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  • section 4-A, section 12, section 12-A, section 14, section 15 or sub-section (1) or (2) of section 16
  • sub-section (3) of section 31-A or sub-section (1) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 33
  • section 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter referred
  • sub-section (3) of section 31
  • sections 12, 14, 15, 31, or 32
  • clause (c) of sub-section (2),
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • section 4-A, section 12, section 12-A, section 14, section 15 or sub-section (1) or (2) of section 16
  • sub-section (3) of section 31-A or sub-section (1) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 33
  • section 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter referred
  • sub-section (3) of section 31
  • sections 12, 14, 15, 31, or 32
  • clause (c) of sub-section (2),
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee was originally assessed for the relevant year (assessment year 1974-75) on a total turnover of Rs. 1,45,62,950.96 and a taxable turnover of Rs. 1,31,49,069.77 by an assessing authority by order dated 30 October 1976. The assessee appealed, disputing only a turnover of Rs. 19,123.50 (relating to discounts at price difference). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed that appeal by order dated 6 October 1978 and the total and taxable turnover were redetermined accordingly.

On 17 July 1980 an inspection of the assessee's business premises revealed that the assessee had purchased motor parts on form C and supplied those parts free during warranty periods, with the manufacturers (M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd.) reimbursing the assessee for the cost. The value of those parts was Rs. 1,84,985. The Joint Commissioner, invoking suo motu revisional powers under section 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 ("the Act"), proposed to levy tax on this alleged escaped turnover at 15% single point. Objections were invited and considered, and the Joint Commissioner confirmed the proposal, thereby bringing the Rs. 1,84,985 to tax for the first time after the completion of assessment and appellate proceedings. A notice under section 34 was issued to the assessee on 21 October 1981.

The assessee (appellant) raised two preliminary objections: (1) that the Joint Commissioner could not, under section 34, bring to tax for the first time an alleged escaped turnover which was neither part of the return nor subject of assessment or appeal; and (2) that the order was barred by the limitation in section 16 of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Joint Commissioner, in exercise of powers under section 34 of the Act, can pass an order bringing to tax an escaped turnover which was not the subject-matter of the assessment or appellate proceedings (i.e., whether section 34 authorises making an original assessment for escaped turnover).
  2. Whether the Joint Commissioner's order bringing the escaped turnover to tax was barred by the limitation prescribed under section 16 of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Joint Commissioner could not, by exercising suo motu revisional powers under section 34, bring to tax for the first time an alleged escaped turnover of Rs. 1,84,985 which was neither part of the return nor of book sales nor the subject-matter of the appeal before the appellate authority.
  • The order of the Joint Commissioner was barred by the limitation period prescribed under section 16 of the Act for bringing escaped turnover to tax.

Respondent's / Revenue's Position (as recorded)

  • The opinion records that the Learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) did not dispute that sections 16(4) to 16(6) of the Act were not attracted in the facts of the case. The opinion does not otherwise set out detailed opposing arguments of the Revenue in the text provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Velayutha Raja v. Board of Revenue (C.T.), [1970] 26 STC 176 (Mad.) Holds that revisional powers under section 34 are subject to other provisions of the Act; the revisional authority cannot make an original/best-judgment assessment for escaped turnover under the guise of revision. The Court relied on this Division Bench decision to hold that the Joint Commissioner exceeded his powers in bringing to tax, for the first time under section 34, the escaped turnover of Rs. 1,84,985 which was not part of the assessment or appeal.
State of Kerala v. Cheria Abdulla & Co., [1965] 16 STC 875 (Supreme Court) Supreme Court authority relied upon for the legal principles and safeguards concerning revisional/assessment powers (as cited in Velayutha Raja). The Court noted that Velayutha Raja relied on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in this case; the opinion treats the Supreme Court's principles as supportive authority for limiting revisional powers and invoking safeguards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by analysing section 34 on its plain meaning. Section 34 confers suo motu revisional powers on the Joint Commissioner to call for and examine orders or proceedings passed by specified authorities and, if prejudicial to Revenue, to initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside such orders. The Court observed that the power is directed at existing orders and proceedings; it authorises revision of an order which is in existence but does not extend to making an order which the statutory authority had never made.

Applying that principle, the Court reasoned that the power to bring an escaped turnover to tax is the province of the assessing authority under section 16 of the Act. The Joint Commissioner, exercising section 34 revisional powers, cannot assume the assessing authority's power to make an original or best-judgment assessment for escaped turnover which was not assessed earlier and was not part of the assessment or appeal.

The Court relied on the Division Bench decision in Velayutha Raja (which itself relied on the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Cheria Abdulla & Co.) to support the proposition that revisional powers under section 34 are subordinate to other provisions of the Act, including section 16, and therefore cannot be used to effectuate an original assessment for escaped turnover.

The Court then addressed the limitation issue under section 16(1), which permits the assessing authority to act within five years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates. The chronology set out by the Court was: assessment order dated 30 October 1976; appellate order dated 6 October 1978; inspection revealing the escaped turnover on 17 July 1980; and notice under section 34 issued on 21 October 1981.

The Court concluded that the assessing authority could have acted to bring the alleged escaped turnover to tax only until the end of 1980 (i.e., within five years from the end of the relevant year), and that the Joint Commissioner could not validly initiate proceedings under section 34 on 21 October 1981 to bring the escaped turnover to tax because that date was beyond the limitation period prescribed in section 16(1). The Court also recorded that the Revenue did not contend that the provisions of sections 16(4) to 16(6) applied.

Combining these analyses, the Court found both that (a) the Joint Commissioner lacked jurisdiction under section 34 to bring to tax an escaped turnover for the first time, and (b) even if jurisdiction had been available, the action was in any event barred by the five-year limitation under section 16(1).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Both preliminary objections were allowed; the Joint Commissioner's order under appeal was set aside.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The order of the Joint Commissioner that brought the alleged escaped turnover of Rs. 1,84,985 to tax under section 34 is quashed on two grounds — lack of jurisdiction under section 34 to make an original escaped assessment, and that the proceedings were barred by the limitation in section 16(1). The case was disposed of on these preliminary objections and the Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the substantive merits of the escaped-turnover determination.
  • No costs were awarded.
  • Broader legal implications: The opinion applies and follows existing authority (as cited) limiting the use of revisional powers under section 34; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying those authorities and does not discuss broader implications beyond the case-specific outcome.

Preliminary objections allowed.

    Reliance Motor Company Private Ltd. v. State Of Tamil Nadu

    Dr. A.S Anand, C.J:— This appeal by the assessee is directed against the order of the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Madras, made in exercise of the powers under section 34 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”.

    2. Learned counsel for the assessee has, before questioning the order on merits, raised two preliminary objections to the order of the Joint Commissioner. According to him, firstly the Joint Commissioner failed to appreciate that the turnover of Rs. 1,84,985 was allegedly the escaped turnover, which was neither part of the return nor of the book sales or even the subject-matter of the appeal before the appellate authority, and the Joint Commissioner could not, in exercise of the powers under section 34 of the Act bring to tax, for the first time, the alleged escaped turnover while exercising suo motu revisional powers. Secondly, it was argued that the order of the Joint Commissioner was barred by limitation prescribed under section 16 of the Act to bring an escaped turnover to tax.

    3. With a view to appreciate the preliminary objections, a short reference to the facts of the case is necessary. The appellant was assessed on a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 1,45,62,950.96 and Rs. 1,31,49,069.77, respectively, by the assessing authority vide order dated 30th of October, 1976.

    4. An appeal was preferred before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner disputing only a turnover of Rs. 19,123.50 which related to discounts at price difference. The appellate authority vide order dated 6th of October, 1978 allowed the appeal and the total and taxable turnover was redetermined. It appears that there was an inspection of the business premises of the assessee on 17th of July, 1980. During the inspection, the Officers found that the assessee had purchased motor parts by issuing form C and supplied those parts as free supply during the warranty period to the customers for their cars but the cost of the parts was reimbursed to the assessee by the manufacturers, M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd. The value of those parts amounted to Rs. 1,84,985. The Joint Commissioner, in exercise of the suo motu powers of revision proposed to levy tax on the estimated escaped turnover of Rs. 1,84,985 at 15 per cent single point. Objections were invited and considered. The Joint Commissioner confirmed the proposal and brought the amount of Rs. 1,84,985 to tax for the first time, after the assessment and appellate proceedings were over, at 15 per cent single point. The relevant assessment year is 1974-75.

    5. To appreciate the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Natarajan, the first point that arises for consideration is: Can powers under section 34 of the Act be exercised by the Joint Commissioner to pass an order relating to an escaped turnover specifically dealt with under section 16 of the Act?

    6. Section 34 of the Act reads:

    “Special powers of Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.—(1) The Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes may, of his own motion, call for and examine an order passed or proceeding recorded by the appropriate authority under section 4-A, section 12, section 12-A, section 14, section 15 or sub-section (1) or (2) of section 16 or an order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (3) of section 31 or by the Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (3) of section 31-A or sub-section (1) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 33 and if such order or proceeding recorded is prejudicial to the interests of Revenue, may make such inquiry or cause such inquiry to be made and, subject to the provisions of this Act, may initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside such order or proceeding and may pass such order thereon as he thinks fit;

    (2) The Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes shall not initiate proceedings against any such order or proceeding referred to in sub section (1) if—

    (a) the time for appeal against that order has not expired; or

    (b) the order has been made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal or of a revision in the Special Appellate Tribunal; or

    (c) more than five years have expired after the passing of the order: Provided that if the order passed or proceeding recorded by the

    appropriate authority, Appellate Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner referred to in sub-section (1) involves an issue on which the Special Appellate Tribunal has given its decision adverse to the Revenue in any other proceedings, and an appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of the Special Appellate Tribunal is pending, the period of time between the date of the abovesaid order of the Special Appellate Tribunal and the date of the order of the Supreme Court shall be excluded in computing the period referred to in clause (c).

    (3) No order under this section adversely affecting a person shall be passed unless that person has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

    (4) In computing the period referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (2), the time during which the proceedings before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes remained stayed under the order of a Civil Court or other competent authority shall be excluded.”

    7. Though this section has undergone a number of amendments, for the question under consideration, we need not detain ourselves to consider the amendments. On its plain meaning, the section confers on the Joint Commissioner or the Board, powers of suo motu revision. This section authorises the Joint Commissioner to find out whether the order of the appellate authority, Appellate Assistant or Deputy Commissioner, is reasonable and legally sound. It, therefore, follows that the power can be exercised to revise an order which is in existence and it cannot extend to revise an order which the statutory authority had not at all made. The Joint Commissioner cannot exercise the power, which the assessing authority should have exercised but did not so exercise. The power to bring an escaped turnover to tax is the power of an assessing authority under section 16 of the Act. The Joint Commissioner or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can however get the escaped assessment brought to tax within the period of limitation only. The question posed by us above has been answered by a Division Bench of this Court in Velayutha Raja v. Board of Revenue (C.T), [1970] 26 STC 176, which relied upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Cheria Abdulla & Co., [1965] 16 STC 875, and the safeguards provided in the said judgment by the Apex Court. The Division Bench held that the revisional powers exercised under section 34 of the Act are subject to the other provisions of the Act and, therefore, the best judgment assessment or an original assessment on the ground of escapement of turnover, cannot be made in exercise of the powers under section 34 of the Act. The Bench opined:

    “We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order of the Board which is extrovertly an original assessment, is fallacious as the Board exceeded its powers to pass such an assessment order.”

    8. The first preliminary objection, therefore, must succeed and we hold that the Joint Commissioner exceeded his powers while exercising jurisdiction under section 34 of the Act to bring to tax the alleged escaped turnover, for the first time when it was neither the subject-matter of assessment proceedings nor the appellate proceedings, in exercise of the revisional powers under section 34 of the Act.

    9. Even the second preliminary objection, according to the learned counsel for the appellant has been answered by the same Division Bench in Velayutha Raja v. Board of Revenue (C.T), [1970] 26 STC 176 (Mad.). Dealing with the powers of the Board of Revenue, now exercisable by the Joint Commissioner under section 34 of the Act and the relevant provisions of the Act, the learned counsel referred to the following observations of the Bench:

    “We have noticed that section 34 is made subject to the provisions of the Act. Section 16 is one such provision., If section 16 stood alone like any other section such as sections 12, 14, 15, 31, or 32 the position would be different. But section 16(1) adumbrates a substantial rule of limitation. If the assessing authority could not bring into the net of taxation escaped turnover, beyond a period of five years from the date of the year of escape, can the Board, which is expected to revise the order of the assessing authority, make an order so as to defeat the substantive legislative provision as to limitation under section 16(1) of the Act? We are of the view that the Board cannot pass such an order.

    The effect of such a period of limitation envisaged in section 16(1) is wide enough and cannot be said to be limited to assessment of escaped turnover under that sub-section by the assessing authority only. In our view, it is to be invoked in all cases where a statutory functionary under the Act assumes jurisdiction to assess escaped turnover. One such case is when the Board exercises its special powers under section 34 of the Act.”

    10. In the instant case, the relevant assessment year is 1974-75. The assessment order was made on 30th of October, 1976. The appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner, on the limited appeal, is dated 6th of October, 1978. Inspection which led to the discovery of the alleged debit notes regarding replacement of parts by the manufacturers, thereby bringing to light the escaped turnover of Rs. 1,84,985 was on 17th of July, 1980. Notice under section 34 of the Act was issued to the assessee on 21st of October, 1981. To bring an escaped turnover to tax, section 16 provides that the assessing authority may act at any time within a period of five years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates. The assessing authority could, therefore, act to bring the alleged escaped turnover to tax till the end of 1980 and even the assessing authority could not start the proceedings to bring the escaped turnover to tax on 21st of October, 1981, when the Joint Commissioner issued the notice under section 34 of the Act. The period of limitation prescribed under section 16(1) of the Act would apply to the cases of escaped assessment. Learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) does not dispute that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of section 16(4) to 16(6) of the Act are not attracted.

    11. Thus, we find that not only the Joint Commissioner lacks jurisdiction in exercise of the powers under section 34 of the Act to bring the alleged escaped turnover to account for the first time, he could not have done it even otherwise, since it was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 16(1) of the Act. Both the preliminary objections, therefore, succeed and are allowed. The order of the Joint Commissioner under appeal is set aside. Since we have disposed of the matter only on the preliminary objections, we have refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. No costs.

    12. Preliminary objections allowed.

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    Reliance Motor Company Private Ltd. v. State Of Tamil Nadu
    (Apr 12, 1991)