are not based on the record.
Velayudham Pillai v. Sandhosa Nadar, 1973 (I) M.L.J. 44 Authority for the proposition that grant of patta or payment of kist is not conclusive proof of title or possession. The respondents relied on this decision, but the Court distinguished it and held that, on the facts and in the presence of acceptable documentary evidence, the patta/kist and related documents supported the plaintiff's claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed whether title may be considered in a suit for injunction. It agreed with the view expressed in P. Krishnan v. Lakshmi Ammal that to protect possession the plaintiff must show that possession is lawful, and that the question of title can be gone into incidentally to determine lawfulness of possession. Consequently, the lower courts were not right in refusing to consider relevant documentary evidence solely because the suit was for injunction.

The Court then examined the scope of Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, relying on several authorities (Kochu Kakkada Aboobacker; Seeni Ammal; Major Singh; A. Irudayasamy) to conclude the High Court is entitled to re-examine whether material evidence was properly considered by the lower courts and to interfere where findings are unsupported, perverse or based on surmise rather than evidence.

Turning to the evidence, the Court analyzed the plaintiff's documentary exhibits and oral testimony:

  • Exhibit A.3 (patta pass book) contained the name of Shanmugam and Chinnappan, survey number, extent, village and kist payable; the court found the minor correction in a name immaterial and could not justify rejection of the document by the Courts below.
  • Exhibits A.4 to A.7 (kist receipts): although some receipts had the same number for the same fasli, the Court considered the relevant fasli (1381) and, in particular, Exhibit A.5 which mentioned Shanmugam; the Court held that documents could not be rejected solely because they were carbon copies rather than originals.
  • Exhibits A.9 (settlement order) and A.10 (rough settlement patta) were seen as corroborative of ancestral linkage and supported the plaintiff's case.
  • The Court noted the plaintiff had oral evidence from P.W.s 1–4 including the lessor (P.W.2). The defendants relied heavily on oral evidence (D.W.s 1–4), two of whom were very elderly and claimed exclusive enjoyment by the first defendant.

After weighing the material documentary evidence and oral testimony, the Court concluded that the lower courts erred in rejecting documentary evidence and in preferring the defendants' oral evidence over acceptable documentary materials produced by the plaintiff. The court characterized the findings below as perverse and contrary to the evidence on record and held that the reasons given by the lower courts for rejecting the plaintiff's documents were unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The Court's final decision was to allow the second appeal. The opinion states: The judgment and decree of both the Courts below are set aside, and the suit filed by the plaintiff for permanent injunction is decreed as prayed for. The second appeal is allowed with costs throughout and CMP No. 12712 of 1995 is closed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The decree for permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff is restored/awarded; both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court's dismissals are set aside, and the plaintiff succeeds on the injunction claim.
  • On precedent/authority: The Court applied established principles under Section 100 C.P.C. and case law to justify interference where lower courts have failed to consider material documents or have rendered perverse findings. The opinion does not purport to create new law; it applies and follows existing authorities to the facts before it.

    Muthu Goundar v. Poosari Palaniappan And 4 Others S

    1. The plaintiff in O.S No. 107 of 1982 on the file of the district Munsif, Mettur is the appellant in the above second appeal. He filed the said suit for permanent injunction against the defendants. The trial Court after holding that since the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit he filed appeal before the lower appellate Court and the same was also dismissed. Against the concurrent findings of both the Courts below the unsuccessful plaintiff filed the present second appeal as stated above.

    2. The case of the plaintiff is as follows:

    According to him an extent of 1 acre 10 cents in Survey No. 4/10 and another 2 acres in Survey No. 12/1 are the subject matter of the suit properties. The suit properties belongs to one Shanmugam. The said Shanmugam on 20.1.1979 leased out the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff for the lease amount of Rs. 300 per year. Further, the had also entered into an agreement of sale on 29.6.1981 for Rs. 15,000 from the said Shanmugam. While, such is the position the defendants who have no semblance of right in respect of the suit properties obstructing the plaintiff from him peaceful enjoyment which necessitated filing of the present suit.

    3. The defendants filed a written statement wherein they have denied the statement that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and the agreement of sale between himself and one Shanmugam. It is stated that the entire Survey No. 4/10 and 12/1 initially belonged to one Kandappa Chettiar, grand father of said Shanmugam as well as one Kuilammal. The said Kandappa Chettiar was incharge of eastern portion and the western portion was under the possession of Kuilammal. The eastern portion belonging to Kandappa Chettiar was leased out to various persons. From the said lands the Shanmugam sold 2 acres to Chinnappan and 50 cents to plaintiff in 1971. On the other hand the said Kuilammal in the absence of any legal heir dedicated her shar in favour of Vellaleswarer Kovil. Thereafter the said lands were entrusted to the person doing service to the said temple. In this manner the suit properties were in enjoyment of the fore-fathers of the first defendant and thereafter first defendant was in enjoyment along with other Kothukarers. Hence according to the defendants the claim of the plaintiff cannot be sustained, accordingly prayed for dismissal of the same.

    4. The learned District Munsif in the light of the above pleadings, after framing necessary issues and in the light of the oral and documentary evidence dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit the unsuccessful plaintiff filed appeal in A.S No. 17 of 1984 before the District Court, Salem, pending appeal he also filed I.A No. 213 of 1984 for reception of certain documents as additional evidence. The learned District Judge after framing necessary points for consideration and after considering the case of both parties confirmed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present second appeal.

    5. While entertaining the above second appeal this Court has framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration:

    “ 1. Whether the Courts below erred in law in declining to go into the question of title even though the suit is one for injunction?

    2. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in not admitting the additional evidence asked for by the plaintiff?

    3. Whether there has been a misconstruction of omission to construe the material evidence on record, on the part of the courts below when the plaintiff was non-suited?”

    6. I have heard Mr. R. Sekar learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Ms. N. Tharakeswari learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

    7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that in as much as the plaintiff has proved his possession by placing acceptable evidence viz., Exhibits A. 1 to A. 10 apart from the oral evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4 the Courts below ought to have granted decree as prayed for. He also submitted that while considering the issue relating to injunction, it is open to the Court to go into title incidentally. Since in spite of valid oral and documentary evidence the Courts below erroneously ignored the claim of the plaintiff, this Court is competent to interfere in this second appeal. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that since the Courts for the respondents submitted that since the Courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff fail to establish his claim and rejected the same, there is no merit in this appeal and prayed for dismissal of the same.

    8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

    9. The plaintiff has filed the suit for bare injunction. According to him the suit property belongs to one S.G Shanmugam, ancestrally he leased out the suit property to the plaintiff with effect from 20.1.1979 He has paid the lease amount of Rs. 300 per year for three years. The plaintiff is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws and he has also in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. With these averments he has filed Exhibit A. 1 receipt issued by the said Shanmugam lessor regarding payment of lease amount. It is also his case that he entered into an agreement of sale with the lessor under Exhibit A. 2 dated 29.6.1981 He has filed patta book Exhibit A. 3 wherein the name of the plaintiff and Survey number, extent have been mentioned. Exhibits A. 4 to A. 7 are kist receipts. Exhibit A. 8 dated 3.3.1982 is a mortgage deed by one Chinnappan and Mariappan. Exhibit A. 9 dated 5.7.1935 is a settlement order which contains the name of grand-father of the lessor. Exhibit A. 10 dated 26.7.1933 is a rough settlement patta. In that document also the name of the grand-father of P.W 2 has been mentioned. Apart from the above documentary evidence plaintiff himself was examined as P.W 1, his lessor Shanmugam Chetty was examined as P.W 2. The plaintiff has also examined two more witnesses as P.Ws 3 and 4 in order to substantiate his claim. On the other hand on the side of the defendants they have filed Exhibits B. 1 and B. 2 - kist receipts. Exhibit B. 1 is for a period 1975 - 76 and B. 2 is for 1976 - 77. The first defendant was examined as D.W 1 and he has also examined 3 more witnesses as D.ws 2 to 4. Both the Courts below after holding that since the plaintiff has come forward with a claim for bare injunction, there is no need to go into the title even incidentally. The Courts below in spite of the oral and documentary evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff referred to above rejected the claim on the ground that some of the documents viz., Exhibits A. 4 to A. 7 are not true documents and they have procured with the help of P.W 4 for the purpose of the suit. The Court below has also observed that Exhibit A. 3 is not a genuine document. Even though there is a reference regarding the enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiff in Exhibit A. 8, the oral Judge has rejected the same as unacceptable. The low appellate Court after holding that since Exhibit A. 4 and A. 7 relate to the same fasli and for the same period, very much doubted the case of the plaintiff. Likewise, after rejecting the other documents including the patta book, kist receipts, settlement order as well as rough patta preferred the oral evidence of D.Ws 1 to 4. No doubt the Defendants witnesses 2 and 4 are aged about 80 and 83 respectively. They deposed that only the first defendant is in enjoyment of the suit property. Now I have to consider whether the rejection of the oral and documentary evidence produced on the side of the plaintiff by both the Courts below are justified and dismissing the suit merely relying on the oral evidence of D.Ws 1 to 4 is acceptable or not.

    10. I have already observed that both the Courts below rejected the documents produced on the side of the plaintiff either as unacceptable or there is no need to go into the title even incidentally. With regard to the first reason given by the Courts below, I shall consider at a later of point of time. Regarding the objection that since the present suit is only for bare injunction, there is no need to go into title, I am of the view that if sufficient proof is there on the side of the plaintiff with regard to his title apart from considering the evidence leading to injunction, it is open to the Courts to go into the title incidentally. In this regard it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of Nainar Sundaram, J. (as he then was) reported in P. Krishnan v. Lakshmi Ammal, 1989 (2) L.W 76. In an identical circumstance, the learned Judge has concluded.

    “To have her possession protected, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that her possession could not be unlawful. Hence for the purpose of finding out whether the plaintiff has got right to lawful possession, so as to maintain that possession the question of title can certainly be gone into.”

    With respect, I am in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge and the contrary view taken by both the Courts below in not considering the material documents even for incidentally cannot be sustained.

    11. Now, I shall consider the scope of Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. In Kochu Kakkada Aboobacker v. Attah Kasim, 1996 (7) S.C.C 389 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that,

    “When the trial Court and the first appellate Court fail to consider the relevant document in proper perspective and effect of those documents on the rights of the parties, this Court is entitled to reconsider the evidence by drawing inferences from the admitted documents.”

    12. In Seeni Ammal v. Veerayee Ammal, 1997 (I) CTC 360: 1996 (2) LW 461, P. Sathasivam, J. after considering the earlier case laws has concluded,

    “If the findings of the Courts below are not supported by evidence or are based on misconception or erroneous, and perverse, this Court can interfere in the second appeal.”

    13. In Major Singh v. Rattan Singh, 1997 (3) S.C.C 546 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have hold,

    “Under these circumstances, when the Courts below have rejected and disbelieved the evidence on the ground that the propounder had not properly discharged his duty, it is the duty of the High Court … to consider whether the reasons given by the Courts below are sustainable in law. In view of the above reasoning of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, necessarily the High Court requires to go into that question to test the reasons. In this perspective, the High Court has rightly gone into that question and found that the reasons given by the courts below are flimsy. Thus there is substantial question of law that has arisen for consideration and the High Court has rightly considered the question, we entirely agree with the High Court.”

    14. In A. Irudayasamy v. V. Perumal Naidu, 1997 (1) L.W 474 subramani, J. with regard to power of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has concluded thus:

    “The High Court under S. 100, C.P.C is entitled to take into consideration the question whether the material evidence and relevant circumstances were considered by the lower Courts. This Court is also entitled to consider whether the finding of the lower Appellate Court is based on evidence, and whether the evidence is based on pleadings. If the finding of the lower Appellate Court is based only on surmises or on wrong application of law, and it is not based on evidence or pleadings, this Court is entitled to interfere with that finding.”

    15. I need not consider the agreement of sale executed by the plaintiff and one Shanmugam - P.W 2 under Exhibit A. 2 dated 29.6.1981 However, Exhibit A. 3 is a patta pass book which contains the name of Shanmugam and Chinnappan. Shanmugam is a lessor of the plaintiff who was examined as P.W 2. No doubt, there is a minor correction in the name of Chinnappan. However, the said document is issued by the competent authority which contains not only the name of P.W 2 but also the survey number, extent, village, kist payable etc., After going through the Exhibit A. 3 carefully, I am unable to accept the reason given by both the Courts below in rejecting the said document. No doubt in Exhibit A. 4 and A. 7 same number is mentioned. However, we are concerned with the fasli 1381 which is relevant to consider the case of the plaintiff. Exhibit A. 5 relates to fasli 1381, wherein the name of Shanmugam is mentioned. The courts below rejected the kist receipts mainly on the ground that those kist receipts are carbon copy and not the original. It is not possible to reject those documents on the only ground that those documents are carbon copies and not the original. Exhibit A. 9 is the settlement order passed in favour of grandfather of the P.W 2 relating to the suit property and Exhibit A. 10 is also supports the case of the plaintiff. By analysing the necessary averments in the plaint, oral evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4, and Exhibits A. 3,5,9 and 10, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established his case with regard to his possession and enjoyment in the suit property. When the acceptable documents are available, it is safe to accept and rely upon them rather than accepting the oral evidence. In our case the defendants have very much relied on the oral evidence and the Courts below have also committed an error in preferring the oral evidence let in on the side of the defendants than the acceptable valid documentary evidence let in on the side of the plaintiff. In the light of what is stated above, the finding of the Courts below are perverse and contrary to the evidence on records. I also hold that the reason given by the Courts below in not considering the documentary evidence let in on the side of the plaintiff also cannot be sustained.

    16. No doubt, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents relying on the decision of this Court reported in Velayudham Pillai v. Sandhosa Nadar, 1973 (I) M.L.J 44 submitted that grant of patta or payment of kist is not a conclusive as to tile or possession. In view of the reasons given by me earlier, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proved his case by placing acceptable evidence.

    17. Under these circumstances, the judgment and decree of both the Courts below are set aside, accordingly the suit filed by the plaintiff for permanent injunction is decreed as prayed for.

    18. Net result, the second appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Consequently, CMP. No. 12712 of 1995 is closed.

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    Muthu Goundar v. Poosari Palaniappan And 4 Others S
    (Feb 26, 1998)