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  • Rule 17 read with Order 30, Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • provisions in Order 6, Rule 7, C.P.C
  • Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C,
  • Order 6, Rule 17 of C.P.C,
  • 6, Rule 17: Amendment
  • Order 6, Rule 17
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Rule 17 read with Order 30, Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • provisions in Order 6, Rule 7, C.P.C
  • Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C,
  • Order 6, Rule 17 of C.P.C,
  • 6, Rule 17: Amendment
  • Order 6, Rule 17
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion: Revision against Order in I.A. No. 496 of 1995 (O.S. No. 559 of 1990)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 559 of 1990 in the District Munsif Court, Tenkasi, seeking declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property against the defendants, who filed a written statement denying the plaintiff's averments. While the suit was pending, the plaintiff had earlier obtained an interim injunction in I.A. No. 1465 of 1990 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.). The plaintiff alleged that, during the subsistence of that injunction, the defendants constructed a staircase and a toilet and fixed a door and window on the plaintiff's site; the Commissioner’s inspection report (dated 26.7.1991) corroborated that new construction existed on the suit property.

The plaintiff then filed I.A. No. 496 of 1995 seeking permission to amend the plaint to add a relief for mandatory injunction to remove the alleged post-suit constructions. The defendants opposed the amendment, contending that the proposed relief was barred by the law of limitation. The trial court dismissed the amendment application on the ground that, as the Commissioner's report of 26.7.1991 already recorded the constructions, the plaintiff had delayed for about four and a half years and the amendment was barred by limitation. The plaintiff filed the present civil revision challenging that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint may be amended under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. to add a prayer for mandatory injunction in respect of constructions alleged to have been erected after suit initiation.
  2. Whether an amendment that introduces a relief for mandatory injunction is barred by limitation where the Commissioner's report recorded the existence of the constructions on 26.7.1991 and the application to amend was filed in 1995.
  3. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the amendment application on limitation grounds, given the absence of a definite date of construction in the materials before the court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The amendment sought under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. would not change the cause of action; it merely seeks relief (mandatory injunction) in respect of structures allegedly erected after suit institution, and hence is permissible.
  • The constructions (staircase, toilet, door and window) occurred after institution of the suit; therefore, the plaintiff had to amend the plaint to seek mandatory relief for removal of those structures for complete adjudication and in the interest of justice.
  • Reliance was placed on authorities (including Natesan v. Govindasami, A.K. Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, and Manohar Lal v. N.B.M Supply) supporting amendment where it does not introduce a new cause of action or where amendment serves justice and prevents multiplicity of proceedings.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • If the proposed amendment is clearly barred by limitation, the court has no power to permit the plaintiff to amend the plaint; an amendment that defeats the defendant's right accrued by lapse of limitation must be refused.
  • Reliance was placed on several authorities (including K. Nagutha Mohamed Nainar v. Vadavalli Ammal, Chinnaswami Naicker v. Kandasami Gounder, A.A.M School v. Jeevanandam, and Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh) for the proposition that amendment which introduces a barred relief or which effectively defeats a defendant's limitation defence should be rejected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Natesan v. Govindasami, 1988 (2) L.W. 397 Amendment as alternative prayer for possession to avoid multiplicity; amendment permissible where it does not change suit character; costs may be imposed for delay. Cited as supporting allowance of amendment where it is only an alternative relief and does not prejudice defendants; used to justify allowing amendment with costs to compensate delay.
A.K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 An amendment will be allowed after limitation expiry if it does not add a new cause of action but only a different approach to the same facts; objective of procedure is to decide rights, not punish mistakes. Relied upon as the leading authority that permits amendment where no new cause of action is introduced; the Court applied this principle to conclude amendment could be allowed here because it did not change the original cause of action.
Manohar Lal v. N.B.M Supply, AIR 1969 SC 1267 Amendment is a matter of discretion and should not be refused on technical grounds. Used to support the view that courts have discretion to allow amendments and should not refuse them merely on technicalities.
K. Nagutha Mohamed Nainar v. Vadavalli Ammal, 1959 (1) M.L.J. 307 An amendment of the plaint which would deprive the defendants of a valuable right of limitation will not be allowed. Cited as authority for refusing amendments that would defeat a defendant's accrued limitation-based rights; considered by the Court when weighing limitation objections.
Chinnaswami Naicker v. Kandasami Gounder, 1969 (1) M.L.J. 393; AIR 1970 Mad. 81 If on the date of the amendment application the suit would be barred, the amendment must be dismissed; amendments are subject to pleas of limitation and prejudice to the other party. Relied upon for the principle that amendment may be refused if the amended claim would be time-barred as on the date of application; Court examined whether that principle applied given the materials (noting the absence of a definite construction date).
A.A.M. School v. Jeevanandam, 1989 (2) M.L.J. 207 (DB) When limitation is in issue, courts must consider the effect of the amendment on limitation and give specific directions on the date the amendment takes effect; if not specified, amendment may be effective only from date of application. Invoked for the proposition that the court must consider limitation-effect and may limit the effective date of an amendment; influenced the Court's approach to permitting amendment subject to contest at trial.
Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh & Ors., 1996 (1) C.L.T. 434 (SC) Permitting amendment after delay may defeat accrued rights of respondents; amendment not permissible where it would defeat such accrued rights following public notice (e.g., registered deed). Cited by respondents and considered by the Court as an example where the Supreme Court disallowed amendment because respondents' accrued rights would be defeated; weighed against facts here (absence of definite date of construction).
Weldon v. Neale, 1887 (19) QBD 394 General rule: a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or new cause of action particularly when such a suit would be barred. Quoted by the Court as part of the general rule limiting amendments that introduce new causes of action; used to frame the boundary for allowable amendments.
Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Ind. App. 255; AIR 1921 P.C. 50 Amendments allowed where what is sought to be introduced is in substance already in the pleading sought to be amended. Applied to support the proposition that amendment is permissible if it does not introduce a new cause of action but is substantially within the original pleading.
L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Co., 1957 SCR 438; AIR 1957 SC 357 Authority cited alongside others that supports allowing amendments which do not introduce new cause of action. Used as part of the body of authorities for permitting amendment where it constitutes a different approach to the same facts.
Cropper v. Smith, 1884 (26) Ch.D 700 Courts and rules of procedure exist to decide rights, not to punish parties for mistakes. Cited in support of the view that technical denial of amendments should not impede adjudication of rights; influenced the Court's balancing of justice over formalism.
Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba, 1909 ILR 33 Bom. 644 Party cannot rely strictly on statute of limitation where the amendment sought to be introduced is in substance already in the pleading sought to be amended. Referenced to support the notion that limitation cannot always be used to defeat an amendment that is substantially contained in the original pleadings.
Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda, 1957 SCR 595; AIR 1957 SC 363 Approved the principle that amendments which are in substance already in the original pleading are not to be defeated on the ground of limitation. Cited as supportive authority for allowing amendments that do not introduce genuinely new causes of action.
Robinson v. Unions Property Corporation Ltd., 1962 (2) All E.R. 24 “Cause of action” for amendment purposes should not be interpreted to mean every material fact; the focus is on whether a new claim based on new facts is introduced. Used to clarify the meaning of “cause of action” and to limit objections to amendments that would introduce a new set of ideas.
Dornan v. J. W. Ellis & Co. Ltd., 1962 (1) All E.R. 303 The words “new case” mean a “new set of ideas”; amendments introducing a new set of ideas are not allowed to the prejudice of a party's rights by lapse of time. Cited to reinforce the principle that amendments cannot introduce a new set of ideas which would prejudice the other party's accrued rights.
Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karlni Sabha, AIR 1974 SC 1178 Court may take notice of events occurring after institution and afford relief where original relief has become inappropriate or where taking notice shortens litigation or does complete justice. Invoked to support allowing amendment where subsequent events (post-suit changes) make the original relief insufficient and where justice requires taking those events into account.
Rai Charan v. Biswanath, AIR 1915 Cal. 103 Cited as supporting the proposition in Shikharchand regarding taking notice of subsequent events to do complete justice. Referenced indirectly via Shikharchand to support the Court’s willingness to consider post-suit events in granting relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first extracting the statutory provision invoked by the petitioner, Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C., which permits amendment of pleadings at any stage as may be just for determining the real questions in controversy. The factual matrix showed that: (a) the plaintiff originally sought declaration and permanent injunction; (b) interim injunction had been granted earlier; and (c) the Commissioner’s inspection report dated 26.7.1991 noted the existence of a toilet and other fittings on the suit property which, according to the plaintiff, were constructed after institution of the suit.

The trial court dismissed the amendment application on the ground of limitation because, in its view, the Commissioner's report (26.7.1991) already recorded the constructions and the plaintiff delayed about four and a half years before moving to amend in 1995. The period of limitation applicable to mandatory injunction relief is three years, and the respondents argued that allowing the amendment would defeat their limitation defence.

The Court reviewed authorities on both sides. It acknowledged the well-settled principle that an amendment which would introduce a new cause of action barred by limitation cannot be permitted (e.g., K. Nagutha Mohamed Nainar; Chinnaswami Naicker). It also recognized authorities allowing amendments after the statutory period where no new cause of action is introduced and the amendment amounts to an additional approach to the same facts (e.g., A.K. Gupta; Charan Das; L.J. Leach).

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court observed that although the Commissioner’s report mentioned the existing structures as of 26.7.1991, there was no definite date of construction established in the materials before the court. Because the precise date of the alleged post-suit constructions was not established, the Court found it not possible at the stage of the amendment application to conclude definitively that the proposed relief was time-barred. The court therefore balanced the competing considerations:

  • The need to prevent amendment that would defeat a defendant's accrued limitation rights; and
  • The object of procedural rules to decide rights on merits and permit amendments that do not introduce a new cause of action, especially where subsequent events may have changed the remedy necessary for complete adjudication.

The Court concluded that permitting the amendment would not change the original cause of action; it would only add a prayer for mandatory relief necessary for effective relief if the plaintiff succeeds on declaration. The Court further stressed that allowing amendment does not adjudicate the merits of the newly pleaded relief — defendants remain free to contest the amended pleas, including by raising the bar of limitation at trial.

Having weighed the authorities and facts, and finding no jurisdictional error in allowing amendment, the Court exercised its discretion to allow the amendment in the interest of justice but directed the plaintiff to pay costs for the delay (Rs. 1,000 payable to respondents within two weeks), thereby compensating respondents for contesting the amendment application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is allowed. The trial court's order dismissing I.A. No. 496 of 1995 (the amendment application) was incorrect and the amendment application should have been allowed. The Court directed the petitioner to pay Rs. 1,000 to the respondents by way of costs within two weeks. The related interlocutory matter (C.M.P. No. 11796 of 1996) is dismissed.

Core Ruling: Civil Revision Petition allowed; amendment of the plaint to include relief of mandatory injunction is permitted (subject to costs and the defendants' right to contest on merits, including limitation, at trial).

Implications

  • Direct effect on parties: The plaintiff is permitted to amend the plaint to add a mandatory injunction prayer; the defendants retain full opportunity to contest the amended pleadings (including raising limitation) at trial.
  • Costs: The plaintiff was ordered to pay Rs. 1,000 to the defendants for the delay in seeking amendment, to be paid within two weeks.
  • Precedential effect: The Court applied and reconciled existing authorities on the limits of amendment in light of limitation. The decision follows established principles (as discussed in cited authorities) and does not purport to set a novel legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts (the Court explicitly balanced the limitation objections against the absence of a definite date of the alleged constructions and the interest of justice).

Note: This summary is strictly limited to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or interpretive claims beyond what the opinion expressly states.

    Muthammal Petitioner v. Thamburati And 6 Others S

    1. Plaintiff in O.S No. 559 of 1990 on the file of District Munsif, Tenkasi, aggrieved against the Order passed in I.A No. 496 of 1995 has filed the present revision before this Court.

    2. The petitioner herein has originally filed O.S No. 559 of 1990 on the file of District Munsif, Tenkasi, for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property against the defendants. The respondents/defendants filed a written statement disputing the various averments.

    3. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A No. 496 of 1995, the petitioner herein contended that pending suit he has also filed I.A No. 1465 of 1990 under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C, and also obtained interim injunction in the said application. According to her, when the injunction was in force, the defendants have constructed stair-case and toilet in the first schedule of the property and also provided door and window on the plaintiff's site. This has been strengthened by the report of the Commissioner, who in categorical terms confirmed that the defendants have put up new construction in the subject matter of the property. In those circumstance, the plaintiff sought for an amendment to incorporate the relief of mandatory injunction. With regard to the new structures created or constructed after the institution of the suit. The respondents/defendants filed a counter affidavit contending that the present relief of mandatory injunction is barred by limitation and it is not open to the plaintiff to take such step at the belated stage.

    4. The court below on consideration of the affidavit and counter affidavit filed by both parties, after holding that the alleged construction was found place in the Commissioner's report filed even as early as on 26.7.1991 the plaintiff having failed to take any step for about 4 1/2 years, dismissed the said application as barred by limitation. The said order is now questioned in the revision by the plaintiff.

    5. Mr. T.M Hariharan, learned counsel for the petitioner, after referring to Order 6, Rule 17 of C.P.C, contended that since the present amendment sought for is not going to change the cause of action and that the order of the court below dismissing his application is incorrect. He also brought to my notice that the construction of toilet and steps as well as fixing of window and door way in the subject matter of the property is after the institution of the suit, hence the plaintiff has no other go except to amend the plaint in the interest of justice and in order for complete adjudication of the cause involved. In support of his contention, he relied on the following decisions of this Court reported in (1) Natesan v. Govindasami, 1988 (2) L.W 397; (2) A.K Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Vallay Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 and (3) Manohar Lal v. N.B.M Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267.

    6. On the other hand, Mr. Peppin Fernando, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, defendants submitted that if the proposed amendment is clearly barred by limitation, the court has no power to permit the plaintiff to amend her plaint. In support of the above proposition, he has very much relied on the following decisions reported in:-

    (i) K. Nagutha Mohamed Nainar v. Vadavalli Ammal, 1959 (1) M.L.J 307; (ii) Chinnawswami Naicker v. Kandasami Gounder, 1969 (1) M.L.J 393; AIR 1970 Mad. 81;(iii) A.A.M School v. Jeevanandam, 1989 (2) M.L.J 207 (DB) and (iv) Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi singh and others 1996 Civil Law Times 434 (SC).

    7. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

    8. Before going into the controversy, it is better to see the necessary provision for amendment, which is incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, Order 6, Rule 17 which is extracted hereunder:-

    “Order 6, Rule 17: Amendment of pleadings:- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.”

    In our case, originally the plaintiff has laid the suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of first schedule property. It is further seen that inspite of obtaining an order of injunction, according to the plaintiff, the defendants put up stair-case as well as toilet in the subject matter of the property. They have also provided door way and window in the property in dispute. In those circumstances, the necessary relief has to be prayed for with regard to removal of the said constructions said to have been taken place after the institution of the suit. The respondents, defendants filed a counter statement wherein it is contended that the present petition is hopelessly barred by limitation. Even in the Commissioner's report filed in the month of july, 1991 he has noted the existence of toilet and other fittings in the subject matter of the property. Knowing his specific stand in the written statement and the report of the Commissioner, the plaintiff did not take any step for amendment of her plaint. No doubt, there is no reference with regard to the exact date of construction. However the court below found that even in the Commissioner's report dated 26.7.1991, there is a reference to the construction found in the suit property. The court below in those circumstance, has come to the conclusion that the present petition filed in the year 1995 that is after 4 1/2 years is clearly barred by limitation. As per the provisions of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is 3 years in respect of the relief relating to mandatory injunction, that is, three years when the right to sue accrues. In this case, as seen from the Commissioner's report dated 26.7.1991, even at the time of inspection, the Commissioner had noted the existence of toilet and other fittings in the suit property. In those circumstance, the court below after holding that the present petition for amendment is clearly barred by limitation, dismissed the said petition.

    9. On this aspect the earlier judgment is K. Nagutha Mohamed Nainar v. Vadavalli Ammal, 1959 (I) M.L.J 307. In the said decision, Ramaswami, J., has held that an amendment of the plaint which would deprive the defendants of a valuable right of limitation will not be allowed.

    10. The other decision is Chinnaswami Naicker v. Kandasami Gounder, 1969 (I) M.L.J 393: AIR 1970 Mad. 81. While interpreting Order 6, Rule 17 K. Veeraswami, J., (as he then was) has held that in the absence of enabling provision, if on the date the application for amendment was made the suit would have been barred by limitation, there is no escape but that the application has got to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. No doubt amendment of pleading should be freely allowed at whatever stage it is asked for. But, this can only be subject to please as to limitation or other prejudice to the other part. The principle is that an application for amendment of the pleading should be within the time allowed for the institution of the suit.

    11. In The Correspondent, A.A.M School v. Jeevanandam, 1989 (II) M.L.J 207, Division Bench of this Court has held thus:

    “………When a contention is being raised about the law of limitation with regard to the amendments sought to be introduced, the Court, while considering the application for amendment, if it is inclined to allow it, must also consider the question of effect of amendments on, limitation and give specific directions as to the date on which the amendments shall take effect. If no such direction is given, then such amendments must be held to be effective only from the date of the amendment application. There could be cases, which are not of amendments properly so called, but a case of addition of barred reliefs into the plaint which did not project them at all, when it was originally laid, as in the present case, and which the Court, as exceptional cases, considers it just and proper to introduce at a later stage. Hence, specific directions, as to their effect on limitation, are required.”

    In the said case, after holding that the relief sought for, namely, relief of damages by way of amending the plaint is barred by limitation the learned Judge refused to allow the amendment because the law of limitation disabled them to do so.

    12. The other latest decision is the decision of the Apex Court reported in Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and others, 1996 (1) Civil Law Times 434 (SC). In that case the gift deed was executed and registered as early as June, 28, 1978 which is a notice to everyone. Even after the filing of the written statement, for 3 years no steps were taken to file the application for amendment of the plaint. According to the Supreme Court, thereby the accrued right in favour of the respondents would be defeated by permitting amendment of the plaint.

    13. On the other hand, there are decisions of this Court as well as the Apex Court that amendment may be allowed irrespective of law of limitation, if the cause of action is not going to be changed and in the interest of justice. Now let me consider the decisions in respect of the above said proposition of law. In A.K Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 the 3 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court had held thus:-

    (7)” It is not in dispute that at the date of the application for amendment a suit for a money claim under the contract was barred. The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred; Weldon v. Neale, 1887 (19) QBD 394. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation; see Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Ind. App 255 : AIR 1921 PC 50 and L.J Leach and Co., Ltd., v. Jardine Skinner and Co., 1957 SCR 438: AIR 1957 SC 357.

    (8) The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedures is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes Cropper v. Smith, 1884 (26) Ch.D 700 (710-711) and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba, 1909 ILR 33 Bom. 644 at P. 651, approved in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda, 1957 SCR 595 (605): AIR 1957 SC 363.

    (9) The expression “cause of action” in the present context does not mean “every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed” as was said in Cooke v. Gill, 1873 (8) CP 107 (116), in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only mean, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unions Property Corporation Ltd., 1962 (2) All. E.R 24, and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words “new case” have been understood to mean “new set of ideas”: Dornan v. J. W. Ellis and Co., Ltd., 1962 (I) All ER 303. This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time.”

    14. In Manohar Lal v. N.B.M Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267, the Supreme Court in the light of Order, Rule 17 read with Order 30, Rule 1 C.P.C, has held that since the amendment of the plaint being discretion of the Court not to be refused on technical grounds.

    15. In Shikharchand v. D.J.P Karlni Sabha, AIR 1974 SC 1178 has held:

    …. Ordinarily, a suit is tried in all its, stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. But it is open to a Court including a Court of appeal to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances where it is shown that the relief claimed originally has (1) by reason of subsequent change of circumstance become inappropriate; or (2) where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstance in order to shorten the litigation, or (3) to do complete justice between the parties. (See Rai Charan v. Biswanath, AIR 1915 Cal. 103).”

    16. Finally in Natesan v. Govindasami, 1988 (2) L.W 397 Sivasubramaniam, J. in a similar circumstance, has held thus:

    ….In this case, I find that what is asked for by way of amendment is only an alternative prayer for possession. This prayer becomes important because of the fact that possession is claimed by the defendants and in case the trial court finds that they are in possession, then the plaintiffs will be without any effective remedy. It is only to avoid such a contingency and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the provisions in Order 6, Rule 7, C.P.C are intended. In this case, I am satisfied that the interests of the defendants are not going to be prejudiced in any manner, since the proposed amendment does not change the character of the suit in any manner. However, the petitioners should compensate the respondents for having delayed the matter unduly. Therefore, this civil revision petition is allowed and the amendments petition will stand allowed, on condition that the petitioners pay a sum of Rs. 200 to the respondents by way of costs incurred in contesting the petition for amendment. Time for payment of costs, four weeks from this date.”

    17. A reading of Order 6, Rule 17 of C.P.C, at the first sight shows that at any stage of the proceedings, it is open to the parties to alter or a mend his pleadings in such a manner and on such terms for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. The decisions cited on the side of the respondents show that if the proposed amendment brings new cause of action and the same is barred by limitation, certainly the same cannot be permitted. In the light of the decisions both in favour as well as against allowing amendment one thing is clear that the general rule is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in A.K Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96, where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment is to be allowed ever after expiry of the statutory period of limitation. In the said leading judgment, the Supreme Court has also observed:

    “The object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of parties and not to punish them for their mistake. Further, a party is strictly is not entitled to relief on the statute of limitation when sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleadings sought to be amended.”

    Even though the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents clearly show that the amendment sought to be made is subject to the law of limitation, if the cause of action is not going to be changed and in any thing happens after filing the suit, it is open to the affected party to take necessary steps for amendment of the plaint. No doubt, no amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party of lapse of time. In our case, even though some new obstructions were made in the suit property after the institution of the suit, at this stage no details were there with regard to the date of construction. No doubt, the Commissioner in his report dated 26.7.1991 has mentioned the above structures in his report. But in the absence of a definite date, it is not possible for the Court to defeat the relief made in the amendment petition at this stage itself without any evidence.

    18. Hence, while holding that in the absence of enabling provision, if on the date the application for amendment was made, the suit would have been barred by limitation, there is no escape but that the application has got to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. In view of the facts available in our case, namely, there is no definite date with regard to the structures constructed in the suit property. In the interest of justice, the plaintiff is entitled to amend her plaint. Moreover, if the plaintiff succeeds in her relief for declaration in respect of the suit property if the relief of mandatory injunction is not before the Court, the plaintiff may not be in a position to use the suit property. Buy permitting her to amend the plaint as prayed for in the petition, the original cause of action is not going to be changed. Only in addition to prove her case for declaration, she has to place necessary materials with regard to the relief of mandatory injunction. The defendants are also equally entitled to place all the materials in order to reject the claim of the plaintiff including the law of limitation at the time of the trial. It is well settled by many decisions of this Court as well as Supreme Court that for merely allowing an application for amendment, there is no adjudication of the merits of the amended pleas introduced that the merits of the amended pleas have got to be adjudicated upon after allowing the opposite side to put-forth additional pleadings in answer to the same and that certainly the additional pleadings may take in also the plea of bar of limitation. As already discussed, it is well settled that the court may in appropriate cases allow the amendment even after the statutory period of limitation. By allowing the amendment, no injury or injustice is caused to the respondent herein. No jurisdictional error is also involved in this case because of the amendment being ordered. The amendment application should have been allowed, since it is not going to change the nature of the plea nor does it affect the rights of the defendants. The defendants are entitled to put-forward all their contentions even if the amendment is allowed. As already observed by the Apex Court, I am of the view that the object of Courts and rules of procedures is to decide the rights of the parties in toto and not to punish them their mistake. Since the plaintiff has taken the present step for amendment only at the time of trial, I hereby direct the petitioner herein to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000 to the respondents by way of cost incurred in contesting the present petition for amendment. Time for payment of cost two weeks from this date. Civil revision petition is allowed. Consequently, C.M.P No. 11796 of 1996 is dismissed.

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    Muthammal Petitioner v. Thamburati And 6 Others S
    (Jan 10, 1997)