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citation codes
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  • Section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act.
  • section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.4.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
  • section 2(f)
  • sub-rule (2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act.
  • section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.4.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
  • section 2(f)
  • sub-rule (2)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ appeal challenges the decision of Mohan, J., in W.P. No. 7254 of 1975 concerning excise demands on "Furacin Syrup", a resin solution manufactured by the appellants. The respondents contended that the product was liable to duty under Tariff Item 15-A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, with effect from 1 March 1964.

Chronology and procedural steps (as set out in the opinion):

  • Until 12-6-1964 no duty under the Tariff Item was levied on the resin solution. A demand arose for 13-6-1964 to 4-11-1964. There was an interval when no duty was demanded between 4-11-1964 and 2-6-1968.
  • From 3-6-1968 to 15-5-1972 excise duty was levied on the actual resin content. From 16-5-1972 duty was levied on the total weight of the bulk irrespective of resin content.
  • A demand dated 24-11-1974 sought Rs. 50,039.82 as differential duty short-levied for 1-4-1971 to 13-5-1972. The appellants appealed to the Appellate Collector (order 21-3-1974) which dismissed the appeal, treating earlier assessments on resin content as a mistake/cause for recovery under rule 10. A revision to the third respondent failed.
  • The appellants filed the writ petition seeking to quash the demand on four main grounds concerning (a) whether dilution amounted to manufacture under Section 3, (b) whether the resin solution was a product different from synthetic resin, (c) whether under amended Item 15-A and its Explanation 2 the process was permitted to render the product excisable, and (d) whether the demand fit the requirements of rule 10.
  • Mohan, J. dismissed the writ petition on the ground that rule 10(1) applied (short levy due to mistake) without expressing findings on the first two contentions (manufacture/excisability).
  • This appeal was brought to the court to consider both the correctness of applying rule 10 and the central question whether the process of producing the resin solution constituted manufacture attracting excise duty under Section 3.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the process of diluting imported synthetic resin (by adding alcohol) to produce a resin solution (Furacin Syrup) amounts to "manufacture" so as to attract excise duty under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
  2. Whether the resin solution produced by that dilution is a manufactured product distinct in character, nature or use from the original synthetic resin and therefore excisable.
  3. Whether, under the amended provision of Tariff Item 15-A (and its Explanation 2), the resin solution would be excisable only if the process adopted is one of those processes mentioned in the Explanation.
  4. Whether the impugned demand for differential duty fits the requirements of rule 10 (i.e., whether the short levy resulted from inadvertence, error, collusion or misconstruction and so was recoverable by notice under rule 10).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The process of diluting imported synthetic resin with alcohol to form a resin solution is a mere dilution and does not amount to a process of manufacture under Section 3.
  • The resin solution is not a manufactured product different from the synthetic resin; it continues to have the same properties as the synthetic resin.
  • Under the amended Item 15-A, unless the process is one of those in Explanation 2, the resin solution cannot be said to be a manufactured product liable to excise duty.
  • The impugned differential demand is bad because it does not properly fit within rule 10 of the rules relied upon for recovery.
  • The appellants relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Sandoz India Limited v. Union of India (1980 E.L.T. 696) to support that mere formulation/dilution without chemical change is not manufacture.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The short levy was properly recoverable under rule 10 because the initial levy on resin content (and not on total weight) arose from inadvertence/mistake by excise officers contrary to Board instructions.
  • The process of mixing imported synthetic resin with alcohol to produce Furacin Syrup is a manufacturing process; the end product is a distinct article with a different character and commercial use, and hence excisable under Tariff Item 15-A.
  • The respondents relied on decisions (including Maharashtra v. C.P. Manganese and cases on mixing/blending producing commercially different products) to support that mixing may amount to manufacture when a new commercial product emerges.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sandoz India Limited v. Union of India (1980 E.L.T. 696) (Bombay High Court) Held that formulation (addition of dispersing agents/diluents) which does not change the dye's composition/character does not amount to manufacture; a change of form alone is insufficient. The court indicated it was inclined to follow this decision and used its reasoning to support the conclusion that dilution/mixing of resin with alcohol, which does not produce chemical change, is not manufacture.
Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 791) (as cited) Principle that "manufacture" implies change, but not every change is manufacture; there must be a transformation into a new and different article with distinctive name, character or use. The court relied on this principle (as cited in other authorities) to evaluate whether the resin solution constituted a transformation sufficient to qualify as manufacture.
South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 922 : 1978 E.L.T. 336) Affirmation of the principle that manufacture requires transformation into a distinct article having a distinctive name, character or use. Used alongside other Supreme Court authorities to demonstrate the legal test for "manufacture" which the court applied to the facts.
Shakti Insulated Wires Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1982 E.L.T. 10) (Bombay High Court) Held that processing is distinct from manufacture; if commodity retains continuing substantial identity through the process, it is not "manufactured" into a fresh article under Section 2(f). The court expressly followed this decision, treating it as supportive of the view that the resin solution retained the resin's substantial identity and therefore was not a manufactured article.
Maharashtra v. C.P. Manganese ((1977) 1 SCC 643 : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 879) Held that mixing different grades to obtain a specified average ("oriental mixture") did not produce a new manufactured product with a separate commercially current name; mere mixing/averaging was not manufacture. The court noted this decision but stated it did not assist the respondents' case; the court observed the decision's principle without adopting it as determinative for this case.
Nilgiri Ceylon Tea Supplying Co. v. State of Bombay (10 S.T.C. 500) (Bombay High Court) Held that mixtures of different brands of tea prepared without mechanical/chemical processing did not constitute a fresh commodity. The court noted this decision but also noted that the Supreme Court did not approve it in PW Food Packers; it did not rely on Nilgiri as controlling authority.
PW Food Packers Case (1980 E.L.T. 343 : 1980 (46) S.T.C. 63) (Supreme Court) Indicated that the Nilgiri decision does not lay down the correct law (Supreme Court did not approve Nilgiri). The court recorded that the Supreme Court in PW Food Packers disapproved the Nilgiri principle and treated that disapproval as part of the landscape of authority.
Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. (35 S.T.C. 493) (Bombay High Court) Held that roasting, grinding and then mixing/blending coffee with chicory to produce "french coffee" produced a commercially different commodity and amounted to manufacture. The court acknowledged this decision as supporting the proposition that mixing/blending can be manufacture when a commercially different product results, but did not adopt it for the facts at hand.
Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Union of India [1984 (15) E.L.T. 32] (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Held that mixing and blending coffee powder with chicory constituted manufacture where the resultant blend was a distinct commercial product. The court noted this decision as another authority supporting the view that blending can be manufacture when a distinct product emerges; however, the court ultimately followed Sandoz and Shakti in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court divided its analysis into two principal parts: (A) applicability of rule 10 for recovery of short levy; and (B) whether the process constituted manufacture attracting excise duty under Section 3.

(A) Applicability of rule 10

  • The court accepted that for the period 1-4-1971 to 13-5-1972 excise duty was levied and collected only on the actual resin content and not on the total weight of the solution.
  • When authorities later treated the total weight as the basis of duty, a short levy had arisen for that earlier period. The court observed that rule 10 provides for recovery where duties have been short levied through inadvertence, error, collusion or misconstruction by officers.
  • The court found that the short levy resulted from a mistake by the initial authorities and from ignoring Central Board of Revenue instructions that the resin solution should be charged on total weight. Therefore rule 10 was properly invoked and the earlier single Judge’s conclusion that rule 10 applied could not be faulted.

(B) Whether the process is "manufacture" and the end product excisable

  • The court recognized the central legal test (as articulated in cited Supreme Court authority and other cases) that "manufacture" requires a transformation into a new and different article having distinctive name, character or use; not every change or process qualifies.
  • The appellants' process involved mixing imported synthetic resin (solid) with alcohol to convert it to a liquid resin solution ("Furacin Syrup"). There was no chemical reaction; heating evaporates alcohol and the resin returns to solid form.
  • The court found that the end product retained the same chemical properties as the synthetic resin and could be reconverted by evaporation; the respondents themselves treated the end product as resin under Tariff Item 15-A.
  • The Chemical Examiner's report (dated 3-6-1964), placed before the court, described Furacin Syrup as "an aqueous solution of a synthetic resin" and stated it is excisable under Item 15-A — the court interpreted this report as indicating the product continued to be synthetic resin and that the process did not produce a new and independent product.
  • Applying the precedents, the court expressly followed the reasoning in Sandoz India Limited and Shakti Insulated Wires, viewing the process here as analogous to mere formulation/dilution or processing that preserves substantial identity and thus does not amount to manufacture.
  • The court considered authorities relied on by respondents (cases where mixing/blending produced commercially different products) but concluded they were distinguishable or not persuasive on these facts because, here, there was no creation of a new product distinct from resin.
  • The court further reasoned that if the process were treated as manufacture then the product, to be assessable, would need to be a distinct article; as Tariff Item 15-A deals with resin, the respondents' attempt to treat the end product both as resin and as a new product was inconsistent and unsustainable.
  • Given that the process did not amount to manufacture, no excise duty could be levied under Section 3, and consequently the demand for differential duty could not stand on the basis asserted by the respondents.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed and the impugned demand is quashed.

Implications and Consequences:

  • Direct effect: The differential demand dated 24-11-1974 (for Rs. 50,039.82) and the recovery sought for the period in question were quashed; the appellants prevail and there will be no order as to costs.
  • Legal consequence on the facts: The court held that the process of diluting/mixing the synthetic resin with alcohol did not amount to "manufacture" under Section 3 because the product retained the chemical identity and commercial character of resin; accordingly, excise duty could not be imposed on the basis contended by respondents.
  • Precedential scope: The opinion did not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond applying established principles (it followed existing authorities Sandoz and Shakti on the test of transformation/manufacture). The court did not state that it was establishing novel law; it applied existing tests to the facts and concluded no manufacture occurred here.

Note: This summary is limited to and strictly based on the information contained in the provided opinion.

    Coromandal Prodorite Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. Of India And Others

    JUDGMENT

    1. The writ appeal is directed against the decision of Mohan, J., in W.P No. 7254 of 1975.

    2. In the said writ petition the appellants who are the manufacturers of Furacin Syrup, a resin solution which, according to the respondents, is liable to duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, under Tariff Item 15-A with effect from 1st March, 1964. However, till 12-6-1964 no duty under the said Tariff Item was levied on the resin solution produced by the appellants. However, duty came to be demanded for the period 13-6-1964 to 4-11-1964. Again there was an interval between 4-11-1964 and 2-6-1968 when the duty was not demanded at all. Later, for the period 3-6-1968 to 15-5-1972 excise duty was levied by the respondents on actual resin content of the resin solution produced by the appellants. However, from 16-5-1972 the excise duty was levied on total weight of the bulk irrespective of the resin content and actually a demand dated 24-11-1974 was issued to the appellants for payment of Rs. 50,039.82 being the differential duty which was short levied for the period from 1-4-1971 to 13-5-1972. The appellants questioned the validity of the said demand by filing an appeal before the Appellate Collector of Central Excise on 31st May, 1973 who, by his order dated 21-3-1974, held that the earlier assessments on the basis of the actual resin content in the syrup produced by the appellants and not on the entire quantity of syrup was due to a mistake or inadvertence on the part of the excise authorities and that mistake was realised only subsequently and it is thereafter a show cause notice has been issued for recovery of the short levy and by an exercise of power under rule 10 the demand has been made for the amount of duty short levied which was not collected by mistake and in that view he dismissed the appeal. Later the appellants filed a revision before the third respondent but without success. Thereafter the appellants moved this court by Way of the above, writ petition seeking to quash the said demand mainly on four grounds namely, (1) that the process by which the resin imported by the appellants is diluted so as to form a resin solution will not amount to a process of manufacture so as to attract excise duty under Section 3, that the levy of excise duty is only on manufacture and that the authorities were in error in taking the mere dilution of the synthetic resin imported as a manufacture; (ii) that the resin solution produced by the appellants by the process of diluting the synthetic resin imported bythem by adding alcohol is not a manufactured product which is different from the synthetic resin; (iii) that in any event as per the amended provision of Item 15-A unless the process adopted to bring into existence the resin solution is one of those processes mentioned in the Explanation 2 therein, the resin solution cannot be said to be a manufactured product which is liable to excise duty under the Act and (iv) that the impugned demand of differential duty is bad for the reason that the said demand will not fit in with rule 10 of the rules under which the demand has been made.

    3. The said writ petition was resisted by the respondents contending that the demand has rightly been made under rule 10 as the short levy was due to an inadvertence and mistake committed by the officers in taking the resin content as the basis for levy and not taking the entire solution as the basis, that the process adopted by the appellants to bring into existence the resin solution which is called ‘Furacin syrup’ by mixing the synthetic resin imported by them and the alcohol is a manufacturing process and the end product brought into existence by such process is a separate and distinct article having different character and different commercial use. Therefore, the end product has rightly been taken as excisable under Tariff Item 15-A. Mohan, J., without giving his findings on the first two contentions referred to above, proceeded to dismiss the writ petition holding on the third contention that rule 10(1) has properly been invoked, as the short levy was due to the mistake committed by the authorities in levying duty on the resin content of the solution and not on the weight of the entire solution. According to the learned Judge, since rule 10 applies to the facts of the case and the requirements of rule 10(1) has been satisfied before issuing the demand, the demand cannot be successfully questioned. Thus, the learned Judge has not dealt with the basic question as to whether the resin solution produced by the appellants by mixing the synthetic resin imported by them with alcohol amounts to a manufacture and whether the end product is excisable. Before us the learned counsel for the appellants contends that though this point was urged before the learned Judge he has not expressed any opinion on that question and therefore this court has not only to deal with the correctness or otherwise of application of rule 10 to the facts of this case but also consider the nature of the process adopted by the appellants for bringing into existence of the resin solution and whether such process can be taken to be a manufacture process so as to attract the levy of duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

    4. The learned counsel for the respondents does not dispute the fact that the question as to whether the end product is excisable at all was in fact canvassed before the learned single Judge. Even otherwise that being a question of law directly arising on the facts put forward in this case, we are of the view that the question as to the applicability of rule 10 will arise only if the article produced by the appellants is excisable, we proceed to deal with the said question even though that question has not been dealt with by the learned single Judge.

    5. So far as the applicability of rule 10 to the facts of this case is concerned, though the learned counsel for the appellant questions the correctness of the view taken by the learned single Judge, we are of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge cannot be taken exception to. Admittedly, for the period 1-4-1971 to 13-5-1972, the excise duty was levied and collected from the appellants only on the actual resin content for the resin solution produced by them. Thereafter when they became aware of the fact that excise duty is leviable not on the actual resin content but on the total weight of the entire solution, short levy has arisen and that short levy is due to the mistake committed by the initial authorities in the collection of the excise duty. Rule 10 of the Act provides for the recovery of the duties or charges short levied and-it provides that if duties and charges have been short levied through inadvertence, error, collusion or through misconstruction on the part of any officer, the proper authority can require by issuing a notice to the person concerned to show cause as to why he should not pay tie amount short levied and sub-rule (2) provides for a determination of the amount actually short levied after hearing the representations if any by the person concerned. Thus it is seen that rule 10 will come into the picture when (i) there is a short levy and (ii) when the short levy was due to inadvertence, error, collusion or misconception. In this case, there is a short levy. In view of the fact that the levy is not in accordance with the instructions issued by the Central Board of Revenue that the resin solution should be charged to duty not on the basis of the actual resin content but on the basis of the total weight of the solution and that the said levy was due to the mistake committed by the officers in ignoring the Board's instructions. Therefore it should be held that rule 10 has correctly been applied in this case.

    6. Coming to the basic question as to whether the process adopted by the appellants to bring into existence the resin solution called ‘Furacin syrup’ is a manufacturing process so as to attract duty under section 3 which is the charging section under the Act, and whether the end product which is brought into existence by mixing the synthetic resin imported by the appellants with alcohol is a product different in character, nature and use so as to say that the end product is excisable under the provisions of the Act.

    7. According to the learned counsel for the appellants what is done is a mere dilution of the synthetic resin which is in a solid from the alcohol to bring into existence a solution which the appellants call by name ‘Furacin Syrup’ and that this process does not amount to in any sense, a manufacturing process. It is also the appellant's case that the end product which is the resin solution is not different from the original synthetic resin and it continues to have the same properties as the synthetic resin which has been used for producing the resin solution. In support of his submission that mere dilution of synthetic resin or the mere mixing of water or alcohol will not amount to manufacture, the learned counsel for the appellants relies on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Sandoz India Limited v. Union of India, (1980 E.L.T 696). In that case the synthetic organic dyes were formulated into a liquid solution. The formulation adopted involved the addition of dispersing agents or diluents which, according to the producers, did not change the dye already manufactured. The question arose as to whether the process of formulation amounted to manufacturing process. According to the producers the process of formulation is only to break the pigment particles for physical aid using dispersing agent or water without any chemical change taking place. Since the Excise Authorities were of the view that the said formulation process amounted to manufacturing process, the matter was taken before the Court and the court held that the original dye which was taken out of the factory was not different from the formulated product which left the factory and therefore the excise authorities were not right in basing the question of excisability merely on the change of the form in the article produced, that the process of formulation adopted by the producers in that case is different from the manufacturing process, that the process of formulation has been resorted only with a view to disperse the dye which is in the concentrated form or in the wet cake form and when the dispersing agents and a solvent is added in order to emulsify the dye, the dye continues to remain the same without any change in its composition or in its characteristic and therefore the end product brought into existence after the formulation is not a product different from the original product out of which the formulated product came. In support of the said view, the court has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. [1977 E.L.T (J 199) : A.I.R 1963 S.C 791)] and South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., A.I.R 1968 S.C 922 : 1978 E.L.T 336) wherein it has been held that the word “manufacture” implies a change but every change is not a manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation, but something more is necessary and there must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. Thus according to the said decisions of the Supreme Court as also the decision of the Bombay High Court referred to above, the word “Manufacture” implies a change but every change in the raw material is not manufacture and to constitute manufacture there must be a transformation and a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. In Shakti Insulated Wires Pvt. Limited v. Union of India, (1982 E.L.T 10) (Bombay), the Bombay High Court again dealt with a similar question. In that case, the copper or aluminium strips were insulated for being advantageously used as a conductor. The insulation was done either by insulating the copper or aluminium strips either by glass-fibre or by paper or cotton cover. The question arose in that case whether the mere application of such process made a different and distinct article than the original article, namely, copper strips or aluminium strips so as to amount to manufacture under section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act. The court while dealing with the question held that as processing is distinct from manufacture and merely because some process is carried on the article produced would not necessarily amount to manufacture of fresh article under section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act and that though at some point processing and manufacturing may merge, where the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the process even after the processing it cannot be said that it has been “manufactured”.

    8. As against the above decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, the respondents' learned counsel relied on the following decisions in support of his submission that if by mixing two articles a new article is produced then the mere mixing may amount to manufacture. Maharashtra v. CP. Manganese, ((1977) 1 SCC 643 : A.I.R 1977 S.C 879) is a case where an assessee owned manganese ore mines in Madhya Pradesh and was entering into contracts at various places outside the State for despatch abroad of manganese ore through different ports. The contracts contained specifications of strengths of maganese ore to be supplied with permissible percentages of other ingredients as admixtures. The assessee arranged for the transport of various grades of manganese ore in railway wagons from one or more of the mines, and the order in which trucks were loaded and unloaded was so arranged that the required average consistency or strength of manganese ore specified in the contracts was obtained in the course of such unloading. Such type of conglomerate was called by the assessee as an “oriental mixture”. The question arose whether the said “oriental mixture came into existence as a result of manufacture and the process of mixing amounted to the manufacturing process. The Supreme Court observed what is, to be determined is whether there has been the manufacture of anew product which has a separate commercially current name in the market and the mere giving of a name by the seller to what is really the same product is not the manufacture of a new product and as there is no new process of manufacture of goods in bringing about the “oriental mixture”, the assessee cannot be said to have brought into existence a new manufactured product and that the name “oriental mixture” represents only an admixture of the manganese ore and other ingredients. We do not see how this decision helps the respondents. The Bombay High Court in Nilgiri Ceylon Tea Supplying Company v. State of Bombay, (10 S.T.C 500) has held that where different brands of tea produced in bulk and without application of any mechanical or chemical process were mixtures so as to conform to a particular mixing formula the mixture was held not to constitute a fresh commodity as neither processing nor alteration of the ingredients of the tea in any manner had taken place. However, this decision of the Bombay High Court was not approved by the Supreme Court in PW Food Packers Case—1980 E.L.T 343 : 1980 (46) S.T.C 63 and the Supreme Court has held that the said decision does not lay down the correct law. In Commr, of Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co., (35 S.T.C 493) the question arose as to whether mixing and blending of coffee powder with chicory powder to obtain “french coffee” amounts to manufacture within the definition of Section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The Bombay High Court observed that for an activity to amount to manufacture it must result in a different commercial article or commodity. It must not be a commodity which is commercially the same as it was before “the activity was applied to it, that in some cases the ingredients are totally transformed and, in other cases, they undergo some change, alteration or transformation and yet retain their essential character and properties and that the test in all cases is to ascertain whether the activities result in a commercially different commodity and it is irrelevant whether this result is produced by a mechanical or chemical process or otherwise. The court ultimately held that the activities of the assessee consisted of purchasing coffee seeds, roasting and grinding them and preparing coffee powder out of the seeds and then mixing and blending the coffee powder prepared by them with chicory powder and producing a mixture known as “french coffee” will amount to a manufacture as the french coffee is commercially a different product. In Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Union of India [1984 (15) E.L.T 32], Andhra Pradesh High Court has also taken the same view on more or less similar facts. In that case also the assessee carried on the business of selling, among other things, coffee-chicory mixture. The activities of the assessee consisted of purchasing coffee seeds, roasting and grinding them and preparing coffee powder out of those seeds by mechanical process and thereafter mixing and blending in a particular proportion the said coffee powder with chicory powder and marketing the same as “Coffee-chicory blend”, what is generally known as “french coffee” in the business market. On those facts, the court had to consider whether the mixing and blending of coffee powder with chicory powder constituted manufacturing process and the outcome is a different and a new commercial commodity which could be subjected to excise duty. The court, after considering the definition of manufacture occurring in section 2(f) as including any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product and following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commr of Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co., (35 S.T.C 493) held that the mixing and blending process is a manufacturing process and the resultant mixture is a distinct commercial product differing in identity from the two ingredients constituting the mixture. On a due consideration of the matter, we are inclined, in this case to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in Smdoz India Limited v. Union of India, (1980 E.L.T 696) and Shakti Insulated Wires Pvt. Limited v. Union of India, (1982 E.L.T 10). In this case what is done by the appellants is mixing the synthetic resin which is in a solid form with alcohol to convert it into a liquid form and it does not result in any chemical reaction. The resin solution which is brought about by mixing synthetic resin with alcohol if heated, the alcohol evaporates and it results in synthetic resin being brought back in a solid form. The synthetic resin, because it is in a solid form, cannot be used for bonding purposes and therefore it is converted into a liquid by adding alcohol and the end product is used for bounding purposes. Therefore it cannot be said that the end product which was brought into existence by the process of dilution or adding alcohol to resin is a separate product apart from synthetic resin and it continues to have the same characteristics as resin. As a matter of fact, in this case the respondents are seeking to bring even the end product under Tariff Item 15-A which deals with resin. Therefore, the respondents themselves have treated the end product as nothing but resin. Though by the process of mixing there is change of form, that by itself cannot, be taken to be the product of a manufacturing process. It is well established that though a process brings about a change in the raw material used, every change cannot be taken to constitute a manufacture. If, as a result of the process, raw materials have been transformed into a distinct and commercially a new product, then alone the process can be taken to be a manufacture. In this case, since the end product brought about by the process of mixture or dilution continues to have the same chemical properties as resin, there cannot be said to be any manufacturing process. As already stated, even the respondents have proceeded on the basis that the end product also continues to be still resin and therefore it is again chargeable under Tariff Item 15-A. If the end product is also treated as resin by the respondents themselves, we do not see bow the process of mixture or dilution will amount to a manufacture. If there is no manufacture, then, the end product is not excisable, for excise duty is leviable on manufacture only and not on any process.

    9. Even if we accept the contention of the respondents that the end product produced by the appellants is a new and commercial product apart from the resin which has been used up in the process, then the article cannot be brought to charge under Tariff Item 15-A for that article deals only with resin. Therefore, in any view, the demand issued by the respondents on the basis that the end product continues to be a synthetic resin and therefore it is assessable under Tariff Item 15-A cannot be sustained. If the process is not treated as a manufacture, no excise levy is possible as Section 3 imposes a charge only on manufacture. If the process is treated as a manufacture, then the end product will have to be distinct and different from the resin which has been used and it cannot be, therefore, brought under Item 15-A as has been done by the respondents. The end product has been chemically analysed and the Chemical Examiner's report dated 3-6-1964 has been placed before us and it reads as follows—

    “The samples mentioned above have been analysed and the sample of Furacin Syrup is an aqueous solution of a synthetic resin. It is excisable under item 15-A of the Current Tariff. The sample of Phenacin ‘A’ syrup is a liquid composed of phenol formaldehyde (Synthetic resin) and about 15% W/W of water. It is excisable under item 15-A of the Current Central Excise Tariff.”

    10. That report shows that the end product still continues to be a synthetic resin and therefore it is excisable under item 15-A. Even after the process of mixture or dilution employed by the appellants, the product continues to be a synthetic resin, then the process adopted by the appellants has not resulted in any new and commercially different product. Therefore, the Chemical Examiner's Report itself indicates that the process employed is such as not to result in a new and independent product. Therefore we have to hold that the process employed by the appellants is not a manufacture so as to attract a charge under S. 3. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to go into the contentions urged by the appellants as regards the scope of the amended provision in Tariff Item ‘5-A. The appeal is allowed and the impugned demand is quashed. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Coromandal Prodorite Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. Of India And Others
    (Jan 22, 1985)