1. The order impugned in this revision petition seeks to set aside an ex parte decree passed on 10.2.1982. The suit itself was filed on the basis of a promissory note and was listed for hearing on 10.2.1982 for final disposal. The defendant did not appear on that date and an ex parte decree was passed. On 5.3.1982, an application for setting aside the ex parte decree was made on the vague ground that the defendant was suffering from illness and that on 10.2.1982 the counsel withdrew from the case, and therefore, the ex parte order should be set aside. On this application, a rather unusual order has been passed by the Principal District Munsif. The order reads as follows:
The counsel for the respondent has on many occasions previously conceded for allowing on terms for more than a year old case. Though it is not a ground, this petitioner has stated that he was suffering from illness. An ex parte decree cannot be considered to be a full decree on merits. Hence, on condition Rs. 50 to be paid towards costs to the other side on or before 15.10.1982, the petition will be allowed.
Not much argument is needed to see the infirmity in this order. In another matter C.R.P. No. 2235 of 1983, Subbiah v. Muthukrishnan since reported in (1987)100 L.W. 536, disposed of today, I have referred to an impression that a practice seems to be growing that suits are allowed to be proceeded With ex parte and then applications are made for setting aside the ex parte decrees which are also allowed as a matter of course. The observation made by the District Munsif that the counsel for the plaintiff in the instant case, has, on many occasions, conceded that the ex parte decree should be set aside, is sufficient basis for the impression referred to above. The power of the Court to set aside an. ex parte decree is to be exercised judicially and unless sufficient cause is shown for non-appearance on the day on which the suit is fixed for hearing there will be no jurisdiction or justification for the trial court to set aside the ex parte decree. The willingness of the counsel for the plaintiff to accept costs does not confer jurisdiction on the court to set aside the ex parte decree and when the court agrees to set aside the ex parte decree on such concession, this virtually amounts to abdication of the jurisdiction and the discretion of the court in favour of the counsel for the plaintiff. This practice is to be deprecated. It is also difficult to appreciate the view taken by the District Munsif f that ex parte decree cannot be considered to be 'full decree on merits'. A decree which is passed ex parte is as good and effective as a decree passed after contest. Before the ex parte decree is passed, the court has to hold that the averments in the plaint and the claim in the suit have been proved. It is, therefore, difficult to endorse the observation made by the Principal District Munsif that such a decree cannot be considered to be a decree passed on merits. It is undoubtedly a decree which is passed without contest; but it is only after the merits of the claim of the plaintiff have been proved to the satisfaction of the trial court, that an occasion to pass an ex parte decree can arise.
2. The vague allegation that the defendant was ill is hardly any justification for setting aside the ex parte decree and such an allegation cannot amount to proof of sufficient cause which is a mandatory requirement before an ex parte decree is set aside.
3. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has stated before me that the plaintiff has not accepted the costs. The defendant though served has not appeared in this Court. Accordingly, the order of the Principal District Munsif setting aside the ex parte decree is set aside and the defendant's application for setting aside the ex parte decree must stand rejected.
4. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed. Since there is no appearance on behalf of the respondent, there will be no order as to costs.