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  • Art. III, rule 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
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  • Art. III, rule 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the first defendant, a carrier of a consignment of urea shipped from Tokyo to Nagappattinam; the respondents are the plaintiffs, consignees, and the shippers were Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo. The plaintiffs sued the first defendant and its agent (second defendant) for damages of Rs. 3,045-20 for alleged short delivery of 1.100 metric tons of urea. Both the trial court and the first appellate court decreed the plaintiffs' claim. The present matter is a second appeal against those judgments and decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court and the first appellate Court were right in decreeing the suit against the carrier in view of the qualified bill of lading and the provisions of S. 5 of the Bills of Lading Act?
  2. When does the cause of action start accruing for the purpose of Art. III, rule 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, if the discharge of the cargo is spread over twenty days?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The endorsement on the bill of lading reading "Said to weigh" did not assure that the weight had been checked or accepted by the carrier.
  • Because of that qualification, the onus was on the plaintiffs to prove the actual quantity shipped at Tokyo, and the plaintiffs failed to produce competent evidence of the actual shipped weight.
  • Accordingly, the carrier cannot be held liable for the alleged short delivery.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' (plaintiffs') legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
New Chinese Antimony Co. Ltd. v. Ocean Steamship Co. Ltd. . 1917-2-K.B. Dn. 664 Bill of lading with a clause like "A quantity said to be..." is not prima facie evidence of quantity; burden lies on plaintiffs to prove actual quantity shipped. Adopted: supported the conclusion that a "said to weigh" endorsement does not establish the shipped weight and shifts burden to plaintiffs to prove quantity.
K. Assinar v. Malabar Steamship Co Notation "weight declared by the shipper but not checked" indicates disclaimer of responsibility by carrier; carrier may contract out of liability. Applied to show the endorsement negates carrier's acceptance of weight and prevents presumption that bill of lading figure is conclusive.
Shipping Corporation of India v. Union of India . A.I.R 1976 Goa 49. Clause that measurement, weight and quantity are "not known" means particulars were furnished by shipper and carrier did not accept them; burden on shipper to prove particulars by independent evidence. Followed: reinforced that particulars in such qualified bills require independent proof by the plaintiffs/shipper.
Messrs. T.S Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Food Corporation of India A.I.R 1983 Mad. 105. The endorsement "said to weigh" means particulars are as given by shipper without assurance of having been checked; burden on claimant to prove actual weight loaded. Applied: supported the conclusion that absent proof of actual loaded weight, carrier cannot be held liable for shortages.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the bill of lading endorsement ("Said to weigh") and factual evidence. It found that only two plaintiff witnesses (PWs 1 and 2) were examined and none competent to prove the actual weight shipped at Tokyo; no evidence from consignors/ shippers was produced. Relying on cited precedents, the Court held that a qualified endorsement such as "said to weigh" or statements that weight/quantity are not known means the carrier did not accept or guarantee the weight and that the burden to prove actual shipped quantity rests on the plaintiffs. The lower appellate court's reliance on the fact that bags were torn and slack at delivery was held to be merely inferential and insufficient to prove the shipped weight. On this basis the Court concluded plaintiffs had not discharged their burden and the carrier could not be held liable for the alleged shortage.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSITION: The second appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the two courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed.

Implications: The direct effect is dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit and absolution from paying costs ("no order of costs" and plaintiffs are absolved of liability to pay costs). The opinion rests the decision on the absence of acceptable proof of shipped weight and does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond the application of the cited authorities.

    Nippon Yeesan Kaisha Ltd. (Nyk Line), Are A Company Incorporated In Japan And Are Carrying On Business With Their Regd. Office At 3-2 Marunchoucht 2 Chome, Chiyodaku Tokyo, Japan, Rep. By Their Agents, The South India Corporation Agencies Pvt. Ltd. Having Their Office At Adyar House, Madras 35 And Correspondence Address At South India House, 99 Armenian St. Madras-1 v. The Union Of India, Rep. By The Dy. Director (Food), Office Of Regional Director (Food), Chennai House, Madras-1 And Another

    1. The appellant in this second appeal has to succeed on a very subtle and convincing point pressed forth by Mr. S. Krishna Srinivasan appearing for King and Partridge, learned counsel for the appellant. The first defendant in the suit is the appellant. The respondents are the plaintiffs. The first defendant is a carrier in respect of a particular quantity of urea shipped from Tokyo to Nagappattinam. The plaintiffs are the consignees. The shippers of consignors were Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo. The plaintiffs sued the first defendant and its agent the second defendant for damages to the tune of Rs. 3,045-20 for short delivery to the extent of 1.100 metric tons of urea. Both the courts below have countenanced the case of the plaintiffs. As such the first defendant is mulcted with the decree as asked for.

    2. In this second appeal directed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court this court, at the time of its admission, formulated the following substantial questions of law—

    “Whether the trial court and the first appellate Court were right in decreeing the suit against the carrier in view of the qualified bill of lading and the provisions of S. 5 of the Bills of Lading Act? and when doss the cause of action start accruing for the purpose of Art. III, rule 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, if the discharge of the cargo is spread over twenty days

    3. Mr. Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel for the appellant—first defendant, was more on the first substantial question of law. The endorsement on the bill of lading marked in this case as Ex. A1 reads as follows;

    Net weight…7,200,000 kgs.

    Gross weight…7,253,280 kgs.

    ‘Said to weigh’

    4. Learned counsel for the first defendant appellant herein would submit that the endorsement extracted above did not give any assurance that the weight had been checked and found to be correct and in such a contingency it is for the plaintiffs to prove the actual quantity shipped at the other end and such a proof is glaringly lacking in the present case. He cites a number of pronouncements in support of this submission. Before I come to the pronouncements, I find factually what the counsel submits is correct. Only two witnesses were examined as PWs. 1 and 2, on behalf of the plaintiffs and they could not competently say anything about the actual weight of the urea shipped at Tokyo-None on behalf of the consignees was examined to prove the actual weight of urea shipped. Hence, we have to take it that in the present case there is dearth of evidence with regard to the actual weight of the urea shipped at Tokyo.

    5. In New Chinese Antimony Co. Ltd. v. Ocean Steamship Co. Ltd. . 1917-2-K.B. Dn. 664 a bill of lading for antimony oxide ore stated that 937 tons had been shipped on board; in the margin was a typewritten clause ‘A quantity said to be 937 tons” and in the body of the bill of lading was printed in ordinary type the clause ‘weight, measurement, contents and value (except for the purpose of estimating freight unknown)”. Under those circumstances, it was held that the bill of lading was not even prima facie evidence of the quantity of ore shipped, and that in an action against the ship owners for short delivery the onus was upon the plaintiffs of proving that 937 tons had in fact been shipped.

    6. In K. Assinar v. Malabar Steamship Co, Bhaskaran, J. as he then was, dealt with a case where the bill of lading was subject to the notation ‘weight declared by the shipper but not checked’, and the learned Judge held that ‘it was indicative of disclaimer of responsibility and liability’. After discussing the case law, the learned Judge further held as follows —

    “The intention of the contracting parties in the present case can be gathered by construing reasonably the implications of the notation ‘weight declared by the shippers, but not checked’. It is very clear that the shipping company did not want to acknowledge the correctness of the weight shown in the bill of lading, or risk any liability arising out of the weight noted in the bill of lading. ……..

    In the light of the decision which holds that it is open to the carrier to contract out of his liability. I am of the view that the first appellate court was correct in holding that the plaintiff did not succeed in establishing that the weight of the goods shipped was actually as noted in the relevant bill of lading, No presumption as was sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the appellant arises merely on the ground that certain quantity has been mentioned in the bill of lading, when what has been noted is qualified by the further statement that the ‘weight was declared by the shipper, but not checked’ by the carrier. In other words, it indicates that though the shipper declared the weight of the sugar that was shipped, the shipper did not take the trouble of satisfying the carrier that the weight mentioned in the bill of lading was correct. It is, therefore, clear that the carrier could not have been held responsible for the shortage when there is no acceptable proof that the actual weight of the 40 bags concerned was as noted in the bill of lading at the time of the shipment.”

    7. In Shipping Corporation of India v. Union of India . A.I.R 1976 Goa 49. it was held that ‘the clause in a bill of lading that the measurement, weight and quantity, not known’ meant that the particulars contained in the document were those furnished by the shipper and that the carrier did not accept the particulars as correct and the burden of proving such particulars was on the shipper and by independent evidence dehors the particulars appearing on the document.’ while holding so, the two pronouncements referred to above were followed.

    8. So far as this Court is concerned, a Bench consisting of S. Natarajan, J. (as he then was) and Sethuraman, J. in Messrs. T.S Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Food Corporation of India A.I.R 1983 Mad. 105., dealing with the endorsement as ‘said to weight’ in a bill of lading, observed as follows-

    “…In other words, it would mean that the particulars of weight entered in the bills of lading were in accordance with the figures given by shipper, but so far as the matter is concerned he did not give any assurance that those particulars had been checked and found to be correct. Once such a conclusion is reached, then it follows that it is for the respondent to prove that the rice bags that were loaded at Bangkok were of the same weight as had been entered in the bills of lading. Only after such proof is adduced the owner of the vessel can be called upon to account for the shortage. Since such proof has not been adduced by the respondent in this case, we have to hold that the appellants cannot be called upon to account for the shortages in the weight contents of the bags.”

    I have already found that with regard to the actual weight of the area shipped at Tokyo, there is dearth of evidence on the side of the plaintiffs. If that is so, it is not possible to pin down the liability on the carriers in view of the endorsement found in the bill of lading. The endorsement ‘said to weigh’ found in the bill of lading Ex. A1 could only mean that there was no admission or acceptance of the weight, by the carriers, as declared by the shippers or consignors. Such an endorsement could not be taken note of as conclusive proof of weight of the goods shipped. If there Is a complaint of short delivery, weight-wise, the burden rests squarely on the plaintiff to place acceptable and convincing evidence of the actual weight of the goods shipped. The plaintiffs have not discharged their burden of proof. The lower appellate Court has chosen to mulct the liability on the first defendant on the simple ground that the bags were found torn and in slack condition. This is only an inferential line of thinking and that cannot hold good in view of the pronouncements referred to above and the well settled principle. The fact that the bags were found torn and in slack condition at the place of destination and delivery will not lead to any inference or proof that a particular weight of goods was supplied at Tokyo. These features oblige me to interfere in second appeal and accordingly the second appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the two courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, I do not think that there should be an order of costs at any stage of the lis. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are absolved of the liability of paying the costs throughout.

    VCS.

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    Comments

    Nippon Yeesan Kaisha... v. The Union Of India, ...
    (Apr 7, 1986)