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  • Nadu City Tenants' Protection, Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • provisions of the Rent Control Act.
  • Madras City Tenants' Protection Act,
  • Nadu City Tenant's Protection Act
  • provision of Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946).
  • Ajmer Rent Contral Act, 1952)
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Nadu City Tenants' Protection, Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • provisions of the Rent Control Act.
  • Madras City Tenants' Protection Act,
  • Nadu City Tenant's Protection Act
  • provision of Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946).
  • Ajmer Rent Contral Act, 1952)
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The central dispute concerns whether the appellant (the defendant in the original suit) is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act ("the Act"), which depends on whether the subject matter of the lease in his favour was land only or included a building. Procedurally, the trial Court held that the lease related to land and granted the defendant the right to purchase the land under S.9 of the Act, dismissed the plaintiff's suit and allowed the defendant's petition (O.P. No.5 of 1977). The lower appellate Court reversed that conclusion, holding that the lease covered both land and building (and was not a lease of vacant land) and therefore the defendant was not entitled to benefits under the Act; it decreed the suit and dismissed the defendant's application under S.9. The defendant (appellant) filed a second appeal and a civil revision petition challenging the appellate Court's decision.

On the facts before the Court: prior to the defendant's tenancy, the property had been leased to a veterinary dispensary and then to the defendant's brother Durai. Documentary evidence includes an application by Durai dated 4-12-1945 (Ex. A6), a lease dated 28-12-1945 (Ex. A7) describing the property as "land and building", a later lease dated 1-3-1952 (Ex. A1) similarly referring to land and building, a transfer letter by Durai of the shop to his brother dated 4-11-1958 (Ex. A8) (which does not explicitly refer to transfer of land), municipal plans and permissions (Exs. A9–A11) showing existing constructions and proposed additions, and plaintiff's account documents (Exs. A23–A27) signed by the defendant which the lower appellate Court accepted as evidence of construction-related expenses. The defendant (D.W.1) in cross-examination admitted that what was originally leased included both building and land.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant (defendant) is entitled to invoke the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act.
  2. Whether the subject matter of the lease in the appellant's favour was land only (vacant land) or included a building (i.e., whether the lease was of land alone or of land together with a building).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Relied on Ex. B1 (a letter from the Secretary of the plaintiff-Committee to the Municipal Commissioner) which referred to a "site" leased to T.K. Durai to install rotary oil and flour mills; argued that use of the word "site" shows the lease was of the site (land) only and not of any building.
  • Pointed to municipal registers indicating the defendant and his brother as owners of the superstructure and the plaintiff-Committee as owner of the site, implying separation between land and superstructure ownership.
  • Contended that even if both land and building were mentioned, the land (about 13,000 sq. ft.) was much larger than the built-up portion (about 800 sq. ft.) and thus should not be treated as appurtenant to the building; relied on J. H. Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar and authorities discussing "appurtenance" and the scope of a "building".
  • Advanced the argument that when the lease's purpose was installation of a rice mill, the transaction should be treated effectively as a lease of land (or split into two leases) — relying on an unreported decision in Jayaramulu Naidu v. Parthasarathy to support the possibility of splitting a lease into building and land portions in appropriate circumstances.
  • Initially objected that Exs. A1 and A7 (the earlier lease deeds) were unregistered and therefore inadmissible in evidence (though the objection was not taken below and was later not pressed fully by counsel).

Respondent's Arguments

  • Emphasised documentary evidence (Exs. A6, A7, A1, A9–A11, A23–A27) and the defendant's own admissions indicating that the lease covered both land and building.
  • Argued that Ex. B1 must be read with the schedule/description at the bottom of the letter (which describes the property by survey number and door number), showing that the "site" reference included the building and was not limited to vacant land; relied on R. Subramania Odayar v. Board of Revenue for the meaning of "site" in context.
  • Maintained that municipal registers are not decisive where there is direct documentary evidence of what was demised.
  • Contended that the lease could not be split into two contracts (land and building) and relied on Sanyal v. Gian Chand and statutory language of the Act (S.1(3) emphasising the Act applies "only to tenancies of land") to assert the Act does not apply to a lease that comprises more than land.
  • Argued the lease deeds did not require registration because they contained clauses permitting termination by the landlord (i.e., determinable tenancy), relying on Ratnasa-bhapathi v. Venkatachalam, Chittilappalli Mathai v. Chittilappalli Kochouseph and Kishori v. Ram Swarup as authority that such determinable leases are not compulsorily registrable; thus the unregistered Exs. A1 and A7 remained admissible and operative.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. Subramania Odayar v. Board Of Revenue (1958 I-M.L.J 410 = 71 L.W. 344) Construal of the word "site" to include the building and the land appurtenant to it when used in context of shops/factories. The Court relied on this case to reject the appellant's contention based on Ex. B1 that the word "site" meant land only; it read Ex. B1 together with the property description and held "site" included the building.
J. H. Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar Interpretation of the definition of "building" under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and consideration of whether land is appurtenant to a building. The Court considered observations in this judgment to assess whether the vacant land formed an appurtenance to the building; applied the principle that appurtenance depends on circumstances and concluded the land was appurtenant to the building.
Jayaramulu Naidu v. Parthasarathy (unreported) Authority (in that case) for the possibility of splitting a lease into separate leases of building and land where facts and conduct justify such a division. The Court explained why that decision did not apply on the facts here: in Jayaramulu Naidu the land and building were used for distinct purposes with landlord's approval, permitting a split; the present facts did not justify splitting the lease.
C.C.C. A Nos. 83 and 84 of 1935 (1938) 2 M.L.J. p.18 (Short-notes) Contains observations that, on the facts there, lease of vacant land may be regarded as separate from leases of shops where no evidence shows appurtenance. The Court treated the observations as obiter and noted that the short note did not show reasoning; it did not consider that authority decisive on the facts of the present case.
Periaswami Naicker v. Sivagnanam Held that vacant lands situated in another street and separated by a lane could not be appurtenances of the building (fact-specific principle about appurtenance). The Court acknowledged the correctness of the proposition but held the facts of the present case did not permit application of that principle.
Sanyal v. Gian Chand (1968 I S.C.R. 536) Tenancy is a single and indivisible contract; court cannot divide a tenancy into residential and non-residential parts to apply eviction provisions selectively (applied under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act). The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to reject the contention that the lease could be split into separable leases for the purpose of invoking statutory protection; it held the lease could not be divided to make part of it fall under the Act.
Salay Md. Sait v. J.M.S. Charity (1969 I-M.L.J S.C. 16) Interpretation that the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act applies only to tenancies of land (supporting narrow application of the statute). The Court cited this Supreme Court view to conclude that because the lease included a building, the tenant could not invoke the Act's protection (the Act applies only to tenancies of vacant land).
Ratnasa-bhapathi v. Venkatachalam (Indian Decisions, New Series, 14 Mad. 271) Where a lease deed is determinable at the option of the lessor (i.e., tenancy at will), such a document is not compulsorily registrable despite provisions for rent. The Court relied on this and similar decisions to hold that Exs. A1 and A7—being determinable leases—did not require registration and thus the objection to their admissibility failed.
Chittilappalli Mathai v. Chittilappalli Kochouseph Single-judge decision following the Ratnasa-bhapathi principle that determinable leases need not be registered. Used by the Court in confirming that unregistered leases containing termination-at-will clauses are admissible and need not be held invalid for want of registration.
Kishori v. Ram Swarup (Allahabad High Court) Similar principle: lease fixing annual rent but allowing ejectment on default or short notice was not a document requiring registration. The Court cited this to reinforce the conclusion that Exs. A1 and A7 did not require registration and were admissible despite being unregistered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a fact-driven documentary analysis and applied statutory and case-law principles step-by-step:

  1. Documentary and testimonial evidence: The Court reviewed Exs. A6, A7 (lease dated 28-12-1945 describing the property as "land and building"), Ex. A1 (lease dated 1-3-1952 likewise describing land and building), Ex. A8 (transfer letter), municipal plans (Exs. A9–A11) showing existing constructions and proposals, and financial/account documents (Exs. A23–A27) signed by the defendant. The lower appellate Court's finding that the demise included both land and building was supported by those documents and by the defendant's own admissions (D.W.1's cross-examination). On that evidentiary basis, the Court accepted the lower appellate Court's factual conclusion.
  2. Construal of Ex. B1 ("site"): The appellant's reliance on Ex. B1 (the Secretary's letter referring to the "site") was analysed in context. The Court read that letter together with the property description at the bottom (survey number and municipal door number) and, invoking R. Subramania Odayar, concluded "site" in the present context included the building and the land appurtenant thereto; thus Ex. B1 did not show the lease was of vacant land only.
  3. Role of municipal registers: The Court observed that municipal registers indicating superstructure ownership would be persuasive only where there was a lack of other documentary evidence. Here, because there existed direct documentary proof of what was demised, municipal registers were not decisive in favour of the defendant.
  4. Appurtenance analysis: Addressing whether the land was appurtenant to the building, the Court considered authorities (notably J. H. Irani) explaining that appurtenance depends on the circumstances of each case. The Court found the prior uses (veterinary dispensary, then intended installation of oil/flour/rice mills), the need for both a building and open space, and other evidence showed that the land served as appurtenance to the building; the relatively small built area did not render the land non-appurtenant.
  5. On splitting the lease: The Court rejected the appellant's submission that the lease should be split into separate contracts (land and building) for purposes of statutory relief. It relied on Sanyal v. Gian Chand to emphasise that a tenancy is a single, indivisible contract and, absent a statutory provision, courts should not divide it to apply a statutory eviction remedy to one portion; accordingly, the lease here could not be split to bring part of it within the Act.
  6. Statutory scope of the Act: The Court considered S.1(3) of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act (which states the Act applies "only to tenancies of land") and cited Salay Md. Sait v. J.M.S. Charity to support the proposition that the Act applies narrowly to tenancies of land. Because the lease included a building, the defendant could not invoke the Act's benefits.
  7. Admissibility/registration of lease deeds: The Court addressed the appellant's objection that Exs. A1 and A7 were unregistered and therefore inadmissible. Noting that the objection had not been raised in lower Courts and that the lease deeds contained clauses allowing termination by the landlord (making them determinable at will), the Court relied on authorities (Ratnasa-bhapathi, Chittilappalli Mathai, Kishori) to hold that such determinable leases did not require compulsory registration; accordingly, the objection failed and the unregistered leases were admissible.
  8. Conclusion based on application of law to facts: Given the documentary record and admissions, the Court agreed with the lower appellate Court's factual determination that the demise included both land and building, and applied the statutory and precedential rules to conclude the appellant was not entitled to relief under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court held that the appellant is not entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act because the subject matter of the lease included both land and building (and the Act applies only to tenancies of land).

Disposition: Both the second appeal and the civil revision petition were dismissed. (The Court ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs in the second appeal and made no order as to costs in the civil revision petition.)

Practical Consequences for the Parties:

  • The appellant must hand over possession to the respondent in accordance with the decree of the lower appellate Court within three months from the date of judgment.
  • The appellant will pay the respondent's costs in the second appeal; there is no costs order in the civil revision petition.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and relies upon existing statutory interpretation and precedent (including the narrow scope of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act and the indivisibility of tenancy contracts). The judgment does not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond application of the cited authorities to the facts of the case.

    T.K Subramania Pillai v. The Pennington Committee Through Its Secretary Srivilliputtur

    JUDGMENT

    1. The only question that arises in the second appeal and the civil revision petition is whether the appellant, who was the defendant in the suit is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection, Act, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’. That in turn depends upon the question whether the subject matter of the lease in his favour by the respondent-plaintiff was a land or a building?

    2. The trial Court held that the subject matter of the lease was a land and that the defendant was entitled to purchase the land under S.9 of the Act. Consequently, the trial Court dismissed the suit and passed an order in favour of the defendant in his petition (O.P) No. 5 of 1977) for purchasing the land at the market value in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The lower appellate Court reversed the said conclusion of the Court and held that the subject matter of the lease a land and building and that it was not a lease of a mere vacant land and therefore, the defendant was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Consequently, the lower appellate Court decreed the suit dismissed the application of the defendant under S.9 of the Act. The aggrieved defendant has preferred this second appeal as well as the civil revision petition.

    3. The admitted facts are as follows: Prior to the date when the defendant became a lessee under the plaintiff his brother by name Durai was a lessee and before him the property had been leased to a veterinary dispensary, Srivilliputtur. The first document to which the defendant's brother is a party is Ex. A6, dated 4-12-1945. That is an application by Durai to the Secretary of the plaintiff-Committee for leasing out land and the building which was rented out to the veterinary dispensary. He has stated therein that he wanted it for purpose of putting up oil Mills. On the reverse of Ex A6 there is an endorsement by a member of the Committee that the place may be let out at the rate of Rs. 40 per month. That was approved by the Committee and a draft lease deed was prepared accordingly. The lease deed which came into existence immediately thereafter is Ex A7, dated 28-12-1945 which describes the property as land and building. There is a clause in the lease deed which permits the leasee to instal the mill etc., in the demised property without causing any harm to the buildings which belonged to the Committee. This indicates that what was leased was not a vacant land but it included some buildings. That lease was for a period of three years. With regard to the other clauses in the lease deed I will make a reference later.

    4. The next lease deed in favour of Durai was of 1-3-1952 evidenced by Ex A1. It is on similar lines to Ex. A7. Hereagain, we find reference to both the land and the building.

    5. Durai has transferred his rights to his brother, the defendant herein and also wrote a letter to the plaintiff-committee on 4-11-1958 which is marked as Ex. A8. In that letter, Durai has referred to the rice mill shop bearing No. G-27 and he has stated that he has transferred the shop to his brother, the defendant herein and that the latter may be accepted as a tenant of the plaintiff-Committee. There is no reference whatever in this letter to any lease of land being transferred to the defendant. At the bottom of the letter the defendant has endorsed his consent for being a tenant of the plaintiff and assured the plaintiff that he would pay the rent without any default.

    6. In addition to these documents which are relied upon by the lower appellate Court to come to the conclusion that the lease was of land and building, the lower appellate Court has also referred to Exs. A9 to A11 which were plans sent to the Srivilliputtur Municipality by the plaintiff. The plans show that the plaintiff applied for permission to construct some additional structures in the disputed property. The plans also show that there were some constructions already existing on the land. The lower appellate Court has also referred to Exs. A23 to A27 which were signed by the defendant himself. Those documents purported to be the accounts maintained by the plaintiff for expenses incurred in connection with the construction of a rice shop. When these documents were put to the defendant in the witness box he had admitted his signatures but would claim that no money was received by him in spite of the fact that the documents bear revenue stamps on which he had himself signed. The lower appellate Court has rightly refused to accept his evidence with regard to the non-receipt of money under Exs.A23 to A27.

    7. In view of the aforesaid documents, the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court that the subject matter of the demise in favour of the defendant was both the land and building cannot be assailed. The evidence of D.W.1 may also be referred to in this connection. He has admitted in the course of cross examination that what was leased to him originally was both the building and land. Hence I agree with the finding of the lower appellate Court that the subject matter of the demise was building and land.

    8. Mr. Chandramouli, learned counsel for the appellant places reliance upon Ex. B1. which is a letter written by the Secretary of the plaintiff-Committee to the Commissioner, Srivilliputhur Municipality. The relevant portion of the letter reads as follows:—

    “We have leased out the site mentioned hereunder to Mr. T.K Durai, C/o. Govindan School of Commerce, West Street, Srivilliputtur, to instal a rotary oil and flour mills there. Necessary permit may be issued to him in this connection.”

    It is argued by learned counsel that the letter makes specific reference to the site as the subject matter of the lease and therefore, what was leased out was only the site and not any building. But, there is a description of the property leased out at the bottom of the letter as if it is a schedule to the letter. The description of property therein reads. “All that piece or parcel of land bearing Town Survey No. 454, IV Ward and Door No. 138 IX, situate in North Srivilliputhur”. That clearly shows that there was a building on the site which was given a door number by the municipality. The word ‘site’ has been construed to include building and land in R. Subramania Odayar v. Board Of Revenue . 1958 I-M.L.J 410=71 L.W 344. when the word ‘site’ is used with reference to building, say for example, shops or factories, it will have the meaning that it includes the site of the building concerned in the context of the situation; it will also indicate the land appurtenant to the building concerned, e.g, if the word ‘site of a factory’ is used it will not only mean the factory building but also the land appurtenant thereto. In the present case when Ex B1 refers to the site it must be read along with the description of the property in the bottom of the letter which refers to the building also. I do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of learned counsel by relying upon Ex. B1.

    9. Learned counsel places reliance upon the fact that the Municipal registers showed the defendant and his brother as the owners of the superstructure and the plaintiff-Committee as the owner of the site. If there had been any evidence to prove the subject matter of the demise, the evidence afforded by the Municipal records could have been accepted as conclusive. When there is documentary evidence to prove the subject matter of the demise, the registers maintained by the Municipality cannot be helpful to the defendant.

    10. Learned counsel for the appellant next contends that even if the lease comprised of both land and building it should be considered whether the land was appurtenant to the building or independent of the building. According to him, the land was of an extent of 13,000 sq. ft. and the building was only occupying a very small portion of about 800 sq. ft or so and therefore, the land should not be treated as appurtenant to the building. He relies upon the observations made in J. H. Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar. There, the Division Bench had occasion to consider the definition of building as found in the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946). The said Act defined a ‘building’ as meaning “any building or hut or part of a building, or hut let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes: (a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut, and let or to be let along with such building or hut, (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut.” While considering the said definition, the Bench had to deal with the question whether, in that case, the site was appurtenant to the building or not. The observations that are relied upon are as follows:—

    “Obviously, the letting of the land was for the purpose of carrying on cinema business and it was well known to the parties that the structure of the theatre owned by the first defendant was already there and what was being granted in substance and in effect under the lease was the right to continue the structure on the land as a building, as without the land the structure cannot stand. Taking all the facts into consideration, what was leased under Ex. P9 was the entire property with its Compound walls and with the buildings of the lessor shown in the plaint plan, Ex.P1, together with the site on which the superstructure was erected and which gave contin uous support to the building and the other vacant space round it. This undoubtedly, is part of the building known as the Gaiety Theatre. So, the lessor leased not only his building but also part of the building of the Gaiety Theatre under the document. What was leased therefore was not merely a vacant land, the small shed in the east of the site belonging to the lessor being only an insignificant portion to be left out of consideration altogether, as contended on behalf of the appellant. The object of the lease was to run the cinema business in the buildings then in existence together with the other buildings used as booking office, office rooms, garages, latrines and so on. It is impossible therefore to escape the conclusion that what was let out to the first defendant under Ex P9 was a “building”.

    Learned counsel for the appellant wants to stress upon the portion of the observation extracted above which refers to the ‘insignificant portion’ to be left out of consideration'.

    11. Again, learned counsel refers to the observations of Justice Raghava Rao in the same judgment (p.232) which runs as follows:

    “……Etymologically “appurtenance” means “pertaining” or “relating to”, and that is the wider sense in which the word may sometimes have to be understood and applied apart from the stricter sense of “belonging to”. Ordinary Dictionaries, Law Lexicons as well as cases in the books do refer to both the senses, and the question which sense should be adopted depends upon the circumstances of the particular case in which it arises……But the word

    “appurtenant” may be used in a secondary sense a equivalent to such phrase as “usually enjoyed with”.

    It is significant from the passages extracted above, that the meaning should depend upon the circumstances of the particular case in which it arises. In the present case we find from the evidence that before the defendant's brother become a lessee the property was used as a veterinary dispensary. For the purpose of using the property as a veterinary dispensary there should be a building in order to keep medicines and other implements. For examining the sick cattle there must be a large open space. Therefore, it can be said without any fear of contradiction that the vacant land a ground the building was used as an appurtenant to the building before the defendant's brother became a lessee. Even when the defendant's brother became a lessee he wanted it for installing an oil mill and flour mill. For the installation of the machinery a building is required. But for other purposes viz., drying paddy and other like purposes, vacant land would be required. No doubt, as pointed out by learned counsel there should be cement platform, etc., for using it as drying place. But still, platforms would be used as appurtenance to the building in which the machinery is installed. Therefore, reference to the above cannot help the appellant in the present case to contend that the lease in his favour was that of a land and not that of a building. It cannot be said that the land is not appurtenance to the building just because the building was in a small portion of the land.

    12. Learned counsel submits that, the very purpose of the lease in favour of the appellant's brother in 1945 was for installation of a rice mill and the building which was in existence at the time of the lease could not be sufficient for installation of a rice mill. He wants the Court to draw an inference that when the purpose of the lease was to install a rice mill it should be treated as a lease of the land in spite of the fact that there was a building in the land. In other words, he submits that it should be treated as two leases, one of land and another of building, though they are contained in the same paper. In this connection he relies upon an unreported decision of this Court in Jayaramulu Naidu v. Parthasarathy. That was a case which arose under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. That was a case where the property described as house and ground was leased out to the petitioner therein. After some time the tenant utilised the vacant land for the purpose of manufacturing slates. The landlord did not raise any objection thereto. When the landlord sought for eviction under the provisions of the Rent Control Act on the ground that the building was required for demolition and reconstruction, the Rent Controller and the Appellant Authority had ordered eviction. In the revision petition by the tenant it was contended that even if eviction could be ordered with regard to the building portion, the land should be considered separately and no eviction could be ordered under the provisions of the Rent Control Act with reference to the land. The learned Judge took the view that the land should not be treated as appurtenant to the building in that case in as much as the landlord had permitted the tenant to use the land for the purpose of manufacturing slates. The building as such was used for residential purpose and the land was used for non-residential purpose. In such circumstances the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the lease could be split up and the order of eviction under the provision of Rent Control Act could be confined only to the building and there could be no eviction with regard to the land. I am of the opinion that the said decision will not apply to the facts of the present case. As stated above, that was a case of the land being carved out by the tenant for a non-residential purpose when he was using the building for residential purpose and such carving out was approved by the landlord. In that situation the learned Judge held that it could be split up into two leases.

    13. Learned counsel relied on the decision of Pandrang Row, J. in C.C.C A Nos. 83 and 84 of 1935(1938) 2 M.L.J, page 18 Short-notes. The facts of the case are not clear from the report in the Short Notes. The report as it is found read as follows:

    “Where the defendant is not entitled by the law of succession to the rights possessed in certain property by the previous tenant, nor has he got a document of transfer in respect of the rights of the previous tenant and the previous tenant left a will and had a son,

    Held, that the defendant is a trespasser and not entitled to any protection under the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act.

    Where a person entered into possession under a document which purported to be a counter-part of a lease, the sub-tenants under that original lessee are not mere licensees but must be deemed to be tenants as defined in the above Act.

    Where the properties demised were described as the market, houses, shops and vacant land in a garden and there was no evidence to show that the vacant land was appurtenant to the shops.

    Held, that the lease must be regarded as a lease of land, so far as the land in the garden was concerned”

    While in the first portion of the notes it is seen that the defendant in that case was held to be a trespasser and not entitled to protection under the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, in the third paragraph of the notes it is seen that the learned Judge had held that the lease of the vacant land was a separate lease and the land could not be treated as appurtenant to the shops. The reasoning of the learned Judge does not appear from the short notes. It may be, on the facts of that case the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge was justified. But it is clear that the observation made by the learned Judge was obiter in as much as he had held that the defendant therein was a trespasser and the Act did not apply.

    14. The next decision that is relied on by learned counsel for the appellant is reported Periaswami Naicker v. Sivagnanam In that case, Ramanujam, J. had to consider whether the lease of certain shops and three separate vacant lands situate in another street and separated by a lane was a lease of a building and appurtenance thereto. The learned Judge took the view that in as much as the vacant lands were situate in another street and separated by a lane, they could not by any stretch of imagination be considered to be appurtenance to the building. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by the learned Judge. The facts of the present case will not warrant the application of the principle laid down in that case.

    15. Mr. Lakshminarayana Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent draws my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanyal v. Gian Chand . 1968 I SCR. 536.. That case arose under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Court to evict a tenant under S.13(1)(e) (of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Contral Act, 1952) may be exercised only when the premises were let out for residential purposes, and not when the premises were let out for composite purposes viz., residential and non-residential purposes. While dealing with that question the Supreme Court observed that the contract of tenancy was a single and indivisible contract, and, in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it was not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting out for residential purposes and the other for non-residential purposes and to grant relief under the section in respect of that portion of the property which was being used for residential purposes, i e., in respect of the portion to which the section would apply. I am of the opinion that in the present case the lease cannot be split up into two as one of a lease of land and another of a lease of the building. In my view it is not even necessary to consider the question whether the land should be appurtenant to the building for the purpose of deciding whether the benefits of the Act can be extended to the tenant. As the Act will apply only to a case of lease of vacant land, it will not apply to a case of lease of land something else.

    16. The Tamil Nadu City Tenant's Protection Act is applicable only to tenancies of land. S.1(3) of the Act reads that the Act shall apply “only to tenancies of land……”. The emphasis is on the word “only”, and if the lease comprises something other than a land, the Act will not be applicable. That is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Salay Md.Sait v. J.M.S Charity . 1969 I-M.L.J S.C 16.. As there is sufficient evidence in this case to prove that what was leased out to the defendant was not merely a land but it comprised a building also, the defendant cannot invoke the benefits of the City Tenants' Protection Act.

    17. Before concluding, I should refer to one other aspect of the matter. The lease deeds Exs.A1 and A7 entered into between the defendant's brother and the plaintiff are unregistered lease deeds. In the beginning of the argument learned counsel for the defendant submitted that they being unregistered documents were not admissible in evidence. But he also fairly admitted that the objection was not raised in the Courts below. To this, the answer of Mr. Lakshminarayana Reddy is that the lease deeds do not require any registration as they contain a clause enabling the landlord to terminate the lease whenever it wants to do so. In both the lease deeds, there are clauses to the effect that whenever the landlord wanted the property for his purpose, the tenancy could be terminated and the tenant should vacate within a period of three months after the intimation from the landlord. Of course, it must be pointed out that both the lease deeds prescribe a period of three years as the life of the lease. According to the learned counsel for the respondent if there is a clause which provides for termination of the lease at any time when the landlord so desires that would make it a tenancy at will and it will not require registration. He relies upon the decisions of this Court in Ratnasa-bhapathi v. Venkatachalam, (Indian Decisions, New Series, 14 Mad. 271) and Chittilappalli Mathai v. Chittilappalli Kochouseph. The former is that of a Division Bench. It was held by the Division Bench that if a lease deed contained a clause whereby the tenancy thereunder was absolutely determinable at any moment at the option of the lessor then the deed was not compulsorily registrable, notwithstanding that it also contained provisions for an “annual rental,” and for payment of “rent in advance each year”. That decision has been followed by a single Judge in the latter case There is also a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kishori v. Ram Swarup to the same effect. That was also a case where the lease deed fixed the annual rent but stipulated that in case of default the tenant would be liable to ejectment and that the lessor would always have a right to eject the tenant after giving him one month's notice. The Court held that the document did not require registration.

    18. Hence the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that Exhibits A1 and A7 are not admissible in evidence for want of registration cannot be sustained.

    19. I find that I have to agree with the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that the appellant is not entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act. Both the second appeal and the civil revision petition fail and are dismissed. The appellant will pay costs of the respondent in the second appeal. There will be no order as to costs in the civil revision petition.

    20. The appellant will have three months from to-day to hand over possession to the respondent in accordance with the decree passed by the lower appellate Court.

    VCS.

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