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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Arendment) Act 1989.Under Sub-clause (1),
  • Sec. 29-A clause (4) in the Andhra Act, corresponding to Sec. 29-A (:5)
  • Nadu Amendment Act. In fact, the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989(v)
  • Andhra Pradesh Hindu Succession Amendment Act
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • SECTION 6 HINDU SUCCESSION ACT
  • Sec. 29-A of the Hindu Succession Act.
  • provisions of the Amendment Act.
  • 14. Section 1 of Tamil Nadu Act
  • Amendment Act 1 of 1990
  • force.15. Section 29-A
  • Nadu Act 1 of 1990.29.
  • Andhra Pradesh Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Arendment) Act 1989.Under Sub-clause (1),
  • Sec. 29-A clause (4) in the Andhra Act, corresponding to Sec. 29-A (:5)
  • Nadu Amendment Act. In fact, the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act
  • Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989(v)
  • Andhra Pradesh Hindu Succession Amendment Act
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • SECTION 6 HINDU SUCCESSION ACT
  • Sec. 29-A of the Hindu Succession Act.
  • provisions of the Amendment Act.
  • 14. Section 1 of Tamil Nadu Act
  • Amendment Act 1 of 1990
  • force.15. Section 29-A
  • Nadu Act 1 of 1990.29.
  • Andhra Pradesh Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (first plaintiff and her three daughters) instituted O.S. No. 192 of 1977 in the District Munsif Court, Cuddalore seeking: (a) declaration of title of the first plaintiff to the A-schedule property and recovery of possession; and (b) partition and separate possession of a 4/6th share in B-schedule properties. The trial court declared the first plaintiff's exclusive title to the A-schedule properties and held the plaintiffs entitled to 4/18th share in the B-schedule properties (except item No. 6), directing division. Defendants 1 and 2 appealed in A.S. No. 142 of 1979, and defendants 3, 4 and 6 appealed in A.S. No. 143 of 1979. The Subordinate Judge modified the trial court's decree: A.S. No. 142 was allowed in part by holding the first plaintiff entitled only to 1/3rd share in the A-schedule property; A.S. No. 143 was allowed to grant equity to defendants 3, 4 and 6 in properties they purchased. The plaintiffs filed two second appeals (relating to the same subject matter) which were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the A-schedule properties were the exclusive property of Velayudha Padayachi and validly settled by the registered settlement deed (Ex. A-1) in favour of the first plaintiff, or whether they were joint family (coparcenary) properties such that the settlement was void.
  2. What is the correct share of the plaintiffs in the B-schedule (admittedly joint family) properties — specifically whether plaintiffs are limited to 4/18th or entitled to 4/6th as claimed.
  3. Whether the Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act (Tamil Nadu Act I of 1990 introducing Sections 29-A to 29-C) — in particular Section 29-A — operates to enlarge the share of the 4th plaintiff (an unmarried daughter) in the B-schedule properties, given the dates of death and the stage of proceedings (preliminary decree passed in 1979).
  4. Whether the equities granted by the lower appellate court in favour of persons who purchased from defendants 1 and 2 (defendants 3 to 6) were legally maintainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs / Appellants

  • The first plaintiff contended that the A-schedule property belonged absolutely and exclusively to Velayudha Padayachi and was settled on her by a registered settlement deed dated 27.8.1955 (Ex. A-1), entitling her to exclusive title and possession.
  • The plaintiffs claimed a 4/6th share in the B-schedule properties (the shares they sought in the joint family properties).
  • Relying on the Tamil Nadu Amendment (Sections 29-A to 29-C), the appellants sought leave to raise an additional ground that the 4th appellant (an unmarried daughter) becomes a coparcener by birth and is entitled to a larger share on par with her brothers under Section 29-A.

Defendants / Respondents

  • Defendants 1 and 2 contended that the A-schedule property was joint family (coparcenary) property and that the settlement in favour of the first plaintiff was null and void.
  • By reply notice (Ex. A-3) defendants 1 and 2 acknowledged that the first plaintiff was legally wedded wife of their father and admitted the settlement deed, but asserted that the settlement conferred only a life estate upon the first plaintiff and that after her death the properties would vest in defendants 1 and 2 — thereby effectively accepting the validity of the instrument but disputing its effect.
  • Defendants 3 to 6, as alienees from defendants 1 and 2, claimed equity in respect of properties purchased by them; the appellants did not challenge that those alienations were supported by some consideration.
  • The appellants (defendants-respondents in the second appeals) argued that the Tamil Nadu Amendment should operate to grant daughters rights as coparceners in pending proceedings (relying on Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gurupad v. Hirabai, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1239 Explains Explanation I to Section 6: the statutory fiction that the deceased's interest shall be deemed to be the share allotted to him if a partition had taken place immediately before his death; that assumption is irrevocable and must permeate the ascertainment of heirs' shares. Used to support the proposition that once the statutory assumption of partition is made for ascertaining a deceased coparcener's share, the heirs' shares must be computed on that basis and cannot be altered; supports conclusion that shares crystallised by a prior partition (or deemed partition) cannot be reopened by later statute.
Raj Rani v. Chief Settlement Commr., Delhi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1234 Reiterates the principle in Gurupad about the irrevocability of the assumed partition under Section 6 and related consequences for heirs' shares. Cited to reinforce the court's interpretation that vested shares under Section 6 cannot be diminished by subsequent events or legislation not intended to affect already vested shares.
Appoovier (alias Seetharamier) v. Rama Subba Aiyan, XI Moore's Indian Appeals 75 Held that a division in status converts a joint tenancy into a tenancy-in-common even if there is no immediate physical division by metes and bounds; a division of right suffices. Relied upon to show that a partition (division in status) can be effected by steps that quantify shares (such as a decree) even without physical allotment; supports view that preliminary decree effected partition.
Balkishen Das & Ors. v. Ram Narain Sahu & Ors., 30 Indian Appeals 139 Approved the principle that separation in estate and interest (division in status) has the same legal effect as partition by metes and bounds. Adopted to support the court's conclusion that partition in the Hindu law sense occurs on division in status and that such partition is conclusive of shares.
Bhagwat Ram v. Ramji Ram, 1947 (2) M.L.J. 67 (P.C.) Held that an after-born son cannot reopen a partition and claim redistribution of shares; partition's quantum for shares is not affected by subsequent births where partition has been effected. Applied by analogy to hold that a daughter born before the Amendment but seeking coparcenary rights after a partition crystallised cannot claim enlargement of shares where partition had been effected before the Amendment.
Kurapati Radhakrishna v. Kurapati Satyanarayana, I.L.R. 1949 Madras 229 Held that an adult coparcener's unequivocal manifestation of intention to separate effects a division in status; such intention, once communicated, is not revocable and can constitute a partition in status. Used to support the proposition that a previous judicial step (like a preliminary decree) creating division in status is sufficient to constitute a partition and is conclusive.
Venkala Reddy v. Pothi Reddy, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 992 Explains that a preliminary decree in suits (including partition suits) is final and conclusive in respect of the matters dealt with by it; a preliminary decree is not merely tentative for the matters it covers. Relied on to hold that the preliminary decree passed in 1979 had become conclusive with regard to the shares of the parties and could not be reopened by the 4th appellant under the Amendment.
I. Pulla Reddy v. I. Seshi Reddy, 1987 (2) A.L.T. 210 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Applied the Andhra Amendment to pending proceedings and held daughters could claim as coparceners in pending appeals/preliminary stages. Not accepted by this court as controlling for the present facts; the court explained why that reasoning did not assist the 4th appellant in this case.
S. Narayana Reddy v. S. Sai Reddy, A.I.R. 1990 Andhra Pradesh 263 Held that the Andhra Amendment could be applied in certain pending partition proceedings so as to enlarge unmarried daughters' shares before passing the final decree; allowed such claims at final decree stage. The court reviewed this authority and disagreed with its reasoning for the present case, distinguishing the concept of "partition effected" as used in the Amendment and emphasizing Hindu law concept of partition by division in status.
Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1470 Dealt with the power of courts to consider subsequent events before passing final decree so as to grant complete relief and avoid multiplicity of suits (as referenced by Andhra judgment). Cited by Andhra judgment; this court considered the reliance but concluded that the Hindu-law understanding of partition and finality of a preliminary decree controls in the present facts.
Girija Bai v. Sadashiv (1916 P.C. 104 and later citations) Illustrates that partition (severance of joint status) can be effected by declaration/intention without physical division; separation of status suffices. Grouped among authorities showing that partition may be effected by a change of status and that once effected it yields definite and quantified rights.
Amritrao v. Mukundrao, 3 L.W. 112 Supports the principle that an unequivocal declaration/manifestation of intention to separate effects partition/status change under Hindu law. Used as one of the authorities to support the proposition that partition by status change need not be followed by metes and bounds.
Yadao v. Namdeo (various citations) Shows jurisprudence that separation in status constitutes partition even without metes and bounds. Relied upon to build the line of authorities that a division in status yields definite shares and cannot be disturbed later.
Syed Kasam v. Jorawar Singh (and related authorities) Part of the collection of authorities confirming that partition may be effected without actual division and that a member's separate intention suffices. Collected to underpin the court's exposition of partition under Mitakshara/Hindu law.
Ramalinga Annavi v. Narayana Annavi One of the precedents supporting the view on partition by status and the effect of such partition. Used as an illustrative authority among several to show the settled law on partition by status.
Narayan v. Mahadeorao, 1971 M.P.L.J. 239 Authority cited for propositions about partition and separations in status. Referred to among authorities demonstrating the rule that partition can be effected without physical division.
Fatechand Mahesy v. State of West Bengal, 76 C.W.N. 137 Included among cases cited to demonstrate partition principles. Used illustratively in the court's review of authorities.
Raghunath Kar v. Gajendra Kar, 1973 Orissa 157 Part of the authorities supporting the legal description of partition under Hindu law. Referenced to reinforce the exposition of partition by status.
Naisha Begum v. Arumuga Thevar, 1974 (1) M.L.J. 201 Supports the principle that partition need not include metes and bounds; separation in status suffices. Adduced among other cases to show consistent doctrine.
Wasudeo v. State of Maharashtra, 1975 Mah. L.J. 404 Supportive authority cited in the survey of partition jurisprudence. Used to buttress the court's legal narrative on partition.
Asa Nond v. Baldeo Raj, 1978 All. 139 One more authority in support of the partition-by-status principle. Included in the series of authorities relied upon for the legal proposition.
Tarapada Ray v. State of West Bengal, 82 Cal. W.N. 331 Part of the jurisprudence cited about partition and division in status. Referred to in the broader survey of authorities.
Lakshmanier v. Krishnamachar, 1976 (1) M.L.J. 452 Included among authorities showing that an unequivocal manifestation of intention to separate effects partition. Used as supporting precedent in the court's reasoning on partition's legal character.
C.I.T. v. Shivolingappa, (1982) 135 I.T.R. 375 Affirms that it is not necessary for partition to be effected by metes and bounds. Quoted to reinforce that partition may be complete as to status without actual physical division of property.
Smt. Lila Wati v. Paras Ram, 1977 H.P. 1 Illustrates that partition by mutation of names or other non-physical acts can be valid irrespective of motive. Referenced in the compilation of authorities on partition in status.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in a sequence addressing each central issue on the factual record and statutory context as follows:

  1. A-schedule properties: The court examined the primary evidence presented by the plaintiffs (oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and documents Exs. A-1 to A-3). Ex. A-1 is a registered settlement deed containing an express recital that the property belonged absolutely and exclusively to the settlor Velayudha Padayachi. The court placed significant weight on this registered recital, especially because the document was executed about 21 years prior to Velayutha's death.
  2. The court observed that defendants had not suggested why Velayutha would insert a false recital in Ex. A-1. Moreover, Ex. A-3 (defendants' reply notice) contains an express admission of the settlement deed and admits that the first plaintiff was a legally wedded wife; the defendants only contended in Ex. A-3 that the settlement created a life estate (not that the deed itself was invalid). The court held that the appellate judge erred in failing to give effect to Ex. A-3 and its admissions.
  3. Burden of proof: The court explained that once the settlement deed's truth is accepted (i.e., its recital that the property was exclusive to Velayutha), the burden shifts to the defendants to show that the recital was false and that the properties were ancestral/coparcenary. Defendants produced no relevant evidence to show that A-schedule properties were purchased with joint family funds or that the recital was false. Thus, the court concluded the A-schedule properties were the exclusive properties of Velayutha and the settlement valid.
  4. Consequence for A-schedule: On that basis the court set aside the lower appellate court's decree limiting the first plaintiff to a 1/3rd share and restored the trial court's declaration of the first plaintiff's exclusive right.
  5. B-schedule properties: These properties were admitted to be joint family properties. Applying Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act (and the statutory fiction of assuming division immediately prior to the death of a coparcener), the court held Velayutha's share to be 1/3rd; then the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and 2 divide that 1/3rd such that each of the four plaintiffs gets 1/18th, totaling 4/18th for plaintiffs. The courts below were correct in holding plaintiffs entitled to 4/18th.
  6. Equities of alienees (defendants 3–6): The appellate judge's provision for equity in favour of the alienees was found to be valid because it was not shown that alienations lacked any consideration. The court explained that whether the properties purchased by defendants 3–6 can be allotted to the shares of defendants 1 and 2 without prejudicing plaintiffs' shares is to be determined at the final decree proceedings; if allotment cannot be made without prejudice, the alienees will not be entitled to equity.
  7. Effect of Tamil Nadu Amendment (Act I of 1990) inserting Sections 29-A to 29-C: The court examined the Amendment's Section 1, which deemed the Amendment to have come into force on 25 March 1989. The court held that the legislature intended the Amendment to be deemed to have come into force on that date only, not earlier; therefore the Amendment's retrospective effect extends only up to 25.3.1989.
  8. Interpretation of Section 29-A: The court analyzed Section 29-A's clauses and concluded that a daughter will become a coparcener by birth in the same manner as a son only if the male coparcener (the father) was alive on 25.3.1989. Married daughters before that date are excluded. The court stressed that Section 29-A does not make a sister a coparcener; the prerequisite is that the father should have been alive on the date the Amendment is deemed to have come into force.
  9. The court rejected the appellants' reliance on Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions that applied an analogous amendment to pending proceedings to enlarge daughters' shares. The court disagreed with those decisions' approach to reopening crystallised shares, emphasizing that the Amendment did not intend to divest already vested shares of female heirs and that the words "partition effected" in clause (5) of Section 29-A must be understood in the Hindu-law sense (i.e., partition-effect by division in status).
  10. Finality of preliminary decree and partition in status: The court applied authoritative precedent (including Gurupad, Venkala Reddy, Privy Council decisions and others) to hold that a preliminary decree that has crystalised the shares effects partition in status and is conclusive in respect of those shares; it cannot be reopened at the instance of one sharer so as to reduce others' vested shares. Because Velayutha died in 1976 and the preliminary decree was passed on 26.2.1979, the 4th appellant cannot claim to have become a coparcener with her deceased father under Section 29-A, nor can she obtain an enlarged share at the expense of the other plaintiffs whose shares were not challenged on appeal.
  11. Conclusion on Amendment claim: The court held that clause (5) of Section 29-A and the finality of the preliminary decree bar the 4th appellant from obtaining an enlarged share; accordingly, she remains entitled to only 1/18th share (the same as each other plaintiff).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The appeal(s) are allowed in part with respect to A-schedule properties and dismissed with respect to B-schedule properties.
  • The lower appellate court's judgment and decree insofar as they reduced the first plaintiff's entitlement in A-schedule properties to 1/3rd are set aside; the trial court's decree declaring the exclusive right of the first plaintiff to the A-schedule properties is restored.
  • With regard to B-schedule properties, the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court are confirmed: the plaintiffs are entitled collectively to 4/18th and each plaintiff to 1/18th share.
  • The 4th appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 29-A of the Tamil Nadu Amendment (Act I of 1990) because her father (the coparcener) died before the Amendment's deemed commencement date (25.3.1989) and because the preliminary decree (passed on 26.2.1979) had already crystallised the shares (constituting a partition in status). Thus she remains entitled only to 1/18th.
  • The provision for equity in favour of alienees (defendants 3–6) made by the lower appellate court stands as valid subject to the final decree allocation without prejudicing plaintiffs' shares.
  • Parties to bear their respective costs.

Implications:

  • The decision restores the trial court's finding that a registered settlement deed (Ex. A-1) carrying an unchallenged recital of exclusive ownership, and supported by admissions in Ex. A-3, is decisive unless the opposing party adduces specific evidence to rebut that recital.
  • The court reiterated and applied settled principles of Hindu succession and partition law: (a) the statutory fiction under Section 6 (deeming partition immediately before death) is binding in ascertaining heirs' shares; (b) partition in the Hindu-law sense can be effected by a division in status (e.g., by a preliminary decree) without actual metes and bounds; and (c) once shares are crystallised by such partition, later legislation (or later-born claimants or changes) cannot be used to diminish vested shares unless the statute clearly requires or permits it.
  • The court construed the Tamil Nadu Amendment as operative from 25.3.1989 (the date fixed by Section 1) and limited Section 29-A's application: a daughter becomes a coparcener by birth only if her father was alive on that date; married daughters and partitions effected before that date are excluded. This construction limits retrospective operation of the Amendment and protects vested rights determined by prior partitions or decrees.
  • The court expressly disagreed with certain Andhra Pradesh High Court authorities that had applied an analogous amendment to enlarge daughters' shares in pending proceedings, distinguishing them on the basis of Hindu-law concepts of partition and the finality of crystallised shares under a preliminary decree.
  • No new broad ratio is proclaimed beyond the application of these principles to the facts; the direct practical effect is the restoration of the trial court's A-schedule finding, confirmation of B-schedule shares, and denial of the 4th appellant's claim under the Amendment.

Costs: The parties will bear their respective costs. The court also recorded its appreciation for the assistance of the Amicus Curiae who appeared in the case.

    Sundarambal And Others v. Deivanayagam And Others

    JUDGMENT

    1. plaintiff's in O.S No. 192 of 1977 on the file of the District Munsif, Cuddalore, are the appellants in both the appeals. They filed the suit for declaration of tne 1st plaintiffs' title to A schedule property and for recovery of possession of the same besides partition and separate possession of 4/6th share in B schedule properties. The trial court granted a decree declaring the first plaintiff's title to the A schedule properties and holding that the plaintiff's were entitled to 4/18th share in B schedule properties except in item No. 6 and directing a division thereof. There was an appeal by defendants 1 and 2 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, in A.S No. 142 of 1979 and another appeal by defendants 3, 4 and 6 in A.S No. 143 of 1979. The Subordinate Judge allowed A.S No. 142 of 1979 in part and held that the first plaintiff was entitled only to 1/3rd share in the A schedule property and recovery of possession thereof. He dismissed the said appeal in other respects. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed Appeal No. 143 of 1979 and modified the decree of the lower court granting equity claimed by defendants 3, 4 and 6 in the properties purchased by them.

    2. Though the plaintiff's could have filed one second appeal and questioned the judgment of the lower appellate court, the plaintiff's have chosen to file two second appeals. As they relate to the same subject matter, they were heard together and a common judgment is being delivered now.

    3. The first question relates to the share of the plaintiff's in A schedule properties. Before proceeding further, I must set out the relationship of parties. The first plaintiff is the secona wife of one Velayudha Padayachi and plaintiff's 2 to 4 are her daughters. Defendants 1 and 2 are the sons of Velayudha Padayachi through his first” wife. Defendants 3 to 6 are alienees of some of the suit properties from defendants 1 and 2.

    4. The case of the plaintiff's is that the plaint A schedule property belonged to Ve Jayudha Padayachi absolutely and exclusively and he has settled the same on the first plaintiff by a registered deed dated 27.8.1955 marked as Ex. A-1. The contention of the defendants is that A schedule property was joint family property and the settlement deed was null and void. While the trial court accepted the case of the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court has accepted the case of defendants and granted a decree for 1/3rd share which according to the lower appellate court belonged to Velayutha Padayachi.

    5. The evidence relating to A schedule properties let in by the plaintiff's comprised of the oral evidence of P.WS 1 and 2 and Exs. A-1 to A-3. Ex. A-1 is the registered settlement deed in which there is a clear recital that the property belonged absolutely and exclusively to the settlor Velayutha Padayachi Nothing is suggested on the side of the defendants as to why Velayutha Padayachi should insert a false recital in Ex. A-1 and treat the property as his exclusive property as against his sons. The recital in the document which was executed about 21, years prior to the death of Velayutha Padayachi will have great weight in the matter of consideration of the character of the properties.

    6. Ex. A-2 is the notice issued by the first plaintiff to defendants 1 and 2 on 12.8.1974, claiming exclusive right to A schedule proper ty as the settlee under Ex. A-1. A reply notice was issued by defendants 1 and 2 under Ex. A-3 dated 17.9.1574 There is no claim in Ex. A-3 that the A schedule propertier were joint family properties and that the settlement in favour of the first plaintiff was not valid. On the other hand, the express recital in paragraph 1 of Ex. A-3 is as follows

    “It is true that your client is a legally wedded wife of my clients' father Velayutha Padayachi and also admits the settlement deed mentioned in your notice with regard to the properties mentioned in A schedule.

    In the second paragraph of Ex. A-3, it is stated that as per the settlemen; deed, the first plaintiff did not have absolute right over the prrperties mentioned in A schedule, but she had only a life estate and that after her death, the properties would go to defendant 1 and 2. Thus in Ex. A-3, there is a cleat admission that the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff's was valid. The defendant cannot, take a directly contrary stand in the written statement and contend that, A schedule properties vere joint family properties an j that the settlement deed was not valid. The learner appellate Judge has not chose to consider the effect of the recitals in Ex. a-3, though he has made a reference to the document and the admission of the defendants to the factum of the first plaintil being the legally wedded wife and the settlement deed The judgment of the learned appelate Judge is clearly vitiated by his failurt to give effect to Ex. A-3.

    7. The learned a apellate Judge has takes the view that the firs, plaintiff giving evidence as P.W.1 admitted the fact that her father-in-law owned 10 acres of land and her deceased husband was his only son. The learned Judge proceeds to state that P.W.1 was not able to say as to how her husband got A' schedule properties and the burden was on her to prove that it was the exclusive property of Velayutna Padayachi as she admitted the existence of joint family properties owned by her father-in-law. The reason, to say the least, is wholly untenable if not absurd. Once the truth of the settlement deed is accepted, the recitals therein should be given due weight. When it is declared by Velayutha that the properties covered by the settlement deed were his exclusive properties, the burden is on the defendants to prove that the recital in the settlement deed was a false one and the properties were really ancestral properties or joint family properties. The defendants have failed to produce any relevant evidence to prove the same. The mere existence of some ancestral properties with Velayutha's father would not lead to the conclusion that the A schedule properties were acquired with the income from the ancestral properties or by the sales of ancestral properties. No evidence has been produced by the defendants to show the: income from the ancestral properties so as to hold that there was adequate nucleus to enable Velayutha to purchase. A schedule properties with the aid of joint family funds. In the absence of any such evidence it has to be held that the A schedule properties were the exclusive properties of Velayutha and the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff's was valid in law.

    8. Consequently, the decree declaring that the first plaintiff is entitled only to 1/3rd share in the A schedule properties is set aside and the decree and the judgment of the trial court with regard to A schedule properties declaring the exclusive right of the first plaintiff are restored.

    9. Turning to the B schedule properties which are admittedly joint family properties, the plaintiff's have claimed 4/6th share. The Courts below have rightly he'd that the plaintiff's will be entitled only to 4/18th share, as under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the share of Velayutha in the joint family properties has to be ascertained, as if a division took place immediately prior to his death. If that is done Velayutha's share therein was only 1/3rd and all the plaintiff's and defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to a share in the said 1/3rd, each being entitled to 1/6th share thereof. Thus each plaintiff got 1/18th share and all the four of them together get 4/18th share.

    10. There is no substance in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the provision for equity in favour of the alienees made by the appellate Judge is erroneous. It is not the case of the appellants that the alienations in favour of defendants 3 to 6 are not supported by any consideration at all. Hence the provision made for equity is certainly valid. The question to be considered at the time of final decree proceedings is whether the properties purchased by defendants 3 to 6 can be allotted to the share of defendants 1 and 2 without causing any prejudice to the shares of plaintiffs. If such an allotment cannot be made, certainly the alienees will not be entitled to claim equity. The court will have to find if an allotment can be made on that basis and if so the alienees will be entitled to have such properties allotted to the shares of their alienors.

    11. The matter does not stop here. During the pendency of these second appeals, Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1990 has come to be passed inserting (sic) an amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in its application to the ‘State of Tamil Nadu. Sections 29-A to 29-C are introduced by the Amendment. Act. Under Sec. 29-A, the daughter of a coparcener shall become “by birtn a coparcener in the same manner as a son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son, inclusive of the right to claim by survivorship. Such of her rights are subject to the liabilities and disabilities in respect of such properties as a son.

    12. Relying on the provisions of the Amendment Act, the appellants have filed C.M.P No. 13561 of 1996 for permission of raise additional grounds in the Second Appeal No. 1130 of 1981. The proposed additional ground is that the 4th appellant has become entitled to a larger share in B schedule properties on par with her brothers, respondents 1 and 2, by virtue of Sec. 29-A of the Hindu Succession Act. As it is a question of law depending only on* the existing materials on record, the permission sought by the appellants is granted. The appellants are permitted to argue that the 4th appellant has become entitled to a larger share by virtue of the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act.

    13. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that after the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, the 4th plaintiff who remains unmarried will be entitled to a share equal to that of respondents 1 and 2. In other words, she will be entitled, according to learned counsel for the appellants, to a 7/24th share and respondents 1 and 2 will be entitled to a 7/24th share each. Learned counsel places reliance on two judgments of Andhra Pradesh High Court in I. Pulla Reddy v. Seshi Reddy (1987 (2) Andhra Law Times 210) and S. Narayana Reddy v. Sat Reddy (A.I.R 1990 Andhra Pradesh 263). In both the cases, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that the Andhra amendment would apply to pending proceedings and the daughters would be entitled to claim a larger share because of the amendment. While in the former case, the question arose at the preliminary decree stage, in the latter, the question arose after the preliminary decree became final, in the sense that the proceedings for passing a final decree were only pending and the correctness of the preliminary decree was beyond dispute at that stage. There is no doubt that if the later judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is applied to this case, the 4th plaintiff will be entitled to a higher share as claimed by her now. But I find it difficult to accept the reasoning of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Before referring to the judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in detail, it is “ necessary to refer to the provisions contained in the amendment Act and consider them in the light of first principles and settled principles of Hindu Law.

    14. Section 1 of Tamil Nadu Act I of 1990 clearly states that the Amendment Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 25th day of March 1989. The Act received the assent of the President on the 15th January 1990. The date mentioned in Sec. 1 is the date on which the Bill was introduced in the Assembly. The legislature intended that the Act is deemed to have come into force on the date on which the Bill was introduced in the Assembly and not on any earlier date. Hence the retrospective effect of the Amendment Act as set out by Sec. 1 thereof extends only up to 25th March 1989 going backwards from the date on which the Act received the assent of the President. The provisions introduced by the Amendment Act have to be considered in the light of the aforesaid provision fixing the date on which the Amendment Act is deemed to have come into force.

    15. Section 29-A as introduced by the Amendment reads as follows: “29-A. Not; withstanding anything contained in S. 6 of this Ac,

    (i) in a Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara Law, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner ai a son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son inclusive of the right to claim by survivorship and shall be subject to the same liabilities and disabilities in respect thereto as the son;

    (ii) at a partition in such a Joint Hindu Family the coparcenary property shall be so divided as to allot 10 a daughter the same share as is allottable to a son provided that the share which a predeceased son or a predeceascd daughter would have got at the partition, if he or she had been alive at the time of the partition shall be allotted to the surviving child of such predeceased son or of such predeceased daughter:

    Provided further the share allottable to UK predeceased child of a predeceased son or of predeceased daughter, if such child had been alive it the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the chilli of such predeceased child of the predeceased son of the predeceased daughter, as the case may be;

    (iii) any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of the provisions of clause (i) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by will or other testamentary disposition;

    (iv) nothing in this chapter shall apply to a daughter mainted before the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989

    (v) nothing in clause (ii) shall apply to a partition which had been (effected before the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Arendment) Act 1989.

    Under Sub-clause (1), the daughter of ac ‘parcener shall become a coparcener in her own right by birth, thus enabling all daughters of a coparcener who were born even prior to 25th March 1989 to become coparceners. In other words, if a male Hindu has a daughter born on any date prior to 25th March 1989, she would also be a coparcener with him in the joint family when the Amendment came into force. But the necessary requisite is, the male Hindu should have been alive on the date of the coming into force of the Amendment Act. The section only makes a daughter a coparcener and not a sister. If a male Hindu had died before 25th March 1989, leaving coparcenary property, then this daughter cannot claim to be a coparcener in the same manner as a son, as, on the date on which the Act came into force, her father was not alive. She had the status only as a sister vis-a-vis her brother and not a daughter on the date of the coming into force of the Amendment Act.

    Clause (4) excludes daughters married before the date of commencement of the Amendment Act i.e, 25th March 1989. Clause (5) protects partitions which had been effected before 25.3.1989

    The position under sec. 29-A will reduce to this. All daughters of a male coparcener will become coparceners entitled to a share with him, if the coparcener had been alive on 25.3.1989 Even among such daughters if any daughter has been married before 24.3.1989, she will not be entitled to claim a share as a coparcener. If there had been a partition in the family before 25.3.1989, that partition will not be affected by the provisions of the Amendment Act. In that event also, the daughter of a coparcener will not be entitled to claim a share as coparcener from the date of her birth and reopen the partition already effected.

    16. This interpretation is necessitated in view of two circumstances. The first is that the Amendment Act expressly prescribes the date of commencement as 25, 3. 1989. Thus the Act will have prospective effect from 25.3.1989 and cannot have any retrospective effect prior to that date. The second aspect is, if an unmarried daughter is given a share in the property of a coparcener who died before 25.3.1989, it will lead to an anomalous situation of reducing the share which has already vested in a married daughter or the widow or the mother of the deceased coparcener. This can be explained clearly by giving an illustration. ‘A’ a male Hindu having an interest in coparcenary property died before 25.3.1989 but after the passing of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, leaving his mother, wife, a son and a daughter. According to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, a partition should be deemed to have been effected just prior to the death of ‘A’ for ascertaining the interest of ‘A’ in the coparcenary property. Thus, he would have had a nalf share, the other half belonging to his son. In that half share of ‘A’ his mother, wife, son and daughter will each get 1/4th. Therefore, on the death of ‘A’ his mother gets 1/8th, his wife gets 1/8th, his daughter gets 1/8th and his son gets a total of 5/8th share. If section 29-A is made applicable to the case, and the daughter is to be treated as a coparcener equal to a son, her share will become 1/3 + 1/4th of 1/3 i.e, 1/3 + 1/12 equal to 5/12th. The son's share will get reduced to 5/12th from 5/8th. As a necessary consequence, the share of the mother and the widow will get reduced to 1/12 each from 1/8th. There is nothing in the Amendment Act to warrant such reduction of shares already vested.

    17. Another illustration may also be given. ‘A’ died after 1956 and before 25.3.1989 leaving two daughters and a son. One of the daughters gets married after the death of ‘A’, but before 25.3.1989 Under the Act as it stood before the amendment, each daughter got 1/6th share in the coparcenary property. If the amendment is applied, the share of the married daughter will get reduced to 1/9th, while the share of the unmarried daughter will increase to 4/9th. The Legislative has not contemplated any such reduction, in the share of the female heirs vested in them already under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, before the passing of the Amendment Act. At any rate, there is nothing in the Amendment Act or in the provisions introduced in the main Act by the Amendment Act to warrant such a conclusion. The object of the Amendment Act is itself to enhance the share of a female heir and raise her status to that of a coparcener. While doing so, the Legislature excluded the daughters who are already married.

    18. The position in law that female heirs of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener referred to in section 6 of the Act get definite shares on the death of such coparcener vested in them, has been clearly set out by the Supreme Court in Gurupad v. Hirabai A.I.R 1978 S.C 1239=91 L.W 169 S.N. Adverting to the assumption of a partition under Explanation I to Section 6 of the Act, the Supreme Court observed thus:

    “In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as the very first to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property. For, by doing that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation 1 to S. 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional that the interest of a Hindu mitakshare coparcener ‘shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death. What is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages. To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle: All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the lifetime of the deceased. The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other conclusion. It has to be treaied and accepted as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the notional partition.”

    The Supreme Court reiterated the same in Raj Rani v. Chief Settlement Commr. Delhi A.I.R 1984 S.C 1234=97 L.W 181 S.N.

    19. If is impossible to imagine that the Stat. Legislature intended to divest the female heirs in whom definite shares had already vested of a portion thereof and reduce the quantum considerably. Therefore, the only harmonious interpretation of S. 29-A that will be in consonance with the other provisions of the Act is that the daughter of a coparcener can become a coparcener only if her father is alive on 25.3.1989 She can become a coparcener only with her father and not with her brothers if her father had already passed away before the Amendment Act ca The into force.

    20. In the present case, the father of the 4th appellant, namely Velayutha, died in 1976 even before the suit was filed. Hence the 4th appellant cannot claim that she had, become a coparcener with her deceased; father and entitled to a share equal to that of respondents 1 and 2.

    21. I am of the view that clause (5) of section 29.A will also stand in the way of the 4th appellant claiming a larger share ill the joint family properties in the present case. The preliminary decree has been passed in the suit on 26.2.1979, long before the Amedment Act came into force. The quantum of shares of the parties has been crystalised by the preliminary decree. There is no challenge by anybody against the said part of the preliminary decree. The only challenge by defendants 1 and 2 is with regard to ‘A’ schedule property. The other challenge was by the alienees who claimed only equity and they did not question the shares of the appellants herein. Thus the preliminary decree had become conclusive with regard to shares of the parties. Under the preliminary decree, each of the plaintiffs is entitled to 1/18th share in ‘B’ schedule properties.. If the present contention of the 4th appellant is accepted, the shares of plaintiffs 1 to 3 who are appellants 1 to 3, with get disturbed. That cannot be done in the vicw of the fact that their shares do not form part of the subject matter of appeal. The are not being questioned in these appeals. Hence there is no way for this court to reduce the shares of appellants 1 to 3. The 4th plaintiff cannot therefore claim a larger share, thus reducing the shares of appellants 1 to 3

    22. Even otherwise, under clause (5) any partition effected before the date of conm mecement of the Amendment Act shall not be disturbed because of the amendment. The question is whether it can be said in this case that a partition had been effected by the preliminary decree on 26.2.1979 Under the Hindu Law, a partition is effected once there is a division in status. There is no necessity for effecting a partition by metes and bounds to say that there is a partition of joint family under the Hindu law. On such a division, the coparceners become tenants-in-common with definite sharps. In Appoovicr alias Seetharamier v. Rama Subba Aiyan and others XI Moore's Indian Appeals 75 “the Privy Council held that the division in status converts a joint tenancy into a tenancy-in-common even if there is no division of the properties actually. The relevant passage reads thus:

    “It is necessary to bear in mind the rwo fold application of the word ‘division’. Tnere may be a division of right, and there may be a division of property; and thus, after the examination of this instrument, there was a division of right in the whole property, although, in some portions, that division of right was not intended to be followed up by an actual partition by metes and bounds, that being postponed till some future time when it would be convenient to make that partition.

    Nothing can express more definitely a conversion of the tenancy, and with that conversion a charge of the status of the family quoad this property. The produce is no longer to be brought to the common chest, as respecting the income of an undivided property, but the proceeds are to be enjoyed in six distinct equal shares by the members of the family, who arc thenceforth to become entitled those definite shares. Thus using the language of the English law merely byway of illustration the join terancy is severed, and converted into a tenancy in common.

    Then, if there by a conversion of the joint tenancy of an individed family into a tenancy in common of the members of that undivided family, the undivided family becomes a divided family with reference to the property that is the subject of that agreement, and that is a separation in interest and in right, although not immediately followed by the dt facto actual division of the subjectmatter. This may at any rime be claimed by virtue of the separate right.

    It operated in law as a conversion of the character of the property and an alteration of the title of the family, converting it from a joint to separate ownership, and we think the conclusion of law is correct, viz., that is sufficient to make a divided possession of what was previously undivided, without the necessity of its being carried out into an actual partition of the subject matter.”

    23. The principle was reiterated by the Privy Council in Balkishen Das and others v. Ram Narain Sahu and others 30 Indian Appeals 139. The Privy Council extracted the following statement of law found in the judgment of the High Court:

    “The question is not whether there was a separation by metes and bounds, but a separation in estate and interest; for that would have the same legal effect, to far as altering the status of the family was concerned, as a partition by metes and bounds.”

    The Privy Council approved of the above statement of law by observing thus:

    “Their Lordships entirely agree in the last quoted passage from the judgment of the High Court, and they think it expresses accurately the effect of the decision in Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan (I I Moore's Ind. A. Ca. 75)”

    24. Again the question arose with reference to an after born son before the Privy Council in Bhagwat Ram v. Ramji Ram 1947-2-M.L.J 67=60 L.W 466 P.C. The Privy Council held that the law is well settled that a son begoten as well as born after the partition, where a share has been allotted to the father,. is not entitled to have the partition reopened and to claim a redistribution of the shares and that he is only entitled to succeed to his father's share and to his separate and self acquired property to the exclusion 6f the divided sons. The Privy Council held that the fact that the partition had not been completed by the actual division of the estate by metes and bounds prior to the birth of such afterborn son cannot affect the quantum of share to which the other members had already become entitled; in so far as their rights are concerned, partition had already taken place and their shares cannot be diminished by the subsequent birth of a son.

    25. That principle will certainly apply to the present case. Though the daughter is actually bom before 25.3.1989 and on that date cannot be considered to be an after-bom coparcener, her position in law will be analogous to that of an after born son claiming a share in the joint family property after a partition had been effected before the Amendment Act came into force. Hence in this case partition having been effected by the preliminary decree in which the shares of the parties are definitely quantified and crystalised, it is not open to the 4th plaintiff to claim the benefits of the Amendment Act 1 of 1990 and contend that she will be entitled to a larger share, as, in my view, she is precluded by clause (5) of Sec. 29-A. The words Partition effected found in clause (5) should be understood in the sense in which they are understood in Hindu Law and it should be held in this case that a partition had been effected prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act.

    26. With regard to the effect of a division in status, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion: to consider in Kurapati Radhakrishna v. Kurapati Satyanarayana I.L.R 1949 Madras 229-62 L.W 884. It was held that excejpt in the case of an agreement constituting a reunion, it is not open to a member of a Hindu coparcenary governed by mitakshara law to revoke or withdraw an unambiguous intention to separate communicated to the other members, after such communication and a suit for partition filed by an adult coparcener, in which the plaint contains a clear and unambiguous expression of an intention that he wishes to treat himself as a divided coparcener from the date of its filing and in which summonses have been served on the other coparceners, effects a division in status between the plaintiff and the defendants, though the suit is withdrawn subsequently. The Division Bench observed that the expression of an intention to separate by an adult coparcener is not revocable after it is communicated to the other coparceners. This is an a fortiori case, as a preliminary decree has been passed by the court long before the Amendment Act come into force.

    27. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the effect of a preliminary decree for Dartition in Venkala Reddy v. Pothi Reddy A.I.R 1963 S.C 992. The relevant passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court reads thus:

    “A decision is said to be final when, so far as the Court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions or the Code of Civil procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision of a review application as is permitted by the code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a panition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made the decision of the Court arrived at the earlier start also has a finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to S. 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicatei that as to the matter covered by it a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree.”

    28. If the above dictum of the Supreme Court is applied to the present case it is clear that the preliminary decree has become conclusive in so far as the shares of the parties arc concerned. The only questions which arc pending in the second appeals relate to the character of ‘A’ schedule properties and equities claimed by the alienees. Hence, I hold that a partition has' been effected in this case by the preliminary decree within the meaning of clause (5) of Sec. 29-A and it cannot be disturbed by the 4th appellant claiming benefits under Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1990.

    29. The character of partition under Hindu Law is clearly brought out in N.R Raghavac ariar's Hindu Law-Principles and Precedent-Flighth Edition at page 309 The relevent portion reads as followings:

    “What is partition, its distinctive marks: In a Hindu joint famil gonerned by the Mitakshara law there is unity of owenership of the family property and comnensality of its enjoyment. Cessor of this unity and commensality means cessor or severance of joint family status of prtilion irresnective if whether it is accompanied or followed by a divis on of properties by metes and bounds Krishnabal v. Apppasuheb (A.I.R 1979 S.C 1880)

    According to the true notion of an undivided family in Mitakshara law, no indivoual member of that family whilst it remains joint and undivided can predicate of the joint and undivided property that he that particular member has a certain definite share, half, one third of one fourth ppoovier Rama Subba Aiayen((1886) 11 M.I.A 75, 89). Partition according to that law consists in defining that share, in a numerical division of the property. An actual division of the shares by metes and bounds is not necessary (ibid; Ram Pershad v. Lakhpati(1950) 30 Cal. 231, 235: 301. A. 1)

    In Hindu Law ‘Partition’ does not mean simply division of property into specific shares. It covers both division of title and division of property. Vijnanesara defines the word ‘Vibhaga’ which is usually rendered into English by the word ‘partition’ as the adjustment of diverse rights regarding the whole by distributing them in particular portions of the aggregate (Mitak., i 1-4). Mitra Misra explains in the V iramitrodaya the meaning of this passage; he shows that the definition of Vijnaneswara does not mean exclusively the division of property into specific shares as alone giving right to property into specific shares but includes the ascertainment of the respective rights of the individuals who claim the heritage jointly. He says ‘For partition is made of that in which proprietary right has already arisen, consequently partition cannot properly be set forth as the means of proprietary right. Indeed, what is effected by partition is only the adjustment of the proprietary right into specific shares Viramitraodaya, 1-36). Nowhere in the Mitakshara is it stated that an agreement between all the coparceners is essential to the disruption of the joint status or that the severance of rights can only be brought about by the actual division and distribution of the property held jointly. If this were so ant there were minors in a joint undivided family, partition would be impossible until all of them attained majority, a position which is expressly combated and negatived in the Viramitrodaya. In fact later writers leave no room for doubt that separation, “which means the severance of status of jointness, is a matter of individual volition. For example, Nilakanta, the author of the Vyavahara Mayukha expressly lays down that “even where there is a total absence of common property, partition is effected by the mere declaration, I am separate from thee, for, partition is a particular condition of the mind, and the declaration is the indication of the same”. The following gloss in the Viramitrodaya appears to be conclusive on the rule of law under the Mitakshara. ‘Here again it says partition at the desire of the sons which expression includes grandsons and great grandsons “whether in the lifetime of the father or after his demise, may take place by the choice of a single coparcener, since there is no distinction, (Observations of Amir Ali in Giriia Bai v. Sadashiv, 43 I.A 151: 37 S.C 321: 48C. 1031 at 1945-7: 14 A.L.J 812: 18 Bom. L.R 621: 20 C.W.N 1085: 31 M.L.J 455: 4 L.W 114: (1916) 2 M.W.N 65: 1916 P.C 104) “Separation from the joint family involving the severance of the jont status so far as the separating member is concerned with all the legal consequences resulting therefrom is quite distinct from the de facto division into specific shares of the property held until then jointly. The first is a matter of individual decision whilst the other is the natural resultant from the decision. Thus an unequivocal and unmistakable marfifestation by a member of a joint family by his words or conduct of a fixed and determined intention to become separate is suffcient to effect the separation of his title and the severance of his interest, although division of possession, or partition by metes and bounds, does not take place or though there is no separation in food and dwelling (Amritrao v. Mukundrao, 3 L.W 112: 1919 P.C 91; Yadao v. Namdeo 49 C.I: 48 I.A 513: 20 A.L.J 481: 42 M.LJ 219: 15 L.W 565: 26 C.W.N 393: 24 Bom. L.R 609: 1922 P.C 216: Syed Kasam v. Jorawar Singh, 50 C. 84: 49 I.A.J 58: 17 L.W 223: 43 M.LJ 676: 25 Bom. L.R.I: 21 A.LJ 57: 27 C.W.N 179: 1922 P.C 353; Ramalinga Annavi v. Narayana Annavi, 45 M. 489; 49 LA. 168; 1922 M.W.N 399; 26 C.W.N 929: 43 M.LJ 428: 20 A.LJ 839: 24 Bom. L.R 1209: 16 L.W 639: 1922 P.C 201: Girija Bai v. Sadashiv. Supra; Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain, 35 A 80:40 I.A 40: 15 Bom. L.R 456: 17 C.W.N 333: 11 A.LJ 172: 1913 M.W.N 183: 24 M.LJ 345: 18 I.C 30 (P.C) Kawal Nain v. Budh Singh, 39 A496; 44 LA. 159; 15 A.LJ 581: 19 Bom. L.R 642: 21 C.W.N ‘986: 33 M.LJ 42: 6 L.W 330: 1917 M.W.N 514: 1917 P.C 39. See also Narayan v. Mahadeorao, 1971 M.P.LJ 239; Fatechand Mahesy v. State of West Bengal. 76 Cl. W.N 137; Raghunath Kar v. Gajendra Kar 1973 Orissa 157; Naisha Begum v. Arumuga Thevar, (1974) 1 M.LJ 201: 1974 Mad. 273: Wasudeo v. State of Maharashtra, 1975 Mah. LJ. 404: Asa Nond v. Baldeo Raj, 197S All. 139: Tarapada Ray v. State of West Bengal 82 Cal. W.N 331: Lakshmanier v. Krishnamachar, (1976) 1 M.LJ 452). It is no requirement of a valid partition that there should be an actual division by metes and bounds (C.I.T v. Shivolingappa (1982) 135 I.T.R 375). Once there is a definite and unmistakable indication of a member to separate, his right to obtain and possess his share is unimpeachable, and neither the co-sharers can question it nor can the Court examine his conscience to find out whether his reasons for separation were well founded or sufficient (Girija Bai v. Sadhashv, Supra: Cf. Smt. Lila Wati v. Paras Ram, 1977 H.p 1 (where there was partition by mutation of names it is immaterial if the motive is to defeat creditors)

    Again it is stated in the same paragraph that “Partition is really a process in and by which a joint enjoyment is transformed into an enjoyment in severalty On partition each sharer has a right to a slice of the property, not merely to its money value.”

    Thus, on a partition by severance in status, the sharers obtain definite rights in the properties which are quantified and crystalised. It does not matter if the properties are not actually divided and the portions allotted to them are not handed over to them.

    30. Now I will advert to the two judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court In I. Putta Reddy v. I. Seshi Reddy 1987 2 ALT 210 a suit for partition was filed by the son and the daughter of the first defendant. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and the plaintiff's filed an appeal. While the plaintiffs case was that all the properties were coparcenary properties, the defendants pleaded that there was a prior partition on March 31, 1974” and the plaintiff were not entitled to maintain the suit for partition. The trial, court disbelieved the prior partition set up by the defendants, but dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not in the interest of the minors to effect a partition. The second defendant in the suit was the father of the 1st and 3rd defendants. He died during the pendency of the appeal. His widow and two daughters were impleaded as legal representatives. During the pendency of the appeal the Andhra Pradesh Hindu Succession Amendment Act came into force and it contains provisions almost ad idem with the provisions now found in the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act. In fact, the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act has taken the clue only from the Andhra Pradesh Act. The question which arose before the Andhra High Court was whether the daughters of the deceased coparcener, namely the 2nd defendant, were entitled to claim a share and whether one of the plaintiff's who was the daughter of the first defendant was entitled to claim a share under the provisions of the Amendment Act. The Court held that the Amendment Act would apply to pending proceedings and accordingly granted the prayers made by the parties and passed a preliminary decree for partition. Even according to my interpretation found above, the daughters of the 1st and 2nd defendant in that case are entitled to claim as coparceners just like the sons. That judgment does not help that 4th appellant in this case.

    31. In the other case before the Andhra Hieh Court namely S. Narayana Reddy v. S. Sai Reddy A.I.R 1990 Andhra Pradesh 263, an application was filed by the plaintiff for passing a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree. The preliminary decree was passed declaring 1/3rd share of the plaintiff in the suit properties. The first defendant filed an appeal against the preliminary decree and it was confirmed by the High Court. But the High Court directed the trial court to make appropriate provisions for maintenance and marriage expenses of defendants 5 to 9 from out of the joint family properties while passing a final decree. By the time the final decree application was filed, Hindu Succession Act was amended in Andhra Pradesh and the unmarried daughters who were defendants 6 to 9 claimed a share on par with their brothers, on the footing: that the properties had not been divided at that time. The trial court held that the preliminary decree having been confirmed by the High Court, it became conclusive and the contention of the unmarried daughters could not be accepted. On revision, the High Court reversed the said conclusion and held that the unmarried daughters would be entitled to a share equal to that of thier brothers and allowed the revision. The High Court held that even after the passing of the preliminary decree subsequent events could be taken note of and reliefs could be granted to the parties without driving them to other proceedings, thus avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. The relevant passage in the judgment of the High Court is as follows:.

    “The law as summarised from the above three judgments is clear and it must be held as a settled proposition that after the passing of the preliminary decree in a partition suit before passing of the final decree if there has been either enlargement or diminution of the shares or rights of the parties have been changed by reason of the rights that have been conferrd by the statute or rights of the parties by a second or by subsequent purchase or by assignments; of interst by whatever cause, the court, before passing its final decree, has to consider and decide the matter and grant a final decree in accordance with such subsequent devolutions to avoid multiplicity of suits and give complete and appropriate relief to all the parties The rere fact that those parties have been added subseq lent to the preliminary decree and their interest has bt n found to be affected and they were added as necessary parties, it does not mean that the court has be right to consider their claims. On the other hand he decision of the Privy Council cited above clear, points out that even in the case of a party who has been brought on record his right has to be adjusted at the time of the final decree.”

    32. The Court also placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal A.I.R 1967 S.C 1470. Ultimately it was observerd by the learned Judge that the rights of the parties in a partition suit could be considered at any stage till the passing of the final decree. According to the learned Judge the words partition effected’ in Sec. 29-

    A clause (4) in the Andhra Act, corresponding to Sec. 29-A (:5) in our Act, meant that in the case of partition through court, the termination of the suit ultimately by passing of the final decree.”

    33. With respect, I do not agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge. The learned Judge has overlooked that the terms ‘partition effected’ found in Sec. 29-A are used in the Hindu Law sense and they should be understood as they were undcrstood in Hindu Law. I have pointed out already, a partition is effected in Hindu law once there is a division in status. In a case where the preliminary decree has become conclusive and the shares of the parties are, crystalised there is no provision or method by which the partition can be reopened and a higher share can be granted to one of the sharers and reduce the shares of the other sharers. In fact, the Legislature has not intended any such effect by the amendment. As construed by me, the legislature wanted to exclude the partitions already effected under which the rights of the parties had been crystalised.

    34. Hence the contention put forward by the 4th appellant cannot be accepted and I hold that she is not entitled to get the benefit of Sec. 29-A of the Amendment Act. The 4th appellant will have only 1/18th share as each of the other appellants.

    35. In the result, the decree and judgment of the lower apellate court in so far as it relates to ‘A’ schedule properties are set aside and the decree ana judgment of the trial court in O.S No. 192 of 1977 are restored with reference to. A' schedule properties. As regard ‘B’ schedule properties the decree and judgment of trie lower appellate court are confirmed. The second Appeals are allowed with reference to ‘A’ schedule properties and dismissed with reference to ‘B’ schedule properties. The parties will bear their respective costs.

    36. I place on record my appreciation and gratitude for Mr. S. Mohamed Abdahir who appeared as Amicus Curiae in this case and helped me considerably.

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