Abdul Hadi, J.

In all these civil miscellaneous petitions one common question of law is involved and hence they are disposed of together. These civil miscellaneous petitions are for stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the Awards passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in three different Motor Accidents Claims Original Petitions, pending disposal of three different civil Miscellanous Petitions for excusing the delay in filing the respective Civil Miscellanous Appeal against the Awards passed in respective Motor Accidents Claims Original Petition. The question is whether these stay petitions are maintainable in the teeth of O. 41, R. 3A(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in other words, whether O. 41, R. 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to such Civil Miscellaneous Appeals filed in this Court under S. 110-D Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or under S. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

2. Order 41 Rule 3A(1) reads as follows:—

“When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he had sufficent cause for not prefering the appeal within such period.”

Order 41, Rule 3A(3) runs as follows:—

“Where an application has been made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall not make an order for the stay of execution of the decree against which the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the Court does not, after hearing under rule 11, decide to hear the appeal.”

Thus, where in an appeal arising out of a regular suit, there is delay in filing the said appeal and an application is filed for excusing the said delay, the abovesaid sub-rule (3) of O. 41, R. 3A, C.P.C precludes the Court from granting an interim stay for execution of decree, until the Court, after hearing under R. 11 of O. 41, C.P.C, admits the appeal for being heard. Therefore, in short, the question to be decided is, whether the same Rule would apply when an appeal is filed against the Award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act.

3. Respective learned Counsel in the above Civil Miscellaneous Peititions made the following submission:— The provisions of O. 41, R. 3A, C.P.C will not apply to the abovesaid appeal under the Motor Vehicles Act. The decisions in Gouse Bi v. Salima Bi (87 L.W 171 (D.B)), National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Vasantha (1987 A.C.J 887 (Madras) = 100 L.W 683 D.B), Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kattanreddi Subbareddy (1975 ACJ 95 A.P) R. Govindarajulu Naidu v. S. Dharman 1986 ACJ 178 (Madras) = 97 L.W 606 D.B), Nirmala Chaudhary v. Bisheshar Lal (AIR 1979 Delhi 26) and State of Assam v. Gobinda Chandra Paul (AIR 1991 Gauhati 104) were relied on by them.

4. We have considered the abovesaid submission. We may first of all state the relevant provisions under which such appeals are filed under the Motor Vehicles Act against the Awards passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Under the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, S. 110-D is the relevant provision, which runs as follows:—

“Appeals: (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claim Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees.”

The corresponding Section in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is

S. 173. There is no difference between the two provisions except the following:—

(1) Under S. 173 of the New Act, there is one more proviso in Cl. (1), by which it is provided that such an appeal shall not be entertained unless the appellant deposits Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court. (2) Under the present S. 173(2), if the Award amount in dispute is less than Rs. 10,000/- no appeal shall lie. (The provision under the old Act was Rs. 2,000/- instead of the abovesaid Rs. 10,000/-). Anyway, apart from what is stated above, no other procedure relating to the abovesaid appeal to the High Court has been provided in the Motor Vehilces ‘Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Particular mention may also be made that even with references to the power of granting stay of execution of the Award, pending an appeal which has been filed in time, nothing has been specifically provided for, under the abovesaid Act or the Rules thereunder and it is needless to say that the High Court, when it grants stay in such an appeal under the Motor Vehicles Act, grants stay only pursuant to O. 41, R. 5 C.P.C

5. Further, it is by now well settled that once the matter reaches the High ‘Court, all provisions of Civil Procedure Code would be applicable and the High Court in dealing with such appeals, is not in the position of a Special Tribunal, but hears the matter as the Original Appellate Court and hence the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable before it. A Bench of this Court has also held so in Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Lazarammal (AIR 1974 Madras 379 (D.B) = 87 L.W 322). In the said decision, this Court was considering whether cross-objections could be filed under O. 41, R. 22 C.P.C in the appeal filed to this Court against the Award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. There, this Court observed thus:—

“As we pointed out earlier, S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act contemplates an appeal to the High Court. Once an appeal is entertained by this Court, all the Rules in the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable, to such an appeal, in as much as no other procedure is prescribed under the said Act. That means, O. 41, R. 22, C.P Code would be applicable and the respondent in an appeal would be entitled to present a Memorandum of Cross-objections as provided under the said Rules.”

5A. Another Division Bench of this Court in Kullappan v. Meenakshi (AIR 1982 Madras 176 = 95 L.W 6) also applied O. 41. R. 27 (1)(b) C.P.C in the appeal under S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The relevant observation there is as follows:—

“We therefore, receive the said document as additional evidence invoking the power under O. 41, R. 27 (1)(b), C.P Code, and mark the said policy in the appeals as Ex. R-3.”

5B. Even the decsion in Govindarajulu Naidu v. Dharman (1986 ACJ 178 = 97 L.W 606) referred to above as cited by counsel has held in the same way. Actually, the said decisions does not support the contention of the petitioners' Counsel. There, the question was whether O. 44, R. 1, C.P.C is applicable to an appeal against the Award by the Claims Tribunal. Answering the said question in the affirmative, this court observed as follows:—

“This Court is not constituted as a Special Tribunal to hear appeals under the Act. S. 10-D merely states that any person aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribunal may within the time prescribed prefer an appeal to the High Court, and the matter is left there. When the statute directs an appeal to an ordinary civil court, without in any manner circumscribing the practice, procedure and powers of such Court as a civil appellate court, the court will have to deal with the appeals with all the trappings and powers as an ordinary civil court of appeal. This is the fundamental rule that has been uniformly countenanced and applied by courts….. Thus, we find that uniformly it has been countenanced that the High Court, while hearing an appeal under the Act, exercises its ordinary appellate powers and should follow its practice and procedure as are normally attributable to it as an ordinary appellate court; and in the absence of any circumscription or regulation of the said powers, the rules of practice and procedure, and power as per the provisions of the Code can be legitimately invoked for the purposes set out therein in the matter of dealing with such an appeal. Order 33 of the Code deals with institution of proceedings by indigent persons. Order 44 deals with appeals by indigent persons and it contemplates that appeals by indigent persons shall be dealt with in the same manner as institution of original proceedings by indigent persons. In this view, we have to hold that it will be competent for the appellants to invoke the aid of Order 44 and thereby Order 33 of the Code.”

No doubt, learned Counsel who relied on this decision contends that the word “trappings” used in the above passage would mean only “embellishment” or “adornment” and so, according to him, though the other provisions of Civil Procedure Code, which give powers to this court may be applicable, the abovesaid provision in O. 41, R. 3A(3), which restricts its power to grant stay, will not be applicable. There is absolutely no merit in this argument. The term “trappings” also means “characteristic accompaniments” and, therefore, there can be no doubt that all the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the abovesaid appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act.

5C). Even the other decsion cited by the same learned Counsel, viz., 1987 ACJ 887 (Supra) which is again a decision of a Division Bench of this Court does not support the argument. There also, the question was, whether O. 41, R. 33, C.P.C could be applied to the abovesaid appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Division Bench only held that O. 41, R. 33, C.P.C could be invoked though it held that the facts in that case do not warrant the application of the said rule.

5D). No doubt, the Bench referred to the above referred to 1975 ACJ 95 (A.P), where it appears the following observation has been made:—

“It cannot, therefore, be contended that once the appeal reached the H.C all the provisions in Civil Procedure Code applicable to appeals to the H.C are automatically attracted.”

For making this observation, it appears the Andhra Pradesh High Court purported to rely on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board (AIR 1934 Madras 103). But, we find that AIR 1934 Madras 103 (Supra) does not lay down such proposition. It has only held that an order passed by the District Judge on an application made to the District Court to set aside the decision of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board under S. 84(!) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (2 of 1927) is not appealable to the High Court because, although that order complies with all the other requirements of the definition of a “decree”, it cannot be a decree in as much as an application cannot be the commencement of a suit and without a suit there cannot be a decree. In our view, A.I.R 1934 Madras 103 (F.B) (Supra) cannot at all lead to the proposition laid down in the above referred to Andhra Pradesh decision. Further, the said observation of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is contrary to several decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and the Privy Council.

6. In this connection, it is worth mentioning the decision by the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Brothers Ltd. (AIR 1953 SC 357), where it observed, dealing with an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Registrar, under S. 76 of the Trade Marks Act, thus:—

“The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court. This rule was very succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C in ‘National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General’, (1913) Ac 546 in these terms:—

‘When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches.’…. S. 76, Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by S. 76, it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction. ..”

6A). Further, in Collector, Voronosi v. Gouri Shanker (AIR 1968 SC 384) also the Supreme Court reiterated the proposition laid down in AIR 1953 S.C 357 (supra), in the contet of an appeal to the High Court under S. 19(1)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1938. The relevant observations therein are as follows:—

“We were informed that neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder prescribe any special procedure for the disposal of appeals under S. 19(1)(f). Appeals under the provision have to be disposed of just in the same manner as other appeals to the High Court. Obviously, after the appeal had reached the High Court, it had to be determined according to the rules or practice and procedure of that court. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court.”

7. Counsel for one of the petitioners also contends that O. 41 R. 3-A(1) gives a further right to claim condonation of the delay, in addition to such right under S. 5 of the Limitation Act and that O. 41, R. 3-A(3) will have application only if the said S. 5 is invoked. According to him these petitions to condone delay are filed under S. 173 of the Motor Vehciles Act and not under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, he relied on Nirmala Chaudhary v. Bisheshar Lal (AIR 1979 Delhi 26) and State of Assam v. Gobinda Chandra Paul (AIR 1991 Gauhati 104.) The observation in A.I.R 1979 Delhi 26 is no doubt as follows:

“The newly added provision of R. 3A of O. 41 in the Civil P.C gives an additional right to a litigant to claim condonation at the time of presenting the appeal.”

In State of Assam v. Gobinda Chandra Paul (AIR 1991 Gauhati 104) also similar view appears to have been expressed in the following words:—

“Besides, this rule is not in derogation of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In fact, it is in addition to that.”

But, we are unable to subscribe to this view, since O. 41 R. 3-A, C.P.C has only been inserted by the Amending Act, 1976 in order to prescribe the procedure for securing the final determination of the question as to limitation even at the stage of admission of the appeal. The Rule does not prescribe the period of limitation for an appeal. The period of limitation is provided only under Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in respect of appeals and it cannot be said that O. 41, R. 3-A gives any additional right to litigants to claim condonation. Moreover, condonation of delay is not a matter of right. The litigant who comes to court after the prescribed period of limitation is bound to satisfy the court that he has sufficient cause for the delay.

8. We may also point out that a Full Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in K. Chandrashekara Naik v. Narayana (AIR 1975 Karnataka 18) held that in an appeal under S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, cross-objections are maintainable under O. 41, R. 22, C.P.C In the said decision, the Karnataka High Court relied on the above referred to Supreme Court decisions and other decisions.

9. Once it is held that the provisions of Rr. 22, 27 and 33 of O. 41, C.P.C are applicable, there is no reason to exclude R. 3-A thereof. In the result, we hold that these Civil Miscellaneous Petitions are not maintainable in view of O. 41, R. 3-A(3), C.P.C and accordingly we dismiss the same.

RR/VCS.