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  • Order 20 Rule 12(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • S. 7, Court Fees Act and O. 7 R. 2, C.P.C
  • provisions of O. 20, Rule 12, Civil
  • (Sec clause (ba) of Rule 1).
  • Rule 12(c) of O. 20
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 20 Rule 12(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • S. 7, Court Fees Act and O. 7 R. 2, C.P.C
  • provisions of O. 20, Rule 12, Civil
  • (Sec clause (ba) of Rule 1).
  • Rule 12(c) of O. 20
  • Order 8, rule 3
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment arises from a second appeal which was taken up for admission on 29.7.1993. The court framed a single question of law for consideration: whether the judgment and decree of the courts below were vitiated by granting future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per mensem without evidence on record and without conducting an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12, Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). Respondents had taken notice and the appeal was posted for argument on the scheduled date.

At the original trial: the plaintiffs served notices (Ex. A15 dated 6.8.1980 claiming damages at Rs. 500 per mensem from April 1977; Ex. A17 dated 10.3.1984 claiming that the tenancy premises would normally get a rental not less than Rs. 1,000 per mensem and indicating intention to sue from 1.5.1984). The defendants replied (Ex. A18 dated 17.3.1984) objecting to the claimed sum as "fabulous". The suit was filed in July 1984.

Paragraph 8 of the plaint alleged that the suit property would fetch a fair rent not less than Rs. 1,000 per month and claimed damages for use and occupation at that rate from 1.5.1984 until delivery of possession. In the written statement the defendants made a general denial (para 2) without any specific reference to paragraph 8 or to the quantum of mesne profits.

The trial court, on the basis that the locality would easily fetch rent in excess of Rs. 1,000 per month, granted mesne profits at the rate claimed. On appeal the Appellate Court rejected the contention that an enquiry under O.20 R.12, C.P.C. was necessary, reasoning that the written statement had not denied the plaint allegation and therefore no issue required such an enquiry. The present second appeal challenged that approach.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the judgment and decree of the courts below were vitiated by awarding future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per mensem without any evidence on record and without holding an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12, C.P.C.
  2. Whether, in claims for mesne profits, a general denial in the written statement (as in O.8 R.3, C.P.C.) is sufficient or whether a specific denial of the quantum is required to put the quantum in issue.
  3. Whether a court is obliged to direct an enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 C.P.C. before passing a final decree for future mesne profits, or may pass a final decree where sufficient material is on record.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The court cannot pass a decree for future mesne profits without an enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12, C.P.C.; Rule 12(c) requires direction of an enquiry into rent or mesne profits from institution of the suit.
  • Relying on the statutory definition of mesne profits (S. 2(12), C.P.C.) and the Privy Council decision in Harry Kempson Gray v. Bhagu Mian (AIR 1930 Privy Council 82), mesne profits are to be assessed by reference to what the trespasser actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received; that test is not satisfied by the present materials on record.
  • The plaint's averment of Rs. 1,000 per mensem was a claim-basis and not a pleaded factual foundation showing what the defendant would have obtained with ordinary diligence; absent such a plea and absence of evidence, the grant was unsustainable.

Respondents' Arguments

  • There were antecedent communications and pleadings supporting the quantum: Ex. A15 (notice of damages at Rs. 500 from April 1977), Ex. A17 (notice claiming that rent would be not less than Rs. 1,000 and intention to sue), and the plaint itself (para 8) asserting the property would fetch not less than Rs. 1,000 per month.
  • The defendants' written statement contained no specific reference to or denial of paragraph 8; it contained only a general denial. In those circumstances the plaintiff's pleaded quantum was not put in issue and the courts below were entitled to accept the plaint averment and grant the amount claimed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harry Kempson Gray v. Bhagu Mian (A.I.R. 1930 Privy Council 82) The test of mesne profits is what the trespasser has or might reasonably have made by his wrongful possession (not simply what the excluded person lost). Relied upon by appellants to argue that the statutory test for mesne profits was not met by the materials on record; the court noted the reliance and observed the test was not satisfied by the present materials as contended by appellants.
J. Jeevanandam v. The Correspondent, The American Advent Mission School (1985 I MLJ 133 = (1984) 97 L.W. 533) Interpretation of Order 8 Rule 3 C.P.C. in relation to claims for damages/mesne profits: where the defendant does not specifically challenge quantum, no issue may arise and the plaintiff may not need to adduce evidence on quantum. Quoted and applied to show that where the written statement contains no specific denial of the claimed quantum the question of quantum may not be in issue and a court may not need to direct an enquiry or call further evidence.
Gangaram v. Beharilal (A.I.R. 1952 Bhopal 89) Held that where the defendant only denied liability generally and did not specifically deny the quantum claimed, the quantum could be deemed admitted and mesne profits awarded without further evidence. Relied upon as a judicial view supporting the proposition that a general denial may not suffice to put the quantum in issue and that the claimed rate can be treated as admitted for purposes of decree.
Veeran Chetti v. Veeran Chetti (A.I.R. 1938 Madras 727 = 47 L.W. 808) Held that it is not necessary in every case to direct an enquiry under O.20 R.12 C.P.C.; if sufficient material is on record a court may pass a final decree for mesne profits without a preliminary enquiry. Used as a principal authority to support the Court's conclusion that a final decree without an O.20 R.12 enquiry is permissible where facts/pleadings make an enquiry unnecessary.
A.P. Bagchi v. Mrs. K. Morgan (A.I.R. 1937 All 36) Explains that a preliminary decree becomes necessary where the exact amount has to be ascertained after examination of fresh evidence; if amount is definitely ascertained there is no occasion for a preliminary decree. Cited to show the distinction between cases requiring inquiry and those where the amount is ascertainable from pleadings/materials and therefore a final decree can be passed.
Dwarka Prasad v. Jahuri Sah (A.I.R. 1963 Patna 158) Affirmed the position that omission to order an O.20 R.12 inquiry does not necessarily invalidate a decree where inquiry is unnecessary; court may pass a decree where appropriate. Relied on to reinforce the view that courts are within their rights to pass mesne profits decrees without directing an enquiry when circumstances allow.
Kalidas Rakshit v. Saraswati Dasi (AIR 1943 Cal 1) Cited in support of the proposition that an enquiry under O.20 R.12 is not always necessary. Referred to in the context of case-law review supporting the permissibility of passing a final decree without formal enquiry in appropriate cases.
Ganeshi Lal Sharma v. Sm. Snehalata Dassi (AIR 1947 Cal 68) Held that a court can pass a decree for mesne profits payable subsequent to the suit if an enquiry is unnecessary in the circumstances of the case. Quoted via Dwarka Prasad as authority for the proposition that an enquiry is not invariably required before awarding mesne profits.
Kantheswaram Ekanathalingaswami Koil, In re (71 MLJ 677) Earlier observations suggesting that as regards future mesne profits the court is bound to pass a preliminary decree (quoted in the Veeran Chetti discussion). The Division Bench in Veeran Chetti rejected the notion that a court is "bound" to pass only a preliminary decree; cited here to show contrasting earlier view which was disapproved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and precedential analysis focused on three strands: (a) the statutory language of Order 20 Rule 12 C.P.C.; (b) the state of the pleadings and documentary material in the record; and (c) prior judicial decisions addressing when an enquiry is necessary.

1) Statutory provision: The Court observed that Order 20 Rule 12 provides two alternatives — the Court "may pass a decree for mesne profits or direct an enquiry as to such mesne profits" (the Court highlighted Sec. clause (ba) of Rule 1). Because the Rule uses permissive language, the Court reasoned that it is competent to pass a final decree without directing an enquiry where an enquiry is unnecessary.

2) Pleadings and materials: The Court examined the documentary record (notices Ex. A15 and Ex. A17, the defendants' reply Ex. A18, and paragraph 8 of the plaint) and the written statement (general denial in para 2). The Court noted that paragraph 8 of the plaint specifically alleged that the property would fetch a fair rent not less than Rs. 1,000 per month and claimed damages at that rate from 1.5.1984. The written statement did not specifically deny paragraph 8 or the quantum; it contained a general denial only.

3) Effect of general denial and precedents: The Court considered whether a general denial under Order 8 Rule 3 is sufficient in mesne profits cases. Drawing on this Court's earlier decision in J. Jeevanandam and other authorities (including Gangaram, Veeran Chetti, A.P. Bagchi, Dwarka Prasad and relevant Calcutta High Court decisions), the Court concluded that:

  • If the defendant does not specifically challenge the quantum claimed (i.e., does not put the plaint allegation as to quantum in issue), there may be no occasion to direct an enquiry or to require further evidence as to quantum.
  • Order 20 Rule 12 is permissive: where the amount can be ascertained from the pleadings/materials or the parties do not contest it, a court may pass a final decree determining mesne profits without a preliminary enquiry.
  • Authorities which stated that an enquiry is necessary in every case were distinguished and their absolute statement (that the court is "bound" to pass only a preliminary decree) was rejected.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that specific averments in the plaint were not denied in the written statement and that sufficient material existed on record (including notices and the plaint averments). Therefore the courts below were justified in accepting the plaintiff's claimed rate as reasonable and granting the decree for mesne profits without directing an enquiry under O.20 R.12.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Second Appeal is dismissed. The Court agreed with the view taken by the courts below and upheld the decree awarding mesne profits at the rate claimed by the plaintiffs. No costs were awarded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The decree and judgment of the courts below are affirmed; the plaintiffs' claim for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per mensem stands.
  • Legal principle affirmed in this opinion: The Court stated unequivocally that "in law the Court is entitled to pass a decree for mesne profits without holding an enquiry under O.20 R.12, C.P.C." where the circumstances and materials on record make an enquiry unnecessary and the plaint averments are not specifically denied in the written statement.
  • The decision applies the settled rule that a defendant must specifically put the quantum of damages/mesne profits in issue (for example by alleging excessiveness) if he wishes to require an enquiry; a mere general denial may not suffice to compel an O.20 R.12 enquiry.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and contains no information that is not present in that text.

    Dayanandammal Dayalamma, And Another v. St. Thomus Tamil Church Rep. By Its Paster

    JUDGMENT — Srinivasan, J.

    When this second appeal came up for admission on 29.7.1993 we passed an order that only one question of law required consideration by us viz., whether the judgment and decree of the courts below arc vitiated by granting future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per mensem without any evidence as at present on record and without enquiry under O. 20, R. 12, Code of Civil Procedure. The respondents had taken notice at that time and both counsel expressed their willingness to argue the appeal this week. Hence we posted the second appeal to this date.

    2. Learned counsel on both sides argued the appeal. It is the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that without an enquiry under O. 20 R. 12, C.P.C, the court cannot pass a decree for future mesne profits. It is submitted that under Rule 12(c) of O. 20 the Court has to direct an enquiry into rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit. Learned counsel draws our attention to the definition of mesne profits in S. 2(12). C.P.C, according to which, mesne profits are those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits but not including profits due to improvements made by the persons in wrongful possession. It is contended that the courts below nave proceeded on the footing that there is no denial in the written statement of the claim for mesne profits made by the plaintiff in the plaint and that approach is erroneous. According to learned counsel, what is claimed in the plaint is only a particular rate of mesne profits with an averment that it would fetch not less than that amount. Learned counsel submits that it is not mentioned as a fact but it is only a basis for the claim of the plaintiff. He submitted that the plaintiff ought to have pleaded in the plaint that the defendant would have obtained with ordinary diligence from the property the profits which he claims. In the absence of such a plea it cannot be said that there is a pleading as to mesne profits and there is no necessity in such a case for the defendant to make a denial of the same. It is also submitted that there is no evidence on record to prove the amount which the defendant would have received with due diligence from the property by way of profits. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Harry Kempson Gray v. Bhagu Mian (A.I.R 1930 Privy Council 82). The Privy Council held that the test set by the statutory definiton of mesne profits is clearly not what a person has lost by his exclusion, but what the trespasser has or might reasonably have made by his wrongful possession. Learned counsel submits that the test laid down by the Privy Council is not satisfied in the present case by the materials on record.

    3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents draws our attention to the following materials: Ex. A15 is a notice issued by the respondents to the appellant on 6.8.1980 It is clearly stated therein that the appellants were liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 500/- per mensem from April, 1977 for unauthorised use and occupation of the suit property. Again in Ex. A17 dated 10.3.1984 the respondents have claimed that the tenancy premises will normally get a rental of not less than Rs. 1,000/- per mensem and that a suit for recovery of possession with a claim for damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per mensem with effect from 1.5.1984 would be instituted by the respondents. In reply to the said notice, appellants sent Ex. A18 dated 17.3.1984 The only averment in the said reply reads thus:

    “… Your client has claimed damages for occupation at Rs. 1,000/- per month. The rent is already too high and the fabulous amount claimed by your client as damages could not be granted to him”.

    4. It is only thereafter the suit was filed in July, 1984. Para 8 of the plaint is in the following terms:

    “Further the suit property is situate on K.K Mutt Road, Mandavely, Madras-28, an important locality in the City of Madras. The suit property has got all locational amenities like Market, schools, bus routes, hospitals etc. In the normal course, the suit property will fetch a fair rent not less than Rs. 1000/- per month. The plaintiffs therefore called upon the defendants to pay damages for use and occupation of the suit property after 1.5.1984, the termination of tenancy.

    The damages payable for the period from 1.5.1984 to 30.6.1984 has fallen due. The defendants are liable to pay damages every month at the rate of Rs. 1000/- from 1.5.1984 till the delivery of vacant possession of the suit property”.

    In the written statement there is absolutely no whisper about para 8 of the plaint. There is no reference whatever to the profits which would arise by way of mesne profits from the property. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the denial in para 2 of the written statement is sufficient to meet the situation. Para 2 of the written statement contains the general denial in the following terms:

    “These defendants deny the various allegations set out in the plaint excepting those which are specifically admitted in this written statement and the plaintiffs are put to strict proof of all the other allegations”.

    This is not sufficient in the eye of law. The defendant is bound to make a specific denial of every allegation in the plaint. O. 8 R. 3 C.P.C, reads that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages.

    5. A question arose before this Court as to whether in the case of mesne profits a general denial would be sufficient in view of the wording of O. 8 R. 3, referred to above. It was answered in the negative by this Court in J. Jeevanandam v. The Correspondent The American Advent Mission School (1985 I MLJ 133 = (1984) 97 L.W 533). The relevant part of the judgment reads thus:

    “The immediate question is what is the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled. In the plaint, the appellant had claimed a sum of Rs. 10,000 towards damages. In the written statement, there is no plea that the amount claimed is excessive. In the result, no issue did arise out of the pleadings with reference to the quantum of damages claimed by the appellant. As a matter of fact, no issue was framed by the trial court. When the Court was not called upon to decide a particular point, It is unnecessary that any evidence need be placed before Court for the claim which was not specifically disputed in the written statement. The learned counsel for the respondent however referred to O. 8, R. 3, C.P.C and contended that notwithstanding any specific denial in the written statement, it was the duty of the appellant to adduce evidence to sustain the quantum claimed by him. A fair reading of O. 8, R. 3, C.P.C will show that the said argument can hardly be countenanced. In the instant case, the respondent-management was so sure about the defence regarding the appellant's entitlement relating to the declaration sought for by the appellant. The result was that the respondent did not specifically challenge the quantum claimed by the appellant. According to me, what is contemplated under O. 8 R. 3, C.P.C is that so far as the damages are concerned the defendant need not specifically deal with each allegation which was averred in the plaint to support the claim of damages. But I am unable to read Order 8, rule 3 as suggesting that there was no duly on the defendant to challenge the quantum of damages, and that even without such a specific denial, he can still call upon the plaintiff to prove the damages. It may not be out of place to point out that in a case where damages or mesne profits are claimed the defendant shall specifically allege that the quantum is either excessive or arbitrary so as to raise an issue and to render the court to give its finding. In this case there is no specific denial relating to the claim for damages. Therefore, as pointed out by me earner, there was no occasion for the court to frame and determine that issue”.

    6. A similar view is expressed by a Judicial Commissioner in Gangaram v. Beharilal (A.I.R 1952 Bhopal 89). It is said:

    “Goingover to the next ground viz; regarding the award of mesne profits in the absence of evidence in support of the quantum, an important rule seems to have been forgotten by the applicant in this behalf. A perusal of the plaint shows that the plaintiff claimed profits at the rate of Rs. 65 per year. In answer to this, the defendant-applicant merely slated that he denied his liability for the profits. There was no specific denial of the quantum of the profits with the result that that portion could be deemed to be admitted. This would be perfectly clear from para 4 of the additional pleadings in the written statement of the defendant. A perusal of para 8 of the judgment in the second appeal clearly indicates that firstly this contention was not even sought to be made while arguments were heard in the appeal and secondly it was, though briefly, still considered and as I have already observed, the contention could not be raised by the petition for review. In the circumstances I am clear that no petition for review of the judgment and decree is tenable on the grounds raised in the petition”.

    7. The trial court has in para 20 of its judgment referred to the fact that in the locality in which the suit property is situate it would easily fetch a rent of more than Rs. 1,000/- per month and accordingly granted the amount prayed for by the plaintiff. In the Appellate Court arguments were advanced that the Court ought to have directed an enquiry under O. 20, R. 12, C.P.C, and ought not to have straightaway passed a decree for mesne profits. Rejecting that argument the Appellate Court thought when the matter was not in issue there was no necessity to direct an enquiry under O. 20, R. 12. The Appellate Court pointed out that the written statement did not contain any denial of the plaint allegation that the income from the property would be not less than Rs. 1,000/- per mensem.

    8. A Division Bench of this Court in Veeran Chetti v. Veeran Chetti (A.I.R 1938 Madras 727 = 47-L.W. 808) has held that it is not necessity for a court to direct always an enquiry into mesne profits under O. 20 R. 12, C.P.C, and that a court could straightaway pass a decree for mesne profits if sufficient materials were available on record. Rejecting a similar contention as raised in this case, the Division Bench observed:

    “But it is contended that it is not competent to a Court to pass a final decree for mesne profits without an enquiry and the only decree it can pass is a preliminary decree under O. 20 R. 12 Civil P.C, arid S. 11(1) contemplates cases only where past profits were claimed as it is only in respect hereof the amount can be claimed and court-fee is payable, having regard to S. 7, Court Fees Act and O. 7 R. 2, C.P.C Reliance was placed on a number of cases in support of this contention, some of which we propose to deal with. Mr. Narasaraju laid emphasis on the observations of Venkatasubba Rao, Officiating C.J, as he then was, in 71 MLJ 677 (Kantheswaram Ekanathalingaswami Koil, In re) at page 680:

    As regards future mesne profits, the Court has no such option but is bound in the first instance to pass a preliminary decree.

    With due respect to the learned Judge, we are not able to appreciate the force of the expression “is bound”. “As he himself says, the Court is not bound to pass a decree for future mesne profits, the passing of the decree being in the discretion of the Court (p. 682), but if it chooses to pass a decree, should it only be a preliminary decree? What the Section says is that in regard to future profits the Court may direct an inquiry and in case an inquiry is directed, it shall pass a decree in accordance with the result of that inquiry. One thing is plain: Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court trying the suit to pass a decree finally determining the amount of profits payable consequent to the institution of the suit. The determination of the said profits is an essential part of the decree in the suit and must be done by the Court which passed the decree and not by the Court which executes it.

    “If this is the principle underlying the Section, is there anything to preclude the Court from passing the decree without directing an enquiry if the parties agree to do not object? The Section does not say that no final decree should be passed unless there had been a previous inquiry and the Court must pass a preliminary decree whether an inquiry is necessary or not. In cases where an inquiry is unnecessary, it seems to puss such a decree. As pointed out by Sulaiman C.J in A.I.R 1937 All 36 A.P Bagchi v. Mrs. K. Morgan) at page 39:

    “A preliminary decree becomes necessary where the exact amount has to be ascertained after examination of fresh evidence.

    In that case the learned Judge observed:

    When the plaintiff made it clear that she confined her relief to the recovery of the fixed rents which had been agreed upon between the parties, the amount was definitely ascertained and there was no occasion for framing a preliminary decree so that there may be another ascertainment of the amount due to the plaintiff.

    The Court was not bound to pass a preliminary decree in the first intance. It is therefore perfectly competent to the Court, without directing an enquiry to pass a decree finally determining the amount of profits payable subsequent to the institution of the suit if it is made out that it is not necessary to make such an enquiry and it cannot be said that such a decree is not final or is incapable of execution, nor would it be in contravention of the provisions of O. 20, Rule 12, Civil P.C”

    In Dwarka Prasad v. Jahuri Sah (A.I.R 1963 Patna 158) a similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of that Court. It has said:

    “The omission to make an order contemplated by Order 20 Rule 12(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure was an accidental slip and it ought to be corrected by the Court. Reference may be made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court, in the case of Kalidas Rakshit v. Saraswati Dasi, AIR 1943 Cal 1. The question now is, whether it is necessary to direct an enquiry, mentioned by Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or whether we should pass a decree at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month from the date of institution of the suit until delivery of possession to the plaintiffs or expiration of three years from the date of decree, whichever event first occurs. Reference in this connection may again be made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court, in the case of Ganeshi Lal Sharma…Defendant, v. Sm. Snehalata Dassi, Trustee…Plaintiff, .*, AIR 1947 Cal 68. Upon a review of the case law on the subject, it was held in Ganeshi Lal Sharma's case, AIR 1947 Cal 68 that a Court would be quite within its rights if it passed a decree for mesne profits payable subsequently to the suit if, in the circumstances of the case, an enquiry is unnecessary. In our opinion, the same position prevails in the instant case”.

    9. Thus there can be no doubt whatever that in law the Court is entitled to pass a decree for mesne profits without holding an enquiry under O. 20, R. 12, C.P.C In fact, the language of the Section is very clear. The Rule provides that the Court may pass a decree for mesne profits or direct an enquiry as to such mesne profits (Sec clause (ba) of Rule 1). Thus, two alternatives are provided, and it is always open to the Court to straightaway pass a decree for mesne profits. In the present/case, the specific averments in the plaint not having been denied in the written statement of the defendants the Court was entitled to proceed on the fooling that the amount claimed by the plaintiff was reasonable and just, and it could be granted. Since the defendants did not join issue on that question the Court was justified in passing a decree.

    10. In the result, we agree with the view taken by the courts below and dismiss the Second Appeal. No costs.

    KA/RR/VCS

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    Dayanandammal Dayalamma, And Another v. St. Thomus Tamil Church Rep. By Its Paster
    (Aug 5, 1993)