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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a tenant who filed this civil revision petition challenging the appointment of an Advocate-Commissioner to inspect the entire building in proceedings connected with eviction petitions. The tenant contends that the appointment (and the appellate order in C.M.A. 122 of 1980) was without jurisdiction because the Rent Controller's order regarding appointment of a Commissioner was a procedural matter and, according to the tenant, not appealable under Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960.

It is admitted that both the tenant and the landladies had sought appointment of an Advocate-Commissioner. The Rent Controller, however, passed orders only in the applications filed by the landladies directing inspection of properties described in R.C.O.P. Nos. 675 and 679 of 1978, and not the entire building. The appellate contest is confined to the order in I.A. 262 of 1980 in R.C.O.P. 675 of 1978.

The petition premises form part of a larger building. The petitioner occupies a portion of the ground floor. There are four other tenants in the building (one having already vacated), and tenants in two other R.C.O.P. matters (Nos. 683 and 685 of 1978) had agreed to vacate and eviction orders were passed. The landladies sought eviction on the ground that the building required demolition and reconstruction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an Advocate-Commissioner appointed in the eviction proceedings could inspect and submit a report in respect of the entire building or whether the inspection must be confined to only the premises described in the petition (the portion occupied by the tenant).
  2. Whether an appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order of appointment of a Commissioner under the statutory framework (notably in the context of Section 23 of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960), or whether such interlocutory orders are not appealable because they are procedural in nature.
  3. Whether addition of Section 18(A) (and related rules such as Rule 19) altered the nature or scope of the right to secure an inspection report (i.e., whether the statutory amendment authorises appointment of a Commissioner to inspect property and thereby affects the question of appealability).
  4. Whether the proper test for allowability of an appeal against an interlocutory order is whether the order, if allowed to remain, would affect the rights and liabilities of the parties so as to cause prejudice that cannot be remedied in the main proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The appointment of a Commissioner is merely procedural; therefore the appellate order (C.M.A. 122 of 1980) was passed without jurisdiction and must be set aside because no appeal lies under Section 23 of the Act against such procedural orders.
  • Relied on this Court's decisions in Lakshmiammal v. Sivasubramania and Chinnaraja Naidu v. Bavani Bai to argue the procedural nature of such appointments and non-appealability.
  • Relied on a Supreme Court decision concerning the Delhi Rent Control Act to argue that an order appointing a Commissioner was of procedural nature and not appealable (as presented by the petitioner's counsel).

Respondent's (Landladies') Arguments

  • Under the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, and after amendment (reference to Section 18(A) and Section 23 as amended), a statutory right exists to obtain a Commissioner for inspection of property; this statutory right (and Rule 19) justifies appointment to inspect the building.
  • The Supreme Court decision relied upon by the petitioner (concerning the Delhi Act) is distinguishable because under the Delhi Act there was no provision equivalent to Section 18(A) and Section 36(c) related to witnesses rather than inspection; thus the scope differs.
  • There is an imminent and practical necessity to inspect the entire building (demonstrated by the landladies' readiness to have a qualified engineer appointed instead of an advocate) because the question of demolition and reconstruction requires assessment of the whole structure, not merely the tenant's portion.
  • Relying on T.N. Krishnamurthi v. Jagat Textiles, a landlord who owns the entire building can institute proceedings against multiple tenants by a single petition and can seek a report about the condition of the whole building.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lakshmiammal v. Sivasubramania (1981) 2 Mad LJ 206 : AIR 1981 NOC 171 Referenced as authority suggesting that the appointment of a Commissioner was to be regarded as a procedural order (relevance to appealability). The Court noted earlier decisions (including this) but held it was not necessary to repeat all points; the earlier decision had been considered in prior rulings on interlocutory appealability.
Chinnaraja Naidu v. Bavani Bai (1981) 2 Mad LJ 354 Considered in relation to whether appeals lie against interlocutory orders; this Court had held in that matter that an appeal would lie against certain interlocutory orders. The Court relied on that decision as part of its analytical lineage and recognized that appeals can lie where interlocutory orders affect rights and liabilities.
Bant Singh Gill v. Shanti Devi & Others (Supreme Court) Stated the general principle that appeals are ordinarily against final orders and that entertaining appeals against interlocutory orders can protract proceedings; but also held that if an interlocutory order affects rights and liabilities, an appeal may be entertained. The Court followed this Supreme Court principle and used it as the governing test: interlocutory orders are not uniformly unappealable; the critical inquiry is whether the order affects rights/liabilities and would cause prejudice if not immediately challengeable.
Seethalakshmi Ammal v. Rajammal (1965) 1 Mad LJ 287 One of the decisions that led to the introduction of Section 18(A); earlier holdings had limited inspection powers and indicated a bar to appointing an Advocate-Commissioner where the Act was treated as a self-contained code. The Court referred to these earlier decisions as the rationale for legislative amendment (Section 18(A)), thereby treating appointment/inspection as a statutory right relevant to the disposal of eviction petitions.
T. K. Chenna Kesavalu v. Mansukhlal (1966) 1 Mad LJ 300 Similar to Seethalakshmi Ammal — contributed to the conclusion that C.P.C. provisions were not applicable and that there was a bar on appointing an Advocate-Commissioner prior to amendment. Used to explain why Section 18(A) was enacted and to support the view that appointment for inspection has since been given statutory recognition and cannot be treated purely as an inapplicable procedural relic.
T.N. Krishnamurthi v. Jagat Textiles, Madurai (1981) 1 Mad L.J 394 Held that a landlord who owns the entire building can institute proceedings against more than one tenant by a single petition and can obtain a report concerning the whole building. The Court applied this holding to justify that a landlord owning the whole building is entitled to seek inspection/report for the entire building rather than limiting inspection to only the portion occupied by the defendant tenant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recognizing the established general principle from the Supreme Court (Bant Singh Gill) that appeals are ordinarily directed against final orders, and that entertaining appeals against interlocutory orders can prolong litigation. However, the Court emphasized the qualification in the Supreme Court's ruling: if an interlocutory order affects the rights and liabilities of a party, an appeal may be entertained.

Building upon its own prior decisions (including Chinnaraju Naidu and Lakshmiammal), the Court stated that it is not correct to hold absolutely that no appeal can be filed against any interlocutory order. Rather, each interlocutory order must be examined to determine whether it affects rights or liabilities in such a manner that waiting until the final hearing would prejudice the affected party.

The Court then turned to the statutory and practical context. It noted that Section 18(A) was introduced in response to earlier decisions (Seethalakshmi Ammal and T.K. Chenna Kesavalu) that had constrained the appointment of an Advocate-Commissioner because the Act was treated as a complete code with limited procedural powers. The Court observed that once a right to procure a Commissioner to inspect property is provided under the Act (and supported by Rule 19 concerning inspection), that right must be treated as an essential procedural step for proper adjudication of eviction petitions.

The Court analyzed the practical consequences of confining an inspection report to only the tenant's portion when the eviction claim rests upon demolition/reconstruction of the entire building. The Court gave explanatory examples: structural defects and cracks often extend beyond a single portion, and an inspection limited to one tenancy could produce an incomplete or misleading picture. The Court stressed that a timely, independent report (by an Advocate-Commissioner or a qualified engineer) may be essential both to protect a landlord from acts of waste and to protect tenants' safety and occupation rights.

Synthesizing the legal and practical considerations, the Court formulated the operative test: before rejecting maintainability of an appeal against an interlocutory order, the court must ascertain whether the interlocutory order has affected the rights or liabilities of the parties in such a manner that deferring relief until final hearing would cause prejudice that cannot be remedied later. If the appellate court finds that what is sought in the interlocutory application cannot await final disposal without prejudice, an appeal would lie.

Applying that test to the present facts (landladies seeking eviction because the building requires demolition/reconstruction, multiple tenants involved, and the landlord's apparent ownership of the whole building), the Court concluded that inspection of the entire building was justified and that the appeal against the order limiting the inspection to the petition premises was maintainable. The Court also noted the landladies' willingness to appoint a qualified engineer, reinforcing the imminence and propriety of a full inspection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is dismissed. Revision dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Court confirmed that interlocutory orders relating to appointment of a Commissioner are not categorically non-appealable; the critical question is whether the particular interlocutory order affects rights or liabilities so as to cause irreparable prejudice if not promptly challenged.
  • Where eviction is sought on grounds such as demolition and reconstruction and where the condition of the entire building is material to the claim, an inspection report of the whole building is appropriate; limiting inspection to the tenant's portion may not be adequate or fair to either party.
  • The decision upholds the statutory framework (including Section 18(A) and Rule 19 as discussed) that supports appointment of a Commissioner to inspect property and indicates that parties may legitimately seek such inspection; the Court explicitly noted that parties may ask for a qualified engineer to act as Commissioner so that a suitable, dispassionate report may be obtained.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the tenant's revision is dismissed and the appellate order (which had been challenged) stands to the extent the appeal was maintainable; the Court left open the procedural option for appointment of a qualified engineer as Commissioner to inspect the entire building.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add factual or legal material beyond that text.

    M.P Appulu v. A. Fatima Lohra And Another.

    1. Tenant is the petitioner herein. Aggrieved against the appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the entire building, this revision petition is filed on the ground that the order of appointment of Commissioner pending disposal of the petition for eviction relates only to a procedural aspect and therefore, as against the order of the Rent Controller, no appeal lies to the appellate authority under S. 23 of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, and hence, the order passed in C. M. A. 122 of 1980, having been passed without jurisdiction, requires to be set aside.

    2. It is the admitted case between the parties that both the tenant and the landladies sought for appointment of an advocate, Commisioner to inspect the properties. The Rent Controller passed orders only in the application filed by the landladies directing that the properties to be inspected are the properties described only in R. C. O. P. 675 and 679 of 1978, and not the entire building. The appeal is confined to the order in I. A. 262 of 1980 in R. C. O. P. 675 of 1978. The prmises involved in this petition is one of the portions of the main building and the petitioner herein occupies a portion of the ground floor. There are four other tenants in the building, and one of them had already vacated. The tenants involved in two other R. C. O. P. Nos. 683 and 685 of 1978, having agreed to vacate, orders of eviction have been already passed. In this petition the landladies have sought for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the building is required for demolition and reconstruction.

    3. The main dispute now revolves round the point as to whether the Advocate- Commissioner could submit his report in respect of the entire building or it should be confined only to the premises involved in the R. C. O. P. Tenant absolutely has no objection to the Advocate Commissioner inspecting the premises in his occupation. The order was passed by the appellate authority has now resulted in the further point being taken that, since the order passed by the Rent Controller, appointing a Commissioner relates to a procedural aspect, in the light of the decision rendered by this court in Lakshmiammal v. Sivasubramania, (1981) 2 Mad LJ 206 : (AIR 1981 NOC 171) and Chinnaraja Naidu v. Bavani Bai. (1981) 2 Mad LJ 354, the appellate order deserves to be set aside.

    4. This court following the decision of the Supreme Court in Bant Singh Gill v. Shanti Devi & Others, held that it is only against final orders passed, appeals could be preferred and that by entertaining appeals as against interlocutory orders, it only results in protraction of proceedings, which will have to be avoided. Since, this Court has already dealt with elaborately by referring to all the conceivable authorities on this point, in the two decisions above referred to eventhough Mr. Vaitheeswaran, learned counsel for the petitioner herein, has taken considerable efforts to place before this court all these authorities, it is not necessary to restate what have been referred to in those decisions. The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in , (cited above) does not go to the extent of holding that there could be no appeal filed whatsoever, as against any interlocutory order, to the appellate authority constituted under the Act. In fact, it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court that if an interlocutory order results in affecting the rights and the liabilities of a party to a proceeding, an appeal could be entertained apart from appeals filed as against final orders. Therefore, there being no prohibition contemplated about appeals being filed against interlocutory orders, it is incumbetant to find out whether a particular interlocutory order passed would affect the rights or liabilities of the party or not. To illustrate, if a tenat has started demolishing portions of the building to cause loss to the land-lord, the landlord has the right to seek for eviction for acts of waste committed (S. 10(a)(iii)) and tto establish as to what was going on and to prevent further loss to property, unless he gets an order for an Advocate-Commissioner to inspect the property, it would highly prejudice his rights. In spite of impressing upon the Rent Controller of imminent need for the appointment of Commissioner, if it is rejected to hold that until the main proceeding is over, he would have no right to file an appeal to seek remedy, and that he can establish it in the final hearing, could be of no benefit to landlord, because, by that time, sizable portion of building could be demolished or impaired in value. It can be never be the intendment of the Act that an affected party cannot have recourse to remedies by way of appeal and revision, as against interlocutory orders, which are either illegal or incorrect or ordered without jurisdiction etc. It is only to prevent frivolous appeals being filed as against interlocutory orders, it was thought that only against final orders, appeals could be filed, but at the same time taking note of interlocutory orders which may affect the rights and liabilities of parties, it has been held that, against such orders, an appeal would necessarily lie. Taking note of this aspect, in Chinnaraju Naidu v. Bavani Bai (1981) 2 Mad LJ 354, this court, has held that, as against the interlocutory orders passed therein, an appeal would lie.

    5. Hence, it has to be held that, in each and every case, before rejecting, where preliminary objection is taken about the maintainibility of an appeal filed against an interlocutory order, it is incumbent upon the court to firstascertain whether it is an order which had affected the rights or liabilities of the parties, and which by agitating only at the stage of the main matter, would prejudice his rights.

    6. The next contention of Mr. Vaitheeswaran is that, the Supreme Court dealing with the appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the property, in respect of a matter which arises under Delhi Rent Control Act, having held that such an order is only of procedural nature, the present order is no different from the same. Mr. Sengottian, learned counsel appearing for the landladies, would state that under the Delhi Act, there was no provision made inSec. 36(c) fortheappointmentofanAdvocate Commissioner to inspect the properties, but it only related to the appointment of Commissioner to examine witnesses. Whereas, under act 18 of 1960 under section 18(a) itself, a right to get a Commissioner appointed to inspect the properties having been incorporated by way of amendment under Section 23 of 1973 Act the scope of this right statutorily conferred had not been properly understood in the earlier two decisions. He refers to Rule 19 of the Rules which deals with the inspection of the property by the Commissioner.

    7. Section 18(A) came to be introduced because of the decisions rendered by this Court in Seethalakshmi Ammal v. Rajammal, (1965) 1 Mad LJ 287, and T. K. Chenna Kesavalu v. Mansukhlal, (1966) 1 Mad LJ 300, wherein it was held that the Act being a Code by itself, and when Rule 26 enabled only inspection by the authority and since C. P. C. is not applicable in the absence of a specific power, there is bar to appoint and Advocate Commissioner to inspect the property.

    8. A Commissioner appointed by court, inspecting the property, whether it be found as a part of the rules or part of the Act itself, in essence it is only one of the procedural aspects taken in the disposal of the main matter. When such a right had been given under the Act, it has to be treated as one of the essentail steps that would require to be taken for rendering a decision in the main petition. When eviction of a tenant could be secured on grounds like subletting, commiting of acts of waste using for different purpose, demolition and reconstruction etc., the right to get an early report or a faithful report as to what was existing at the relevant point of time should not be underestimated. It cannot be understood in the perspective in which an application is filed to examine a witness on commission, which was considered in the Supreme Court decision. There are circumstances in which, it is only by a Commissioner inspecting the property promptly and recording timely assessment of what obtains relating to the building, could alone assist courts to decide correctly. If such prompt actions are not taken, it may destroy the valuable rights of the parties. It may so happen when a landlord high-handedly starts pulling down a portion of the main building, the tenant would be greatly interested in securing a Commissioner appointed forthwith. If the right of tenant to have access to stair-case is obstructed, he is most interested in seeking appointment of the Commissioner and secure immediate relief for resoting amenities, which is assured to him under Section 17 of the Act. In such similar circumstances, if an application for appointment of Commissioner is not properly understood and appreciated and resulted in dismissal of the application, to hold that an appeal would lie, would result in taking away this right which is enshrined in the Act itself.

    9. The acid test to find out whether an appeal would lie or not is to ascrain whether the order, if allowed to remain, would affect the rights and liabilities of that party and is of such a nature that the aspect sought to be established at the interlocutory stageis one which though to some extent can be established in the main matter, would due to its rejection at this stage, prejudice his valuable rights. If the appellate court finds that what is sought to be established in the I. A. cannot await the disposal of the main matter, it would also be a case where an appeal would necessarily lie.

    10. The landladies have initiated proceedings against the tenant on the ground that the building requires to be demolished and reconstructed. To establish that the entire building requires to be inspected, unless the report submitted by the Commissioner deals with the condition of the entire building as well it would not be sufficient to inspect only the portin occupied by one of the tenants. Here again, it will be useful to illustrate about the futility of preparing a report only for a particular portion of the building. Invariably, cracks devolop from the foundation and extend to the other portions which are above ground. In a building with two floors where cracks have already devoloped in the ground floor, by inspecting only the second floor, it would not be possible to evict the said tenant, if the report is confined only to its portion. Even for the tenant, it would be unwise for him to occupy the top floor if the first floor and the ground floor are unsafe to be occupied. It will be in his own interests to get a correct report as to whether the building is fitt enough to be demolished or not. In matters of this nature unless at the appropriate time, a Commissioner submits a report, it will not be possible even for the Rent Controller, to correctly decide the matter. If insepction and report is to be related to final hearing stage, it would further delay the matter.

    11. It is then contended that this is an aspect which could be established when the main petition is heard and disposed of. No doubt, lanladies will have to establish about the condition of the building and they may even examine an expert engineer. But such evidence would be characterised as motivated or interested, whereas by appointing a Commissioner, dispassionate report could be secured at the appropriate time. Rather Mr. Sengottiah straightway stated that instead of an Advocate, the qualified Engineer may be appointed to submit a report on the condition of the entire building and that the landladies are prepared for the same. This only shows that there is an imminent need for the inspection of the property, so that the exact condition of the building could be established. The tenant is in occupation of the ground-floor and if by chance, a portion of the upstairs is to slide down, it would greatly affect not only the continued occupation, but it may even result in the personal safety of himself and his family being affected. Hence instead of looking at the application as one filed for appointment of Commissioner, the emphasis should be laid in all such applications, to find out as to whether the refusal or the ordering of the relief asked for, would affect the rights and liabilities of the parties and if it is an order of such nature appeal is maintainable. When some of the other tenants have already agreed to vacate any delay in ascertaining the condition of the entire building would deprive the correct evidence being secured at the appropriate time. The appeal filed against the order confirming report of the Commissioner only to the petition premises was maintainable and hence the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. It is now open to the parties to ask for a qualified Engineer to be appointed as Commissioner so that the report secured could enable the Rent Condition of the building. Even otherwise, submit his report on the entire building, as asked for by the landladies?

    12. Yet another point taken is that, when under Section 2(2) 'building' is defined as a part of a building let seperately including appurtenant areas, the relief granted in an I.A. could not be beyond the property decribed in the petition. This contention overlooks the fact that, if the entire building belongs to one landlord, he has the right to institute proceedings against more than one tenant by a single petition, as held in T.N. Krishnamurthi v. Jagat Textiles, Madurai, (1981) 1 Mad L.J 394, and building he can ask for a report for the building when he owns. Furthermore, when the appartment portions would also form part of the building in question, the report to be prepared about the condition of his building would be with reference to the whole building and need not be only for the portion occupied by the tenant.

    13. In this view, the civil revision petition is dismissed.

    14. Revision dismissed.

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    M.P Appulu v. A. Fatima Lohra And Another.
    (Apr 15, 1982)