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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision Petitions arising from E.P. No. 342/83 and related proceedings)

Factual and Procedural Background

The two revision petitions arise from the same dispute involving O.S. No. 5540 of 1971 in the City Civil Court, Madras. The plaintiff (first respondent in the revisions) sued the defendant (second respondent) for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 30.10.1967; the suit was decreed on 24.1.1974. While the suit was pending, the defendant (second respondent) sold the suit property to the revision petitioner by a sale deed dated 11.5.1972. The decree-holder (first respondent) pursued execution proceedings (E.P. No. 226 of 1979; later E.P. No. 342 of 1983) to give effect to the decree and impleaded the revision petitioner (who had purchased pendente lite) in execution proceedings (E.A. No. 1523/79). The executing court allowed execution and later E.P. No. 342/83 was filed for delivery of possession and removal of a superstructure allegedly erected by the revision petitioner after the sale. The revision petitioner sought a declaration in E.A. No. 1282/84 that the decree was not executable against her and resisted delivery of possession. The learned 10th Assistant Judge dismissed E.A. No. 1282/84 and allowed E.P. No. 342/83 by order dated 16.11.1984, finding the sale to the revision petitioner was affected by lis pendens; the revision petitioner brought these two revisions to challenge that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a transferee who purchased immovable property pendente lite (during the pendency of a suit) can claim compensation for bona fide improvements under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act when the transfer is hit by Section 52 (the doctrine of lis pendens).
  2. Whether a decree for specific performance that is silent about delivery of possession can be executed for possession in the same execution proceedings, or whether the decree-holder must file a separate suit for possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The revision petitioner, having bought the property believing in good faith that she was absolutely entitled to it, erected a costly superstructure costing several lakhs of rupees; under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act she is entitled to require the person causing her eviction to either pay or secure the value of improvements or to sell his interest in the property to her at market value.
  • Alternatively, the decree sought to be executed is silent about delivery of possession; consequently, the decree-holder is not entitled to possession in the execution petition and must file a separate suit for possession.

Respondent / Decree-Holder's Position (as evidenced by record and court findings)

  • The transfer in favour of the revision petitioner was effected during the pendency of the suit and is therefore hit by the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; the transferee pendente lite cannot claim to defeat the decree-holder's rights under the decree.
  • The execution applications were properly prosecuted: the revision petitioner was impleaded in execution proceedings and the executing court lawfully directed delivery of possession and removal of the superstructure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Moitheensa Rowthan v. Apsa Bivi, I.L.R. 36 Madras 194 (1913) 21 M.L.J. 969 Held that a purchaser at a court auction (not a party to the decree) was entitled to the value of bona fide improvements on eviction for defect in sale (equitable compensation analogous to Section 51 principles). Cited by counsel for revision petitioner to support a claim for compensation, but court observed this line of decisions does not deal with transfers pendente lite under Section 52 and therefore did not advance the revision petitioner's case.
Narayanamurthy v. Secretary of State (1925) 48 M.L.J. 682; A.I.R. 1925 Madras 963 Grantee who improved land bona fide and paid assessment was held entitled to value of improvements under Section 51. Cited by revision petitioner; court noted it does not concern transfers pendente lite under Section 52 and thus is not helpful to override Section 52.
Bright v. Boyd (1 Story 478) (Story, J.) Equitable principle allowing recovery for valuable and permanent improvements made in good faith where eviction followed from defect in title by conveyance from an administrator. Referenced as the origin of equitable compensation principles relied upon in some Indian cases, but not held sufficient to displace Section 52 when transfer pendente lite is involved.
Achut v. Shivajirao, A.I.R. 1937 Bombay 244 Explained that lis pendens is not based on notice but on preventing a party from alienating property during litigation so as to defeat other party's rights; a purchaser pendente lite is bound by the decree as if he had notice. Used by the court to articulate the foundational principle behind Section 52 — that transactions during pendency are subject to the suit's outcome irrespective of notice.
Kulandaivelu v. Sowbagyammal (1945) 1 M.L.J. 261 : A.I.R. 1945 Madras 350 Held Section 52 makes no exception for a bona fide transferee for value without notice; Section 52 hits transfers that would affect the rights of the other party. Cited to support the proposition that a bona fide transferee pendente lite cannot claim protection under Section 51 against Section 52.
Md. Shafiqullah v. Md. Samiullah, A.I.R. 1929 Allahabad 943 Held that estoppel under Section 41 of the Act cannot override the imperative provisions of Section 52; special provision (Section 52) governs transfers during pendency and excludes general estoppel rules. Applied to show that other general statutory protections do not displace the special rule of Section 52.
Motichand v. British India Corporation, A.I.R. 1932 Allahabad 210 Considered whether Section 51 can override Section 52; held Section 51 did not apply to transfers pendente lite in view of Section 52. Relied upon as direct authority that Section 51 cannot prevail where transfer is hit by pendente lite rule in Section 52.
Chinna alias Lakshmi Kutty Amma v. Md. Ali (1958) K.L.T. 557 Transferee pendente lite could not claim benefit of Section 51 for improvements; improvements were not bona fide due to appeal pending and transfer pendente lite. Cited as supportive of the principle that improvements by a pendente lite transferee do not attract Section 51 protection.
Hari Bachan Singh v. Major Har Bhajan Singh (High Court of Punjab & Haryana, single judge) Held an alienee pendente lite cannot claim compensation for improvements; purchaser takes subject to result of litigation whether party or not. Relied upon as a recent authority consistent with the view that Section 52 bars claims under Section 51 for pendente lite purchasers.
Amir Chand v. Durga Das, A.I.R. 1916 Lahore 379 Held that a plaintiff could not recover property without paying compensation for improvements made by purchasers during pendency; purchasers had improved believing title sound. Court distinguished this decision as of no relevance because the Transfer of Property Act did not apply to Punjab (per the opinion) and because the case did not discuss the principles of Section 52; thus the court did not rely on it.
Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal (Supreme Court decision referenced) Considered whether a decree for specific performance that did not expressly grant possession could be executed for possession; Supreme Court held that delivery of possession ordered by the High Court was "eminently just" and that insisting on a separate suit would be hyper-technical. Cited by the court to justify that the omission of an express order for possession in a long-pending specific performance decree was inadvertent and did not bar execution for possession; court held decree-holder entitled to possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in two main strands: (A) the effect of Section 52 (lis pendens) on transfers made during litigation, and (B) the executability of the decree for specific performance with respect to possession.

(A) Effect of Section 52 on the revision petitioner's claim for improvements

  1. The court observed as an admitted fact that the sale to the revision petitioner (11.5.1972) was subsequent to the institution of the suit for specific performance (1971) and therefore falls squarely under the doctrine of lis pendens in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  2. The court analysed the revision petitioner's reliance on Section 51 (right to compensation for bona fide improvements) and authorities that allow compensation in some contexts (for example purchasers at court auction or grantees under Tahsildar orders), but emphasised that those decisions do not address transfers pendente lite covered by Section 52.
  3. The court reviewed a series of decisions (Kulandaivelu, Md. Shafiqullah, Motichand, Chinna alias Lakshmi Kutty Amma, Hari Bachan Singh) establishing that Section 52 makes no exception for bona fide transferees and that Section 51 cannot override the imperative rule in Section 52. The court treated this catena as directly applicable and controlling.
  4. The Lahore decision (Amir Chand v. Durga Das) was considered by revision petitioner but the court rejected reliance on it because the Transfer of Property Act was said not to apply to Punjab and because that decision did not engage with Section 52 principles; therefore the court did not treat it as persuasive.
  5. On the facts, the court examined the quantum and timing of the alleged improvements. Documentary evidence (an engineer's certificate) put the total value of construction and charges at Rs. 1,52,555. The revision petitioner's earlier statement in April 1979 (in E.A. No. 1523/79) admitted she had started construction and paid Rs. 25,000 to a contractor; the court inferred the construction commenced after she applied to be impleaded, indicating knowledge of the litigation and negating a claim of bona fide ignorance of the suit.
  6. Combining the legal principle that Section 52 bars benefits of Section 51 for transfers pendente lite with the factual finding that the revision petitioner was not an innocent, unaware improver, the court concluded the revision petitioner could not claim compensation for improvements.

(B) Executability of decree for possession

  1. The revision petitioner contended for the first time in these revisions that the decree was silent on delivery of possession and hence the decree-holder must litigate possession in a separate suit.
  2. The court noted that this objection had not been raised earlier in the execution proceedings and considered the jurisprudence in Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, where the Supreme Court found it "eminently just" to allow possession despite a technical omission.
  3. The court found no reason to infer that the trial court intentionally denied relief of delivery of possession when granting specific performance; it considered the omission to be inadvertent, particularly given the long delay since the suit (1971) and the equities involved.
  4. Relying on the cited precedent's refusal to allow a hyper-technical objection to defeat possession, the court held it just and proper that the decree-holder be entitled to possession in execution of the decree for specific performance.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed both revision petitions. The court held that the transfer in favour of the revision petitioner is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the revision petitioner is not entitled to claim the value of any improvements made on the property; further, the decree-holder is entitled to delivery of possession in execution of the decree for specific performance.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The revision petitions fail; the executing court's orders (allowing execution and directing delivery of possession and removal of the superstructure) stand. The revision petitioner cannot recover compensation for improvements under Section 51 because the sale was pendente lite and therefore governed by Section 52.
  • Procedural consequence: An omission in the decree to expressly order delivery of possession was treated as inadvertent and did not require the decree-holder to institute a fresh suit for possession; the decree-holder may obtain possession in execution proceedings.
  • No broader or novel legal principle was announced beyond the application of established authorities interpreting Sections 51 and 52; the decision applies existing precedent to the facts at hand.

Disposition: Both revisions are DISMISSED. No costs were awarded.

    Mrs. Pauline Frederick. v. V.L Narayanan.

    1. These two revision petitions arise out of the same matter and the parties are the same. CRP.No. 4800 of 1984 arises out of the order of the 10th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in E.A. No. 1282 of 1984 in E.P. No. 342 of 1983 and the petitioner in the execution application is the revision petitioner. C.R.P. No. 219 of 1985 arises out of the order of the said judge in E.P. 342 of 1983 and the second respondent therein, who is the petitioner in E.A. No. 1282 of 1984 is the revision petitioner.

    2. The brief facts of the case are these:- The first respondent herein filed the suit in O.S. No. 5540 of 1971 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras against the second respondent for specific performance of an agreement for sale of the scheduled property, entered into between them on 30.10.1967. The suit was decreed on 24.1.1974. Pending suit, the second respondent herein, who is the defendant, has sold the suit property in favour of the revision petitioner by a deed of sale dated 11.5.1972. In E.P. No. 226 of 1979 the 1st respondent/decree-holder filed the execution against the 2nd respondent/defendant for the execution of the deed of sale. In E.A. No. 1523/79 in the said execution petition the 1st respondent/decree-holder sought to implead the revision petitioner herein as a party to the execution petition as he had obtained a deed of sale pendente lite. The application was resisted by the revision petitioner but was allowed on 24.7.1979 and the revision petitioner was impleaded as the 2nd respondent in the execution petition. The execution application was allowed and the deed of sale was executed by the Court. There after, the 1st respondent/decree-holder filed E.P. No. 342/83 for delivery of possession after removing the superstructure put up by the revision petitioner subsequent to the sale in her favour. The said execution petition was resisted by the revision petitioner, who contended that she had put up the superstructure worth several lakhs of rupees, that she is not bound by the decree for specific performance obtained by the 1st respondent/decree-holder/revision petitioner and that the decree-holder is not entitled to the relief for possession as against the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner then filed E.A. No. 1282/84 in the aforesaid E.P. No. 342/83 for a declaration that the decree in O.S. No. 5540/70 obtained by the 1st respondent/decree- holder is not executable against the revision petitioner and for the dismissal of the execution petition.

    3. The learned 10th Asst. Judge by his order dated 16.11.1984 dismissed E.A. No. 1282/84 holding that the sale in favour of the revision petitioner was affected by lis pendens and she is not entitled to contend that the decree obtained by the 1st respondent against the 2nd respondent is not executable. Consequently he allowed E.P. No. 342/83 and directed delivery. The revision petitioner has, therefore, come forward with these two revisions.

    4. It is an admitted fact that the deed of sale in favour of the revision petitioner executed by the defendant/2nd respondent herein is subsequent to the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff/1st respondent herein and the sale is therefore hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act.

    5. The main contention advanced by Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned senior Counsel for the revision petitioner is that the revision petitioner, believing in good faith that she is absolutely entitled to the property, has made vast improvements by putting up a superstructure at a cost of several lakhs of rupees and she has, therefore, a right to require the decree-holder/1st respondent herein, who is seeking to evict her on the basis of a better title either to have the value of the improvements estimated and paid to her or to sell his interest in the property to the revision petitioner. Reliance is sought to be placed on Section 51 of the Act, which runs as follows:

    When the transferee of immovable property makes any improvements on the property, believing in good faith that he is absolutely, entitled thereto and he is subsequently evicted therefrom by any person having a better title, the transferee has a right to require the person causing the eviction either to have the value of the improvement estimated and paid or secured to the transferee, or to sell his interest in the property to the transferee at the then market value thereof, irrespective of the value of such, improvement.

    The amount to be paid or secured in respect of such improvement shall be the estimated value thereof at the time of the eviction.

    When, under the circumstances aforesaid, the transferee has planted or sown on the property crops which are growing when he is evicted therefrom, he is entitled to such crops and to free ingress and egress to gather and carry them.

    6. Mr. M. Srinivasan strenuously contends that all the ingredients of Section 51 of the Act are satisfied in the instant case and the revision petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the said provision of law and placed before me several authorities in support of his contention. In Moitheensa Rowthan v. Apsa Bivi I.L.R. 36 Madras 194 : (1913) 21 M.L.J. 969 a Bench of this Court held that a purchaser in a court auction, who was not a party to the decree, is entitled to the value of the improvements bona fide effected by him, on being evicted from the property owing to some defect or irregularity in the proceedings leading upto the sale. A court auction purchaser is not really entitled to the benefit of Section 51 of the Act but he has been allowed compensation for improvements on equitable principles following the judgment of Story, J. in Bright v. Boyd (1841-1943) 1 Story 478 where a person who had been evicted from land which he had held by a conveyance from an administrator on the ground that the administrator had failed to comply with the requirements of law essential to the validity of sale, was held entitled for the recovery of valuable and permanent improvements made by him in good faith believing that the deed from the administrator conveyed a good title to the premises, Narayanamurthy v. Secretary of State (1925) 48 M.L.J. 682 A.I.R. 1925 Madras 963 is another decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner where the grantee of land under an order of the Tahsildar paid the assessment in respect of the land and spent money in putting the land to good use without knowing that there was an appeal decreed against him. It was held:

    that the grantee effected his improvements bona fide within Section 51 and was therefore entitled to the value thereof.

    These decisions do not deal with a case of transfer pendente lite falling under Section 52 of the Act and they therefore do not advance the case of the revision petitioner.

    7. Section 52 of the Act, which embodies the doctrine of pendente lite runs thus:

    During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or establishing beyond such limits by the Central Government... of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose.

    Explanation:- For the purpose of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge or such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.

    The principle underlying this rule of law has thus been stated by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Achut v. Shivajirao A.I.R. 1937 Bombay 244:

    It is clear from the terms of this section, that the doctrine of lis pendens is not based upon notice, but it rests upon the ground that neither party to a suit can alienate the property in the suit pending the suit so as to defeat the rights of the other party. As the decisions show, it is based upon expediency, and it is immaterial whether the alienee pendente lite had or had not notice of the suit ... The mere pendency of a suit will not prevent one of the parties from selling the property, the subject-matter of the suit, but the purchase will in no manner affect the right of the other party under any decree which may be made in the suit, unless the property was sold with the permission of the court. The section lays down the principle, which is in conformity with what Story in his "Equity Gurisprudence" observes that the effect of the maxim "ul life pendente nihil innovetur" is not to annul the conveyance, but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation... A purchase made of land actually in litigation pendente lite for a valuable consideration and without any express or implied notice affects the purchaser in the same manner as if he had notice, and he will accordingly be so far bound by the judgment or decree as not to be entitled to defeat the main object of the suit. Ordinarily the judgment of a court binds only the parties and their privies in representation or estate. But he who purchases during the pendency of an action is held bound by the judgment that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted taking any notice of the title so acquired and such purchaser need not be made a party to the action.

    In Kulandaivelu v. Sowbagyammal (1945)1 M.L.J. 261 : A.I.R. 1945 Madras 350 this court has observed that Section 52 makes no exception in favour of a bona fide transferee for value without notice and it hits against all transfers which would affect the rights of the other party. In Md. Shafiqullah v. Md. Samiullah A.I.R. 1929 Allahabad 943 the question arose whether a transferee from an ostensible owner entitled to the benefit of Section 41 of the Act will be hit by Section 52 of the Act. A Bench of that court held that the estoppel arising under Section 41 of the Act cannot be such as to override the imperative provisions of Section 52 of the Act. Section 52 is a special section which applies to transfers during the pendency of a suit. In the presence of a special provision of law applicable to pending suits, the general provisions of estoppel contained in Section 41 will not apply. In Motichand v. British India Corporation A.I.R. 1932 Allahabad 210 the question on hand whether Section 51 can override Section 52 of the Act came up directly for consideration. During the pendency of a mortgage suit, the property in suit was purchased by the predecessors of the plaintiff who claimed the benefit of Section 51 of the Act as against the purchasers in execution of the mortgage decree. Following the earlier Bench decision of that court in Md. Shafiqullah v. Md. Samiullah A.I.R. 1929 Allahabad 943 referred to above, this Bench held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of Section 51 of the Act in view of Section 52 of the Act. In Chinna alias Lakshmi Kutty Amma v. Md. Ali (1958) K.L.T. 557 the first plaintiff filed is suit for recovery of possession from the defendant who claimed to be the cultivating tenant. The suit was decreed and the first plaintiff took delivery of possession of the property in execution of the decree and sold it subsequently to the second plaintiff, but, the appeal filed by the defendant-tenant was allowed and remanded for retrial then the second plaintiff - transferee is impleaded as a party. The second plaintiff - transferee pendeate lite claimed the value of improvements effected by him by way of reclamation and fresh constructions. The suit and the restitution matters were jointly tried and the suit was dismissed, white the re-delivery was ordered unconditionally as the second plaintiff was a transferee pandente lite and could not claim the benefit of Section 51 of the Act. In the second appeal the High Court held that the improvements could not be said to have been made bona fide as there was an appeal pending. Agreeing with the observation of the learned author of the 4th edition of Mullah's Transfer of Property Act, the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court held that Section 51 of the Act is controlled by Section 52 of the Act. In a very recent decision, a single judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Hari Bachan Singh v. Major Har Bhajan Singh held that an alienee pendente lite cannot claim any compensation for the improvements made by him on the property purchased during the pendency of the suit. He purchases the property subject to the result of the litigation which will be binding on him whether he is a party to the case or not.

    8. As against the aforesaid catena of decisions the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner would place before me a decision of the Bench of the Lahore High Court in Amir Chand v. Durga Das A.I.R. 1916 Lahore 379. During the pendency of a suit for possession, the property in dispute was sold by the 1st defendant to defendants 2 to 5, who in turn sold it to the sixth defendant and defendants 2 to 5, believing the soundness of their title, had effected certain improvements in the property, and it was held that the plaintiff could not recover the property without payment of compensation to the sixth defendant for the improvements effected. It may be pointed out that the Transfer of Property Act has no application to Punjab and this decision has therefore no relevance. There is also no discussion in the said decision about the principles enunciated in Section 52 of the Act. I am, therefore, unable to place any reliance on this decision.

    9. In the result, I hold that the transfer in favour of the revision petitioner is hit by Section 52 of the Act and she is not entitled to claim the value of any improvements claimed by her.

    10. The revision petitioner has come forward with a claim that she has put up costly structure worth several lakhs of rupees on the land purchased by her pending suit. The certificate produced by the Engineer shows the total value of construction and other charges only at Rs. 1,52,555. In the counter filed by the revision petitioner in April, 1979 in E.A. No. 1523/79 for impleading the revision petitioner as a party to the execution petition, the revision petitioner has stated that she has started the construction and paid a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to the contractor with whom she had entered into an agreement for construction. Evidently the construction has taken place only after the application was filed to bring her on record. She cannot, therefore, pretend to be ignorant of the pending litigation and to have made improvements bona fide believing in good faith that she was absolutely entitled to the property. On merits too, she has no sustainable case.

    11. It is finally contended by Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner that the decree sought to be executed is silent about delivery of possession and the plaintiff/respondent herein is not therefore entitled to seek delivery of possession in this execution petition. He has to file a separate suit for possession. This contention has not been raised in the counter to the execution petition and has been raised for the first time only in this revision. In Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal the plaintiffs obtained a decree for specific performance of an agreement for sale, which was confirmed in second appeal by the High Court. When they filed an application for execution, several contentions were raised, one of which was that the decree was inexecutable as there was no decree for possession. It was also contended that as the Urban Land Ceiling Act had come into force, the decree-holder must obtain permission required under the Act. The executing court allowed the objection of the judgment-debtor in part and refused to grant the relief for possession observing that the remedy of the decree-holder was by means of a separate suit. The other objections of the judgment-debtor were overruled. The Additional District Judge confirmed this order of the executing court. On appeal by both the judgment-debtor and the decree-holders the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the judgment-debtor and allowed the appeal of the decree-holders and modified the order of the courts below to the effect that the decree-holders shall be entitled to possession also. The matter came up before the Supreme Court and their Lordships, after an elaborate discussion of law on this subject, held that the order of the High Court directing delivery of possession was an "eminently just" one. According to the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, the plaintiff, in the instant case has prayed for possession also in the suit and since the court has not granted a decree for possession it must be deemed to have refused to grant that relief. No such inference can be drawn in the instant case, for, there was no reason for the court to deny the relief of delivery of possession, having decreed the suit for specific performance. The omission appears to be quite inadvertent. The suit is of the year 1971 and fourteen years have passed since then. As observed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, it will really be a travesty of justice to ask the decree-holder to file a separate suit for possession. To quote the language of the Supreme Court, the objection raised by the revision petitioner is hyper-technical. It is therefore just and proper to hold that the first-respondent-decree-holder is entitled to possession also.

    12. In the result, both the revisions fail and are dismissed. No costs.

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    Mrs. Pauline Frederick. v. V.L Narayanan.
    (Sep 25, 1985)