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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion: Padmanabhan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ appeals (W.A. No. 368 of 1998 and W.A. No. 369 of 1998) were heard together and disposed of by this common judgment because the parties relied on common legal contentions despite factual differences.

- W.A. No. 368 of 1998: A.K. Ansari (appellant) challenged the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 8181 of 1996 and sought certiorari/mandamus to quash Ref. No. 24/133/96 dated 7 May 1996 and to direct Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd. (the respondent-bank) to pay pension under the Bharat Overseas Bank Employees (Pension) Regulations, 1995 with effect from 1 November 1993.

- W.A. No. 369 of 1998: V. Raman (appellant) challenged the dismissal of W.P. No. 9235 of 1996 and sought certiorari/mandamus to quash the respondent's order No. CHSECT/102/96 dated 4 May 1996 and letter No. 24/110/96 dated 13 May 1996, and to direct grant of pension and related benefits in terms of the 1995 Regulations.

The learned Single Judge had earlier held that the writ petitions were maintainable but dismissed them by a common order dated 10 December 1997. The present appeals arise from that dismissal. Both appellants argued before the Division Bench; the respondents (the bank) appeared and contested the claims.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether writ petitions under Article 226 are maintainable against Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (i.e., whether the respondent-bank is amenable to writ jurisdiction or qualifies as an "other authority" under Article 12).
  2. On the merits, whether each appellant validly exercised the option to join the Pension Scheme (Bharat Overseas Bank Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995) and, if so, whether the respondent-bank could deny pension benefits on the ground that the option letter lacked attestation or other formalities.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The writ petitions are maintainable; the respondent-bank is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 because its nature, regulation under the Banking Regulation Act, funding connections with nationalised banks, and its public-facing banking functions give it sufficient public element or state control to warrant judicial relief in appropriate cases.
  • The attestation requirement (appearing as a footnote in the schedule format) is a mere formality; failure to obtain attestation should not defeat a retiree's substantive entitlement to pension benefits, particularly given that the Regulations (Chaps. I, II and IX) do not make attestation a mandatory precondition whose non-compliance causes forfeiture.
  • Pension is a social-security and livelihood matter; welfare measures like the pension regulations should be construed liberally to effect their social object and not defeated by minor technicalities.
  • Both appellants had either exercised option within the relevant time or had exercised an option under an earlier scheme that is deemed to operate under the 1995 Regulations; hence they are eligible to claim pension subject to procedural formalities (e.g., refunding employer's PF share with interest) as called for by the bank.

Respondent/Bank's Arguments

  • The writ petitions are not maintainable against the respondent-bank because it is not an "other authority" under Article 12 and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226; several unreported orders and some judgments were relied upon to support this contention.
  • The option letters submitted by the appellants were defective (not attested) and, despite being informed of the defect by telephone, the appellants refused to rectify them; therefore their options are invalid and they have forfeited any right to pension under the Regulations.
  • Pension cannot be equated to livelihood under Article 21 (submission made by the respondent's counsel in argument).
  • Disputed questions of fact (such as compliance with procedural formalities and whether notices/circulars were sent) preclude writ relief; disputed facts should be resolved by appropriate fora rather than by exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] Articulated principles when writs may be entertained against private bodies—writs possible in extraordinary/monstrous situations or where public duty exists. The Court relied on its principles as part of the test for maintainability against a private banking company and accepted that writs can lie in appropriate circumstances.
V. Sadasivan (V. Sathasivan) v. Binny, Ltd. [1998 (1) L.L.N 235] Summarised law relating to maintainability of writs against private/public companies; emphasised facts determine whether Art. 226 should be invoked. The Court treated it as authoritative for the proposition that writ jurisdiction against private entities depends on peculiar facts and that no universal rule bars such petitions.
Unreported orders: Jayasimha Babu, J., W.P No. 3005 of 1995; P. Sathasivam, J., W.P No. 14716 of 1996; R. Jayasimha Babu, J., W.P No. 5184 of 1997 Instances where courts declined or limited writ relief against the same respondent-bank or expressed caution about entertaining writs against private banks. The Court referred to these orders as part of the factual and judicial landscape but noted differences and that some were not before the Single Judge when the petitions were heard.
Division Bench: W.A No. 584 of 1997 (etc.) dated 17 June 1998 Held in respect of the same bank that it would not fall under the category of “other authority” amenable to writ jurisdiction (as contended by respondent's counsel). The Court analysed that judgment and treated it as not laying down an absolute bar; it applied its analysis to hold maintainability depends on circumstances.
Raj Soni v. Air Officer-in-charge Administration [(1990) 3 SCC 261 : A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1305] Private institutions governed by statute/rules and performing public duties cannot defy statutory obligations merely because they are not "State" under Art. 12. Relied upon by appellants to support the proposition that entities subject to statutory control or discharging public duties may be subject to writ jurisdiction.
Shakunthala Mehrishi v. New Delhi Municipal Committee [1991 (1) L.L.N 53] Authority for the proposition that writ jurisdiction can be invoked where statutory obligations are involved (cited by appellants). Used to buttress the contention that statutory/regulatory control brings entities within the ambit of public law obligations.
Union of India v. D.R.R. Sastri [(1997) 1 SCC 514] Referenced by appellants (and by respondent) on issues of timing/opting; court noted it does not support respondent's position here. The Court observed the decision is far from supporting the respondent-bank's case and does not assist in denying pension under the 1995 Regulations as argued by the bank.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress [1991 (1) L.L.N 613] Employees of public/semi-government/statutory instrumentalities have status that allows invocation of fundamental rights; highlights fairness in employment and procedure under Arts. 14 & 21. Referred to in support of the general proposition that right to livelihood and procedural fairness are constitutionally protected; used to emphasise fairness in employment-related claims.
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur [1980 (2) L.L.N 575] Noted for distinction: case pertained to an institution that answered the description of "State" under Art.12, therefore permission to entertain writs there is not a direct precedent for private banks. Distinguished by the Court to show that the LIC case does not automatically justify writ relief against a private bank unless facts warrant.
All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Association v. Union of India [1992 (2) L.L.N 635] Held that pension is not charity or bounty; pension is earned and in nature a social security plan; related to equal treatment and Art.14 issues. Quoted to reinforce that pension is an earned social-security right and not a mere gratuity, adding weight to the appellants' claim about livelihood interests.
J.P. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1993) 1 SCC 645 : A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178] Quoted for emphasis on nature of duty imposed on bodies and when duties may attract public law obligations. Referred to by the Court (via citation in other judgments) to show limits of extending the educational-institution reasoning to private companies doing business.
Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Manual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1306] Mandamus requires a legal right to the performance of a duty; the duty-holder need not be a public official for mandamus to lie. Referred to support the proposition that a private body may be subject to mandamus if a legal duty to perform exists.
M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank [1988 (1) L.L.N 298] Writ maintainable where constitution of a bank and measure of State control make it an instrumentality of the State (Regional Rural Banks Act example). Applied by analogy to consider the extent of state control and statutory/regulatory framework affecting the respondent-bank's amenability to writ jurisdiction.
D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. [1993 (2) L.L.N 575] Affirmed constitutional protection of right to livelihood (Arts. 14 & 21) and importance of fairness in procedures affecting employment. Used to underpin the relevance of livelihood and fair procedure in considering pension denial to retirees.
Francis John v. Director of Education [1990 (1) L.L.N 317] Writ maintainable challenging termination by an aided private school when public funds, statutory codes and State participation exist. Invoked to show that entities receiving public funds or subject to statutory schemes can be amenable to writ jurisdiction.
Cochin Shipping Company v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation [1992 (2) L.L.N 737] Benefits conferred by a welfare/statutory enactment should be given liberal construction to promote objectives. The Court applied the liberal-construction principle to the pension Regulations (a welfare measure) to avoid defeating its object by technicalities.
Life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts Ltd. [(1986) 1 SCC 264] Form cannot control substance; prescribed forms should not defeat substantive rights under statutes or rules. Quoted to support the conclusion that a mere formality (attestation footnote) in the schedule should not defeat substantive pension rights.
Brojo Nath (cited in Delhi Transport Corporation summary) [1986 (2) L.L.N 382] Doctrine on fairness/reasonableness of contract terms when bargaining powers are unequal; courts may strike down unconscionable clauses. Referred to in broader discussion of fairness and the court's concern for protecting weaker parties in employment/social-security settings.
Union of India v. A.J. Fabian [(1997) 10 SCC 465 : A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1921] Authority where an optee failed to avail opportunities given and was denied relief; cited by respondent but Court distinguished the facts here. Cited by the Court in fairness to the respondent but held distinguishable on facts because appellants here had exercised options within relevant timelines and the scheme was yet to commence.
Other: Vasudev Ramachandra Shlal v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar (cited) Referenced to support the point that rigid adherence to form may be archaic; substance should prevail over form. Used to reinforce the conclusion that the prescribed format or its footnote should not defeat substantive rights under the pension Regulations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the maintainability issue at the threshold and proceeded step-by-step:

  1. Maintainability analysis:
    • The Court examined statutory and factual indicia (incorporation under Companies Act, regulation under the Banking Regulation Act, pervasive controls by Reserve Bank of India including approval of key appointments, inspection, directions, and the deeming of banking company officers as public servants for certain IPC offences).
    • The Court noted the respondent-bank's composition of subscribers (nationalised and scheduled banks) and its public-facing banking functions, concluding these factors give the bank a strong public element.
    • The Court surveyed case-law (Division Bench and Apex Court decisions) and distilled the prevailing principles: there is no absolute bar to writ petitions against private bodies; writ jurisdiction depends on the facts and whether public duty, monstrous situations, or violation of fundamental rights or lack of alternate efficacious remedies exist.
    • Applying those principles to the present facts (state/regulatory control over banks, public funds involvement and the public character of banking services), the Court concluded the writ petitions were maintainable to the limited extent indicated.
  2. Merits analysis (pension entitlement and attestation issue):
    • The Court examined the 1995 Pension Regulations: Chapter II (application and eligibility) requires exercising option within 120 days from the notified date and refund of employer's PF contribution with interest; Regulation 3(a) deems options exercised earlier to be options under the 1995 Regulations.
    • It accepted as undisputed that the appellants satisfied eligibility and that one appellant had submitted an option within the relevant period while the other had submitted an option under an earlier scheme that is deemed effective.
    • The bank contended that the schedule's format required attestation (footnote) and that non-attestation rendered options invalid; the Court analysed the Regulations and found Chaps. I, II and IX do not prescribe attestation nor do they provide consequences (forfeiture) for failure to obtain attestation.
    • Relying on precedents instructing liberal construction of welfare measures and that form should not defeat substance (e.g., Cochin Shipping and LIC v. Escorts), the Court held attestation was a non-mandatory formal precaution intended to prevent fraud but not intended to be a condition whose omission causes forfeiture.
    • The Court observed the appellants had confirmed options by subsequent correspondence and had demonstrated readiness to refund PF amounts; the bank did not show it had given written notice to rectify defects; telephone calls alone were insufficient to prove a clear opportunity to rectify.
    • Noting that the 1995 Regulations had not yet been fully implemented due to the Central Government not amending Income Tax Rule 89 (so that private banks could obtain tax treatment for pension annuities), the Court nonetheless held there was no justification to deny accrued pension rights on technical grounds.
  3. Remedies and directions:
    • The Court quashed the impugned communications of the bank denying pension on the attestation ground and directed the respondent to treat the appellants' options as valid under the 1995 Regulations.
    • The Court limited relief to directing entitlement to pension as per the Regulations upon the appellants complying with the remaining requirements (e.g., refunding employer's PF share with interest) as and when called upon by the bank.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench allowed both writ appeals.

The Court's concrete orders (direct effects):

  • The orders dismissing W.P. No. 8191 of 1996 and W.P. No. 9235 of 1996 by the Single Judge were set aside.
  • The impugned proceedings/communications of the respondent-bank denying pension benefits on the ground of non-attestation were quashed.
  • The respondent-bank was directed to treat that the appellants validly exercised their option in terms of the Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd., Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995, and to pay pension in terms of those Regulations upon the appellants complying with the remaining requirements (e.g., refunding provident fund contribution with 6% interest) as and when called upon.
  • Parties were directed to bear their respective costs; certain connected miscellaneous petitions (C.M.Ps Nos. 3832 to 3834 of 1998) were dismissed.

Implications as expressed or supported in the opinion:

  • The Court confirmed that writ petitions may be maintainable against private banking companies in appropriate situations where regulatory control, public element, public duty or the absence of an efficacious alternative remedy justifies judicial intervention; the Court rejected the respondent-bank's broad contention that no writ at all lies against it.
  • On the specific point of pension entitlement, the Court emphasised that welfare/social-security measures (like the 1995 Pension Regulations) should be liberally construed so that their object is not defeated by minor technicalities such as non-attestation of an option letter when the substantive entitlement is otherwise clear.
  • The decision had direct effect on the parties named (the appellants were entitled to be treated as having validly exercised options and to receive pension upon meeting residual conditions); the judgment did not purport to lay down a rigid universal rule but applied established principles to the facts before the Court.

Source: This summary is based exclusively on the judgment text delivered by Padmanabhan, J., as provided. No information not present in the provided opinion has been added.

    A.K. Ansari v. Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Padmanabhan, J.:— In the above writ appeals, notice of motion was ordered. The respondents have been served and they have entered appearance through their counsel. Excepting the factual difference between the two appeals and exercising their options and the materials being connected therein, all other contentions are common. Learned counsel appearing for either side submitted common arguments and hence the two writ appeals are disposed by this common judgment.

    2. W.A No. 368 of 1998, has been preferred by one A.K Ansari being aggrieved by the dismissal of this Writ Petition No. 8181 of 1996 praying this Court to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the first respondent/Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd, and quash the order Ref. No. 24/133/96, dated 7 May, 1996, and issue mandamus directing the respondent to pay pension under the Bharat Overseas Bank Employees (Pension) Regulations, 1995, with effect from 1 November, 1993 and award exceptional costs.

    3. W.A No. 369 of 1998 has been filed by one V. Raman being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P No. 9235 of 1996 praying for the issue of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records pertaining to the respondent's order No. CHSECT/102/96, dated 4 May, 1996 and the letter No. 24/110/96, dated 13 May, 1996, and quash the same and issue a mandamus directing the respondent-bank to grant the petitioner the pension and the commuted pension with effect from 1 July, 1994 as per the Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd., Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995, and other benefits of additional pension from 1 November, 1994, arrears of basic pay and dearness allowance from 1 July, 1993 and the arrears of H.R.A from 1 November, 1992 and award exemplary costs.

    4. The learned Single Judge while holding that the writ petitions are maintainable, dismissed the writ petitions by the common order, dated 10 December, 1997. Being aggrieved by that order, the above writ appeals have been preferred by the respective writ-petitioners.

    5. Heard Sri N.G.R Prasad and Ms Vaigai, learned counsel for the appellants, in both the writ appeals and Sri T.K Seshadri, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/bank.

    6. Though the learned Single Judge has held that the writ petitions are maintainable. Sri T.K Seshadri, the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, contended that the writ petitions are not maintainable as against the respondent-bank as it is not an “other authority” falling under Art. 12 of the Constitution and it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

    7. Sri T.K Seshadri also relied upon the unreported order of Jayasimha Babu, J., dated 1 March, 1995 in W.P No. 3005 of 1995, the order of P Sathasivam, J., dated 12 April, 1997 in W.P No. 14716 of 1996 and the order of R. Jayasimha Babu, J., dated 12 April, 1997, in W.P No. 5184 of 1997. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 7220 of 1996 wherein in respect of the very same respondent-bank, it has been held that the writ petitions are not maintainable and the respondent-bank is not amenableto writ jurisdiction.

    8. Sri T.K Seshadri also placed reliance on the unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W.A No. 584 of 1997, etc., batch., dated 17 June, 1998, wherein the Division Bench consisting of Raju and T. Meenakumari, JJ., according to the learned counsel, in respect of the same bank held that it will not fall under the category of “other authority” amenable to writ jurisdiction. That apart, Sri T.K Seshadri also relied upon the earlier judgments of this Court reported in Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] and V. Sathasivan v. Binny, Ltd. [1998 (1) L.L.N 235], in support of his contention that the respondent Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd., is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court.

    9. Per contra, Sri N.G.R Prasad and Ms Vaigai, relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court reported in Raj Soni v. Air Officer-in-charge Administration [(1990) 3 SCC 261 : A.I.R 1990 S.C 1305]. Shakunthala Mehrishi v. New Delhi Municipal Committee [1991 (1) L.L.N 53], Union of India v. D.R.R Sastri [(1997) 1 SCC 514], and contended that no interference is called for with respect to the learned Single Judge holding that the writ petitions are maintainable and the respondent-bank is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

    10. Before the learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for the respondent had not chosen to refer the unreported decisions of this Court rendered in W.Ps Nos. 3005 of 1995, 14716 of 1996 and 5184 of 1997. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A No. 584 of 1997, etc., batch could not have been placed before the learned Single Judge as the said judgment was delivered after the dismissal of the writ petition on 17 June, 1998.

    11. With respect to the maintainability of the writ petitions substantial arguments were addressed by the counsel appearing for either side. Hence this question has to be decided at the threshold. The next question with respect to the merits of the petitioners claim in each of the writ petitions will be considered.

    12. Point No. 1: Maintainability.

    12A. The first respondent, Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd., was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, on 22 September, 1995 and the subscribers to the Memorandum of Association being

    (1) Indian Overseas Bank

    (2) Bank of Rajasthan, Ltd

    (3) The South India Bank, Ltd.

    (4) Karnataka Bank, Ltd.

    (5) Vysya Bank, Ltd.

    (6) Karur Vysya Bank, Ltd, and

    (7) The Federal Bank, Ltd.

    12B. The Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the bank for brevity is a banking company which transacts the business of banking in India as defined in S. 5(b) as well as S. 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. In terms of the said provisions of the said enactment, the bank is carrying on it banking transactions and its functions should be within the four comers of the said enactment and strictly in conformity with its provisions as it is a licensed Bank. The Reserve Bank of India controls and supervises the activities of the respondent-bank besides inspection and has got the power to issue directions. The appointment of Managing Directors or other members, officers of the bank as well as the Directors or Chairman as the case may be requires to be approved by the Reserve Bank of India. The Reserve Bank of India also reserves control over the management of the bank as set out in S. 36(aa) of the Act. Apart from other provisions which are pervasive, with reference to the affairs of the respondent-bank it is to be pointed out that in terms of S. 46(A) the Chairman, Director or any other employee of a banking company is deemed to be a public servant for the purpose of Chap. IX of the Indian Penal Code. As such, all the persons namely, Chairman, Director, Auditor, Liquidator, Manager, and any other employee of the banking company shall be deemed to be a public servant for the purpose of offences mentioned in Chap. IX of the Indian Penal Code.

    12C. There is no dispute with respect to the status of the respondent-bank which is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. It is also not in dispute that the respondent-bank is not owned by the Central or State Government and 70 per cent of the total share capital of the bank is being held by other banks either private or public sector banks. The banking business carried on by the respondent-bank throughout the length and breadth of the country dealing with the public at large who are its customers. It is also not disputed that 30 per cent of the shares is held by the Indian Overseas Bank, a nationalised bank.

    12D. Sathasivam, J., in W.P No. 14176 of 1996 declined to issue a writ of mandamus in exercise of Art. 226 of the Constitution since the impugned action of the respondent-bank not being monstrous as has been held by the Division Bench in Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. reported in 1995 (1) L.L.N 687 (vide supra), and in that view of the matter dismissed the writ petition. It cannot be said that the learned Judge had taken the view that no writ petition at all is maintainable against the respondent-Bank, Jayasimha Babu, I, also in W.P No. 5184 of 1997 had not held that the respondent-bank is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court, but had taken the view that this Court will not normally entertain a writ petition except in most extraordinary circumstances. While disposing of the batch of Writ Appeal No. 584 of 1997, etc., and writ petitions, the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Raju and T. Meena Kumari, J., before whom a reference was also made to the earlier orders in W.Ps Nos. 3005 of 1995 as well as 14176 of 1996 and Division Bench judgment in V. Sadasivan v. Binny, Ltd. reported in 1998 (1) L.L.N 235 (vide supra), and the Division Bench analysed the case-law and held thus:

    “It is by now well settled in a series of decisions of this Court as also the Apex Court, that there is no universal or general rule that no writ petition could lie against a private person of a private institution and that in certain given circumstances or when the monstrosities of the situation or exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial intervention or mandate, nothing precludes this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, to grant relief against such persons also. The question for consideration therefore, in this case before ever going into the question of the respective claims of the petitioners as such is as to whether the principles laid down and the criteria indicated in the decision reported in Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] (vide supra) and V. Sadasivan v. Binny, Ltd. [1998 (1) L.L.N 235](vide supra), can be said to have been satisfied in this case for this Court to entertain a writ petition and adjudicate all the issues raised on merits. The fact that the bank management in question is a private institution not answering the description of the ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India is not in serious controversy, since no such exercise has been undertaken before us to substantiate with reference to the Constitution of the bank as such and any principles of law that it so answers the description of ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances, the exercise of powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India could be made only if the subject-matter of the claim or the grievance sought to be vindicated as such could not otherwise be effectively undertaken for pursuit of remedies before any other forum or under any other law. The violation alleged, in our view, in this case cannot be said to be prima facie made out without any further enquiry into the details of the merits of the clams. An adjudication of such issues as have been raised on merits for the claims in these proceedings would involve further collection of material and detailed enquiry and the existing situation as also the respective rights of parties. All such exercises in our view have to be undertaken in every case of any alleged violation of statutory provision de hors the disputed basis of facts of such alleged violation also otherwise this Court would be only substituting itself in the place of the regular machinery created for adjudication under the respective industrial law governing a situation. So far as the case on hand are concerned, or any alleged violation of S. 9-A as also S. 33-A of the Act, there are ample remedies available under the Act itself to vindicate their rights. The decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J Bahadur-[1980 (2) L.L.N 575], is one pertaining to an institution which answered the description of “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and the fact that a writ petition was entertained in such a case by itself, is no justification to entertain likewise a writ petition in this case also.”

    12E. The Division Bench had not laid down that no writ is maintainable against the respondent-bank but it has accepted the principle that the writ petition is maintainable against the respondent-bank where situations warrant as has been laid down by the Division Bench in Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd [1995 (1) L.L.N 687], as well as in V. Sadasivan v. Binny, Ltd. [1998 (1) L.L.N 235] (vide supra).

    12F. In V. Sadasivan v. Binny, Ltd. [1998 (1) L.L.N 235] (vide supra) (D.B) Raju, J., speaking for the First Bench of this Court after referring to 1995 (1) L.L.N 687 (vide supra), as well as earlier pronouncements of this Court summarised the law relating to the maintainability of writ petitions in respect of public companies as hereunder, in Paras. 9 and 10, at pages 240 and 241:

    “9. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In our view, the expansive use and exercise of powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be made as a matter of course, merely because some grievance of a wrongful dismissal is made, despite the fact that such grievance is against a private party and not even any ‘other authority’ and notwithstanding the position that an adjudication of the issues raised involve determination of question of fact which could be properly and effectively determined only on appreciation of materials placed on record, documentary or oral, or gathered in the manner known to and in accordance with law. Even the Division Bench decision reported in 1995 (1) L.L.N 687 (vide supra), professes to call out certain principles as flowing from out of the various decisions considered therein and stated such principles in a little too general and wide terms, the facts that ultimately the very Bench in applying those principles only took the view that the earlier decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Workmen of Buckingham and Carnatic Mills v. State of Tamil Nadu [1983 (1) L.L.N 558], taking the view that the implementation of a settlement entered into under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be had in exercise of the writ jurisdiction, will govern the case before them. The plea of alleged violation of Ss. 25-N and 25-O was refused to be gone into as involving consideration of disputed questions of facts. Therefore, the exercise of powers would always depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and there cannot be any hard and fast rules of universal application. If any violation of fundamental right is directly involved for consideration, it matters very little as to the character or the status of the violator, be it or be not answering the description of ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12 and the Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 would intervene. At the same time, even if he it be a person or authority against whom ordinarily a writ would lie if the subject-matter of the writ or the grievance sought to be vindicated is such which the Courts exercising jurisdiction would hesitate to undertake to adjudicate on account of their being an effective statutory machinery to have such issues or on account of the need to take or record evidence oral or mark documentary evidence with Liberties to do so for either side, the writ Court would always consider it to be inappropriate to embark upon or entertain such issues for adjudication under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, though there are no statutory or constitutional limits stipulated on the exercise of power itself and the limitations imposed are self imposed or imposed by any declaration of law made by the Apex Court. The decisions in 1995 (1) L.L.N 801 and 1996 (2) L.L.N 965, while also go to show that the claim of the petitioners cannot be countenanced, as projected.

    10. We now proceed to consider the area of disputes between parties in this case. There are vertical differences of vital and serious nature in the claim made of the nature of relationship between parties which is a fundamental and basic issues and which will have great impact upon the right to claim relief in this proceeding itself. Whereas the management claims that the staff in question are managerial staff, that they were promoted to such positions with higher scales of pay and that they also executed the required contracts of service and have been enjoying the benefits under the same and it is not open to them, to wriggle out of their commitments, the petitioners would contend that they continue even thereafter to do works and attend to jobs which entitle them the retention of the status of workers and unionised staff and, therefore, in the teeth of the alleged violation of the statutory provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act, protecting their rights, they are entitled to seek relief in this writ petition. In the absence of proper investigation and determination of the factual issues disputed after collecting the required materials in accordance with law, it would be not only inappropriate but impossible also for this Court to effectively adjudicate on these factual issues concerning the status of the petitioners and the nature of relationship between parties in these proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, we are well justified in declining to go into such factual issues in these proceedings.”

    12G. In the above pronouncement one of us Sri M.S Liberhan, C.J, was a party. In Sadasivan v. Binny, Ltd. [1998 (1) L.L.N 235] (vide supra), also it has not been ruled out that no writ is maintainable against private individual or company or private limited public company and on the other hand the Division Bench had accepted the principle that when situation warrants or where the situation is monstrous or where the fundamental rights are being infringed, writ petitions are maintainable.

    12H. The contention of Sri T.K Seshadri that no writ is maintainable against the respondent-bank in our considered view is too wide and cannot be sustained. In fact in the later pronouncements, their Lordships of the Apex Court had laid down further tests with respect to exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 even against the private individuals or companied or public companies which requires to be referred to.

    12-I In Delhi Transport Corporation v. Delhi Transport Corporation Mazdoor Congress reported in 1991 (1) L.L.N 613, it has been field that employees of public/semi Government undertakings, statutory corporations or instrumentalities of State Government by Art. 12 have a status and employment in such undertakings being public employment in which society has a stake and interest and employees are entitled to invoke the rights guaranted under Parts III and IV of the Constitution. In the said judgment it has been held thus, in Paras. 273 and 274, at page 706:

    “273. In Brojo Nath case [1986 (2) L.L.N 382], after elaborate consideration of the doctrine of ‘reasonableness or fairness’ of the terms and conditions of the contract vis-a-vis the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties this Court laid down that the principles deducible from the discussion made therein is in consonance with right or reason intended to secure socio-economic justice and conforms to mandate of the equality clause in Art. 14. The principle laid was that Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract or an unfair and unreasonable clause in contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal or where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction.

    274. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infrastructural organisations the State through its instrumentalities and agencies has been entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce and field of service, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated not fully illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.”

    12J. In the light of the above observations, the question requires consideration. In Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. reported in 1995 (1) L.L.N 687 (vide supra), Srinivasan, J., as he then was, speaking for the Bench after analysing the various pronouncements of the Apex Court as well as this Court summarised the position as here under, in Paras. 47 and 48, at pages 705 and 706:

    47. In J.P Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1993) 1 SCC 645 : A.I.R 1993 S.C 2178], the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court approved of the dictum of Sri Andi Mukta Sadguru case [1989 (2) L.L.N 281] and quoted a good portion of the judgment and observed.

    ‘The emphasis in this case is as to the nature of duty imposed on the body. It requires to be observed that the meaning of authority under Art. 226 came to be laid down distinguishing the same term from Art. 12. In spite of it, if the emphasis is on the nature of duty on the same principle it has to be held that these educational institutions discharge public duties Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid does not detract from the nature of duty.’

    What the Bench said with respect to educational institutions will not apply to private companies doing business and it cannot be said that such companies are discharging public duties.

    48. On an analysis of the above rulings, the following propositions emerge:

    (1) A private body which is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India is not generally amenable to Art. 226 of the Constitution.

    (2) A writ will issue against a private body to protect the fundamental rights declared under Part III of the Constitution of India.

    (3) A writ will issue in extraordinary circumstances if the monstrosity of the situation warrants it.

    (4) A mandamus will be issued against a private body, if there is no equally convenient remedy and if there is a public duty.

    (5) The implementation of a settlement under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not a public duty and no writ will lie against a private body.

    (6) If the features are patent and they establish gross violation of the mandates of law, the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution could be exercised to quash a settlement under S. 18(1) or S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.”

    12K. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on propositions Nos. 3 and 4 and persuaded this Court to hold that the writ petition is maintainable. The above propositions have been followed by the subsequent judgment by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A No. 584 of 1997, etc., batch as well as the Division Bench's judgment in V. Sadasivan v. Binny, Ltd. reported in 1998 (1) L.L.N 235 (vide supra). In V. Sadasivan v. Binny, Ltd. Raju, J., speaking for the Bench while quoting the propositions laid down by the Division Bench in Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] (vide supra), emphasised that the exercise of powers under Art. 226 would always depend upon the peculiar circumstances of a case and there cannot be any hard and fast rule of universal application and in appropriate cases, the writ Court could always consider it either it is appropriate or inappropriate to embark upon or entertain such issues for adjudication under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and the restriction on limitations are only self imposed or imposed by any declaration of law made by the Apex Court.

    12L. Incidentally it has been pointed out that in All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Association v. Union of India reported in 1992 (2) L.L.N 635 their Lordships of the Apex Court held that pension is not a bounty or charity or gratuitous payment solely dependent on the whim or sweet will of the employer. In that context it has been held thus, in Para. 5, at page 639:

    “The concept of pension is now well known and has been clarified by this Court time and again. It is not a charity or bounty nor is it gratuitous payment solely dependent on the whim or sweet will of the employer. It is earned for rendering long service and is often described as deferred portion of compensation for past service. It is in fact in the nature of a social security plan to provide for the December of life of a superannuated employee. Such social security plans are consistent with the socio-economic requirements of the Constitution when the employer is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. All the bank employees who had retired prior to 1 November, 1990 were governed by the CPF Scheme. However, by the introduction of the pension scheme under the regulations those employees who retired on or after 1 January, 1986 have been given an option to switch over to the pension scheme provided they refund the employer's contribution to the CPF Scheme together with interest thereon and further agree to pay interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of receipt of the fund amount on superannuation till the repayment thereof, The grievance of the petitioners is that all employees who were governed by the CPF Scheme on the date of their superannuation constituted a homogeneous class and the pension scheme introduced under the regulations seeks to divide them between those who retired on or before 31 December, 1985 and those who retired on and after 1 January, 1986, to the latter the benefit of the pension scheme is extended by option while to the former that benefit is denied altogether. This artificial division between members belonging to the same group, contend the petitioners, is a flagrant violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution as held in Nakara case [1983 (1) L.L.N 289].”

    12M. In the very same pronouncement it was pointed out that in a case of pension retirees the Government had a continuing obligation till the retiree is alive. While in the case of provident fund retirees, each one's right had finally crystallised on the date of retirement and there was no continuing obligation thereafter.

    12N. In Raj Soni v. Air Officer-in-charge Administration (vide supra), even in respect of a recognised private school whether aided or otherwise who are governed by the provisions of statutory enactments cannot be permitted to defy the State on the pretext that it is neither a “State” nor an “authority” under Art. 12 of the Constitution. Kuldip Singh, J., speaking for the Bench held thus:

    “The recognised private schools in Delhi whether aided or otherwise are governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The respondent-management is under a statutory obligation to uniformly apply the provisions of the Act and the Rules to the teachers employed in the school. When any authority is required to act in a particular manner under a statute it has no option but to follow the statute. The authority cannot defy the statute on the pretext that it is neither a State nor an ‘authority’ under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India.”

    12-O. In Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union reported in [1997 (1) L.L.N 75], after analyzing the earlier pronouncements while considering the term “appropriate Government” their Lordships held thus, in Paras. 25 and 26, at pages 93 to 95:

    “25. It must be remembered that the Constitution adopted a mixed economy and control over the industry in its establishment, working and production of goods and services. After recent liberalised free economy private and multi-national entrepreneurship has gained ascendancy and entrenched into wider commercial production and services, domestic consumption goods and large-scale industrial productions. Even some of the public Corporations are thrown open to the private national and multi-national investments. It is axiomatic, whether or not industry is controlled by Government or public corporations by statutory form or administrative clutch or private agents, juristic persons, corporation whole or corporation sole, their constitution, control and working would also be subject to the same constitutional limitations in the trinity, viz., preamble, the fundamental rights and the directive principles. They throw open an element of public interest in its working. They share the burden and shoulder constitutional obligations to provide facilities and opportunities enjoined in the Directive Principles, the Preamble and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The word ‘control,’ therefore requires to be interpreted in the changing commercial scenario broadly in keeping with the aforesaid constitutional goals and perspectives.

    26. From the above discussion, the following principles would emerge:

    (1) The Constitution of the Corporation or instrumentality or agency or Corporation aggregate or Corporation sole is not of sole material relevance to decide whether it is by or under the control of the appropriate Government under the Act.

    (2) If it is a statutory Corporation, it is an instrumentality or agency of the State. If it is a company owned wholly or partially by a share capital, floated from public exchequer, it gives indicia that it is controlled by or under the authority of the appropriate Government.

    (3) In commercial activities carried on by a Corporation established by or under the control of the appropriate Government having protection under Arts. 14 and 19(2), it is an instrumentality or agency of the State.

    (4) The State is a service Corporation. It acts through its instrumentalities, agencies or persons natural or juridical

    (5) The governing power, wherever located, must be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations and abide by the principles laid in the Directive Principles.

    (6) The framework of service regulations made in the appropriate rules or regulations should be consistent with and subject to the same public law, principles and limitations.

    (7) Though the instrumentality, agency or person conducts commercial activities according to business principles and are separately accountable under their appropriate bye-laws or memorandum of association, they become the arm of the Government.

    (8) The existence or deep and pervasive State control depends upon the facts and circumstances in a given situations and in the altered situation. It is not the sole criterion to decide whether the agency of instrumentality or persons is by or under the control of me appropriate Government.

    (9) Functions of an instrumentality, agency or person are of public importance following public interest element.

    (10) The instrumentality, agency or person must have an element of authority or ability to effect the relations with its employees or public by virtue of power vested in it by law, memorandum of association or bye-laws or articles of association.

    (11) The instrumentality, agency or person renders an element of public service and is accountable to health and strength of the workers, men and women, adequate means of livelihood, the security for payment of living wages, reasonable conditions of work, decent standard of life and opportunity to enjoy full leisure and social and cultural activities to the workman.

    (12) Every action of the public authority, agency or instrumentality or the person acting in public interest or any act that gives rise to public element should be guided by public interest in exercise of public power or action hedged with public element and is open to challenge. It must meet the test of reasonableness, fairness and justness.

    (13) If the exercise of the power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair, the public authority, instrumentality, agency or the person acting in public interest, though in the field of private law, is not free to prescribe any unconstitutional conditions or limitations in their actions.”

    12P. The learned counsel for the appellant emphasised the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in particular (2), (8), (9), (10) and (12) in support of their contention. The said principles definitely advance the case of the appellant with respect to the contention that the writ petition is maintainable as the respondent-bank has been brought into existence not only by a consortium of nationalised banks, by contribution of share capital, but also by scheduled banks though private the activities of those banks, as well as, the respondent-bank regulated by the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act which would prove the existence of substantial control on the activities of the respondent-bank and also the factor that the respondent has the authority to effect relations with its employees or public by virtue of power vested in it by Memorandum of association or bye-laws or articles of Association and not to speak of the Banking Regulation Act. The respondent definitely renders an element of public service by running a banking institution and it is accountable to the health and strength of workers, its employees and also it is obliged to provide adequate means of livelihood, reasonable conditions of work, decent standard of life and opportunity to enjoy full leisure.”

    12Q. In the light of the above factors it is obvious that the respondent is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court though it is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act and may not have the direct investments by the State, but definitely the funds of the State, namely, nationalised banks have been invested and the respondent-bank as already pointed out, the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act requires the business of the respondent-bank to be carried on strictly in terms of the said provisions and the said enactment provides for various controls which are deep and pervasive. Further the respondent being a bank, a financial institution is connected with the public at large.

    12R. In D.K Yadav v. J.M.A Industries Ltd.., Ltd. [1993 (2) L.L.N 575], their Lordships of the Apex Court emphasised the right to public employment and the constitutional right to livelihood which is protected by Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. In this respect, it has been held thus, in Paras. 14 and 15, at pages 581 and 582:

    “14. Therefore, fair play in action requires that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable. The manner of exercise of the power and its impact on the rights of the person affected would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. When it is interpreted that the colour and content of procedure established by law must be in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despising opportunity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the actithesis of arbitrariness. It is there conclusively held by this Court that the principles of natural justice are part of Art. 14 and the procedure prescribed by law must be just, fair and reasonable.

    15. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. Delhi Transport Corporation. Mazdoor Congress [1991 (1) L.L.N 613] (vide supra), this Court held that right to public employment and its concomitant right to livelihood received protective umbrella under the canopy of Arts. 14 and 21, etc. All matters relating to employment include the right to continue in service till the employee reaches superannuation or until his service is duly terminated in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Constitution and the rules made under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution or the statutory provisions or the rules, regulations or instructions having statutory flavour. They must be conformable to the rights guaranteed in Parts IE and IV of the Constitution Article 21 guarantees right to life which includes right to livelihood, the deprivation thereof must be in accordance with just and fair procedure prescribed by law conformable to Arts. 14 and 21 so as to be just, fair and reasonable and not fanciful, oppressive or at vagary. The principles of natural justice are an integral part of the guarantee of equality assured by Art. 14. Any law made or action taken by an employer must be fair, just and reasonable. The power to terminate the service of an employee/workman in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure is an essential inbuilt of natural justice Article 14 strikes at arbitrary action. It is not the from of the action but the substance of the order that is to be looked into. It is open to the Court to lift the veil and gauge the effect of the impugned action to find whether it is the foundation to impose punishment or is only a motive. Fair play is to secure justice, procedural as well as substantive. The substance of the order is the soul and the effect thereof is the end result.”

    12-S. In Francis John v. Director of Education [1990 (1) L.L.N 317], Venkataramaiah, Chief Justice, as he then was, held that a writ petition is maintainable challenging the order of termination passed by a school which is aided though it is a private educational institution. In that respect it has been held thus (Vide short notes at page 317 of L.L.N):

    “Any private school which receives aid from the Government under the Grant-in-aid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the management but also for the benefit of the employees in the school for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under Grant-in-aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and particularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumentality of the State is participating in the decision-making process. Under these circumstances we find that the High Court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and the dispute settlement committee were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution since the matter squarely falls within the principles laid down by this Court in Tika Ram case [1985 (1) L.L.N 20].”

    12T. In the leading case Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Manual [(1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R 1969 S.C 1306], the emphasis that was laid being that there must be a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one against whom it is sought, and it is not necessary that the person or the authority on whom duty is imposed need be a public official or official body.

    12U. In M.K Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank [1988 (1) L.L.N 298], the Apex Court held that the writ is maintainable taking into consideration of the constitution of the Bank and the further fact that the bank is regulated, by me Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. In that context it has been held thus, in Para 9, at page 300:

    “Now, to the second point. The bank is constituted under the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. Having regard to its constitution and nature of its legal entity and the measure of State control, it is an instrumentality of the State and is made of latter's own ‘flesh and ones’ and is, accordingly, ‘State’ within the meaning, and for purposes of Art. 12 of the Constitution.”

    It is fairly stated at the Bar that whatever policy or benefit or the decision that are conferred by the nationalised banks or scheduled banks is made applicable or adopted on the employees of the respondent-bank as a matter of course as the respondent is a member of the All India Banks' Association and there is no dispute that the employees of all the banks either nationalised or scheduled or otherwise, are being given the same treatment on par with each other including the terminal benefits.

    12V. It is also rightly pointed out that the appellants have no alternative or efficacious remedy except to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court and right of pension which is sought to be denied is the subject-matter of consideration, it is a livelihood and denial of such a livelihood definitely offends and this situation is monstrous in respect of retirees, who lead a frugal life.

    12W. In the foregoing circumstances, in the light of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Apex Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court, we confirm the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition is maintainable and the contention to the contra raised by Sri T.K Seshadri has to be necessarily rejected. On the facts and to the limited extent indicated above, we hold that the writ petition is maintainable.

    13. Point No. 2: Factual matrix in W.A No. 368 of 1998

    The appellant on completing 58 years of age and reaching the age of superannuation, retired from the respondent-bank on 1 December, 1992 while he was working as a Regional Manager. During 1992, the introduction and framing of pension scheme was under the active consideration of all banks and it is in lieu of the employer's contribution to provident fund. A scheme has been framed by the respondent-bank in respect of all present employees as well as employees who have retired from the bank on and after 1 January, 1986 and in terms of the scheme the superannuated employees are eligible for pension with effect from 1 November, 1993 provided they exercised option and returned the employer's share of provident fund with 6 per cent simple interest per annum. The appellant exercised his option for pension as early as 27 July, 1994, which was acknowledged by the personal department of the respondent-bank on the same date. According to the appellant his request for pension had been denied on the sole reasoning that the option exercised by him had not been attested by the designated officer in the respondent-bank under whom the appellant had worked last. 19 March, 1996 is the last date for exercise of option in terms of the respondent's letter, dated 8 February, 1996.

    13A. It is the claim of the appellant that he had complied with the requisite formalities by exercising the option and he was willing to comply with the further formalities if any. It is the case of the appellant that the respondent-bank, a member of the Indian Banks' Association had issued a notice in the leading dailies stating that the employees who retired on or before 30 October, 1993 can apply in the bank's format for membership of the pension scheme. The appellant is eligible to avail the benefit under the scheme. The retired employees who desired to opt for pension in lieu of contributory provident fund were required to exercise their option within four months from 1 April, 1994, i.e, by 1 August, 1994 and also refund the banks provident fund contribution with interest at 6 per cent per annum, and such refund should be within seven days of the intimation from the bank. To such a scheme, the respondent-bank was a signatory to the settlement arrived at between the Indian Banks Association and the Federation of Bank Employees.

    13B. The appellant had exercised his option on 27 July, 1994, initially and it was subsequently extended till 30 September, 1994. However, the respondent had framed the Bharat Overseas Bank Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995 which the appellant was not aware of and as the appellant who had already exercised his option under the earlier scheme, was under the faith that he will get all the benefits under the pension scheme. The option already exercised was not rejected and it was very much with the respondent-bank.

    13C. On 8 February, 1996, the appellant received a letter from the respondent-bank intimating the details of Pension Regulations, 1995, which had come into force with effect from 20 November, 1995. In terms of the regulations the employees who retired on or after 1 January, 1986 but before 1 November, 1993 are also eligible for pension subject to the condition that:

    (1) they exercise their option by 19 March, 1996; and

    (2) refund the bank's contribution to provident fund with 6 per cent interest per annum.

    It is not in dispute that the appellant had submitted the option format, dated 15 February, 1996, along with his covering letter, dated 16 February, 1996. On 14 March, 1996, the appellant requested the respondent seeking clarification on the exact amount to be repaid by the appellant and also requested for a copy of the Pension Regulations, 1995. Even for the said letter there was no reply. On 19 April, 1996 the appellant had sent a telex message to the Chairman of the respondent-bank in this regard while the appellant had complained about the conduct of the personnel department. The appellant had also funded Rs. 1.30 lakhs in the savings bank account of the respondent-bank, Annanagar Branch, and advised the head office of the respondent-bank which was the approximate provident fund amount with interest to be refunded by him. After the said telex message, the respondent by letter, dated 23 April, 1996, while alleging certain incidents, intimated the appellant that his right to pension had been forfeited as he had failed to submit the option format with due attestation by an officer in the bank.

    13D. Even according to the respondent the option letter is incomplete and despite pointing out the appellant had failed to rectify the defect in the format, dated 15 February, 1996. Thereafter there has been exchange of notices between the appellant and the respondent-bank and challenging the communication of the respondent-bank the appellant filed the writ petition which was dismissed. Hence the writ appeal.

    13E. A detailed counter has been filed by the respondent-bank. It is not in dispute that pension scheme and the benefits thereof are available to the eligible employees including those who have retired 1 January, 1986 but before 1 November, 1993, provided that option is exercised in the prescribed format, According to the respondent those who failed to exercise the option in the prescribed format will not be entitled to claim any benefit. The service particulars of the appellant had not been denied. According to the respondent the appellant had deliberately and wilfully submitted an invalid letter of option without attestation and, therefore, the option exercised by the appellant is not valid. The said decision of the respondent was challenged in the writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Hence the present writ appeal.

    13F. It is to be pointed out that the pension scheme framed by the respondent-bank, namely, Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd. Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1993, had not come into force, so also the Bharat Overseas Bank Employees (Pension) Regulations, 1995, till date, and this scheme 15 yet to be implemented in its entirety.

    13G. In terms of the Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd. Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995, it is admitted that the appellant is eligible to avail the scheme subject to the conditions that he exercised his option within 120 days from 20 November, 1995, on which date the pension regulation came into force. The said regulation had been approved by the Board of Directors of the respondent-bank on 20 November, 1995. The time to exercise the option was to expire on 19 March, 1996. Regulation 3(a) also provides that option already exercised by an employee before the notified date will be deemed to be an option under the 1995 Pension Regulation as well. It is the case of the respondent-bank that on 8 February, 1996 a circular was sent to the appellant calling upon the appellant to exercise his option in the format. In terms of the format and as specifically instructed therein, the option should contain the signature of the optee and it should be attested by the head of the department or by the Manager of the branch where the employee was working at the time of retirement. It is further admitted that on 15 February, 1996, the appellant had forwarded an incomplete option letter without attestation.

    13H. It is further pleaded that the respondent-bank's officials contacted the appellant over phone and required the appellant to rectify the defects, which instructions the appellant had decline to carry out before 19 March, 1996, and thereby the appellant had forfeited his claim to become a member of the Pension Scheme Regulations, 1995. The exchange of notices had been admitted in the counter-affidavit. The main thrust of the counter being that an incomplete option letter is invalid, consequently the appellant had forfeited his right to avail the benefits under the Pension Scheme, 1995.

    13-I At the time of arguments in the writ appeal it was contended that the appellant who had failed to send the option in the proper format and his failure to get attestation in the option letter is fatal and the appellant cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Single Judge took the view that:

    “if a rule or regulation prescribes that certain things are to be done in a particular way, that has to be done or complied only in such a manner and there is ho exemption for anybody whoever may be and whatever his position may be, “and any deviation will be fatal.”

    13J. Sri N.G.R Prasad, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the attestation of the option letter is a mere formality and merely because the option letter has not been attested, the appellant cannot be denied benefit of the scheme. It was contended that the action of the respondent is highly arbitrary and the respondent should not be allowed to deny the benefit which had accrued to the appellant under the Pension Scheme, 1995, as he had also exercised his option earlier to the commencement of the 1995 Scheme Sri N.G.R Prasad, learned counsel elaborated his argument contending that it is a beneficial regulation to achieve the social objects and the appellant should not be denied on mere technicalities and he shall not be deprive of the right to the person which he is entitled to.

    13K. Per contra, Sri T.K Seshadri, the learned counsel for the respondent-bank contended that disputed facts cannot be gone into and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. It was also contended by Sri T.K Seshadri that pension cannot be equated to livelihood under Art. 21 of the Constitution. It was further contended that the appellant had to blame himself for failure to get the attestation in the option format. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that despite repeated telephone calls, the appellant had declined to rectify the defect in the option format and had even refused to come on line and that the appellant had forfeited his right to avail the benefit under the scheme. It is essential to refer to the provisions of the scheme.

    13L. There is no dispute that the appellant is entitled to avail the benefits of the 1995 Pension Scheme if he satisfies the procedural requirements of submitting an option format and refunding the provident fund contribution which was paid to him on superannuation. Chapter II of the 1995 Pension Reguations relates to application and eligibility Regulation 3 in Chap. II provides that an employee who was in service of the bank on or after 1 January, 1986 but had retired before 1 November, 1993 and who had exercised the option in writing within 120 days from the notified date is eligible to become a member of the pension fund and such an employee is bound to refund the entire amount of the banks contribution to the provident fund including interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the said amount from the date of settlement of provident fund till date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the bank. Regulation 3(2)(b) provides that exercise of option should be in writing and it should be within 120 days from the notified date to become a member of the fund.

    13M. There is no dispute in the present case that the appellant had submitted his option format within 120 days. There is also no dispute that the appellant is eligible in terms of regulation 3 to avail the benefits under the 1995 Pension Scheme. Nowhere in Chap. II of the Regulations it has been provided that the option is liable to be rejected for submission (sic) of any of the defects. In other words consequences for defective declaration or option had not been provided for in the regulations. Only format A, B or C in the Schedule to the 1995 Pension Regulations and that too as the footnote, it has been indicated that the option letter is required to be attested by the head of the department in the Administrative Offices/Manager of the Branch, where the member is attached with their specimen signature, number. In the body of regulations and in particular Chap. II or in Chap. IX, general conditions, it has been not been provided that the option letter has to be attested and that it should be in the printed format. Nowhere it has been provided in the scheme that the defective option letter such as failure to secure attestation would result in rejection of the option letter or it resulting forfeiture of the rights under the scheme had been provided for.

    13N. Sri T.K Seshadri, learned counsel contended that the format provided in the Sch. A to the Regulation, according to him abundantly makes it clear that attestation is essential and any option without attestation is fatal. We are unable to agree with such a contention.

    13-O The Pension Scheme, 1993, as well as the Pension Scheme, 1995, are social obligation which the management of the respondent-bank and other banks have undertaken as a social measure. Such a measure should be read so as to advance the spirit and philosophy behind it. The purpose of the scheme should be given effect. So also the object of the social welfare or measure which the bank desires to achieve should not be forgotten. As far as possible the endeavour of the Court must be to cover all the employees than to deny the benefit of the welfare measure and the regulation should not be used as a measure to deny the fruits of social welfare legislation. It is equally fundamental that the provisions of the regulations should be so construed as to make it effective and operative.

    13P. As already pointed out Chap. I. Preliminary Chap. II, Application and Eligibility as well as Chap. IX, General Conditions, nowhere prescribe that the option letter should be either in the prescribed format or requires attestation. The body of the regulations as set out in the said three chapters has to be given full meaning and effect as it is a social legislation and a welfare measure. It is not disputed that the appellant is eligible in terms of Chap. II of the Pension Scheme, 1995. The only defect is the non-attestation of the option letter. It is already pointed out that the three chapters namely Chaps. I, II and III nowhere prescribe attestation of the option letter Only in the format which is found in Sch. A at the bottom it has been indicated that the option letter should be attested. It is merely a formality to confirm the option in case of doubt and such an attestation is not essential when the optee confirms the option and contents of the option letter. The dispute if any with respect to the option could be raised, only by the optee or his dependants and not by anybody. To avoid such controversy it has been indicated that option letter requires to be attested by an officer of the bank where the individual had worked on the date of superannuation. Merely because attestation is not found it is farfetching to state that the option is defective and on that score the individual could be denied of the benefit of the scheme.

    13Q. As already pointed out, none of the regulation in the scheme provides or mandates or prescribes that the option letter requires to be attested. It is also to be pointed out that nowhere it has been provided in the 1995 Pension Regulations that the failure to attest the option letter would result in rejection of the request to join the pension fund. The consequences alone would make it mandatory which is not the case here.

    13R. Though Sri T.K Seshadri took pains and pointed out that format A, B and C of Schedule forms part of the regulations, it is only a formality which is required to be complied with and at any time the appellant could be called upon to rectify the defects. Except to state that there have been telephone calls, the bank had not chosen to write to the appellant to rectify the defect and no material has been placed in this respect.

    13-S. The Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd., Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995, is framed, by the respondent-bank to achieve the social object and it is a welfare measure which the bank has undertaken like any other bank.

    13T. In Cochin Shipping Company v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation [1992 (2) L.L.N 737], while interpreting the statutory enactment, which is a social welfare legislation, it has been emphasised that the benefits conferred by the Act under a welfare legislation requires to be given a liberal construction so as to promote its objects. Though the regulation is not statutory, the same principle could very well be adopted in respect of the Pension Scheme, 1995 Even assuming that the format provides for attesation, it is to be pointed out that the failure to comply with is not fatal. The consequences for such failure being absent and when it is mere formality, in the absence of any specific provision, such defect would not take away the rights of the appellant who had admittedly exercised the option within he time prescribed. The format which is heavily relied upon by Sri T.K Seshadri, the learned counsel for the respondent, and in particular to the foot note found in the bottom of the format cannot be reason at all to deny the benefit of a social welfare measure which the bank has undertaken If such a construction is to be placed in the absence of any specific provision in the regulation providing for the consequences of non-compliance, we are afraid the very purpose of the pension scheme will be defeated. The object of the pension scheme should not be allowed to be frustrated by such technicalities.

    13-U. Once the option is confirmed and the optee not only confirms the option but also stands by the option exercised by him and in the present case the optee had written to the respondent-bank that he is ready with the money to refund the provident fund contribution. Hence there is no reason at all to deny the benefit of social welfare measure.

    13V. In respect of the format it has been pointed out by Ms Vaigai, learned counsel for the appellant, that the three formats in the schedule have no application to the case of the appellant as the dates mentioned therein is in respect of others and it will not cover the appellant. According to the counsel for the appellant a formal option letter is more than sufficient for all purposes and the respondents have chosen to reject the appellant's request on a misconception and misreading of the regulations At any rate the format will not govern Chap. I or Chap II or Chap IX of the Regulations which requires to be given effect to as a social welfare measure.

    13-V(a) It is fundamental and it is equally well settled that the format prescribed by the respondent cannot control the regulation or the rules or the directions. Definitely the format will not control either Chap I or Chap II or Chap IX of the Regulations and at any rate on that score the benefits to which the appellant is entitled to avail cannot be denied nor it could be contended that the appellant had forfeited his right or claim to the pension scheme merely because the option letter had not been attested. At this stage we are remembered of the saying “It is the dog that wags the tail and not the tail that wags we dog.” The instruction in the foot-note to the format in the scheduled is neither a statutory direction nor it is a mandatory instruction and it is at best an advise or direction to the retirees so as to avoid disputes. There is nothing in the whole of the scheme which even remotely is suggestive at a direction, namely, failure to secure attestation would result in automatic rejection of the option letter and forfeiture of the rights to avail the scheme.

    13W. The object of attestation, as provided in the option letter is just to ensure that there is no fraud or other vitiating circumstance in the execution of the said letter of option. The instructions set out at the bottom of the option letter cannot be equated to a statutory provision nor it is akin to S. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which statutory provision provides the essential conditions of valid execution and attestation of documents or instruments with respect to transfer of property. Admittedly the appellant had affixed his signature to the option format and there is no controvercy. The appellant is estopped from going back from the consequences of his option. The admission of execution of the option format by the appellants by themselves serve as sufficient proof of execution as against the appellants, though it be a form which according to the respondent requires to be attested. As seen from the subsequent correspondence and also from the fact that the appellants have reiterated their respective option, would be sufficient proof against the appellant. For all the above reasons, we hold that the options exercised by the appellants in the above writ appeals is valid.

    13-X. It is interesting to refer to the passage in this respect in Life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts Ltd. [(1986) 1 SCC 264], wherein it has been held thus:

    “Surely, the form cannot control the Act, the Rules or the directions. As one learned Judge of the Madras High Court was fond of saying ‘it is the dog that wags the tail and not the tail that wags the dog’: We may add that this Court had occasion to say in Vasudev Ramachandra Shlal v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar:

    The subservience of substance of a transaction to some rigidly prescribed form required to be meticulously observed, savours of archaic and outmoded jurisprudence.”

    13Y. Admittedly, till this date, the Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd. Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995, had not been implemented and none of the retirees who have been called upon to exercise option or to deposit the employer's contribution with interest until now had been sanctioned pension under the scheme as the Central Government is yet to amend the rule 89 of the Income Tax Rules so as to grant exemption to the private sector banks from the requirement of purchasing annuities from Life Insurance Corporation of India. As the said rule has not been amended till date the private banks like the respondent-bank have not implemented the pension scheme though the respondent had constituted a trust under a deed of trust for the management of the fund by the trustees. This factual aspect also persuades us to interfere as there is no justification at all to deny a valuable right of pension, which has accrued to the appellants/retirees and it is a livelihood. The denial of such a livelihood to a pension is a monstrous situation as in these days of spiralling prices pension though earned by all standard is a pittance. The Courts of equity shall not be a party to denial of such a welfare measure of scheme on such minor technical grounds, such as want of attestation. The Court should extend all the help as has been held by the Apex Court in Cochin Shipping Company v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation [1992 (2) L.L.N 737], the endeavour of the Court should be to place a liberal construction so as to promote the objects for which Pension Scheme, 1995, has been framed by the respondent-bank.

    13Z. In terms of the scheme, we also hold that attestation is neither a must nor it is a mandatory requirement and when the optee had confirmed the option by following it with letters and by filing the writ petition, the respondent shall no insist for attestation in the case of the appellant and the appellant is entitled to all the benefits in terms of the Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd., Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995, and the impugned communication are quashed and the writ petition deserves to be allowed to the limited extent to enable the appellant to claim pension.

    Writ Appeal No. 369 of 1998:

    14. As we have already considered the provisions of the Pension Scheme, 1995, in detail in the Writ Appeal No. 368 of 1998, it is not necessary to refer to the scheme once again. In this writ appeal admittedly the option format had not been forwarded by the appellant. The appellant had come out with a specific case that he had not received the circular from the bank calling upon the appellant to exercise the option under the 1995 Pension Scheme.

    15. Per contra, the respondent-bank contends that the circular had been sent to the appellant and that they also relied upon the despatch register in this respect. It is not necessary to go into this controversy as admittedly the appellant had submitted an option letter pursuant to the earlier circular of the respondent-bank in terms of the 1993 Pension Scheme. The appellant in this writ appeal is also eligible and he satisfies the eligibility conditions prescribed in Chap. II of the 1995 Pension Regulations. The option once exercised is final and binding on the retiree/optee and there is no doubt about it.

    16. Clause (9) of the regulation 3 in Chap. II provides that an option exercised before the notified date by an employee or the family of a deceased employee in pursuance of the settlement shall be deemed to be an option for the purpose of Chap. II of the (Pension) Regulations, 1995. In the present case the appellant had submitted his option immediately after the coming into force of the 1993 Pension Scheme which has been modified by the 1995 Pension Regulations by providing certain additional facilities. It is not in dispute that in respect of 1993 Pension Scheme the appellant had submitted his option and the respondent also admitted the same. That being the factual position, there is no reason at all to deny the benefits of the scheme. As the appellant had admittedly submitted his option under the 1993 Pension Scheme, the benefit of such option will ensure and enable the appellant to avail the benefits of the Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995, as well. In that view of the matter, other factual controversies need not be gone into in this writ appeal. Therefore, this writ appeal is also allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and there will be a direction in favour of the appellant. Though the appellant's prayer in the writ petition is all inclusive, we are not inclined to grant such relief as prayed for. It would be sufficient to hold that the appellant had submitted the option and he is entitled to pension benefits as per the regulations on his refunding the provident fund with interest at 6 per cent as and when called by the respondent-bank.

    17. Before concluding, in fairness to Sri T.K Seshadri, the learned counsel for the respondent-bank, we have to refer to Union of India v. AJ. Fabian [(1997) 10 SCC 465 : A.I.R 1997 S.C 1921], in which case the optee factually despite number of opportunities being given, failed to avail those opportunities given to him and their Lordship in that view declined to interfere with the orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the view that the optee will not be entitled to opt for pension after a lapse of considerable time, which is not the case here. Though the regulations have been framed in 1995, admittedly, the pension scheme is yet to commence. Therefore, on facts the said decision has no application to the facts of the present writ appeal.

    18. Sri T.K Seshadri also relied upon the decision reported in Union of India v. D.R.R Sastri [(1997) 1 SCC 514], which decision is far from supporting the respondent's case, advance the appellants claim for payment of pension under the 1995 Pension Regulations.

    19. In the foregoing circumstances:

    (i) We allow both the writ appeals.

    (ii) The order dismissing writ petitions W. P No. 8191 of 1996 and W.P No. 9235 of 1996, passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge are set aside.

    (iii) The impugned proceedings of the respondent-bank are quashed.

    (iv) The respondent is directed to treat that the appellants have validly exercised their option in terms of Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd., Employees' (Pension) Regulations, 1995, and they are entitled to payment of pension in terms of the said regulations on the appellants complying with the balance of requirements prescribed in the said regulation as and when called upon to comply and required to by the respondent-bank.

    20. The parties shall bear their respective costs throughout. Consequently, C.M.Ps Nos. 3832 to 3834 of 1998 are dismissed.

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    A.K. Ansari v. Bharat Overseas Bank, Ltd.
    (Sep 24, 1998)