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Acts
  • Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act,
  • S. 153C and S. 153-D of the Indian Companies Act. 1913,
  • S. 397 and 391 of Companies Act of 1956.
  • Indian Contract Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act,
  • S. 153C and S. 153-D of the Indian Companies Act. 1913,
  • S. 397 and 391 of Companies Act of 1956.
  • Indian Contract Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Ismail, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from Company Petition No. 9 of 1976. The appellant (identified in the annexure as M. C. Duraiswamy) appealed against an order dated 25 August 1977 of Ramaprasada Rao, J., dismissing a company petition that was purportedly filed under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 ("the Act").

The original company petition sought multiple forms of relief, including (a) suspension of the Board's powers and appointment of an Administrator, (b) investigations into alleged diversion of company funds and alleged fraudulent inducement of cane-growers' funds into shares, (c) directions to persons responsible to make good losses, (d) shifting the registered office, (e) consequential orders upon investigation and (f) costs of the petition.

To satisfy S. 399 of the Act the appellant filed an annexure containing a letter of consent signed by 147 members. The company raised a preliminary objection that the petition was not maintainable because it violated statutory conditions precedent. In support of that objection, the company filed 73 affidavits from persons whose signatures appeared in the annexure, saying they had signed on a misrepresentation (they thought they were signing for an extraordinary general meeting regarding cane price) and had not consented to the filing of a company petition. The learned Judge below (Ramaprasada Rao, J.) took those affidavits and the statutory scheme into account, held that the petition was not maintainable for lack of proper consent under S. 399(3), and dismissed it. The appellant challenged that conclusion by way of the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the "consent in writing" contemplated by S. 399(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 is satisfied by the annexure filed (a form statement purporting to give consent for M. C. Duraiswamy to file a petition under S. 397 and related provisions) or whether the consent must show that the consenting members knew the particular allegations and reliefs to be pursued in the petition.
  2. Whether, in light of the requirements of Ss. 397, 398 and 399, the company petition filed on the basis of the annexure was maintainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court (In re Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills Ltd) and the submissions of counsel (Mr. S. Sen) that S. 399 does not require that the consenting members must have the petition physically before them when they give their consent.
  • Implicit in that reliance was the contention that a written consent to an application under S. 397 and/or S. 398 (i.e., consent to certain action being taken) is sufficient even if the precise petition document is not shown to the consenting members.
  • The appellant filed an annexure in the prescribed form indicating that 147 members gave consent for M. C. Duraiswamy to file the petition on their behalf; the appellant treated that annexure as satisfying S. 399(3).

Respondent / Company’s Arguments

  • The company raised a preliminary objection that the petition was not maintainable because it failed to satisfy a statutory condition precedent (the proper consent required by S. 399).
  • In support of that objection the company produced 73 affidavits of purported signatories who said they had signed the annexure under a misapprehension: they believed they were signing a communication concerning an extraordinary general meeting about cane-price fixation, not consenting to the presentation of a S. 397 / S. 398 petition. They asserted there was no consensus ad idem with the appellant about the real scope and content of the petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills Ltd (Calcutta High Court) Authority addressing the meaning of "consent in writing" under provisions analogous to S. 399 — specifically indicating that consenting members need not have the petition physically before them when they give consent; consent may be to the action of applying under S. 397/398. The court considered this decision and accepted its limited holding (that the petition need not be physically before consenting members). However, the court distinguished it: the Calcutta High Court did not go so far as to permit blanket or unspecified consent; consenting members must still have applied their minds to the question (i.e., know the nature of the allegation and relief). Thus the Calcutta decision did not support the appellant's broader claim that no particulars were required.
Makhanlal Jain v. Amrit Vanaspathi Co. Ltd (Allahabad High Court) — as cited in the Bengal Luxmi report Held that "consent in writing" implies the persons who gave consent had "applied their minds to the question before them" and given their consent to certain action being taken; consent is not a merely mechanical signature. The court relied on this principle to require that consenting members must know what action is being consented to (i.e., the particular relief and grounds). The judgment in the present case applied the requirement of an intelligent consent (consensus ad idem) drawn from this authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by closely reading Ss. 397, 398 and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 and explaining the substantive and procedural demands those sections impose:

  • S. 397(1) permits a member to apply where the affairs of the company are conducted prejudicial to public interest or oppressively to members; those complaints necessarily require particulars of how the conduct is prejudicial or oppressive.
  • S. 398(1) contemplates complaints of conduct prejudicial to public interest or to the company's interests, and also a separate ground where a material change in management/control has occurred; again, a petition under S. 398 requires specification of the complaint relied upon.
  • S. 399(3) allows one or more members to apply on behalf of others provided they have obtained the consent in writing of the rest; that consent must be read against the backdrop of S. 399(1), which contemplates applications by large numbers of members and thus provides a procedural mechanism to avoid every member personally litigating.

From that statutory context the court concluded that "consent in writing" under S. 399(3) is not a mere mechanical or blanket permission to commence some unspecified company proceedings. Rather, it is an "intelligent consent" that must show the consenting members knew (at least in prima facie terms) the particular allegations to be advanced and the relief to be sought on their behalf. The court explained that:

  • A consenting member must have applied his mind to the question before him — not necessarily by seeing the final petition document, but by understanding the nature of the complaint and the relief proposed — so that there is consensus ad idem between the sponsor and the named shareholders about the presentation of a particular petition.
  • A blanket statement that a member consents to "filing a petition under S. 397 and S. 398" without particulars of the complaint or relief does not constitute the requisite informed consent; it fails to show that members applied their minds to the specific matter and thus falls short of S. 399(3).
  • The annexure in the present case (which stated that the undersigned give consent for M. C. Duraiswamy to file a petition under S. 397 and 391 [as typed in the annexure]) was examined. The court found that it gave an impression of mechanical signing and did not create a reasonable presumption that signatories had applied their minds to a particular petition with particular allegations and reliefs.
  • The court also noted factual indicia reinforcing that inference: many signatories had signed only in Tamil or affixed thumb impressions and thus might not have understood the English text typed on the annexure.

The court considered but distinguished the Calcutta High Court decision cited by the appellant. It accepted the narrower proposition from that decision that the petition document need not necessarily be placed before the members when they give consent; however, it rejected the broader implication that no particulars at all are required. The court emphasized that "applying their minds" necessarily means applying the mind to the particular relief sought and the grounds relied upon.

Reading S. 399(1) together with S. 399(3), the court concluded the legislative purpose of sub-section (3) was to permit a subset of consenting members to present the application on behalf of others, but only where those others knew what was being done and consented to that precise action. Therefore the annexure failed to satisfy the statutory requirement and the petition was not maintainable.

The court also remarked that in these circumstances it was unnecessary to determine the effect of the 73 affidavits filed by signatories, because the statutory deficiency alone rendered the petition non-maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The court held that the consent in writing required by S. 399(3) was not satisfied by the annexure filed and, therefore, the company petition filed under Ss. 397 and 398 was not maintainable. Emphasizing the core ruling:

DISMISSED

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The company petition (as filed on the basis of the annexure of consent from 147 members) was held not to comply with S. 399(3) and was correctly dismissed by the trial Judge; the appellant's appeal against that dismissal was unsuccessful.
  • Scope and precedent: The court's decision clarifies that the "consent in writing" under S. 399(3) must be an intelligent consent related to particular allegations and relief; mere blanket consent to the filing of a petition under S. 397/398 without particulars is inadequate. The opinion contains no declaration that it creates a novel legal principle beyond applying and explaining the statutory text and existing authorities; the court expressly confined the Calcutta decision to its limited terms and applied the established requirement that consenting members must have "applied their minds." No broader new precedent beyond this statutory interpretation was announced in the opinion.

End of summary. This summary is drafted strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not infer facts or holdings that are not stated therein.

    M. C. Duraiswami v. Sakthi Sugars Ltd.

    JUDGMENT

    Ismail, J.

    1. This is an appeal preferred by the petitioner in the Company Petition No. 9 of 1976 against the order of Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was, dt. 25th August, 1977 dismissing the said petition. That petition was purported to be one under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and It prayed for the following reliefs:

    (a) an order suspending the powers of the Board of Directors of the Company and the appointment of an Administrator to take charge of the affairs of the company;

    (b) to order an investigation into the affairs of the company as to the diversion of the funds of the company into the several organisations mentioned therein;

    (c) to order an investigation into the fraudulent inducement (?) of the funds belonging to the cane-grower-ryots who supplied sugarcane to the company into shares of the companies named therein;

    (d) to order an investigation into any matter in the affairs of the company as the Court may deem St;

    (e) to direct such persons as the Court may find responsible for the loss occasioned to the company to make good the same;

    (f) to direct the shifting of the Registered Office of the company to Erode or to Appakkadal;

    (g) to pass such orders on the basis of the result of investigation; and

    (h) to order costs of the petition.

    2. The appellant herein purported to file along with the petition, a letter of consent signed by 147 shareholders similar to the appellant herein, in order to satisfy the requirements of S. 399 of the Act, One of the objections taken by the company in the nature of preliminary objection was that the present petition under S. 397 and 398 of the Act was not maintainable as it violated one of the conditions precedent prescribed in the statute it self not only for its validity but also for its maintainability. In support of this objection, 73 affidavits sworn to by 73 out of 147 person; whose signatures found a place in the annexure to the petition were filed. The contention in those affidavits was that they were asked by the appellant herein that as an extraordinary general meeting was to be called for in connection with fixation of cane price, they should sign a letter or statement of consent to that effect and that it was in that context that they signed the paper placed before them by the appellant herein; that they never gave consent to a company petition being instituted by the appellant herein; that they had signed the annexure on misrepresentations and that there was no consensus as between them and the appellant in the matter of the real scope and content of the petition. In some of the affidavits it was also stated that they understood the appellant to mean that an extraordinary general meeting was being called for for the purpose of requesting the company to review the cane price and that it was in pursuance of such representation that they affixed their signatures on the document. The learned Judge, after taking into account these affidavits as well as the requirements of Ss. 397, 398 and 399 of the Act, held that the petition was not maintainable and dismissed the same. It is the correctness of this conclusion that is challenged before us.

    3. Ss. 397, 398 and 399 of the Act read as follows:—

    “397(1). Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner oppressive to any member or members (Including any one or more of themselves) may apply to the Court for an order under this section, provided such members have a right so to apply in virtue of S. 399.

    (2) If, on any application under aub-S.(1), the Court is of opinion—

    (a) that the company's affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudical to public interest or in a manner oppressive to any member or members; and

    (b) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice such member or members, but that otherwise the facts would justify the making of a winding-up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up;

    the Court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit.

    398 (1) Any member of a company who complains—

    (a) that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public Interest or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company; or

    (b) that a material change (not being a change brought about, by, or In the intercits of, any creditor including debenture holders, or any class of share-holders, of the company) has taken place in the management or control of tee company, whether by an alteration In its Board of Directors, or of its managing agent or secretaries and treasurers or manager, or in the constitution or control of the firm or body corporate acting as its managing agent or secretaries and treasurers) or In the ownership of the company's shares, or if it has no share capital, in its membership or in any other manner whatsoever, and that by reason of such change, it is likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner prejudicial to interests of the company;

    may apply to the Court for an order under this section, provided such members have a right so to apply in virtue of S. 399.

    (2) If, on any application under sub-S, (1) the Court is of opinion that the affairs of the company are being conducted as aforesaid or that by reason of any material change as aforesaid in the management or control of the company. It is likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted as aforesaid, the Court may, with a view to bringing to an end or preventing the matters complained of or apprehended, make such order as it thinks fit.

    S. 399 (1). The following members of a company shall have the right to apply under S. 397 or 398.—

    (a) Is the case of a company having a share capital, not less than one hundred members of the company or not less than one-tenth of the total number of Its members, whichever is less, or any member or members holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company, provided that the applicant or applicants have paid all calls and other sums due on their shares

    (b) In the use of a company not having a share capital, not lass than one-fifth of the total number of its members.

    (2) For the purposes of sub-S.(1). where any share or shares are held by two or more persons jointly, they shall be counted only as one member.

    (3) Where any members of a company are entitled to make an application in virtue of sub-S,(1), any one or more of them having obtained the consent in writing of the rest, may make the application on behalf and for the benefit of all of them.

    (4) The Central Government may. If In its opinion circumstances exist which make it just and equitable so to do, authorise any member or members of the company to apply to the Court under S. 397 or 398, notwithstanding that the requirements of Cl. (a) or Cl.(b) as the case may be, of sub-S.(1) are not fulfilled.

    (5) The Central Government may, before authorising any member or members as aforesaid, require such member or members to give security for such amount as the Central Government may deem reasonable, for the payment of any costs which the Court dealing with the application may order such member or members to pay to any other person or persons who are parties to the application”,

    4. A perusal S. 397 (1) of the Act will show that a petition filed thereunder may be based on a complaint that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner oppressive to any member or members including any one or more of themselves. Thus it will be clear that the foundation of a petition under S. 397(1) will be the allegation or complaint that the affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest which will necessarily and naturally involve giving particulars as to how it was prejudical to public interest. Similarly, an averment or allegation as to the affairs of the company being conducted in a manner oppressive to any member or members must necessarily involve giving on particulars as to what constituted ‘oppressive manner’. 5.398(1) of the Act in its turn contemplates a complaint that the affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner prejudical to public interest or in a manner prejudical to the interests of the company. In fact, “in a manner prejudicial to the interests” is common to both S. 397 (1) and 398 (1) of the Act. On the other hand, the second alternative under S. 398 (1), namely, “in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company” does not find a place in S. 397 (1). S. 398 (1) (b) refers to yet another ground, namely, a material change having taken place in the management or control of the company. Thus, S. 397 (1) contemplates making of two types of complaints, namely, (1) that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest; and (2) that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to any member or members. S. 398 (1) in its turn contemplates three different complaints, one of them being, namely, that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudical to public interest, being common to S. 397 (I) and S. 398 (1) of the Act and the other two being that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudical to the interests of the company and that a material change has taken place in the management or control of the company. Consequently, for any petition to be filed under S. 397 or S. 398 or under both, it is necesary that the petition should make a reference to any one of these complaints as the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under the relevant sections.

    5. It is against the background of these requirements that we will have to see what constitutes “consent in writing” as contemplated by S. 399 (3) of the Act.

    6. From the very nature of the case, “consent in writing” contemplated in S. 399(3) of the Act is a consent to the filing of a particular petition with particular allegations for a particular relief under 5.397 or S. 398 or under both. There cannot be a blanket consent like a certain member or members consenting to some other member filing a petition under S. 397 or S. 398 or under both. In this particular case, the annexure to the petition filed by the appellant contains the following statement:

    “We the undersigned, the members of Sakthi Sugars Limited, whose particulars are given below give consent for M. C. Duraiswamy (the appellant herein a member of the Company for filing a petition in the Hight Court of Judicature Madras on their behalf under S. 397 and 391 of Companies Act of 1956.”

    Below this, the following particulars are found namely, name of the member, address of the member, number of shares held by him, whether all the calls/other due on shares have been paid or not and the signature. The question for consideration is, whether such a consent satisfies the requirement of S. 399 (3) of the Act or not,

    7. We are of the opinion that for the reasons mentioned above, such a consent cannot be said to be a valid consent as contemplated by S. 399 (3) of the Act. Before a member can be said to have consented to a particular action, the said member should have known what was the action to be taken, what was the relief to be prayed for and what was the ground to be urged in support of the relief claimed. It is one thing to say that the member who gives consent should have applied his mind to the question before him before giving consent; it is another thing to say that before a member gives his consent, the actual petition prepared to be filed, must be before him. It is in this context a reference to the decision of the Calcutta High Court very strongly relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant becomes relevant. That decision is In re Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills Ltd1 and at page 199 of that report the following passage occurs:

    “As to the meaning and import of consent by members of a company, a reference should be made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Makhanlal Jain v. Amrit Vanaspathi Co. Ltd,2 which was relied upon by Mr. B. San in support of his argument that consent in writing meant consent given by the members after the petition was made ready In that case while dealing with the meaning of the phrase ‘consent in writing’ as required by S. 153C and S. 153-D of the Indian Companies Act. 1913, it was held that consent in writing’ implied that the persons who gave the consent had applied their minds to the question before them, and had given their consent to certain action being taken. Mr. S. Sen, however, relying upon this decision, argued that consent in writing was not consent to the petition, but a consent to certain action being taken, namely, an application under S. 397 and S. 398 of the Act. It was not necessary, Mr. S. Sen submitted, that the petition should be before the members who were giving their consent. It was enough if the consenting members had considered the question of a petition being moved under S. 397 and S. 398. In my opinion, Mr. S. Sen's contention that S. 399 does not require that the consenting members should have the petition before them before they give their consent, is sound. There is nothing in S. 399 or in rule 88 to indicate that the members giving their consent should have the petition before them, and, for that purpose, the petition should be prepared well in advance of the consent in writing given by the members”.

    We are of the opinion that the above observations of the Calcutta High Court do not support the claim of the appellant at all in the present case; The above observations have laid down a limited rule on the basis of the contention advanced before the Court. The contention advanced was that before the members give their consent, they should have the petition before them and for that purpose the petition should be prepared well in advance of the consent in writing given by the members. We are of the opinion that the decision of the Calcutta High Court, if we may say so with respect, is correct. But, that is far different from stating that the consenting members need not know anything about what the petition should contain. In fact, when the language used is, “they should have applied their minds to the question before them”, it necessarily implies that the application of the mind was to the particular relief sought to be prayed and the ground on which that relief was sought to be prayed. A mere consent for filing an application under S. 397 or S. 398 or under both, without any particulars, such at the nature of the allegation or complaint to be made in the petition and the nature of the relief fought to be claimed in the petition, cannot be the result of an application of the mind to the question before them and therefore such a consent cannot be a valid consent. It is this point that has been stressed by Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was, in the present case. The learned Judge after extracting the relevant provisions of law, has pointed out:

    “‘Contest’ used In this Act could be interpreted in the same sense as ‘consent’ defined in the Indian Contract Act which means that two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. In my view, the consent that if required, which has to be obviously In writing, should be such that there should be prima facie proof that the share-holders who get themselves involved in petitions under Ss 297 and 398 should give the impression to a reasonable mind that they applied their minds and gave the consent for the filing of a particular application for a particular relief under 5.397 and/or S. 398.

    To give consent mean that there was consensus ad Idem between the sponsor or promoter and the other named shareholders in the annexure in the matter of the presentation of a particular petition with particular allegations and complaints against the company under S. 397 and 398 of the Act”.

    If we may say so with respect, the abve statements correctly represent the legal require mentsasexplained by us already. The learned Judge actually recorded a funding by stating;

    “In the instant case, I have perused the annexure to the petition which was obviously filed in compliance with R. 88 and Form No. 43 prescribed thereunder. That gives the impression that the signatories thereto have mechanically subscribed their signatures to it and one does not gain the reasonable impression that they applied their minds to it”.

    Here again, we may point out that a persual of the annexure can lead only to this inference and nothing else. The said annexure itself shows that many persons have signed their names only in Tamil and some others have affixed only their thumb impressions and it is reasonable to infer that they could not have understood what has been, typed in English on the top of the said annexure.

    8. The expression “consent in writing” occurring In S. 399(3) of the Act will have to be read in the context of the provisions contained in S. 399(1). S. 399(1)(a) contemplates not less than 100 members of the company filing the application. Instead of all such members signing the application and pursuing the application in Court by taking all the trouble, the Parliament thus provided for a procedural facility in sub-S.(3), of S. 399. The expression occurring in S. 399(3), is that

    “any one or more of them having obtained the consent in writing of the rest, may make the application on behalf and for the benefit of all of them”.

    Consequently, the appellant in the present case was purporting to file the application on behalf of and for the benefit of all the 147 persons who figured in the annexure. From this it necessarily follows that the said 147 persons must know what exactly the appellant was doing and that he was acting for their benefit. They can know this only if they knew what was the actual ground to be but forward for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under S. 397 or S. 398 or both and that was the relief proposed to be claimed in the petition. Therefore, the consent contemplated under S. 399(3) is an intilligent consent, in the sense, a consent given for the purpose of making a particular allegation in the petition and for the purpose of claiming a particular relief therein and therefore a blanket consent as in the present case cannot be a consent as contemplated by S. 399 (3). Thus, a combined reading of S. 399 (1) and (3) will also reinforee the conclusions we have already reached.

    9. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the requirements of S. 399 (3) of the Act are not satisfied and therefore, the company petition filed by the appellant herein was not maintainable and consequently was rightly dismissed.

    10. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the affidavits filed by 73 out of 147 persons who have subscribed their signatures to the annexure to the petition.

    11. Consequently there is no substance in the appeal and the same is dismissed.

    vcs

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    M. C. Duraiswami v. Sakthi Sugars Ltd.
    (Jun 14, 1978)