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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The matters arise from two writ petitions by a group of employees engaged for a Leprosy Vaccine Trial under the Central Jalma Institute for Leprosy (CJIL) Field Unit of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR). The petitioners had been recruited (many via Employment Exchange) on written-test-and-interview basis for a research scheme started in 1991 and had their appointments renewed year-to-year. Their appointments were on consolidated salaries under written appointment letters that described the posts as temporary and renewable annually.

Writ Petition No. 18969 of 1994 sought a writ of mandamus directing respondents to regularise the petitioners' service with continuity and statutory entitlements. Writ Petition No. 15648 of 1995 sought to quash a termination communication dated 27 March 1995 and to regularise services.

The petitioners had earlier filed interlocutory applications (Writ Misc. Petns. Nos. 28843 & 28844 of 1994) for injunction/continuation of employment beyond 31 March 1995. One interim order was granted by a single Judge but another interlocutory application for extension was dismissed; a related writ appeal was dismissed in limine on 30 March 1995 with directions to dispose the writ petition by 4 April 1995. The respondents issued termination communication dated 27 March 1995 which the petitioners say was served after dismissal of the writ appeal; they then filed Writ Petition No. 15648 of 1995 to quash that termination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners — employed on written, time-bound contracts for a research scheme — had any vested right or fundamental right to demand regularisation of service and whether a writ of mandamus/certiorarified mandamus could be issued to compel such regularisation.
  2. Whether the termination order (dated 27 March 1995 / effective 31 March 1995) was arbitrary, mala fide or in contempt of the Court because it was passed while related proceedings were pending.
  3. Whether the ICMR (and its Field Unit) is an "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution, such that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 would be invoked (issue raised but not decided).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Sri M.A. Sadanand)

  • The Scheme is ongoing and was not completed on 27 March 1995; the petitioners had been working for multiple years and the posts are functionally permanent.
  • The termination was passed while a writ appeal was pending and after an earlier interlocutory order — the action was pre-emptive and mala fide and amounted to contempt of the Court's orders.
  • The termination order is non-speaking and arbitrary; a clause in the appointment order (described as a "Henry VIII Clause") is contrary to public interest and S.23 of the Contract Act (petitioners relied on Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly).
  • The petitioners were recruited legitimately (including compliance with reservation) after selection; most were graduates and some postgraduates; no adverse remarks during service.
  • The petitioners had a legitimate expectation of absorption because services were repeatedly extended, they had crossed age-limits for other employment, and the Scheme was long-term in nature.
  • They would suffer loss of livelihood and effectively be unemployable if not regularised; this implicates Art. 21 concerns according to petitioners' counsel.
  • The petitioners lost Employment Exchange registration and seniority; the respondents also reportedly recruited others to do the same work after termination — alleged mala fides.
  • Counsel cited decisions including Inder Pal Yadav v. Union of India and Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority in support of their claims and requested absorption in any unit if not the same unit.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Sri S. Jayaraman)

  • The petitioners were engaged purely on specific, temporary, year-to-year contracts for a time-bound research project (Leprosy Vaccine Trial) and their appointment letters expressly so provide.
  • Appointment letters contained express terms giving the Director or officer-in-charge the right to dispense with services without assigning reason, excluded standard employment benefits and declared that such staff are not CJIL/ICMR employees and shall have no claim on regular vacancies after project completion.
  • Because engagements were contractual and time-bound, there is no vested right to regularisation; the court cannot be asked to substitute a new contract for the parties' contract.
  • The project is funded and reviewed annually; continuation is contingent on budgetary allocations and committee reviews — the project can be wound up if funding stops.
  • Judicial precedent (including a reported CJIL/ICMR-related decision, S. Ramachandran v. Director, Vector Control Research Center, and others) supports the proposition that project-appointees engaged for specific projects have no right to regularisation after the contract ends.
  • Under the Industrial Disputes Act and statutory definitions, such contractual specific-period appointments do not amount to "retrenchment" triggering protections; therefore petitioners cannot claim protection by such labour laws.
  • The respondents denied contempt and explained the termination became effective on 31 March 1995 and that a clerical omission in an earlier order resulted in some confusion but did not amount to contempt.
  • The respondents denied the allegation that vacancies for permanent field investigators existed which the petitioners could have filled as of right and explained promotions/transfers of permanent staff did not create automatic entitlement for petitioners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Gangully (cited by petitioners) Cited by petitioners to argue that an employment clause (a Henry VIII style clause) in the appointment order is against public interest and contrary to S.23 of the Contract Act. The Court noted the citation but concluded the petitioners' reliance on Apex Court pronouncements was not of assistance on the facts — the employees were engaged on specific project contracts and termination followed contract terms; the precedent did not change that conclusion in this case.
Inder Pal Yadav v. Union of India (cited by petitioners) Counsel for petitioners invoked the decision in support of their entitlement/arguments. The Court recorded the citation but held that the references to Apex Court judgments relied upon by the petitioners could not assist given these facts; it did not apply the decision to grant relief.
Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority (cited by petitioners) Cited by petitioners as supportive authority for their claims for regularisation. The Court noted the citation but found it unhelpful on the facts and did not rely on it to grant any relief.
S. Ramachandran v. Director, Vector Control Research Center (Writ Petition No. 13260 of 1985) Authority for the proposition that employees engaged for a specific project have no vested right to be regularised; service ends on expiry of time-bound contract. The Court treated this decision as directly relevant and supportive of the respondents' position; the Court relied upon it (and the Division Bench confirmation) to conclude that petitioners had no vested right to regularisation.
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Rajeev Kumar Srivastava (Allahabad High Court) Applied the principle that ad hoc/contractual appointments that end by efflux of time do not amount to retrenchment; S.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act not attracted. The Court cited this decision as directly on point and consistent with the view that contractual appointments coming to an end do not create retrenchment rights; it supported the Court's conclusion that non-renewal does not vest a right.
Director, Institute of Management Development, Uttar Pradesh v. Pushpa Srivastava (supra) Supreme Court held contractual/ad hoc appointment ending by efflux of time gives no right to regularisation though continuation till end of current calendar year was directed in that case. The Court cited this Supreme Court authority to reinforce that contractual ad hoc appointments do not entitle employees to regularisation; the Court referred to that precedent as supportive of dismissal of claims for regularisation (while noting the limited relief granted in that case).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded to decide the matter on merits without resolving whether ICMR is an "authority" under Article 12 (the point was raised but not pressed by the parties). The Court's analysis followed these principal steps:

  1. The Court examined the appointment orders and documentary material and found that the petitioners were engaged on written contracts for specific periods (annual/renewable) under the Research Scheme. The appointment letters explicitly described the posts as temporary and renewable and contained express terms permitting termination without assigning reason and excluding employment benefits (CPF/GPF/medical/bonus/LTC), and stating that staff are not employees of CJIL/ICMR and will have no claim after project completion.
  2. Given those contractual terms, the Court held the relationship to be a private contract of employment between the petitioners and respondents, and that renewal had been discretionary and subject to the contract terms. The contract expressly provided for termination (one month's notice or payment in lieu) and non-counting of service for seniority or other purposes.
  3. The Court observed that mandamus or certiorarified mandamus to compel regularisation arises only when a statutory or public duty exists and is not available to convert or substitute parties' contracts. Here, no such statutory/public duty to regularise was shown; therefore the extraordinary writ relief sought to compel regularisation could not be sustained.
  4. The Court relied on precedent and prior decisions that have consistently treated project-specific, time-bound contractual engagements as not vesting a right to permanence or regularisation (citing S. Ramachandran and higher-court decisions). The Court also referenced principles reflected in labour law (Industrial Disputes Act) indicating that non-renewal of such specific contracts does not amount to retrenchment.
  5. On the contempt allegation, the Court examined the sequence of interlocutory orders and the timings — noting a clerical omission in an earlier order but accepting the respondents' explanation that the termination became effective 31 March 1995 and that there was no contempt. The Court recorded that the earlier interlocutory dismissal meant the injunction application would not survive.
  6. The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments based on legitimate expectation, Article 21 and other constitutional guarantees as legally insufficient in the presence of clear contractual terms that were accepted by the petitioners at appointment. The Court stressed that the petitioners were aware of and had consented to the contract conditions.
  7. While dismissing the substantive relief sought, the Court noted a passage in the respondents' counter-affidavit acknowledging that new cases of leprosy continue to occur and observed that if the Scheme continues the respondents might sympathetically consider re-employing the petitioners; however the Court made clear it was not directing regularisation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISPOSED OF

The Court dismissed the writ petitions and held that:

  • The petitioners, having been engaged under specific time-bound contracts containing clear terms allowing termination and excluding claims to regular employment or statutory benefits, have no vested or fundamental right to be regularised by writ.
  • The termination effected in accordance with the contract terms was not arbitrary, did not constitute contempt of Court in the circumstances, and did not give rise to entitlement to mandamus or certiorarified mandamus for regularisation.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The immediate effect is that the petitioners' claims for mandatory regularisation were rejected and their termination was valid as per their contracts. The writ petitions were disposed of and there was no order as to costs.
  • The Court did not issue any new general rule altering the legal position on project-based contractual engagement; rather it reaffirmed the settled principle that time-bound project appointments do not create a right to regularisation simply by virtue of renewals.
  • The Court left open the practical possibility that the respondents, in their discretion and sympathetically, may consider re-employment of the petitioners if the Scheme continues; but the Court explicitly clarified that it did not direct regularisation or re-employment.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the matters and reasoning recorded in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    C.R Mugundan And Others v. Director-General (Member Secretary), Indian Council Of Medical Research, New Delhi, And Others

    1. The prayer in Writ Petition No. 18969 of 1994 is to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to regularise theservice of the petitioners in their respective categories as they are working now in the service of the Indian Council of Medical Research, CJIL Field Unit or any other unit before the expiry of the last extended period of 31 March 1994 to 31 March 1995 with continuity of service and statutory service entitlements and benefits.

    2. The prayer in Writ Petition No. 15648 of 1995 is to call for the records of the respondents in CFU/Scheme/ESTT/94-95/83, dated 27 March 1995, in respect of the petitioners and quash the same and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to regularise the service of the petitioners in their respective categories in the Indian Council of Medical Research, CJIL Field Unit or any other unit with continuity of service and all the entitlements and benefits.

    3. The petitioners were recruited by the Central Jalma Institute for Leprosy (CJIL) for its Leprosy Vaccine Trial in the Institute under the wing of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR). They were recruited for the very scheme and now after working for over three years and in spite of their filing Writ Petition No. 18969 of 1994 for a mandamus for regularisation of their services, they were by order, dated 27 March 1995, ousted from service and now face a future where there is no chance of employment having crossed the age periphery for any job.

    4. The petitioners right for rcgularisation spring from the fact that they were working in scheme, which is a on-going one and which would at a conservative estimate last two decades more and the posts to which they were recruited temporarily are permanent posts. The Leprosy Vaccine Trial is the only one of its kind in India which has one of the world's largest incidences of leprosy and this Scheme is not one that can be wound up once it was started. After languishing in the Employment Exchange Register for several years, they were all sponsored by the Employment Exchange and recruited after a written test and an interview. Except a few in the cadre of drivers and clerks, all the field investigators are graduates and petitioners 4, 13, 16 and 25 are post graduates. There is no specified qualification prescribed for the posts. They were recruited in conformity with the relevant reservation quotas and there had been no infraction of any rub in the manner of recruitment. There arc no adverse remarks against them during the last three years. They all have crossed the age for employment elsewhere. The details relating to the date of birth and other details of the petitioners are furnished as Annexure A to the writ petition.

    5. ICMR is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, on 20 December 1949. Its objects inter alia are the prosecution and assistance of research, the propagation of knowledge and experimental measures generally in connection with the causation, mode of spread and prevention of diseases, primarily of those of communicable nature and to initiate, aid, develop and co-ordinate medical scientific research in India and to promote and assist institutions for the study of diseases, their prevention, causation and remedy. Under Object IX, the funds of the Council are to be held by the Government of India. The President of the Council is the Health Minister, Government of India. The Vice-President is the Joint Secretary to the Health Ministry Government of India. Apart from these top Government officers, the governing body consists of the Director-General of Health Services, Financial Advisor to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Director-General, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Director-General of Armed Forces Medical Services, a few other Government officers and the Additional Director-General of ICMR. The Director-General of ICMR is the member-Secretary. Thus, it is a conglomeration of the country's cream of Government officers and none else, giving the ICMR the status of “other authority” mentioned in Art. 12 of the Constitution, whose fractious actions can be remedied by writ commands. The ICMR is amenable to writ jurisdiction.

    6. The petitioners have registered themselves at the District Employment Officers, Kancheepuram and Trivellore and they were sponsored by the Employment Exchange for the Leprosy Vaccine Trial Scheme of the CJIL Field Unit of the ICMR. All the petitioners were recruited after written examination, followed by interview. Twenty two petitioners were designated as field investigators. Besides, there were 6 field workers, 5 drivers, 3 field assistants and a research officer. They were given training for three months by the ICMR in villages in census taking, vaccination, finger printing, motivation of the locals, mapping of the area, taking of smear samples and reassessment of the area visited after the initial work, etc. The scheme is to cover every denizen of the villages assigned to the petitioners so as to keep a tab on the disease prone, to catch them young as it were, in order that the treatment for leprosy, which is totally curable, can be started at an early stage and preventive steps taken to contain it. This scheme was never intended to be an experimental one, for, Tamil Nadu leads the country in the incidence of leprosy, and the treatment is of long duration, which requires monitoring. It was, therefore, not merely on a medical mission the scheme was mooted but as a social revolution that wanted to spared the message among the unfortunate victims and their suffering relatives, that there is nothing reprehensible about the disease, which is only a skin disorder, i.e, with patience and co-operation of the people, curable. The petitioners are, therefore, not only technical hands dealing physically with the patients, but social workers with a mission and engaged in pioneer work in a field that was, until the Scheme was started in 1991 severely left alone by all as infrading.

    7. It is stated that many people are employed as field invsestigators on a permanent basis in the organisation. As all appointments are usually made on temporary basis and every year the same was renewed for one more year, the work in the Scheme not having got off the base and at least two decades of work remains to be done, the petitioners were under a bona fide and legitimate expectation led to believe that what they were going through was only a normal uncertainty in Government employment where years pass before a person's service is regularised. Their legitimate expectation was that since they had all been recruited through the Employment Exchange as required under law and they are all graduates and within the age limit for entry into service and had been recruited against the service quota for the reserved categories, they would be absorbed into service by the respondents on a permanent basis as the need for their services in 1991 for the Leprosy Vaccine Trial Scheme continues. It is not as through leprosy is controlled and eradicated and the Scheme is no longer in force.

    8. When the petitioners learn that there would be no further extension beyond 31, March 1995, they met the respondent in April 1994, to verify the veracity of the floater and the respondent told the petitioners that the Director-General of ICMR, New Delhi, is against extension of their services beyond 1995 on fiscal grounds. The petitioners, therefore, made written representations to the officer-in-charge CJIL Field Unit, Avadi, seeking regularisation, pointing out the hardship that would be fall all if not regularised and are axed. The petitioners understand that the said officer had written to the Director-General recommending regularisation of the service of all as the Scheme is a live one and extremely useful, which requires to be continued.

    9. Since the recommendation has not evoked any written response, the petitioners were obliged to file Writ Petition No. 18969 of 1994 for a mandamus to regularise their services. They also filed Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28843 of 1994 for an injunction to restrain the respondents from terminating their service on 31 March 1995. They filed Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994 for continuing their employment beyond 31 March 1995 pending disposal of the writ petition. J. Kanakaraj, J., by order, dated 16 November 1994, granted interim direction in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994 and or deride notice in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28843 of 1994. When the matter came up on 20 March 1995, R. Jayasimha Babu, J., dismissed Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994, against which the petitioners filed Writ Appeal No. 288 of 1995, which was dismissed in limine on 30 March 1995 with a direction to dispose of the writ petition by 4 April 1995 uninfluenced by anything mentioned in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994. On 27 March 1995 even when the said writ appeal was pending,’ in which the respondent had entered a caveat, the present impugned orders were passed and they were served on the petitioners after the dismissal of the writ appeal. The petitioners, therefore, filed Writ Petition No. 15648 of 1995 to quash the order of termination.

    10. Sri M.A Sadanand, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the order of termination is eminently quashable on the following grounds:

    (a) The Scheme is not completed.

    (b) The Scheme was neither completed nor terminated on 27 March 1995, the date on which the respondent passed the termination order while Writ Appeal No. 288 of 1995 was subjudice and he was a caveator. This pre-emptive action was to overreach this Court and a clear action of mala fide, On the date of the impugned order, the order of J. Kanakaraj, J., in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28843 of 1994, dated 16 November 1994, restraining the respondents in Writ Petition No. 18969 of 1994, from terminating the services of the petitioners was alive, as it had not been disposed of by R. Jayasimha Babu, J. The termination of the petitioners' services on 27 March 1995 was, therefore, a gross evidence of contempt of the orders of the learned Judge of this Court. It was only subsequent to the dismissal that the said order was vacated, but the contempt stood only reinforced.

    (c) The non-speaking order or termination is a classic in arbitrariness and an exposition of the fall out of the Henry VIII Clause in the appointment order that is an aberration in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Gangully|1986 (2) L.L.N 382], which had held that such a clause in a contract of service is against public interest and falls a foul of S. 23 of the Contract Act.

    (d) The order of termination is admittedly when the scheme is in force and there are two more years of its shortened span to elapse. The appointment orders not being for segmented phases but for the whole Scheme, there cannot be an outster midstream. The action is arbitrary.

    (e) All the field investigators are graduates and though there are no prescribed qualifications, they cannot be faulted for that. They were eligible and qualified for the post at the time of their appointment.

    (f) The petitioners' appointment was in conformity with the reservation rule in the respondent's organisation.

    (g) The petitioners' record of service is satisfactory as there have been no complaints from any quarter against any of the petitioners.

    (h) The petitioners have all crossed the age for entry into any Government or quasi-Government service, and, if the petitioners should, at this juncture in their career be dropped, they have no means of livelihood which is akin to the right to life protected by Art. 21 of the Constitution. The situation has been brought about by the respondents extending as a matter of routine, petitioners' service beyond the first year giving rise to a legitimate expectation that they would be absorbed into the regular service in the Scheme that is an on-going one. The need is not ad hoc or temporary. This Court would till in favour of the petitioner's physical existence rather than the respondents' fiscal reason, even if it is true.

    (i) The petitioners have all lost their registration at the Employment Exchange and even if it can be revived, their seniority is lost.

    (j) After the termination of petitioners' services, the respondents has recruited five persons to do the very work, which the petitioners have been doing and which, according to the respondent, does not need any hands. This action is perfidious and vitiated by mala fides.

    11. Sri M.A Sadanand, learned counsel for the petitioners, cited the decisions Inder Pal Yadav v. Union of India [1986 (1) L.L.N 18] and Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority [1990 (2) L.L.N 1032]. Winding up this argument, Sri M.A Sadanand made fervant appeal to the respondent through this Court that the petitioners may be absorbed in any other unit if not in the present unit. According to Sri M.A Sadanand, the petitioners are all poor who had implicit faith in the sense of justice which a public sector undertaking would normally have and they had dedicated themselves to the Scheme and in the process, made themselves unfit for any other avocation in life as society does not accept readily who intermingle with lepers. Therefore, they who have less in life, should have more in law and this Court, the fountain of justice, would grant them the benediction of the dignity of the individual promised in the preamble to the Constitution and exhorted by Arts. 39 and 41 of the Constitution of India by accepting the contention made in their affidavit as truthful regarding the fact that the Scheme is not completed or terminated, and pass an order to extend their tenure.

    12. In support of his contention for extension of service, Sri M.A Sadanand invited my attention to the statement made in Para. 8 of the counter-affidavit in Writ Petition No. 15648 of 1995 and in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 24895 of 1995 wherein it is stated that evcn though the total number of leprosy patients at any given point of time are brought down substantially, new cases of leprosy have been occurring more or less at the same rate in the CJIL Field Unit area in particular and various leprosy endemic districts in general.

    13. The Deputy Director (Senior Grade), CJIL Field Unit, filed a detailed counter-affidavit denying the allegations made in the affidavits filed in support of both the writ petitions. Sri S. Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in reply to the arguments of Sri M.A Sadanand, answered alt the contentions with specific reference to the documents filed and the counter affidavits. He has also invited my attention to the various documents' filed in the typed set, particularly the proceedings, dated 15 September 1991 of the ICMR with regard to the sanction and budget allotment for the scheme in question and for the subsequent years 1991–92, from 1 April 1992 to 31 March 1993, from 1 April 1993 to 31 March 1994, etc., and the order of appointment of staff in the Research Scheme, dated 31 May 1991, order renewing the appointment for the years from 1 April 1992 to 31 March 1993, from 1 April 1993 to 31 March 1994, and from 1 April 1994 to 31 March 1995.

    14. A perusal of the order of appointment would go to show that the Director of the Central Jalma Institute for Leprosy, Tajganj, Agra, has sanctioned the appointment of the persons like the petitioners on a purely temporary ad hoc and year to year basis to work in the Research Scheme, on a consolidated salary per month and that the appointment will get automatically terminated on 31 March of every year and may be renewed on the first of April in the subsequent year.

    15. The appointment is subject to the following terms and conditions of service.

    (1) The post is purely temporary and on yearly renewable basis. However, the Director reserves the right to dispense with his services at any time without assigning any reason before the end of the year/before the termination of the project.

    (2) He will be normally posted anywhere within the area of the Field Unit, avid, Madras, but may be posted at any other place as may be required in the interest of work.

    (3) The appointee under the ‘Scheme’ will not have any benefits like CPF/GPF, Medical Benefits, Bonus, LTC, etc.

    (4) The staff employed under Research Scheme are not employees of the CJIL field Unit/ICMR and the employment of the staff after the completion or termination of the scheme will not be the responsibility of either CJIL Field Unit or ICMR. The staff employed on this scheme shall not have any claim for appointment in CJIL Field Unit/ICMR.

    (5) The appointment can be terminated at any time by giving one month notice on either side. The service of the employees can be terminated forthwith or before the expiry of notice period by making payment to the employees of a sum equivalent to the pay and allowance for unexpired portion of the notice thereof. However, the employees cannot surrender pay and allowances in lieu of the period of notice or unexpired portion thereof and may be required to serve for the full period of notice.

    (6) Service rendered under this scheme will not count for any purpose including seniority, leave, grant of increment, fixation of pay, etc., if appointed to regular vacancies in the CJIL Field Unit or ICMR.

    16. The appointment of the petitioners was renewed from 1 April 1992 to 31 March 1993 and thereafter till 31 March 1995, subject to the same terms and conditions as laid down in their previous appointment letters.

    17. In this background, I now proceed to consider the contentions of Sri M.A Sadanand and the rival submissions of Sri S. Jayaraman.

    18. Though a contention was raised in regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions, that the ICMR is not an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, no serious arguments were advanced on this issue by both parties. Therefore, I refrain from giving my finding on this issue and proceed to consider the matter on merits.

    19. The prayer in Writ Petition No. 15648 of 1995 is for a writ of certiorarified mandamus. The prayer, in my opinion, will arise only when there is a statutory or public duty or obligation cast upon the respondents and they have failed to discharge the same.

    20. In this case, as could be seen from the facts, the employees were engaged on contract basis on and from various dates from 31 May 1991 to 15 June 1992, and which is evidenced from the orders issued to the petitioners. The orders themselves clearly state that the petitioners are engaged only for a specific period. The said contract was renewed at the end of the earlier contract period if there was any necessity for renewing the same. Moreover, this is only a private contract of employment entered into as between the respondent and the concerned petitioners. The contract itself has stipulated various terms and conditions. It clearly states that the posts are temporary. Moreover, the officer-in-charge, has also got a right to dismiss or dispense with the services of the petitioners at any time without assigning any reason before the need of the year or before the termination of the project. The appointees under the scheme will not have any benefits like contributory provident fund, general provident fund, medical benefits, bonus leave travel concession, etc. It is also made clear in the contract that the staff employed in Research Scheme are not employees of CJIL, which is a Field Unit of ICMR, and the employment of the staff after completion or termination of the Scheme will not be the responsibility of either the CJIL Field Unit or the ICMR.

    21. The staff employed in this case shall not have any claim for appointment in CJIL or ICMR. The other condition is, that their appointments can be terminated at any time by giving one month's notice on either side. It further states that the services of the employees can be terminated forthwith or before the expiry of the notice period by making payment to the employees of a sum equivalent to the pay and allowances for the unexpired portion of the notice thereof. However, the employee cannot surrender the pay and allowance in lieu of the period of notice or unexpired portion thereof and may be required to serve the full period of notice. The other important clause is that the services rendered under the Scheme will not count for any purpose including seniority, leave, grant of increment, fixation of pay, etc., if appointed on regular vacancies in CJIL/ICMR.

    22. A careful perusal of the terms and conditions of appointment clearly reveals that it is only a contract of employment entered into between the respondent and the petitioners while it is true that the said contract of employment was renewed for the last two or three years, it does not mean that these employees get a vested right to employment. It is submitted that since it is only a private contract of employment, the petitioners cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution as if public duty has been violated and seek a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to regularise them. Thus amounts to invoking Court's jurisdiction and seeking the Court to renew the contract, which has been entered into between the respondent and the petitioners, and seeking the Court's direction to substitute the same by a new contract. As rightly pointed out by Sri S. Jayaraman, the above is clearly not permissible under law. It is too well settled that such a prayer as asked for in the present writ petition, cannot be maintained in law.

    23. Sri S. Jayaraman, at the time of hearing highlighted certain features and details with regard to this case. As narrated earlier. ICMR has in its control various Research Institutions, Centres and Units, which are functioning throughout the country. One such unit is CJIL at Agra. This unit is a part of Central Jalma Institute for Leprosy (CJIL), which is situate at Agra. The CJIL Field Unit is engaged in various epidemi-logical studies for leprosy. At present, its activities are concentrated a Sriperumbudur and Kancheepuram Taluks of Chengai M.G.R District.

    24. The unit is undertaking various studies with reference to transmission of leprosy and risk factors for leprosy using various immuno-spidemiological studies. All the studies under taken by CJIL Field Unit are essentially oriented towards assisting in research needs of the National Leprosy Eradication Programme. One of the essential areas in which Field Unit is interested is to undertake various intervention studies. Treatment of leprosy using multi-drug therapy has been effectively implemented by the Field Unit. The total load of leprosy prevalence, which was in the range of about 12 per thousand population, has been brought down successfully around 1 to 2 per thousand population. This was achieved because of the ability of multi-drug theraphy to cure patients of leprosy in a comparatively short period of time. It has been observed that even though the total number of leprosy patients at any given point of time are brought down substantially, new cases of leprosy have been occurring more or less at the same ratio in the CJIL Field Unit area in particular and in various leprosy endemic districts in general.

    25. It is submitted by Sri S. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the respondents, that the Leprosy Vaccine Trial is a project undertaken by CJIL Field Unit, which in turn is a unit of ICMR. The petitioners were recruited only for the Leprosy Vaccine Trial Project, which is a time bound one and they have been recruited for a specific period.

    26. It is further argued by Sri S. Jayaraman, that a Comparative Vaccine Trial against leprosy is an important activity of the CJIL Field Unit. Apart from the permanent staff, members of the Unit, it was necessary to recruit additional staff members for specified time limit, for which the petitioners were recruited. For this purpose, an extra-mural project was sanctioned by the ICMR. This project was fully funded by the ICMR which in turn is funded by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. Since, 1991, the CJIL Field Unit is involved in this important exercise.

    27. It is contended by Sri S. Jayaraman that four different promising anti-leprosy vaccines are being tested at community level by this unit and this project has been taken up as a time bound project. For effectively carrying out the project, the staff under various categories were recruited following the usual Government procedure. All the staff except Technical Officer and equivalent and above were appointed on a consolidated salary and all the staff were appointed on yearly renewable basis. It is thus the petitioners have been appointed pursuant to specific contract of employment for a specific period, which was renewed pursuant to one of the conditions of contract of employment, which enables the respondents to renew the period. As pointed out by Sri S. Jayaraman, a mere perusal of the various terms and conditions specified in the contact of employment clearly say that it is a time bound project work and the petitioners are engaged only for the specific purpose. As could be seen from the terms and conditions, the petitioners have no vested right to claim permanent employment. It is also made clear in the contract of employment that the petitioners have agreed and accepted while joining duty that the contract itself can be terminated either before the completion of the project or at the expiry of the period of contact of employment or even earlier by giving necessary notice. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the petitioners were engaged on the specific contract on a time bound project and for a specific period. The petitioners' claim as if they are entitled to regularisation and continuation in employment is totally unsustainable in law and also on the facts of the case.

    28. In this connection, it is useful and necessary to refer to a judgment of this Court in S. Ramachandran v. Director, Voctor Control Research Center, Pondicherry [Writ Petition No. 13260 of 1985, dated 9 April 1986], cited by Sri S. Jayaraman. This decision was rendered by K. Shanmukham, J., on 9 April 1986. In that case, in one of the projects of ICMR, some of the employees who were recruited for a specific period for the project as that of the present one, filed the writ petition seeking similar reliefs. This Court has dismissed that writ petition. While dismissing the writ petition, this Court has clearly and categorically held that these employees are only employees engaged for a particular project and thus they have no vested right for employment. The learned Judge has observed in more than one place that this is not a case of termination of employment of service but the service itself is coming to an end at the expiry of the period of contract, which itself is time bound in nature. The leaned Judge has held that after the expiry of the period of contract, the relationship between the employer and the employee is snapped once and for all. Therefore, they have no locus standi either to claim permanency or continuation in employment or renewal or continuation of the project.

    29. The above judgment of K. Shanmukham, J., was also confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of S. Mohan, J. (as he then was) and S. Ramalingam, J., in [Writ Appeal No. 1215 of 1986], by judgment, dated 25 July 1989. The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal field by the workmen with costs. It is also necessary to point out here that the learned Judges have also taken into account the beneficial consideration and implications, viz., the funding-of the project and the budgetary allocations, etc. The learned Judges have clearly referred to the fact that the project itself is time-bound one and it cannot traverse beyond the budgetary allocation and there cannot be unnecessary expenditure to the exchequer. Citing the above decision, Sri S. Jayaraman contended that there are absolutely no merits in the claim of the petitioners herein.

    30. The petitioners' allegation that the Scheme would last for two decades or more and that the posts for which they have been temporarily recruited are permanent posts, is bereft of any merit. It is submitted by Sri S. Jayaraman, that once the project is accomplished, it is not necessary to continue the project in the State of Tamil Nadu. Secondly, if the ICMR decides to wind up the project, they are permitted to do so because the project itself is funded by the ICMR, which in turn is controlled by the Government of India. Therefore, if there is no budgetary allocation, the project can be wound up. Hence, Sri MA. Sadanand's contention that the project will last for two decades is absolutely devoid of any merit. Moreover, as could be seen from the facts of this case, like any other project, the project-in-charge will have to submit a study report every year to the ICMR and that project report is reviewed by a Technical Committee and later on by the Scientific Advisory Committee. The recommendations of the three committees are reviewed by the ICMR before accepting the budget for the scheme every year. It is only after the perusal and assessment of the said project, the budgetary allocation is made for the next year and year after year. If the budgetary allocation is stopped, the project will have to wound up. Thus, the project itself is contingent upon so many factors as enumerated above. Therefore, the petitioners' contention in this regard is totally unfounded;

    31. Even assuming for a moment that the project is continued for more than a decade, it is not necessary or incumbent on the respondents to continue all the petitioners in service. It is too well settled a principle that the determination of strength of labour force is the prerogative of the management, and, in fact, is the prerogative of the management, and, in fact, a management's function. If, in the distribution and retrenchment is caused, the same is recognised by Courts and is also permissible in law. Therefore, as rightly contended by Sri S. Jayaraman, the petitioners are not entitled to be continued till the project is continued. Moreover, as could be seen from the various documents and also from the facts of this case, the petitioners were appointed only for a specific period on a specific contract, which is renewable at the instance of the respondents. The petitioners have agreed for the said terms and joined duty with the extra-mural project of the CJIL Field Unit. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioners cannot claim that they arc entitled to be continued for ever till the project is continued.

    32. In so far as the contention of Sri M.A Sadanand with regard to the sponsoring by the Employment Exchange, etc., is concerned, it is submitted by Sri S. Jayaraman, that there is no necessity to traverse into those details. The respondents would submit that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that merely because the petitioners have crossed the age of employment elsewhere and become unemployable they can seek the intervention of this Court and seek regularistion, is untenable.

    33. The allegation of the petitioners that the Scheme is expected to last for 20 years is denied by the respondents. It is submitted by Sri S. Jayaraman, that it is not necessary to deal with the same having regard to the nature and scope of the writ petition and “suffice it to point out that one cannot specifically say that the particular Scheme will last for a particular number of years and the expectation of the Scheme to continue for a period is not itself sure and legitimate. Sri S. Jayaraman would submit that the petitioners contention that they were under the impression that they will be continued in employment in view of the fact that the project itself would last for two decades is misconceived for the reasons narrated earlier. The allegation that since leprosy has not been eradicated totally in the country, the petitioners will be entitled to be continued in employment is again bereft of any substance or merit.

    34. Sri S. jayaraman would submit that the allegation of the petitioners that the respondents should be consistent with the requirement of Arts. 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, is again totally untenable because the respondents never violated any of those provisions. Moreover, the petitioners are not entitled, as a matter of right, to employment having regard to the nature of contract which has been entered into between the petitioners and the respondents. As stated earlier, the petitioners were engaged for the specific project of Leprosy Vaccine Trial of CJIL Field Unit for a specific period. This project itself is time bound one and as could be seen from the orders issued to the petitioners, their engagement is also time-bound one for a specified period hence, the petitioners invoking the above mentioned Arts. 12, 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and complaining that the respondents have violated the above articles and thereby seeking relief, cannot be maintained at all. The allegation of the petitioners that their names have been deleted in the Employment Exchange and, therefore, they must be granted the relief is also unsustainable. As pointed out, the petitioners will be given seniority from the date of registration if they report for re-registration to the Employment Exchange within 90 days from, the date of ousting, as communicated by the Employment Exchange Office.

    35. The petitioners have referred to the written representations made by them to the officer-incharge, who in turn contacted the ICMR. For this, the respondents submit that if the ICMR decides either to stop funding the project or allocate lesser funds, the respondents will have no other option excepting to discontinue the contract of all the employees or at least some of them as required.

    36. In answer to the contention of Sri M.A Sadanand, Sri S. Jayaraman, would submit that the petitioners' contention that they are only trained persons in the job and, therefore, there is justification and warrant for regularisation of their services, is not correct. Merely because the petitioners have been engaged for more than three years, it dos not automatically vest any right to them. As narrated in detail in paragraphs supra, the petitioners have neither a vested right nor a fundamental right to employment and consequently, they cannot seek any relief here.

    37. The contention of Sri M.A Sadanand that the petitioners arc graduates and that their appointments were also in conformity with the reservation rules of the respondent organisation, cannot advance the case any further in view of the fact that the issue involved in this case is as to whether the petitioners have any right at all, viz., vested right or the fundamental right as they claim. In view of that, the petitioners' claim that their record of service has been satisfactory is also irrelevant. Sri S. Jayaraman would submit that it is not correct that the record of all the petitioners have been found to be not up to the mark and some of them have also indulged in certain irregularities, for which action had been taken separately.

    38. Sri M.A Sadanand's contention that if the petitioners are discontinued, the right to livelihood is taken away and the same has been brought about by the respondents is again untenable. It is submitted by the respondents that the petitioners were fully conscious of the fact while signing the, contract of employment that they were engaged only for a specific period, renewable at the discretion and instance of the respondents and that too, in a time bound project. The petitioners having signed the contract of employment, cannot now go back and say that the right to livelihood has been taken away by the discontinuation of service. The petitioners contention that the respondents are estopped from discontinuing is absolutely without any merit whatsoever. The respondents would submit that even if the registration of the petitioners in the Employment Exchange is renewed, they lose the seniority is again without any substance in view of the facts stated above.

    39. The contention of Sri M.A Sadanand that the order of appointment is unfair and one sided and hit by absence of consensus and, therefore, violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution is without substance. A mere perusal of the appointment order would show that the petitioners have consented for the same and the conditions have been clearly spelt out in that order. A perusal of the same would show that the above allegation of the petitioner is incorrect.

    40. The contention of the petitioners that they were led to believe by the respondents that they would be absorbed and in that belief they did not seek employment elsewhere and consequently, the respondents arc estopped from discontinuing them on and from 31 March 1995 is contrary to all set proposition of law. It is submitted by Sri S. Jayaraman, that initially the petitioners were appointed only for one year. The terms and conditions of the contract are clearly specific that it may be renewed at the instance of the respondents if at all there is any requirement. The petitioners having been fully aware of the above terms and having signed the contract, cannot now turn round and complain further that their chances of employment elsewhere are deprived and, therefore, the respondents are estopped from discontinuing there services.

    41. The respondents also deny that permanent posts of Field Investigators are lying vacant in the project of the CJIL Field Unit Under the plan budget of CJIL Field Unit, some of the Field Investigators selected against the post of technicians were promoted to the post of technicians and hence, there are no resultant vacancies. Therefore, Sri S. Jayaraman would submit that the contentions of the petitioners are incorrect. The allegation with regard to the promotion of nine Field Investigators to the post of technicians in January-June 1993 and 3 Field Officers as technicians in June 1993, though may be true, will not be of any assistance to the petitioners because they are permanent employees of ICMR and they have been promoted in the regular posts. The further allegations that the above promotion belies the assumption of the respondents that the petitioners cannot be absorbed as there are no vacancies in permanent posts, are again without substance. The respondents have denied that there are many vacancies. Even as denied that there are many vacancies. Even assuming that there are vacancies as stated earlier, the petitioners cannot claim that as a matter of right much less promotion or employment in permanent vacancies.

    42. It is submitted by Sri S. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the respondents, that there is no vested right or any fundamental right for the petitioners. Therefore, they cannot claim any relief asked for by them in the present writ petitions. Moreover, even under the Industrial Disputes Act, appointment on specific contract for a specific period comes within S. 2 (oo) (bb) of the said Act and mere non-renewal of the contract thereof will not amount to “retrenchment.” Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the framers of the statute have made it clear that employment on this type of contract does not vest the employees with any right whatsoever to posts. As stated earlier, the petitioners have absolutely no right for employment and the very right itself is not there.

    43. It is contended by Sri S. Jayaraman, that the petitioners' allegation that even while the writ appeal, which was filed as against the order passed in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994, was pending, the respondent had terminated the services of the petitioners, is not correct. It is submitted that though the communication is, dated 27 March 1995, terminating the services of the petitioners, the actual termination came into effect only on 31 March 1995, whereas, in the meantime, even on 30 March 1995, the Division Bench of this Court was pleased to dismiss the writ appeal directing the learned Judge to dispose of the writ petition by 4 April 1995.

    44. It is submitted by Sri M.A Sadanand, that the respondent had committed contempt of Court. I am of the view that it is not correct. The two applications, viz., Writ Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 28843 and 28844 of 1994 were filed in Writ Petition No. 18969 of 1994. Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994 is for extension of the petitioners' services beyond 31 March 1995 and Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28843 of 1994 is for an injunction restraining the respondents from terminating the services of the petitioners. R. Jayasimha Babu, J., after hearing both parties passed orders dismissing Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994, i.e, the application for extension of services of the petitioners. Unfortunately, by clerical omission, the number of Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28843 of 1994 was not incorporated in the order. The learned Judge has given various reasons as to why he had dismissed Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994, which is for extension of services of the petitioners beyond 31 March 1995. This itself would, in my opinion, clearly show that the question of restraining the respondents from terminating the services of the petitioners pending the writ petition will not survive. The same, it appears, was pointed out to the learned Judge after the dismissal of the writ appeal, that there had been an omission in mentioning the number of Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28843 of 1994 in the orders passed on 16 November 1994 in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 28844 of 1994. R. Jayasimha Babu, J., was pleased to accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents and recorded the same. Hence, I am of the view, that the respondents have not committed any contempt as alleged. This apart, the termination came into effect only on and from 31 March 1995, whereas the writ appeal has been disposed of even on 30 March 1995.

    45. Reference to the judgments of the Apex Court by the petitioners' counsel referred to above cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners having regard to the facts of the case. As stated earlier, the petitioners were engaged for a particular project for a specified period and the same was renewable year after year, and their services were discontinued in accordance with the terms of the contract and as such, I am of the view, that the allegations made by the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of this case. I am also of the view and it is well settled that the termination of an employee, who was appointed for a particular project, after the purpose for which he was employed was over, in accordance with the contract of employment will not amount to an arbitrary termination and such an employee does not have the vested right to continue in service.

    46. The contention of Sri M.A Sadanand that if the petitioners are discontinued, the right to livelihood is taken away and the same has been brought about by the respondents is untenable. The petitioners, in my view, were fully conscious of the fact that while signing the contract of employment, they were engaged only for a specific period renewable at the discretion and instance of the respondents and that too, in a time bound project. The petitioners having signed the contract of employment with such conditions, cannot now go back and say that the right to livelihood has been taken away by the discontinuance of service. The petitioners' contention that the respondents are estopped from discontinuing is absolutely without any merit whatsoever.

    47. The submission of Sri M.A Sadanand that even if the registration of the petitioners in the Employment Exchange is renewed, they lose the seniority is again without any substance. Likewise, the further contention of the petitioners that the order of appointment is unfair and one-sided and hit by absence of consensus and, therefore, violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution is without any merit. A mere perusal of the appointment order would show that the petitioners have consented for the same and the conditions have been clearly spelt out in the order. A perusal of the same would show that the above allegations of the petitioners are incorrect.

    48. The further contention of Sri M.A Sadanand that the petitioners were led to believe by the respondents that they would be absorbed and in that belief they did not seek employment elsewhere and consequently the respondents are estopped from discontinuing them on and from 31 March 1995 is contrary to all set propositions of law. As narrated earlier, the petitioners were appointed only for one year. The terms and conditions of the contract are clearly specific that it may be renewed at the instance of the respondents if at all there is any requirement. The petitioners having been fully aware of the above terms and having signed the contract, cannot, in my opinion, now turn round and complain that their chances of employment elsewhere are deprived and, therefore, the respondents are estopped in discontinuing their services.

    49. In regard to the allegation that the field work is going to be started at Pudukottai, Salem and Nilgiris, it is submitted by Sri S. Jayaraman that the projects which are to be undertaken in those places are not the projects undertaken by the organisation and that those projects are undertaken by the respondents, for which some of the permanent Field Investigators of the respondents are sought for by that organisation and that for the service surrendered by the permanent Field Investigators of the respondents, that organisation would compensate the respondents as well as the Field Investigators. Therefore, the petitioners' allegation that their services would be required a Pudukottai, Salem and Nilgiris, is devoid of any merit.

    50. The judgment cited by Sri S. Jayaraman Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Rajeev Kumar Srivastava [1994 (1) L.L.N 460], of the Allahabad High Court is directly on the point. In Para. 17, at page 464 that Court has observed as follows:

    The next submission of the learned counsel of the appellants is that the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director, Institute of Management Development, Utttar Pradesh (1992 (2) L.L.N 863, determines the case of the parties may be seen. In this case Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the appointment is purely on ad hoc basis and is contractual and by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the said post. We have considered the submissions. The ratio of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner's contractual employment on daily payment basis having come to end by efflux of time, does not amount to retrenchment. Thus the provisions of S. 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act is also not attracted”

    51. In Director, “Institute of Management Development, Uttar Pradesh v. Pushpa Srivastava (1992 (2) L.L.N 863], which was followed in the above judgment by the Allahabad High Court, the Supreme Court held that the appointment being contractual and ad hoc which came to an end by efflux of time, the respondents therein had no right to continue in the post and to claim regularisation in service in the absence of any rule providing for regularisation after a specified period of service. However, in the above case, the respondent was directed to be continued in the service till the end of the current calendar year on the same terms.

    52. Before concluding, let me invite the attention of the respondents to the averments made in Para. 8 of the counter-affidavit filed in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 24895 of 1995 in Writ Petition No. 15648 of 1995, wherein it is stated as follows:

    “It has been observed that even though the total number of leprosy patients at any given point of time are brought down substantially, new cases of leprosy have been occurring more or less at the same rate in CJIL Field Unit area in particular and various leprosy endemic districts in general.”

    53. The above statement would show that the scheme is likely to be continued further. If so, the respondents may sympathetically consider the re-employment of the petitioners, who have alt crossed the age for entry into any Government service, for such period should they so desire. In that event, this judgment will not stand in the way of the respondents considering the case of the petitioners. However, I make it clear that it is not to be understood that I have directed regularisation of the services of the petitioners.

    54. The writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

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