1. The appellant in these two appeals is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 295 of 1978 and the first defendant in O.S. No.3 of 1980 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruppattur, North Arcot District. The respondent in these two appeals is the defendant in O.S. No.295 of 1978 and the plaintiff in O.S. No.3 of 1980.
2. The appellant herein filed the suit O.S. No.295 of 1978 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruppattur for directing the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 to be ordered to be registered by the Sub-Registrar, Vaniyambadi. The case of the appellant in the said suit is as follows:
The respondent herein executed the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 after receiving the entire sale consideration of Rs.20,000/-. All the formalities required for the registration of the document have been strictly complied with and the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 was presented for the purpose of registration before the Sub-Registrar, Vaniyambadi. The appellant called upon the respondent to register the document by means of a lawyer's notice dated 29.9.1977. The respondent refused to register the document. Thereupon the appellant applied for compulsory registration of the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 and the respondent after receiving the notice of compulsory registration, did not register the document and the Sub-Registrar, Vaniyambadi, after enquiry, passed orders on 20-1-1978 refusing to register the document. The appellant then filed an appeal before the District Registrar of Vellore and the District Registrar, Vellcre, after due enquiry, passed final orders under Section 76 read with Section 20(1) of the Registration Act, confirming the order of refusal passed by the Sub-Registrar, Vaniyambadi. The order of the District Registrar, Vellore dated 21.8.1978 is illegal and liable to be set aside.
3. The respondent herein as defendant in O.S. No.295 of 1978 resisted the suit contending as follows:
The sale deed dated 2.11.1977 is void in law and not enforceable. The entire sale consideration was not received as alleged in the plaint. Inasmuch as the respondent herein denied the execution of the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 the Sub-Registrar and the District Registrar rightly refused to register the document The interpolations in the sale deed were not made at the time when the respondent affixed her thumb-impression in the sale deed. The interpolations in the sale deed were made only after the respondent affixed her thumb-impression on the sale deed. The recitals in the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 regarding the 5 H.P. Oil engine and 16 coconut trees were inserted only after the respondent affixed her thumb impression on the sale deed. The respondent is an illiterate woman and she does not know to read and write. Though the. 5 HP. Kirloskar oil engine and 16 coconut trees were not agreed to be sold, the appellant, with the help of the scribe and attestors had materially altered the document after the thumb impression of the respondent was taken and before it was given for compulsory registration. In those circumstances the respondent had denied the execution of the said document, which is materially altered.
4. The respondent herein her turn filed the suit O.S. No.3 of 1980 for declaration of her title to the suit property and for permanent injunction and in the alternative for recovery of possession of the suit property. The case of the respondent in O.S. No.3 of 1980 is that the suit property originally belonged to her father Bossiappan and out of love and affection he had executed a settlement deed in favour of the respondent on 12.12.1971 and delivered possession of the suit property to the respondent. The further case of the respondent is that the appellant herein, who has no manner of right, title or Merest in the suit property taking advantage of the position as adjacent land owner is attempting to trespass into the suit land and caused disturbance to her peaceful possession.
5. The appellant herein as the first defendant in the suit resisted the suit raising the very same pleas which he had raised in the plaint in the suit O.S. No.295 of 1978.
6. The appellant also filed an additional written" statement in O.S. No.3 of 1980 stating that he was put in possession of the suit property even on the date of execution of the sale deed dated 2.11.1977.
7. The trial court, after joint trial, by a common judgment dismissed the appellant's suit O.S. No.295 of 1978 and decreed the respondents suit O.S. No.3 of 1980. As against the judgment in O.S. No.295 of 1978 the appellant filed an appeal A.S.No.199 of 1982 before the District Court of North Arcot at Vellore. As against the judgment in O.S. No.3 of 1980 the appellant herein filed A.S. No.81 of 1982 before the District Court, Vellore.
8. The appellate court, by a common judgment confirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed both the appeals A.S. Nos. 81 of 1982 and 199 of 1982. Aggrieved by the judgments of the courts below the appellant has preferred the present second appeals.
9. The main question that has to be decided in both these second appeals is, whether the appellant proved the due execution of the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 and whether it should be ordered to be registered under the provisions of the Registration Act.
10. Mr. R. Shanmugham, learned Counsel for the appellant would contend that in a suit filed under Section 77 of the Registration Act, praying for a decree directing the registration of document, the enquiry in Court is to be directed only to the following two points:
(a) Whether the document had been executed; and
(b) Whether certain requirements of law as to the presentation for registration in due time to the proper officer and in the manner prescribed by the Registration Act was complied with by the person presenting the document for registration;
In a suit filed under Section 77 of the Registration Act, the Court is concerned not with the validity but with the genuineness of the document sought to be registered, i.e., whether the document has been executed by the person by whom it is alleged to have been executed and the question of validity of the document must be determined in a suit properly framed for that purpose. Learned Counsel for the appellant further contended that the civil court in a suit filed under Section 77 of the Registration Act cannot also go into the question whether the document presented for registration is vitiated by fraud or coercion or whether the document is void for want of consideration, if the executant of the document admits execution of the document as contemplated under Section 35 of the Registration Act, the registering authority is bound to register the document
11. Let us first examine the meaning of "admission of the execution of a document" for the purpose of Section 35 of the Registration Act. The execution of a document is not mere signing of it. It is a solemn act and the executant who must own up the recitals in the instrument and there must be clear evidence that he put his signature in a document, after knowing fully its contents. The executant of a document must, after fully understanding the contents and the tenor of the document, put his signature or affix his thumb-impression. In other words, the execution of a document does not mean merely signing but signing by way of assent to the terms of the contract of alienation embodied in the document.
12. In dealing with the meaning of "admission of execution of document" for the purpose of Section 35 of the Registration Act" a Division Bench of this Court in Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma, (1949 II M.L.J. 684) has held as follows:
The admission required under Section 35 of the Registration Act is admission of execution of the document. It may be a sale deed, it may be a mortgage deed. It is not enough for the person, who is the ostensible executant, to admit his signature on a paper on which, it may be, the document is ultimately engrossed. The identity of the paper on which the signature occurs is not sufficient. If a man says that he signed a blank paper on the representation that it was required for presenting a petition, or if he signed a completed document on the representation that his signature or thumb impression is required as an attesting witness, that admission of the signature or thumb impression in those circumstances cannot be construed to be an admission of the execution of the document Far from its being an admission, it is a clear and unambiguous denial of the execution of the document He must admit in order to attract the provisions of Section 35(1) of The Registration Act that he signed the document, viz., a sale deed or a mortgage deed or a lease deed as the case may be.
13. Let us now examine the question whether the appellant in this case proved the due execution of the sale deed dated 2.11.1977 by the respondent. The respondent admits that she affixed her thumb impression in the sale deed Ex. Al dated 2.11.1977. But, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that at the time when the respondent affixed her thumb impression in Ex. Al, the document did not contain the recitals regarding the 5 H.P. Kirloskar oil engine and 16 coconut trees and the said recitals were inserted in Ex. Al only after the respondent affixed her thumb impression in Ex. Al and, therefore, it cannot be taken that the respondent admitted the execution of the sale deed, Ex. Al. There is force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent. As already stated, the execution of a document does not mean mere signing or putting the thumb-impression in the document, but, signing the document or putting the thumb impression in the document by a party by way of an assent to the terms of the sale deed. Simply because the respondent admits her thumb impression in Ex. Al, it cannot be held that she admits the execution of Ex. Al. The specific case of the respondent that the recitals in Ex. Al regarding the 5 HP. Kirloskar oil engine and 16 coconut trees were not there in the document Ex. Al when she affixed her thumb impression on Ex. Al, but, they were interpolated or inserted in the document Ex. Al, after she affixed her thumb impression, stands proved by the evidence of P.W.4 and D.W.2. Further the intrinsic evidence in Ex. Al such as alteration of the figure '6' as '16' with regard to the coconut trees and the interpolation of the words (sic) made towards the end of the document Ex. Al will also go to show that the respondent could not have agreed for the sale of 16 coconut trees and the 5 H.P. oil engine at the time when she affixed her thumb impression in Ex. Al, but, the recitals regarding the coconut trees and the oil engine were inserted in Ex. Al after the respondent affixed her thumb impression in Ex. Al. Taking into consideration all the circumstances mentioned above and the evidence on record both the courts below rightly held that the respondent herein has not admitted the execution of the document Ex. Al. Further, the alteration or interpolation in Ex. Al is not admitted by the respondent and, therefore, the registering authority is justified in refusing to register the document. In Veemppa Chettiar v. Viswanatha Iyer A.I.R. 1916 Madras 673, a Division Bench of this Court dealing with the effect of non-admission of interlineation in the document has held as follows:
Where there is an interlineation at the end of a deed and the parties are not prepared to admit it a Sub-Registrar is justified in refusing to register the document. In such cases, the executant must be taken to have denied the execution within the meaning of Section 35 of the Registration Act.
In Bolla Guruvayya and Ors. v. Cherukuri Venkatarathnam 47 M.L.J. 271, this Court dealing with the scope of enquiry by the civil court in a suit filed under Section 77 of the Registration Act has held as follows:
When a document is presented to a Registrar of Assurances for registration and it bears on its face signs of having been tampered with, he has only to answer the question whether the document is in the state in which it was executed by the parties to it. He would be exceeding his functions if he went into a roving enquiry to guess at the probabilities of its provisions; and in a suit under Section 77, Registration Act, the same considerations should guide the Court which should guide the Registrar in considering his duty to register or to refuse registration.
14. In these circumstances, the concurrent findings of the courts below that the respondent has denied the execution of the sale deed Ex. Al and that the orders of the District Registrar and the Sub-Registrar refusing to register the document Ex. Al is just and legal are correct and do not call for interference in these second appeals. There are no merits in the second appeals and they are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly they are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, there is no-order as to costs.