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  • provisions of S. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Land Charges Act, 1925.
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of S. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Land Charges Act, 1925.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The 1st respondent-Bank filed a suit against the appellant (4th defendant in O.S No. 14 of 1982) and defendants 2 to 4 for recovery of Rs. 69,083.52 with interest and costs. The defendants 2 to 4 obtained loans under “Cash Credit Facility” and “Overdraft Facility on Trade Bills” for business expansion, with the appellant agreeing to act as guarantor and providing his property as security by executing a Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deed (Ex. A.8). The defendants 2 to 4 hypothecated their goods as additional security. The Bank alleged non-payment despite repeated demands and filed suit for recovery. Defendants 1 to 3 did not contest, while the appellant filed a written statement denying guarantor status and asserting he signed documents only as an attestor, without understanding or consenting to a mortgage. The trial court framed seven issues, including whether the appellant created an equitable mortgage and whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the Bank, which led to the present appeal by the appellant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of cause of action?
  2. Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable?
  3. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction?
  4. Whether defendants 1 to 3 stood as guarantors?
  5. Whether the 4th defendant created an equitable mortgage?
  6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the interest claimed?
  7. To what relief?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant denied expressing willingness to stand as guarantor and claimed he only signed as an attestor to documents executed by defendants 1 to 3.
  • He alleged that Bank officials took his signature on blank papers and forms without disclosing the nature or contents.
  • He contended that he did not mortgage his properties by depositing title deeds.
  • Even if a mortgage existed, it was invalid because only a copy, not the original document, was deposited with the Bank.
  • The appellant disputed having posted a consent letter (Ex. A.18) to the Bank.

Respondent-Bank's Arguments

  • The Bank asserted that the appellant executed a Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deed (Ex. A.8) creating an equitable mortgage as collateral security for the loan repayment.
  • The Bank relied on documentary evidence and the appellant’s own admissions to prove the mortgage and guarantee.
  • It argued that deposit of original documents is not necessary to create a valid equitable mortgage, citing binding precedents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.A.V.R Nataraja Nadar & Sons v. State Bank of India, 1993(1) L.W 456 Original documents are not necessary to create a valid equitable mortgage; bona fide deposit of title deeds suffices. The court relied on this precedent to hold that the appellant’s deposit of title deed copies constituted a valid equitable mortgage.
Angu Pillai v. Kasi Viswanathan Chettiar, 1973(1) M.L.J 334 = 86 L.W 94 Deeds deposited bona fide relating to the property and intended as security constitute an equitable mortgage. Followed to affirm that the appellant’s deposit of title deeds was sufficient to create an equitable mortgage.
Chidambaram Chettiar v. Aziz, A.I.R 1938 Rangoon 148 Reviewed English and Indian authorities on equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Supported the principle that original documents are not essential if deposited deeds relate to the property and show intention to create security.
Jessie Moyle Stewart v. Bank of Upper India Limited, A.I.R 1916 Lahore 39 Equitable mortgage can be created by deposit of attested copies of title deeds. Applied to reject appellant’s contention that only originals could create a valid mortgage.
Gurudas Mal v. Punjab-Sindh Bank Ltd., A.I.R 1933 Lahore 972 Deposit of copy of award evidencing title can create equitable mortgage when original is elsewhere. Affirmed that deposit of copies can suffice to create equitable mortgage.
K.J Nathan v. S.V Maruthi Rao, A.I.R 1963 S.C 430 Documents of title deposited must show prima facie title and intention to create security for debt repayment. Quoted approvingly to emphasize that deposit of title deeds creates prima facie equitable mortgage unless rebutted.
K. Prakasa Rao v. N. Ramakrishna Rao, A.I.R 1982 Andhra Pradesh 272 Deposit of true copy of title deed can create valid equitable mortgage without original document. Relied upon to reject the appellant’s argument that only originals can create valid mortgage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully examined the evidence, focusing on the appellant’s own admissions and two key documents (Exs. A.8 and A.18). The appellant admitted signing the Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deed (Ex. A.8) and a consent letter (Ex. A.18) expressing his intention to create an equitable mortgage as security for the loan repayment by defendants 2 to 4. The court rejected the appellant’s claim that he signed only as an attestor, noting his experience as a Vakil clerk and that he did not read the documents before signing. The court also found the appellant’s denial of posting the consent letter unconvincing.

Legally, the court relied on established precedents holding that deposit of original title deeds is not essential to create an equitable mortgage; bona fide deposit of documents evidencing title suffices. The court referenced authoritative decisions from the Madras, Andhra Pradesh, Lahore, Calcutta High Courts, and the Supreme Court, which collectively establish that the intention to create security and delivery of title deeds or their material evidence is determinative.

Applying these principles, the court concluded that the appellant did create an equitable mortgage in favor of the Bank by depositing the title deeds and consenting in writing. The trial court’s decision was affirmed as it was based on a proper appraisal of oral and documentary evidence and correct application of legal principles.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs, thereby affirming the decree in favor of the 1st respondent-Bank for recovery of the loan amount with interest and costs against the appellant.

The direct effect of this decision is that the appellant is held liable as guarantor and mortgagor for the loan facilities granted to defendants 2 to 4, validating the equitable mortgage created by deposit of title deeds (including copies) and consent letter. No new legal precedent is set; rather, the court reaffirmed settled law regarding creation of equitable mortgages without necessity of original documents, emphasizing the intention of parties and bona fide deposit of title deeds.

    C. Rajagopal v. State Bank Of Travancore, Karur Branch, Karur By Its Manager.

    JUDGMENT

    AR. Lakshmanan, J.

    The 4th defendant in O.S No. 14 of 1982 on the file of Sub Court, Vriddhachalam, is the appellant in the present appeal. The 1st respondent-Bank filed the suit against the appellant and respondents-2 to 4 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 69,083-52 together with subsequent interest and for costs. According to the 1st respondent, respondents 2 to 4 herein approached the Bank for loan facilities to be granted to them under two classifications styled as “Cash Credit Facility” and “Overdraft Facility on Trade Bills”, for the purpose of expanding and developing their business. The appellant herein, who was the 4th defendant in the suit, has expressed his willingness to stand as guarantor for the facilities granted and to be granted by way of enhancement. Accordingly the plaintiff initially granted the maximum limit of Rs. 10,000/- on 2.3.1979 on the Loan Classification “Cash Credit Facility” and a maximum limit of Rs. 25,000/- on 2.3.1979 in “Overdraft on Trade Bills”. Respondents 2 to 4 have executed necessary promissory notes and other documents in favour of the Bank as required under the Rules. Respondents 2 to 4 have also agreed to hypothecate their goods and whole of their stocks in Trade and Merchandise stocked in their premises at Karur which relates to the loan sanctioned and paid to them under cash credit classification. The deed of hypothecation dated 2.3.1979 has been filed as Document No. 3 in the suit. The 4th defendant (appellant herein) has also executed the Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deed which has been marked as Ex. A.8 in the suit. Under the said document, the 4th defendant, the appellant herein has given his property situated in S. No. 314/1A house site as a security for the due repayment of the loan sanctioned to the defendants 2 to 4. Therefore, the defendants 2 to 4 have also executed additional guarantee for the additional amounts sanctioned and received by them. According to the plaintiff Bank, the 4th defendant is also liable to the plaintiff for the loan dealings of other defendants in respect of the facilities granted and also enhanced from time to time and in consideration of the loans granted to them. The 4th defendant with intention to create an equitable mortgage on his immovable property mentioned in the schedule to the said document and by way of collateral security, deposited his title deeds relating to the property mentioned in Ex. A.8 on 1.3.1979 with the plaintiff at Karur. It is the further case of the plaintiff Bank that the 4th defendant has also left a Memorandum of Deposit of Title deeds dated 6.3.1979 signed by him. The said Memorandum has been marked as Ex. A.8 in this proceeding. Since the defendants have not paid the amount due to the plaintiff in spite of repeated demands, the plaintiff has filed the above suit for recovery of the money due to them from the defendants 1 to 4. Respondents 2 to 4 who are defendants 1 to 3 have not filed any written statement and contested the proceedings. The 4th defendant, the appellant herein, alone has filed a written statement. According to the 4th defendant, he never expressed his willingness to stand as a guarantor for defendants 1 to 3 and he was asked to sign some documents only as an attestor for the documents executed by defendants 1 to 3 and that the officials of the plaintiff Bank took the signatures of the 4th defendant in several forms and blank papers stating that he is signing only as attestor to the documents. It is also his case that the Bank officials took his signature in number of blank papers and forms without disclosing the real nature and contents of the documents. According to him, he did not mortgage his properties by deposit of title deeds and even assuming without admitting that there is a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff Bank, the said mortgage is not valid since a copy of the document alone has been filed with the Bank and not the original. On behalf of the plaintiff-Bank, Exs. A.1 to A.19 were marked and on behalf of defendants' side, Exs. B.1 to B.3 were marked. The plaintiff-Bank examined its Manager and the 4th defendant has examined himself as D.W 1. The Lower Court on the above pleadings framed the following seven issues.

    1. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of cause of action?

    @BT9PTIND = 2. Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable?

    @BT9PTIND = 3. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction?

    @BT9PTIND = 4. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 stood as guarantors?

    @BT9PTIND = 5. Whether 4th defendant created equitable mortgage?

    @BT9PTIND = 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the interest claimed?

    @BT9PTIND = 7. To what relief?

    2. Since the decree is challenged only by the 4th defendant, we are not adverting to the other documents filed by the plaintiff-Bank to prove their claim. Therefore, we confine ourselves to the evidence adduced by D.W 1 and two crucial documents viz., Exs. A.8 and A.18 The learned Subordinate Judge, on a careful consideration of the entire materials placed before him and on an appraisal of the evidence tendered both oral and documentary, has decreed the suit as prayed for with costs. Mr. R. Aravindan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant herein, would reiterate the contentions raised by the 4th defendant in the written statement. According to the learned counsel, the 4th defendant did not create any mortgage in favour of the plaintiff Bank and even assuming without admitting that the mortgage is created, the said mortgage is not valid since the original document has not been deposited with the Bank. He would further contend that the court below has failed to note that even the original partition document is only produced by the 4th defendant and that would not show that the plaintiff's case of deposit of title deeds by the 4th defendant is not correct and therefore, the court below should have on the entire evidence, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree against the 4th defendant. We are unable to agree with the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant herein. As rightly pointed out by the learned Subordinate Judge, the appellant herein has executed Ex. A.8 clearly expressing his intention to create an equitable mortgage in favour of the plaintiff Bank for the due repayment of the amounts advanced to the other defendants. Ex. A.8 has been signed by the 4th defendant on 6.3.1979 In the description of property, the 4th defendant has clearly mentioned the nature of title deeds as security and the survey number of the property and the area, extent, etc. In page 2 of the Memorandum of Deposit of Title deeds, the appellant has duly signed the said document. This apart, the appellant has also executed Ex. A.18 clearly willing to offer his property as security for the amount to be advanced to the respondents 2 to 4 herein. The said document has been written by the 4th defendant himself in his own hand writing and is also duly signed by him. Therefore, we are unable to accept the case of the appellant herein that he was asked to sign some documents only as an attestor of the documents executed by the defendants 1 to 3 and that he signed only as an attestor to the document. In fact, the appellant herein, has admitted his signature in all the documents filed by the plaintiff in his evidence as D.W 1. In our opinion, the 4th defendant has not discharged his burden to prove that he has attested the documents only as an attestor. He has also admitted in his evidence that he did not take any steps to read the documents before affixing his signature. It is seen from his evidence that he is working as a Vakil clerk for more than 25 years and he would not sign any document without reading the contents of the same. He has further admitted in his evidence that when he affixed his signature, the 2nd defendant, 3rd defendant, Bank Manager, Accountant and other staff of the Bank were present. He has also categorically admitted that even after the issue of notice and filing of the suit, he did not approach the second and third defendants about the matter in dispute. Therefore, we are unable to accept the oral evidence of the appellant herein as D.W 1 that he has signed only as an attestor which in our opinion, is only an afterthought and has been invented only for the purpose of this case. The execution of Ex. A.18, which is a consent letter written by the appellant herein to the plaintiff Bank, has also been admitted by the appellant herein in his evidence. As pointed out earlier, the appellant has agreed to create an equitable mortgage under Ex. A.18 in favour of the 1st respondent-Bank. Further Ex. A.18 was sent by the appellant under a registered post from his native place to Kallakurichi to the 1st respondent Bank. The contention now raised by the appellant that he did not post the said letter, cannot also be accepted.

    3. We are also unable to countenance the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the mortgage created by the appellant only with a copy of the document, is not valid, in view of the number of pronouncements of our High Court and also of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. An identical question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of our High Court reported in 1993(1) L.W 456 M.A.V.R Nataraja Nadar & Sons etc. v. State Bank of India & 2 others in which one of us, is a party (Abdul Hadi, J.). The Division Bench, on a consideration of the entire law on the subject and in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of this Court and other High Courts, held that in order to create a valid mortgage, it is not necessary that the original documents of title to the property should be deposited. The Division Bench has also followed some of the earlier judgments of our High Court reported in A.I.R 1925 Madras 723 The The Official Assignee Of Madras…(), v. Basudevadoss Badrinarayan Doss…(Petitioner), * and 1973(1) M.L.J 334 = 86 L.W 94 Angu Pillai v. Kasi Viswanathan Chettiar, which in turn followed a Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Aziz A.I.R 1938 Rangoon 148. The Full Bench has reviewed the English and Indian authorities and has pointed out that in order to create a valid mortgage, it is not necessary that the whole, or even the most material of the documents of title to the property should be deposited, that the documents deposited should show a complete or good title in the depositors and it is sufficient if the deeds deposited bona fide relate to the property or are material evidence of title and shown to have been deposited with the intention of creating security thereon.

    4. It is also relevant at this stage to notice a decision of the Lahore High Court reported in A.I.R 1916 Lahore 39 in which the said High Court held that “title includes copies, where the originals are not forthcoming”. A.I.R 1932 Calcutta 589 is also an authority for the same proposition Surendra Mohan Rai Choudhury v. Mahendra Nath Banerjee) wherein a similar view was expressed by the Calcutta High Court. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in a later decision made an observation that it is sufficent if the deeds deposited bona fide relating to the property are material evidence of title and are shown to have been deposited with the intention of creating a charge. It is to be noticed that in the Calcutta case, besides the certificate of probate, only a certified copy of the redemption certificate was produced as the Court held that deposit of certified copy of redemption certificate taken along with the probate clearly indicates an intention to create a security on the probate.

    5. Our Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of creation of equitable mortgage in K.J Nathan v. S.V Maruthi Rao A.I.R 1963 S.C 430. After referring to the observation in V.E.R.M.A.R Chettiyar Firm v. Ma Joo Teen I.L.R 1933 Rangoon 239 = A.I.R 1933 Rangoon 299 to the effect that what the terms “documents of title” and “title deeds” denote is that such a document or documents show a prima facie or apparent title in the depositor or some interests therein, quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment A.I.R 1965 S.C 430.

    “If the form of the documents of title that have been delivered to the creditor is such that from the deposit of such documents alone the Court would be entitled to conclude that the documents were deposited with the intention of creating a security for the repayment of debt, prima facie a mortgage by deposit of title deed would be proved; although of course, such an inference would not be irrebuttable, and would not be drawn if the weight of the evidence as a whole told against it”.

    6. Thus, a Court will have to see and ascertain in each case whether in substance there is a delivery of title deeds by the debtor to the creditor. In the instant case, the appellant has in fact deposited with the Bank the title deed with intention to create a mortgage in favour of the Bank for the due repayment of the amounts advanced to the other defendants. The above referred to Division Bench of our High Court in 1973(1) M.L.J 334 = 86 L.W 94 has also held that it is sufficient if the deeds deposited bona fide relate to the property or are material evidence of title or are shown to have been deposited with the intention of creating security thereon, to constitute an equitable mortgage by the appellant in favour of the Bank in respect of his right in the property which has been mortgaged to the Bank. As seen above, the intention of the appellant to create an equitable mortgage in respect of the property was confirmed by the appellant, in Ex. A.18 consent letter, in clear and unambiguous terms. In our considered view, this is sufficient to constitute an equitable mortgage by the appellant in favour of the Bank in respect of his rights over the property in question.

    7. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. R. Aravindan, cited a decision in K. Prakasa Rao v. N. Ramakrishna Rao A.I.R 1982 Andhra Pradesh 272 to contend that by producing true copy, a valid equitable mortgage cannot be created. Two contentions were raised before the Andhra Pradesh High Court by the counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant therein (1) there cannot be a valid equitable mortgage in favour of the Bank over the property subject matter of Ex. A.2 (sale deed) without delivering to the Bank the original title deed; (2) it was an act of gross neglect on the part of the Bank to have accepted the delivery of a registration extract of a sale deed without insisting on the delivery of the original of the sale deed. The Division Bench turned down the plea of the learned counsel for the appellant in that case. In that case, the deposit of an extract from the registration of the sale deed in favour of the borrower was held sufficient to create a valid mortgage. The Court rejected the argument that a valid mortgage (by deposit of title deeds) can never be created without delivering the original title deeds. In support of its decision, the Court also relied on Jessie Moyle Stewart v. Bank of Upper India Limited A.I.R 1916 Lahore 39 where only attested copies of title deeds had been deposited and Gurudas Mal v. Punjab-Sindh Bank Ltd. A.I.R 1933 Lahore 972 where a copy of an award evidencing title had been deposited, the original having been filed in a Court.

    8. Much closer to the decision in the abovesaid case in the remark made by Pepys, M.R in Goodwin v. Waghom 1835(41) RR 208 that the deposit of a copy of a Court roll (official record) would suffice to create an equitable mortgage. It should, however, be noted that in England, an equitable mortgage can be created without deposit of title deeds, but in such cases, the charges must be registered under the Land Charges Act, 1925. In view of the provisions of S. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, deposit of documents of title is, however, essential in India to create what is frequently referred to as an equitable mortgage. The issue that, therefore, arises in cases like the present is whether the term “document” of title would only apply to a document by which the mortgagor derives title to the property to be mortgaged, or whether it would also apply to any document which provides some, if not conclusive, evidence that the mortgagor has title to the property. In our view, it is beyond doubt that the term lends itself to the interpretation that it includes the latter category of documents.

    9. In matters like this, the intention of the parties alone is the prime factor to be considered. The appellant has clearly expressed his intention to create an equitable mortgage in favour of the 1st respondent-Bank under Ex. A.18 We also find that the conduct of the appellant leaves no doubt that he intended to create an equitable mortgage in favour of the Bank in order to enable the other defendants to avail the credit facilities from the Bank. The Trial Court has dealt with the oral and documentary evidence in full and we agree with the conclusion reached by the Trial Court on this aspect.

    10. The appeal, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent-Bank.

    KA/RR/VCS

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    Comments

    C. Rajagopal v. State Bank Of Travancore, Karur Branch, Karur By Its Manager.
    (Nov 8, 1994)