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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Revision Petition)

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from M.C.O.P. No. 110 of 1985 filed by the first petitioner (the injured claimant) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge), Tirunelveli, claiming Rs. 20,000 as compensation for injuries sustained in a motor accident that occurred on 31.3.1984 at about 1:30 A.M. at Arasankulam South on the Kayathar-Tirunelveli Main Road. While the M.C.O.P. was pending, the first petitioner died, but the opinion records that the death was not due to the injuries sustained in the accident.

After the death of the first petitioner, the present petitioner (the deceased's sister) filed an interlocutory application (I.A. 1987) in the claims petition seeking to be brought on record as a second petitioner in place of the deceased. The Subordinate Judge dismissed that application by an order dated 10.2.1988, stating: “Married sister is not a dependant to the injured who is since dead. Hence petition is dismissed.” The present Civil Revision Petition challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when an injured claimant dies during the pendency of proceedings but not as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident, a sister (specifically a married sister) may be permitted to be brought on record as a legal representative or as a second petitioner to continue the claim petition.
  2. Whether the petitioner (sister) can claim, as representative of the deceased's estate, amounts spent by the deceased towards hospital and related expenses arising out of the accident.
  3. What is the correct legal meaning and scope of the term "legal representative" in section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and whether that meaning permits persons other than the traditional dependants (wife, husband, parent, child) to be brought on record and pursue claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The view of the Court below (that a married sister is not a dependant and hence cannot be brought on record) is contrary to the view of this Court in Thailammal & others v. A.V. Nallayya Pillai & others (1981 ACJ 185 = 1980 93 L.W. 32) and contrary to the ratio in the Supreme Court decision in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (1987 ACJ 561 = AIR 1987 S.C. 1690).
  • The older view that only dependants can come on record in place of deceased or injured persons in motor accident claims is no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court judgment; Parliament, via section 110-A, intended not to restrict the statutory right to claim damages to the injured alone.
  • At least, the petitioner should be entitled to recover amounts spent by the deceased towards hospital expenses and related expenditures, representing the estate of the deceased.

Respondent's (Insurance Company's) Arguments

  • The supporting affidavit for the application shows that the petitioner did not benefit during the lifetime of the deceased brother and there is no evidence that the deceased gave anything to the petitioner during his lifetime; consequently, even accepting the Supreme Court judgment (which concerned death from a motor accident), the petitioner is not entitled to be brought on record as a second petitioner to pursue the claim.
  • The present case involves an injury claim (not a death claim), and there is no evidence that the death of the claimant pending disposal of the M.C.O.P. was due to the injury sustained in the accident.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thailammal and others v. A.V. Nallayya Pillai and others, 1981 ACJ 185 = 1980 93 L.W. 32 Recognised, via V. Ramaswami J.'s analysis, that by introducing section 110-A in the Motor Vehicles Act Parliament did not intend to restrict the statutory right to claim damages to the injured alone; the cause of action may survive to legal representatives. The court relied on the principles in this decision to reject the narrower approach taken by the Court below and to support the conclusion that the petitioner can be brought on record to continue proceedings.
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another, 1987 ACJ 561 = AIR 1987 S.C. 1690 Elaborately considered the expression "legal representatives" in section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and held that the term should be given a wide meaning (a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person), enabling legal representatives to apply for compensation; recognised that the Act alters and enlarges rights compared to the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The court adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation to hold that the order below (excluding the sister) could not be sustained and to justify permitting the petitioner to continue the proceedings as a person who may represent the estate or be a legal representative.
Megjibai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai (Gujarat) Approved approach that non-traditional dependants (e.g., brothers) may be entitled to maintain petitions under section 110-A if they are legal representatives of the deceased. The court cited and expressed approval of this approach as consonant with justice and the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act to support the wider construction of "legal representative."
C.P. Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores (Division Bench) (referred) Earlier Division Bench authority noticed in the Thailammal reasoning and discussed in the opinion (the Division Bench decision was distinguished by V. Ramaswami, J.). The court noted that V. Ramaswami, J. had considered and distinguished that Division Bench case when reaching his conclusion that section 110-A should not restrict rights to the injured alone; the present court used that line of authority to support allowing the petitioner to be placed on record.
Videowola v. Union of India; Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Storey, 86 Law Weekly 667 (as cited by respondent) Earlier authorities relying on narrower concepts of who may be brought on record or who may claim compensation. The court stated that these decisions "cannot be pressed into service" in light of the wider interpretation endorsed by later authorities (including the Supreme Court decision).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a structured analysis based on the common facts, the submissions of counsel, and the statutory and precedential framework discussed in the cited authorities.

  1. Facts: The court noted it was common ground that the first petitioner sustained injuries in the accident and filed M.C.O.P. No. 110 of 1985 seeking compensation of Rs. 20,000; while the proceedings were pending the petitioner died, but the death was not due to the injuries sustained in the accident.
  2. Application Below: After the death, the sister-petitioner applied to be brought on record as second petitioner; the Subordinate Judge dismissed the application on the short ground that a married sister is not a dependant of the injured and therefore could not be allowed to come on record.
  3. Key Statutory and Precedential Points: The court considered section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (and section 110-B), and the Supreme Court's exposition of the phrase "legal representative" in the 1987 Supreme Court decision (AIR 1987 S.C. 1690). The court observed that section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines "legal representative" as someone who represents the estate of a deceased person, and that, while this definition does not strictly apply to Claims Tribunals, the expression is commonly understood similarly.
  4. Effect of Section 110-A and Section 110-B: The court recounted the Supreme Court's reasoning that section 110-A permits applications by "legal representatives" (and their agents) and that the proviso requires that the application be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all legal representatives; section 110-B empowers the Claims Tribunal to determine compensation and the person(s) to whom it shall be paid. Those provisions, the court noted, substantially modify the earlier Fatal Accidents Act scheme insofar as motor vehicle accidents are concerned and create an enlarged right for legal representatives.
  5. Application to Present Case: The court accepted the principle that the term "legal representative" should be given a wide meaning for claims arising from motor accidents. It emphasised the distinction between (a) the question of who may be brought on record as a legal representative, and (b) whether such a person is entitled to compensation on the facts — two separate issues. The court held that even if a person is allowed to be brought on record, that person is not thereby automatically entitled to compensation; entitlement must be decided by the Claims Tribunal on the facts and principles of law.
  6. Conclusion of Analysis: Applying the wider meaning of "legal representative" as endorsed by the Supreme Court and this Court's earlier decision, the court concluded that the lower court's order dismissing the application on the ground that a married sister is not a dependant could not be sustained. Accordingly, the petitioner must be permitted to continue the proceedings; the lower court is to determine in the first instance whether she is entitled to any compensation and, if so, the quantum, having regard to the relevant principles and evidence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The court held that the petitioner is entitled to continue the proceedings as a person who may represent the deceased for the purposes of the M.C.O.P., and the order of the Court below dismissing the interlocutory application cannot be sustained. There will be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner (the deceased's sister) is permitted to be brought on record and to continue the claim petition as a person representing the deceased; however, whether she is entitled to receive compensation (and the extent thereof) is left to the Court below to decide on the facts and in accordance with the principles laid down in the cited authorities.
  • Scope and precedent: The court applied and relied upon existing High Court and Supreme Court authority interpreting section 110-A and section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act to give a wider meaning to "legal representative." The opinion does not purport to create a novel precedent beyond applying those authorities; it directs that the lower court determine entitlement and quantum in the light of the principles set out in the cited cases.
RR/VCS

    Pushpam v. Nirmala

    This Civil revision Petition is directed against an Order dated 10.2.1988 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal declining to entertain I.A.I of 1987 in M.C.O.P No. 110 of 1985, on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli. The said I.A was one for bringing on record the petitioner as second petitioner in the M.C.O.P No. 110 of 1985 in view of the death of the deceased first petitioner.

    2. The learned Subordinate Judge held:—”Counter filed. Heard. Married sister is not a dependant to the injured who is since dead. Hence petition is dismissed.”

    3. Against the above order, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed.

    4. Mr. Peppin Fernando, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the view taken by the Court below is contrary to the view of this Court in Thailammal and others v. A.V Nallayya Pillai and others 1981 ACJ 185 = 1980 93 L.W 32 as well as the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another 1987 ACJ 561 = AIR 1987 S.C 1690. According to the learned counsel, the old view that dependants alone can come on record in the place of deceased or injured persons in motor accidents is no longer good law in view of the above mentioned Supreme Court judgment. At any rate, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner will be entitled to the amount spent by the deceased towards hospital expenses and also the expenses connected therewith representing the estate of the deceased.

    5. Mrs. Bhagirathi Narayanan, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent-Insurance Company, submitted that a perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the application will clearly show that the petitioner was not at all benefited during the lifetime of the deceased brother and there is nothing to show that the deceased brother gave anything to the petitioner during his lifetime. Therefore, even according to the judgment of the. Supreme Court, (which was with reference to a death in a motor accident) the petitioner is not entitled to come on record as second petitioner to pursue the claim petition. The learned counsel also pointed out that the present case is one of injury and there is no evidence that the death pending disposal of the M.C.O.P was due to the injury sustained in the accident.

    6. I have considered the rival submissions. It is common ground that the first petitioner sustained injury in the accident that took place on 31.3.1984 at about 1.30 A.M at Arasankulam South off Arasankulam on the Kayathar-Tirunelveli Main Road.

    7. The deceased first petitioner filed M.CO.P 110 of 1985, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge), Tirunelveli, claiming a sum of Rs. 20,000.towards compensation for the injuries sustained by him. It is also common ground that pending disposal of the said M.C.O.P, he died, but not due to the injuries sustained in the accident in question. After the death, the petitioner, as the sister of the deceased first petitioner, filed an application to come on record as second petitioner and to continue the proceedings. The Court below dismissed the application. In more or less identical circumstances, V. Ramaswami, J., as he then was, in 1981 A.C.J, page 185 (supra), after noticing a Division Bench judgment of this Court in C.P Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores, held that by introducing section 110A in the Motor Vehicles Act, the Parliament intended not to restrict the statutory right to claim damages to the injured alone. In the case of claims arising out of motor accidents, clause (b) provides that cause of action would survive to the legal representatives where death has resulted from the accident. This was an exception to the general principle ‘Actio personalis martyr cum persona’. It is true there is a distinction between case of death resulting from the accident and a case of other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, i.e, the party dying subsequently during the pendency of the proceedings not due to the accident. But the Motor Vehicles Act does not, in my opinion, make any distinction so far as the right to claim damages. The claims in all these cases are not statutory rights. Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone.” The learned Judge further distinguished the Division Bench case 1974 ACJ 362 on facts. The learned Judge ultimately held, as reasonable question of recovering the actual expenses incurred by the deceased. I have no doubt that the claim will survive since that amount had it not been spent might have been available as the estate of the deceased to be succeeded by his legal representatives. In 1987 II A.C.J 561 (supra)=AIR 1987 S.C 1690 the Supreme Court has elaborately considered the expression ‘legal representatives’ in Section 110-A of the Act. After noticing the divergent views of the various High Courts, the Supreme Court has held as follows:—

    “Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 11C-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to subsection (1) of section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression ‘legal representative’ has not been defined in the Act. Section 2 (11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines ‘legal representative’ as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and clause (c) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation Shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A (1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the person for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act. This section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that “every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased.”

    While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased, section 110-A (1) of the Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from section 110-B of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This provision takes the place of the third paragraph of section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in every such action, the court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whose benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by section 110-A and section 110-B of the Act and to that extent the provisions of the Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in so far as motor vehicle accidents are concerned. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was “new in its species, new in its principles, in every way new” the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of the an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.

    We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by sections 110A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, (Gujrat) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under section 110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.” Paras 10, 12

    In the light of the principles laid down in the above two judgments, I am of the view that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent, namely, Messrs. Videowola v. Union of India and Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Storey 86 Law Weekly 667, cannot be pressed into service. I am further of the view that the question of bringing on record or coming on record as legal representatives and the further question whether they are entitled to compensation on the facts and circumstance of the case are two different issues. Merely because they are brought on record, that does not automatically entitle them to get compensation. In the light of the wider meaning given to the expression ‘legal representative’ by the Supreme Court, though in a case of death in a motor accident, the order of the Court below cannot be sustained. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to continue the proceedings and it is for the Court below to decide whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation at all, and if so, how much in the light of the principles laid down in 93 L.W 321=1981 A.C.J 185 (supra) and other cases.

    8. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

    RR/VCS

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    Pushpam v. Nirmala
    (Jan 30, 1991)