Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 126, 128, 133, 140 and 145 of the Indian Contract Act,
  • S. 126 of the Contract Act,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 126, 128, 133, 140 and 145 of the Indian Contract Act,
  • S. 126 of the Contract Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S. 163 of 1982 on the file of the Sub-Court, Gobichettipalayam. The plaintiff sued the respondents for a permanent injunction restraining them from recovering Rs. 85,639.89 from the State Bank of India, Gobichettipalayam branch until the respondents establish their claim in a court of law. Pending disposal of the suit, the plaintiff filed I.A. 737 of 1982 seeking a temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 and Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, to restrain the respondents from realising the said amount by enforcing bank guarantees. The trial court and the appellate court rejected the interim relief, and the plaintiff filed this civil revision petition challenging those orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether courts may grant an interim injunction restraining the invocation or enforcement of an irrevocable bank guarantee (or analogous instruments) in the ordinary course.
  2. Whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case (a bona fide contention or a serious question to be tried) — particularly by alleging fraud — sufficient to justify injuncting invocation of the bank guarantees.
  3. Whether the lower courts erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to obtain handwriting expert opinion on a document alleged to be forged (Ex. B28), thereby preventing the plaintiff from adducing relevant evidence on the fraud plea.
  4. Whether the suit could seek relief preventing invocation of the bank guarantees without impleading the bank (State Bank of India) as a party.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff was appointed a dealer by the first defendant and furnished two bank guarantees (Ex. B13 and B14) totalling Rs. 1,00,000 as security for prompt payment of invoices.
  • The plaintiff contends that certain officials of the second defendant committed fraud by supplying products to third parties and, to conceal those transactions, recorded them in the names of recognised dealers (including the plaintiff); the plaintiff disputes liability for Rs. 85,639.89 of the demand.
  • The plaintiff made specific allegations and pointed to particular documents (including Ex. B28 which it alleges to be forged) and sought particulars and scrutiny; it requested details (Ex. A5) and an account but the defendants did not furnish particulars.
  • The trial court wrongly refused to send Ex. B28 to a handwriting expert (I.A. 46 of 1983) and thereby prevented the plaintiff from adducing relevant evidence on forgery and fraud; this frustrated the prima facie case that would justify injuncting invocation of the guarantees.
  • The plaintiff admitted part liability (Rs. 43,543.50) and had paid Rs. 20,735, and said that if the guarantees were invoked it would ruin the small dealer's business; therefore balance of convenience favoured injunction, subject to conditions (deposit, renewal of guarantees).

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants denied the fraud allegations and contended that, once irrevocable bank guarantees were furnished and a demand made, the bank must be honoured; they relied on the principle that banks are not concerned with the underlying dispute between buyer and seller.
  • They relied on precedents (including United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India and Tarapore and Co. v. V/O Tractor Export) to submit that courts should not ordinarily interfere with irrevocable obligations assumed by banks and that only in exceptional circumstances (e.g. clear fraud known to the bank) will a court exercise the power to grant interlocutory relief.
  • The defendants also contended that because State Bank of India was not impleaded, no relief could be granted against the bank; the court, however, treated that contention as not being an impediment to granting relief confined to preventing defendants from invoking the guarantees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1426 (95 L.W. S.C. 29) Establishes that a bank issuing or confirming a letter of credit (and by analogy guarantees) is not concerned with the underlying contract/dispute between buyer and seller; courts should generally not interfere with irrevocable obligations assumed by banks. The court recognised this principle but observed that exceptions exist (fraud and other exceptional circumstances). The decision was relied upon by both sides; the court applied it as part of the background rule while evaluating whether an exceptional case was made out by the plaintiff.
Messrs. Tarapore and Co., Madras v. V/O Tractor Export, Moscow and another, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 891 Authority for the general rule that courts will not lightly grant injunctions to restrain instruments of payment/irrevocable obligations such as letters of credit; interference is only in extraordinary circumstances. The trial court relied on this case to deny interim relief. The revising court accepted the underlying principle but emphasised that it does not create an absolute bar where exceptional circumstances (e.g., fraud) are shown.
Harbottle Ltd. v. Westminster Bank Ltd. (R.D. Harbottle v. National Westminster Bank cited) States that only in exceptional cases will courts interfere with the machinery of irrevocable obligations assumed by banks; courts have discretion to grant interlocutory injunctions where just or convenient. The court cited this authority for the existence of exceptions and the discretionary nature of injunctive relief; it supported the proposition that fraud may constitute such an exception.
Elias v. Matsas (Elian/Elias v. Matsas), 1966-7 L.I.L.R. 495 Observation that a letter of credit sometimes resembles a contract of guarantee and that in exceptional cases courts may grant injunctions against performance of such instruments. The court noted the limited and passim nature of the observation in Elias v. Matsas, and cautioned against equating letters of credit and bank guarantees without regard to statutory definitions; used to illustrate that exceptional cases may warrant relief.
Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P., 1983-4 S.C.C. 353 (96 L.W. S.C. 159) Principle that a case is authority only for what it actually decides; obiter observations beyond the facts have only persuasive value. The court relied on this to argue that precedents dealing with letters of credit should not be uncritically applied to bank guarantees and to stress that factual differences matter for deciding exceptional cases.
U.C.M. (Investments) v. Royal Bank of Canada Recognises the general rule protecting confirmed irrevocable documentary credits, but carves the established exception where the beneficiary fraudulently presents materially untrue documents — fraud unravels all. The court cited this case to support the fraud exception: if a beneficiary has knowingly committed fraud in presenting documents, courts may enjoin payment despite an otherwise irrevocable obligation.
M.S.E.B. Bombay v. Official Liquidator, H.C. Ernakulam Holds that the liability under a guarantee may be absolute and unconditional and that a bank issuing a guarantee cannot confine liability to the extent of loss sustained by the party on whose behalf guarantee is issued. The court cited it to demonstrate that guarantees create strong obligations, reinforcing the general reluctance to interfere except in special cases.
B.S. Aujla Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Kaluram, A.I.R. 1983 Cal. 106 States that in the absence of clear fraud to the bank's knowledge, courts should not grant injunctions restraining payment under a letter of credit; balance of convenience favors non-interference. The court used this authority to underline the requirement that the plaintiff must establish a clear prima facie case (including fraud) to warrant injunctive relief.
Vinay Engineering v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation (Referred as one of the authorities supporting the principle that courts generally refrain from restraining invocation of bank instruments unless exceptional circumstances are established.) Referred to along with other decisions to show the weight of authority regarding non-interference, while acknowledging possible exceptions for fraud.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the legal issue as balancing two competing principles: (i) the established rule that banks' irrevocable obligations (letters of credit or guarantees) should not ordinarily be interfered with by injunction because banks are not concerned with underlying disputes between contracting parties; and (ii) the recognised exception that courts may intervene in exceptional circumstances, most notably where fraud is shown (fraud unravels all).

The court analysed the material in these steps:

  1. Recapitulated the governing legal principles and precedents: decisions such as Tarapore and Co., United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, Harbottle, U.C.M. Investments and others establish that interference is exceptional and that a plaintiff seeking interlocutory relief must show a prima facie case — a bona fide contention or a serious question to be tried — and that balance of convenience favours granting relief.
  2. Examined the plaintiff's pleadings and particulars: the plaintiff had pleaded specific instances of alleged clandestine dealings and fraud, referenced particular documents (including Ex. B28 which was alleged to be forged) and sought particulars and accounts (Ex. A5). The court noted that the plaintiff did not simply make an allegation in general terms but supplied particulars and documentary references to support the fraud plea.
  3. Contrasted the defendants' response: in the written statement and affidavits the defendants relied largely on general denials and on established precedent that banks should honour guarantees; the court observed defendants did not meet the plaintiff's specific factual allegations with particularised rebuttal or documentary explanation.
  4. Criticised the lower courts' approach: the trial court and the appellate court were found to have decided the interlocutory application primarily on the face of documents without analysing the specific discrepancies pointed out by the plaintiff. Notably the trial court refused the plaintiff's request to refer Ex. B28 to a handwriting expert, stating "no finding need be given for the present", yet proceeded to conclude there was no forgery. The revising court held that refusal prevented the plaintiff from adducing relevant evidence and undermined the proper assessment of the prima facie case.
  5. Assessed the discrepancies the plaintiff highlighted: the revising court summarised several documentary inconsistencies (nine items) — mismatches in delivery certificates, lorry numbers, overwritten warehouse names, missing delivery challans, and an allegedly forged letter (Ex. B24/Ex. B28) — and found that these discrepancies, if plausible and seemingly worthy of belief at interlocutory stage, required further inquiry and could support a prima facie case of fraud.
  6. Applied the legal test: given that the plaintiff had presented particulars of alleged fraud and the defendants had replied largely by general denials without particularised rebuttal, the court concluded that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case (a bona fide contention or a serious question to be tried). The court also accepted the plaintiff's balance of convenience argument (possible ruin of small dealer's business if guarantees were enforced) and that keeping the guarantees alive during litigation would not prejudice the defendants.
  7. Imposed conditional relief rather than absolute interdiction: the court allowed the revision petition but attached conditions designed to protect defendants' ultimate rights (deposit by plaintiff; obligation on plaintiff to keep guarantees live by renewing them) and to ensure the matter could be finally determined at trial.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The civil revision petition was allowed subject to conditions. The court ordered:

  • Plaintiff to deposit Rs. 20,735 in the trial court on or before 15th June, 1984.
  • The plaintiff must keep the two bank guarantees (Ex. B13 and B14) alive during the pendency of the proceedings by renewing them from time to time, at least 30 days before expiry; failing which the defendants may invoke the bank guarantees.
  • The petition was allowed with costs; counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 250.

Implications:

  • The direct, practical effect is that the defendants are restrained from invoking the bank guarantees during the pendency of the suit provided the plaintiff complies with the deposit and renewal conditions imposed by the court.
  • The court recognised the general rule that banks' irrevocable obligations are not to be lightly interfered with, but reaffirmed that there is no absolute bar to injunctive relief; exceptional cases (notably where prima facie fraud is shown) may warrant intervention. The opinion emphasises that plaintiffs who particularise allegations of fraud and produce plausible supporting materials may obtain interlocutory protection, subject to appropriate conditions.
  • The court considered and rejected the contention that relief could not be granted unless the bank (State Bank of India) was impleaded; it held that the relief sought — preventing defendants from invoking Ex. B13 and B14 — could be granted against the defendants without impleading the bank.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down an entirely new rule; its effect is to apply established principles to the facts and to correct the lower courts' failure to permit relevant evidence (handwriting expert) and to analyse documentary discrepancies at the interlocutory stage. No broader novel precedent beyond the application of existing exceptions to guarantees is proclaimed in the text.
VCS.

    Messrs. Arul Murugan Traders By Its Sole Propr., G.R Srinivasan v. Rashtriya Chemicals And Fertilisers Ltd., Bombay & Another

    1. Petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S 163 of 1982 on the file of the Sub-Court, Gobichettipalayam. It filed the suit against respondents herein, for grant of a permanent injunction restraining them from recovering the sum of Rs. 85,639.89 from the State Bank of India, Gobichettipalayam branch till they establish their claim against the plaintiff in a court of law. Pending disposal of the suit, in I.A 737 of 1982, it sought for grant of a temporary injunction under O. 39, R. 1 and S. 151, C.P.C, restraining respondents from realising the said amount by enforcing the bank guarantee till the disposal of the suit. Courts below having rejected the relief, this civil revision petition is preferred.

    2. The plaintiff claimed as follows: The first defendant manufactures Nitrogenous and other chemical fertilisers. The plaintiff was appointed as a dealer under Ex. B25, dt. 25th September, 1980 for the sale and distribution of its products in certain territories of Tamil Nadu. As and when plaintiff informs second defendant specifying the requirements, allocation would be made by issue of delivery notes to the concerned warehouse and thereafter, plaintiff will receive the supply. Second defendant issues invoices whereupon plaintiff makes payments. In order to assure prompt payment of invoices, plaintiff was directed to furnish bank guarantee, and, it had furnished two bank guarantees totalling Rs. 1 lakh under Ex. B13 and B14, dated 17th October, 1979 for Rs. 50,000 each issued by State Bank of India, Gobichettipalayam. Though plaintiff was prompt in payment of invoices, it understands that some, of the officials of second defendant supplied products to retailers and other parties closely known to them, and to avoid detection, for record purposes they bring those transactions under any one of the recognised dealers in a clandestine manner, and so long as payments are received within time from such clandestine purchasers, there was no trouble. But when it finds, the officials in order to exculpate themselves demand payments from authorised dealers, and that was how, a demand for Rs. 1,29,183.69 was made on the plaintiff by letter, dt. 17th July, 1982 (Ex. A4). Defendants having threatened to invoke the bank guarantee in default of payment of the amount so claimed, it sent a reply on 3rd August, 1982 (Ex. A5) requesting for details to be furnished. But, second defendant had not chosen to give any reply so far. Out of the claim made, plaintiff admits liability only for Rs. 43,543.50 and has already paid a sum of Rs. 20,735, on 29th July, 1982, and is prepared to pay the balance at any time. It disputes liability only for Rs. 85,639.89. In paragraph 7 of the plaint, it refers to certain communications, to show bow the demand made by the second defendant was fraudulent. When the product was not actually supplied, the bank, as the surety, is also not liable to pay the amount as per the terms in Ex. B13 and B14. Bank guarantees have been invoked only to save the skin of the officers of the defendants, who have committed fraud, and hence, the suit had been filed.

    3. Second defendant in the written statement had repudiated this claim, stating that, when irrevocable bank guarantees had been furnished, a demand having been made by letter, dt. 1st October, 1982 for payment of a sum of Rs. 1,29,183.69, plaintiff had unjustly intercepted it by filing the suit. The Bank had violated the terms of the bank guarantee. It is due to inability to pay debts, in spite of taking delivery of goods, the suit had been filed on false grounds. After referring to the procedure adopted in selling goods, the allegations made in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the plaint have been denied. In the light of a decision in United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India . A.I.R 1981 S.C 1426=95 L.W S.C 29, the Bank has no other option than to honour the bank guarantee.

    4. The trial court held that documents produced by defendants show that there could not have been clandestine sale of products to third parties, and, hence, the plaintiff has not made out a ‘prima facie’ case of fraud. Relying upon Messrs. Tarapore and Co., Madras v. V/O Tractor Export, Moscow and another . A.I.R 1970 S.C 891 it held, that it is only under extraordinary circumstances, courts would injunct the bank guarantee from being invoked. The appellate court also concurred with these findings.

    5. Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that it will not be his endeavour to claim that a court can in a light hearted manner grant interim injunctions, preventing a bank guarantee or a letter of credit being honoured on time. He has taken considerable pains to analyse the decisions hereunder referred to, to show that the correct view to be taken is to proceed on the basis that a bank guarantee or a letter of credit and the like, must be allowed to be effective instruments so as to secure payment irrespective of whatever be the disputes raised between the seller and the buyer, and that only in extraordinary circumstances, an injunction could issue. With fraudulent intention if a party to the contract invokes a bank guarantee, no court could allow an illegality being committed, merely because the relief claimed is in respect of a bank guarantee or letter of credit. He respectfully submits that, in spite of specific instances adverted to by plaintiff to show that fraud had been committed, this essential factor had been evasively dealt with by courts below, and that by continuing to keep the bank guarantees alive, during the pendency of the proceedings, defendants would not, in any manner, be prejudiced.

    6. As to what should be the approach made by courts when bank guarantees are invoked, after referring to Ss. 126, 128, 133, 140 and 145 of the Indian Contract Act, dealing with indemnity and guarantee, he refers to United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, wherein it was held that it is a well established rule that a Bank issuing or confirming a letter of credit, is not concerned with the underlying contract between the buyer and the seller. After referring to the decision in Harbottle Ltd. v. Westminster Bank Ltd., it is stated therein as follow—

    “We would like to adopt a passage from his judgment at page 761: it is only in exceptional cases that the Courts will interfere with the machinery of irrevocable obligations assumed by banks.”

    Dealing with the scope of O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, it was held that, unless plaintiff establishes that there was a bona fide contention between the parties, or a serious question to be tried and balance of convenience is taken into account, an interim injunction would be wholly unwarranted. In paragraph 41 it is stated:—

    “A letter of credit sometimes resembles and is analogous to a contract of guarantee…to warrant interference by injunction.”

    Counsel for defendants also relies upon the same decision to plead that courts cannot intercept Bank guarantees being invoked, and that inter se disputes between contracting parties cannot be taken into account by the Bank.

    7. The contention of Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned counsel, is that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Tarapore and Co., Madras v. Tractor Export, Moscow and another, and United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India,3 are to the effect that usually courts should refrain from granting injunctions to restrain performance of the contractual obligations arising out of a letter of credit or a bank guarantee. But, there is no absolute bar against courts granting interim injunction, under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, and S. 151, C.P.C, if circumstances warrant, He would point out, that in none of the decisions, it had ever been held that courts are powerless to injunct invocation of letter of credit or bank guarantees. He submits that the courts below misconstrued, that this matter does not fall within the exception contemplated in the said decisions. Before proceeding further, he points out that the observation in Elian v. Matsas . 1966-7-L.I. L.R 495., to the effect that a letter of credit sometimes resembles and is anlogous to a contract of guarantee, overlooks the fact that a letter of credit could not come within the definition of S. 126 of the Contract Act, and hence, in so far as India is concerned, the bank guarantee like the one issued in the present matter, cannot be equated to a letter of credit. He points out that, even in the said decision, no analysis had been made anywhere as to how a bank guarantee could be equated to that of a letter of credit, and that it is only a passing reference made in the course of the judgment. He pleads that the emphasis laid in Tarapore and Co., Madras v. V/O Tractor Export, Moscow and another, cannot be imported to the same extent, when bank guarantees are involved. At this juncture, he refers to Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P . 1983-4-S.C.C 353=96 L.W S.C 159 S.N wherein it was held that:

    “A case is an authority only for what it actually decides and not for what may logically follow from it. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there, are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but governed of qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. Observations in the judgment which were really not necessary for the purposes of the decision and go beyond the occasion have no binding authority and merely have peruasive value.”

    Hence it is rightly contended that by referring to the decision of Lord Denning (sic) in Elias v. Matsas, made in United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, it would not mean that a bank guarantee and a letter of credit, are equatable. In view of what has been stated in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P, no difficulty exists in understanding the correct legal principles to be followed, when bank guarantees are involved. Though in Tarapore and Co., Madras v. V/O Tractor Export Moscow and another,6 it was in report of a letter of credit, in United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, as to how a bank guarantee should be dealt with having been well laid down, what further requires to be considered is whether plaintiff's case would be an ‘exceptional case’ warranting interference by court. There can be exceptional cases was recognised in Harbottle Ltd. v. National West Minster Bank Ltd., and this view having found approval by the Supreme Court, it is not as if, in no case a bank guarantee could be intercepted from being honoured. Even in Elias v. Matsas, it is stated that ‘circumstances may arise such as to warrant interference by injunction; and it was a case wherein the Court granted injunction, treating it as a special case, because the ship owners in breach of the undertaking, imposed a further fee and hence, they have disabled themselves from acting on the guarantee.

    8. To show that extraordinary or exceptional or special cases would arise, wherein courts would be inclined to injunct the invocation of bank guarantees, U.C.M Investments v. Royal Bank of Canada, is relied upon, wherein it was held that the system of confirmed irrevocable documentary credits had been developed in international trade to give the seller an assured right to be paid before he parted with control of the goods and that does not permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale to be used as a ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of payment, but to this general statement of principle as to the contractual obligations of confirming bank to the seller, there is one established exception; that is, where the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulenly presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication material representations of facts which to his knowledge are untrue. The exception for fraud, on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the credit, is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi cause non oritur actio or, if plain English is to be preferred ‘fraud unravels all’. The Courts will not allow their process to be used, by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud. In R.D Harbottle v. National Westminster Bank, also it was held that only in exceptional cases would the courts interfere with the machinery of irrevocable obligations assumed by banks, and that courts have a discretion to grant interlocutory injunctions, whenever it is just or convenient to do so. In M.S.E.B Bombay v. Official Liquidator, H.C Ernakulam, it was held that a bank issuing a guarantee cannot raise the plea that it is liable only to the extent of any loss that may have been sustained by the party, on whose behalf it has issued bank guarantee and not for the whole amount, and that the liability is absolute and unconditional. B.S Aujla Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Kaluram . A.I.R 1983 Cal. 106. is to the effect that in the absence of a clear case of fraud to the knowledge of the bank, it is a well settled principle of balance of convenience that a court should not grant injunction restraining payment in terms of the letter of credit. An injunction would issue under O. 39, R. 1 and 2 only if the plaintiff establishes that he was a prima facie case, meaning thereby that there was a bona fide contention between the parties, or a serious question to be tried. On behalf of defendants, apart from relying upon Tarapore and Co., Madras v. V/o Tractor Export, Moscow and another,8 and United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, reference is also made to U.C.M (Investments) v. Royal Bank of Canada, and Vinay Engineering v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation. 9

    9. The decisions make it quite clear that there is no absolute rule prohibiting grant of interim injunction relating to Bank guarantees and in exceptional cases courts will interfere with the machinery of irrevocable obligations assumed by banks, and that the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, meaning thereby that there is a bona fide contention between the parties or serious question to be tried, and further the balance of convenience is also a relevant factor. If the element of fraud exists then courts step in to prevent one of the parties to the contract from deriving unjust enrichment by invoking bank guarantee.

    10. Hence, the primordial aspect to be considered is, whether there is a bona fide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried, so as to make out a prima facie case. The only contention of the plaintiff herein is that defendants have practised fraud upon it and hence, they cannot invoke the bank guarantee. In paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint, the specific instances, relating to the alleged fraud, are placed. In the written statement, except for a vague denial not even a single instance had been explained away by reference to any of the documents. When a party to a proceeding pleads fraud by referring to certain transactions and furnishes particulars to sustain the said contention and if the opposing party rests content by general denials, the only course open to the court, at this stage of the matter, is to act upon the claims of the plaintiff, provided they are plausible and seemingly worthy of belief. Even in the counter-affidavit filed in the I.A except for stating the usual nature of transaction adopted between the parries, and the decision in United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, no particulars are furnished to show as to how far the plea of fraud, as raised, is unsustainable. As for the trial courts, in paragraph 6, it has simply catalogued in seriatim all the documents filed by contesting parties. In paragraph 7, it takes up the only point relating to forgery pleaded, regarding Ex. B28. It compares the signature found therein with that in Exs. B26 and B27, and states that on a superficial comparison, it is unable to make out forgery. No other factual claims made by the petitioner, had been dealt with. Plaintiff filed I.A 46 of 1983, for sending Ex. B28 for opinion of a handwriting expert. But it was rejected, on 19th February, 1983, holding that ‘no finding need be given for the present to dispose of I.A 737 of 1981, and hence, the petition was closed with liberty to file a separate petition for the same prayer at the time of trial, if necessary. Having stated that no finding need be given for the present on the aspect of forgery, it had proceeded to dispose of the matter, only on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish forgery. It has unjustly prevented plaintiff from establishing an important factual claim, by refusing to send Ex. B28 to a handwriting expert to give his opinion as to its genuineness. When a plea of fraud is made, by claiming that a particular document has been forged, the trial court ought not to have stood in the way of relevant evidence being adduced, even at this stage of the matter. By preventing the plaintiff from adducing relevant evidence, and in spite of holding that no finding need be given for the present on the aspect of forgery pleaded, it had erroneously proceeded to render the only finding that Ex. B28 does not appear to be forgery. It is on this sole ground it held that plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case.

    11. As for the appellate court, in paragraph 6 alone it deals with the prima facie nature of the case. After referring to Exs. B25, 13, 14 and 10 it holds that, when plaintiff had received four delivery orders and four invoices, it must naturally be taken that it bad taken delivery of the goods covered by the delivery orders from the warehouse. It further observes that, when signatures of the persons who took delivery on behalf of the plaintiff are found, Exs. B1 to B8 go to show that all the goods covered by the invoices have in fact been supplied to the plaintiff, and hence, there is no warrant for the plaintiff's contention, that the defendants have played fraud in supply of goods to strangers and making the invoices in the name of the plaintiffs. Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned counsel for the plaintiff, argued at great length, by referring to each one of the documents, to show that lower appellate Court had relied on documents filed by defendants, without looking into the inherent discrepancies existing therein, and hence, the court had not applied its mind to the contents of these documents. Merely because four delivery orders and invoices exist, it had proceeded on a presumption that plaintiff must have taken delivery of goods from the warehouse, when its main grievance is that, they are documents brought into existence by the officials of the defendants in the clandestine dealings indulged in by them. This criticism is not without substance, because, the appellate order does not deal with the points taken by the plaintiff, as to why such documents cannot be put against it and of the discrepancies existing therein. Even the limited materials which plaintiff had referred to in paragraph 7 of the plaintiff had not been dealt with by the courts below, to show that there is no serious question to be tried between the parties. Though he has taken more than one point to show discrepancies and obvious defects in the documents relied upon by defendants, only a few are dealt with hereunder, for the limited purpose of finding out whether this case would come under the category of exceptional or special cases, as held by the Supreme Court.

    12. Item No. 1: Under Ex. A5, dated 21st March, 1982, plaintiff asked defendants to furnish a copy of account till date from the beginning. Under Ex. A2, dated 21st May, 1982, defendants informed the Bank that “the party had settled fully their dues with us and as on date their debt balance is nil”. Plaintiff states that in spite of it, under Ex. A4, dated 17th July, 1982, they state that the opening balance is Rs. 3,279.79, but no explanation is forthcoming as to how this amount became due.

    Item 2: As for Ex. A7, the invoice, admittedly there is no delivery challan issued.

    Item 3: Ex. BS is the delivery challan for the invoice under Ex. B9. This shows that G.R Anantharaman (brother of G.R Srinivasan, who is the sole proprietor of the plaintiff firm took delivery of 20 tons by lorry TMR 9473 on 24th May, 1982, whereas Ex. B12, the certificate produced by defendants and issued by warehouse at Salem, discloses that 10 tonnes were delivered on 24th May, 1982, and one ton on 1st June, 1982, and 9 tones on 3rd June, 1982, and the lorry numbers also vary. Hence, it is pleaded that Ex B8 does not prove delivery of the goods covered by Ex. B9.

    Item 4: In Ex. B2, an invoice, the words ‘Dindigul’ is scored out and overwritten as ‘Salem’ whereas in the two copies received by plaintiff, only Dindigul warehouse is shown at the place from where delivery had been effected. When these copies of invoices were sought to be marked as additional documents, the lower appellate Court has refused to receive that. I.A 95 of 1983 filed for additional documents to be received, was dismissed on 30th April, 1983.

    Item 5: As for Ex. B1, a delivery challan, it shows delivery by lorry TMT 4142, whereas Ex. B12 the concerned invoice shows that the lorry number is TMT 4242, and here again, Dindigul had been scored out and Salem had been written.

    Item 6: In Ex. B3, the name of the person to receive delivery is not filled up. But yet the second defendant has put his signature, as if he had attested the signature of the person ‘who is to take delivery’. The delivery had been made to one A. Govindaswamy, who does not represent the plaintiff. In respect of this consignment, Ex. B12, the certificate of the warehouse manager is to the effect that delivery was made through lorry TNL 3579, and not TNL 4889 which is mentioned in the delivery challan. In Ex. B6 also, there is alteration regarding the warehouse from where the goods are to be cleared.

    Item 7: In Ex. B5, the delivery challan, it shows that one V. Raman received delivery on 2nd June, 1982, in TNL 3579, whereas the corresponding certificate of the warehouse manager (Ex. B12) shows that delivery was through lorry TNL 4889.

    Item 8: Ex. B7 is an invoice showing that the name of the warehouse had been corrected as Salem. But no delivery challan is produced. But still Ex. B12, written by Manager of Salem warehouse shows that delivery was effected under order No. 404517, dated 19th June, 1982, which cannot be correct.

    Item 9: Under Ex. A5, dated 3rd August, 1982, on plaintiff realising that clandestine transactions have been put through in his name, made a request for a copy of the accounts to be furnished, but till date, defendants have not furnished the required particulars. Instead, within seven days, under Ex. A6, dated 11th August, 1982, second defendant had addressed one Amirthalingam, stating that Kannan was being sent in connection with the settlement of plaintiff's accounts amicably. Kannan had written on Ex. A6 stating that he could not meet Amirthalingam, and that there is urgency in settling the plaintiff. This bears the date 14th August, 1982. Defendants rely upon Ex. B24, of the same date, to claim that Anantharaman had signed on behalf of the plaintiff stating that the goods covered by the four disputed delivery orders had been received. It is in respect of this document plaintiff states, that it is a rank forgery. If such a letter had been sent to defendants, then in the ordinary course of business, the seal of the defendants most find a place therein.

    13. Courts below have passed orders only on documents and not on any oral evidence. When so many discrepancies have been pointed out and when plaintiff had relied upon them and wants to show that in some of the documents relevant lorry numbers are not there or concerned signatures are not affixed, in the background of the claim made that officers of the respondents have indulged in clandestine dealings, and that, under the disputed invoices, plaintiff had not received goods, the courts below have miserably failed to look into the prima facie case pleaded by the plaintiff. As for the claim made in paragraph 7 of the plaint, defendants have not placed any material so far as to how the claim made therein is beset with any incorrectness or misconception of facts. The added feature is that when Ex. B28 is claimed to be a forged document, the first endeavour of the Court ought to have been to secure the opinion of the handwriting expert, when plaintiff was prepared for such a course to be adopted. If it is a forged document, then the element of fraud pleaded becomes relevant, and which would disentitle defendants from invoking the bank guarantee. That was the main reason why they have opposed the application.

    14. As already pointed out, in spite of the trial court stating that no finding need be given for the present on the genuineness of the document, it had proceeded on to hold that plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case, only on the aspect of forgery, and on no other point raised by the plaintiff. As for the lower appellate court, it would not refer to a single document relied upon by the plaintiff. It has failed to analyse the contents of the document marked by the defendants, but bad proceeded on a surmise that when the delivery orders and invoices are present, naturally it should mean that the goods have been delivered, forgetting that the case of plaintiff is that the goods covered by the said documents were not delivered to it. If only courts below, which are duty bound to do this analysis, bad done it, it would not have resulted in considerable judicial time of this Court being spent on a matter like this. Subordinate Courts shall not avoid their duty, to analyse contents of documents, which are relevant to find out the prima facie case. On what is stated above, it is quite obvious that the suit involves serious questions to be tried, and particularly, relating to the plea of fraud, which courts have invariably held as a significant factor to be taken into account, whenever a relief is claimed for interdicting the enforcement of a bank guarantee.

    15. On balance of convenience, in the plaint itself it is admitted that a sum of Rs. 43,543.50 is payable. The plaintiff being a small dealer, if bank guarantees are invoked, in spite of a prima facie case having been made out, and compelled to part with a sum of Rs. 85,639.89, it would ruin its business prospects. By allowing the bank guarantee to be kept alive, defendants cannot be prejudiced.

    16. Hence, the revision petition is allowed, subject to the following conditions—

    (i) Plaintiff to deposit in the trial court a sum of Rs. 20,735, on or before 15th June, 1984.

    (ii) It must keep the two bank guarantees alive, during the pendency of the proceedings, by renewing them from time to time, 30 days before the expiry of the periods of respective guarantees, failing which, it will be open to defendants to invoke the bank guarantees.

    17. On behalf of the defendants it is stated that, when State Bank of India is not impleaded as a party, no relief as prayed for could be granted. This would not be any impediment, because the relief asked for is to prevent defendants from invoking the bank guarantees. As per Cl. 4 of Ex. B13 and B14, unless the amount claimed had be come due by reason of buyer's failure to pay the Corporation invoices, they cannot be invoked. It is the claim of the plaintiffs that in the absence of supply of goods, the amount had not become due. Without the amount becoming due, defendants cannot invoke the bank guarantees. That is the reason why the relief is confined only against the defendants, preventing them from invoicing Ex. B13 and B14 the bank guarantees. Hence, the civil revision petition is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250.

    VCS.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Messrs. Arul Murugan... v. Rashtriya Chemicals ...
    (Mar 29, 1984)