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  • provisions of Article 147
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  • provisions of Article 147
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the plaintiff's legal representative. The suit was filed for recovery of possession of a suit property described as measuring one acre 98 cents. The property originally belonged to Joseph De Gonzaga ("Joseph"). The plaintiff purchased the property from John De Gonzaga ("John"), Joseph's son, by a sale deed dated 6-6-1962 executed through Roger. The second defendant claimed title under a sale deed dated 7-2-1959 executed by Piere (another son of Joseph) through Arumaikannu. The third defendant is Piere's sister and the fourth defendant is a pre-deceased sister's son of Piere. Joseph, Roger and Arumaikannu are admitted French citizens governed by French Civil law.

There was a factual and legal dispute about marriages and legitimacy. The second defendant asserted that Joseph had earlier married Arumaikannu (prior to 1914), that they lived as husband and wife and had seven children, and that the marriage between Joseph and Roger was either non-existent or invalid because a second marriage is prohibited under the French Code Civil. The plaintiff (via John) alleged that there was no marriage between Joseph and Arumaikannu and that the marriage between Joseph and Roger was legally valid; accordingly John would be the legal heir and Piere (if born of Arumaikannu) would be illegitimate.

Both Courts below found (1) a marriage between Joseph and Arumaikannu, (2) a factual marriage between Joseph and Roger but held that the second marriage was not valid in law and therefore deemed John to be illegitimate, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The appellate court accepted the factual findings of both lower courts (that Joseph had married Arumaikannu before 1914 and that a factual marriage with Roger occurred) and proceeded to consider the legal consequences under French civil law: specifically, whether the marriage between Joseph and Roger was valid as a second marriage and whether John could claim rights to the suit property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the marriage between Joseph and Roger, being a second marriage contrary to Article 147 of the French Civil Code, was valid or could be treated as valid for civil consequences in the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity.
  2. Whether children born of the second marriage (specifically John) are legitimate and entitled to inherit if the second marriage has not been declared null by a competent court during the relevant persons' lifetimes.
  3. Whether John (son of Roger) had a valid share in the succession of Joseph and whether he could convey that share (i.e., whether the plaintiff acquired title from John by the 6-6-1962 sale deed).
  4. Related question: whether an action to declare the second marriage null could be brought after the death of Joseph or the persons concerned under the French Civil Code provisions cited.

Arguments of the Parties

Second Defendant's Arguments

  • Joseph had been validly married to Arumaikannu long prior to 1914 and they lived together as husband and wife and had seven children; Piere and the third defendant are surviving children.
  • The marriage between Joseph and Roger was either not proved (i.e., no factual marriage) or, if a factual marriage occurred, it was invalid in law because a second marriage was prohibited by Article 147 of the French Civil Code.
  • As a result, John (son of Roger) should be deemed illegitimate and not entitled to inherit or convey title to the suit property.

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • There was no marriage between Joseph and Arumaikannu and that alleged marriage had not been legally proved.
  • There was a legal and valid marriage between Joseph and Roger, making John the legitimate heir and able to convey title to the plaintiff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
sirey (1883) II 137 (French jurisprudence example cited in Blackwood Wright) Illustrates that where parties acted in good faith in a marriage contracted contrary to formal requirements, courts held the parties had civil rights and the children born before annulment were declared legitimate. Used to support the principle that children born of a marriage entered into in good faith remain legitimate even if the marriage is later annulled; applied to conclude John's legitimacy in absence of proof of bad faith.
Table de Jurisprudence, 1791–1850, Sub-tit. "Marriage," 437 (cited) Example referenced to show courts have granted civil rights and legitimacy to spouses/children where good faith is found despite formal defects. Relied on as part of the body of jurisprudence supporting the same good-faith legitimacy rule; contributed to the court's conclusion that no lack of good faith was proved.
Table Decennale, 1851–1860, Sub-tit. "Marriage," 74 (cited) Used as an authority that mistakes of law fall within the scope of the good-faith principle conferring civil consequences and legitimacy to children. Supported the court's application of the good-faith doctrine to this case (no proof of bad faith), reinforcing legitimacy of children born before annulment.
Table Decennale 1871–1880, Sub-tit. "Marriage," 5354; sirey (1900) II, 131 (cited) Further authorities showing the principle that errors of law or other mistakes do not defeat the good-faith protection for spouses and children. Combined with other jurisprudence to justify treating the children as legitimate absent a judicial nullity pronounced during the relevant lifetimes.
sirey (1887) II, 235 (cited) Authority cited to show that a woman who married a man already married has a right to support as if lawful wife until she remarries. Illustrated ancillary civil consequences of marriages entered into in good faith; used to demonstrate the civil rights that can accrue despite irregularities.
sirey (1902) I, 225 (cited) Authority indicating the court must consider the nature and seriousness of the error in determining good faith; the nature/seriousness do not defeat the principle per se. Reinforced the court's approach in assessing absence of evidence of bad faith and in applying the good-faith doctrine.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded on the accepted factual findings (from the lower courts) that Joseph had earlier married Arumaikannu and that there was also a factual marriage between Joseph and Roger. The legal analysis proceeded solely under the French Civil Code (Code Civil) and related doctrinal and jurisprudential materials referenced in the opinion.

Key statutory provisions relied on (as explained in the opinion):

  • Article 147: prohibits entering into a second marriage before the first has been dissolved.
  • Chapter IV of Title V, particularly Article 184: provides that a marriage contracted in violation of Article 147 may be impugned (i.e., nullified) by the parties, interested persons, and the Public Prosecutor.
  • Article 187: where Article 184 permits an action for nullity, collaterals or children born of another marriage cannot bring such an action while parties to the marriage are alive.
  • Article 188: a husband or wife whose rights have been violated by a second marriage may demand nullity during the lifetime of the person who had been previously married.
  • Article 189: allows parties to the second marriage to plead that the first marriage was null.
  • Articles 201 and 202: set out civil consequences of a marriage declared null; notably, Article 201 states that a marriage declared null has, if contracted in good faith, the civil consequences for the parties and the children; Article 202 provides that if only one party acted in good faith, legal consequences arise in favour of that person and the children.
  • Article 146 and Articles 150–155: discussed in relation to consent requirements and the effect of lack of consent, with temporal bars to challenging certain defects.
  • Article 745: in intestate succession, children, even if issue of different marriages, inherit equally (per capita) without distinction.

Applying these provisions and the cited jurisprudence and commentary (including Blackwood Wright's note and other French authorities), the court reasoned as follows:

  1. The Code Civil provides for annulment (nullity) of marriages contracted contrary to Article 147, but nullity is a remedy that must be sought by authorized persons and, crucially, during the lifetimes of the relevant persons (for example, the first spouse or the Public Prosecutor) as prescribed by the Code.
  2. Doctrinal and jurisprudential authorities show that where parties acted in good faith, a marriage, even if later annulled by a court, confers civil consequences on the parties and legitimacy on children born before annulment (Articles 201–202 and supporting jurisprudence cited).
  3. The court found no evidence in the record to prove lack of good faith on the part of Joseph or Roger when they entered into the second marriage. Consequently, even assuming the marriage could have been annulled under Article 147, the children born before any annulment (including John) must be treated as legitimate for civil and succession purposes under Articles 201–202 and the jurisprudence cited.
  4. Because nullity could only have been sought during the lifetime of the previously married person, and Joseph died on 15-10-1956 (and Roger died on 14-9-1963), Arumaikannu could not challenge the second marriage after Joseph's death. The opinion notes that she in fact did not challenge it and described John as the son of Joseph and Roger.
  5. Under Article 745 of the Code Civil (intestate succession rule cited), children of the deceased from different marriages inherit equally. The succession opened on Joseph's death (15-10-1956). On that date John, Piere and the third defendant were alive; accordingly each was entitled to one-third share. The widow (Arumaikannu) was entitled only to maintenance out of income during her life (but she is now deceased, so that claim no longer arises).
  6. Therefore, John, as a legitimate child under the applied rules, had a one-third share in the suit properties and could legally convey that one-third by the sale deed dated 6-6-1962 (Exhibit A-11) to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, though he claimed the whole property, established title only to one-third.
  7. Given the plaintiff established a lesser interest than claimed, the court applied the equitable and procedural principle (recognized in the opinion) that when a plaintiff establishes a lesser interest than claimed, a decree may be granted to that extent. The court granted a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff's one-third share. As a co-owner, the plaintiff was entitled to possession and the defendants were not entitled to claim improvements even if they had made any.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED

Holding (core ruling):

  • The second appeal is allowed in part: the plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of one-third share in the suit properties (i.e., the share that John, from whom the plaintiff purchased, legitimately owned and could convey).
  • There will be no order as to costs. The opinion records "No leave." (as stated in the judgment).

Implications (direct consequences for the parties):

  • The plaintiff's claim to the entire suit property is rejected, but he succeeds to the extent of one-third of the suit property, based on John's one-third succession share and his sale to the plaintiff.
  • Defendants who are co-owners will not be entitled to claim improvements even if they made improvements, since the plaintiff will be co-owner with rights to partition and separate possession of his one-third share.
  • The court's decision follows and applies existing French Civil Code provisions and cited French jurisprudence; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond its application to the facts. The decision resolves the parties' rights in this property dispute by awarding the plaintiff a one-third share.

This summary has been prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been added.

    Visalakshi Ammal v. Narayanaswami Naidu And Others

    1. The plaintiff's legal representative is the appellant. The suit was filed for recovery of possession of the suit property which is said to measure an extent of one acre 98 cents. It is not in dispute that this property originally belonged to one Joseph De, Gonzaga who will hereinafter be referred to as Joseph. The plaintiff purchased the property from one John De. Gonzaga, hereinafter referred to as John, who is the son of Joseph, through a lady by name Roger under the sale deed dated 6-6-1962. The second defendant claimed title to the same property under a sale deed dated 7-2-1959 executed by one Piere who is the son of Joseph through another lady, Arumaikannu. The third defendant is the sister of the said Piere and the 4th defendant is a pre-deceased sister's son of the said Piere. Joseph, Roger and Arumaikannu are admittedly French Citizens governed by the French Civil laws.

    2. It was the case of the second defendant that Joseph was married to Arumaikannu long prior to 1914, that they lived together as husband and wife, that Arumaikannu had seven children out of this marriage and Piere and the third defendant are the only person to survive Joseph. It was her further case that there was no factual marriage between Joseph and Roger and even if there was a marriage, it was not valid in law as second marriage was prohibited under the Code Civil.

    3. It may be mentioned that the plaintiffs case was that there was no marriage between Joseph and Arumaikannu and it had not been proved as required by law and that there was a legal and valid marriage between Joseph and Roger. Therefore according to the plaintiff John, his vendor alone was the legal heir of Joseph and Piere if at all would only be an illegitimate child not entitled to any share. On the factual position, both the Courts below have held raising a legal presumption that there was a marriage between Joseph and Arumaikannu. Both the Courts below have also held that there was a factual marriage between Joseph and Roger as per law, but the marriage was not valid and therefore, John, the vendor of the plaintiff should be deemed to be an illegitimate child. On these findings the Courts below dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that his vendor had no title to the property and therefore, he could not have conveyed any title to the plaintiff. It is not necessary for me, though the learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended otherwise, to consider whether the marriage between Joseph and Arumaikannu had been proved by legal evidence. I will take it as a finding of fact and proceed on the assumption that there was a marriage between Joseph and Arumaikannu some time prior to 1914 and Piere and the third defendant are the two children through Arumaikannu. On the said reasoning I would have to accept the finding that Joseph was also married to Roger, that is factually there was a marriage between Joseph and Roger. The question for consideration is whether the marriage between Joseph and Roger was valid even as a second marriage and whether John, the admitted son of Joseph through Roger, could claim any right in the suit properties.

    4. Title V of the French Civil Code deals with marriages. Article 147 states that it is not lawful to enter into a second marriage before the first had been dissolved. Chapter III of Title V deals with caveats to marriages and by whom such caveats should be filed. But these provisions relate to preventing a second marriage. The legal consequence of a factual second marriage and how a marriage could be annulled are to be found in Chapter IV of Title V, Article 184 provides that a marriage contracted in violation of the provisions of Article 147 may be impugned by the parties themselves, by all those interested and by the Public Prosecutor. Under Article 187, whenever according to Art 184 an action for declaration of nullity may be brought by file interested parties, such an action cannot be brought by the collaterals or by children born of another marriage while the parties to the marriage are alive. Article 188 provides that a husband or wife, whose rights have been violated by a second marriage, may demand the nullity of such marriage during the lifetime of the person who had been previously married to him or her. In such an action it was open to the parties to the second marriage to plead that the first marriage was null. (vide Article 189). If the action is to be brought by the Public Prosecutor he could only demand the nullity of marriage while the parties are still living and he must request the Court to order them to separate. The consequences of declaring a marriage null are contained in Articles 201 and 202 which read as follows:

    “201. A marriage which has been declared null has, if contracted in good faith, the civil consequences of a marriage so far as the parties thereto are concerned and the children.

    202. If only one of the parties to the marriage has acted in good faith, the legal consequences of marriage only come into existence in favour of such person and the children born of the marriage.” It may be seen from these provisions that if a husband or wife whose rights have been violated by the second marriage, wants to get the second marriage declared null, he or she could do it only during the lifetime of the person who had been previously married to him or to her. In this case, if Arimaikannu the first wife wanted to get the second marriage with Roger declared as null, she could have taken proceedings for such a declaration only during the lifetime of Joseph. She could not get the marriage declared null and void after Joseph's death. Similarly, if the Public Prosecutor is to file an application for declaring the marriage void, he could do so only during the lifetime of Joseph and Roger and not after the death of any one of them. We find a note on the French Civil Code by Blackwood Wright which is the publication which is followed in this Court, to Article 201 and Article 202 which is to the following effect:

    (d) These two latter sections are most important to persons marrying French subjects for it has been held under them that where either or both the parties acted in ignorance of law and in good faith, the marriage, though it may be annulled by the Court, still makes the children born before the annulment legitimate, and the parties who believed they were acting lawfully have the civil rights of married persons. Until a Court has pronounced a marriage null, though the forms required by French law have not been complied with the marriage is good. The word “null” throughout this chapter means “voidable” or “annullable by law”. Thus, a Mexican woman who had gone through a religious ceremony of marriage with a Frenchman in good faith in Mexico without having been married before the civil status officer, as required by Mexican law, was (as Courts at French held she had acted in good faith) given the civil rights of a wife and her children declared legitimate (sirey (1883) II 137). So a Non-French subject who has married a Frenchman outside France who was under twentyfive years of age without his having obtained the previous consent of his parents was declared to have the civil rights of a wife and her children declared legitimate. (Table de Jurisprudence, 1791–1850, Sub-tit. “Marriage,” 437). The curious thing about this theory is that both the parties are entitled to marry again, though the innocent party has such rights, and the children born or conceived before the decree of nullity are ligitimate. A woman, for example, who has gone through a ceremony of marriage with a man who is already married has a right to support as if she were a lawful wife until she marries again, when such right ceases, (sirey, (1887), II, 235). The principle applies equally to mistakes of law (See Table Decennale, 1851–1860, Sub-tit. “Marriage,” 74; Table Decennale 1871–1880, sub-tit. Marriage, “5354 sirey (1900) II, 131). The nature and the seriousness of the error do not effect this principle, but are only facts which the Court must consider in determining whether there was good faith, (sirey, (1902), I. 225). The difference between the English Law, which requires certain statutory conditions to be complied with, in default of which there is no marriage, is very marked. By English law a marriage is only voidable for want of consent, or impotence, as distinct from sterility”.

    5. There is no evidence to prove lack of good faith on the part of Joseph or Roger when they contracted the second marriage. Therefore, even if the marriage had been annulled the children born before the anulment are to be treated as legitimate children and not illegitimate. If the court bad not pronounced the marriage null, though the marriage was contrary to Art 147, the marriage was good as the law provided only for a voidance of the marriage by the parties interested and had not declared the marriage itself as void ab initie.

    6. In Amos and Walteon's Introduction to French Law, Second Edition, by Lawson, we find the following passage at page 65 which is to the same effect:

    7. The nullity of a null marriage must be declared by judgment, Neither the parties nor strangers are authorised, in default of such judgment to assume the nullity to be established”. It may also be mentioned that even the case of marriage by persons who have not attained the age of consent is treated as a null marriage, but it could not be questioned after a lapse of six months from the attainment of that age or by the pregnancy of the wife. Another provision contained in Article 146 requires the consent of the persons referred to in Articles 150 to 155 as essential for the marriage end there could be no marriage where there is no consent. This want of consent by the father or mother or the ascendants, as the case may be, is also considered to make a marriage a null marriage. But the marriage could not be questioned after some time as provided in the other Articles. Thus under the Code Civil, marriages contracted in contravention of the provisions are not treated as void marriages and not taking effect ipso jure but it will have to be declared by Courts on the ground of contravention as nullity. So long as there is no such declaration by judgment, neither the parties nor strangers are authorised to assume the nullity to be established. In this case, the validity of the marriage could not be questioned, as Joseph died on 15-10-1956 and Roger died on 14-9-1963. Even Arumaikannu, the first wife, could not have questioned the second marriage after the death of Joseph. In fact, it appears, that she never questioned the marriage. On the other hand, she was describing John as the son of Joseph through Roger and as her husband's second wife's son. The result of it is both Joseph and Piere are the legitimate children of Joseph.

    8. Under the French Law, in the case of intestate succession, when the deceased leaves children whether of the sane or of different marriages, the children succeed equally without distinction of age or sex. That is provided under Art, 745 which reads as follows:

    “Children or their descendants inherit the property of their father and mother, grandparents or other ancestors, without distinction of sex or right of primogeniture, even if they are the issue of different marriages. They inherit equally or per capita when they are all related in the first degree to the deceased and entitled in their own right; they succeed per stirpes when all or some of them inherit by representation”.

    9. The heirs of course, will have to be determined when the succession opens. The succession in this case opened on the death of Joseph on 15-10-1956. On that date, John, the vendor of the plaintiff, Piere, the vendor of the second defendant, and third defendant alone were alive. They would each be entitled to one-third share. Arumaikannu, the widow of Joseph who was alive was only entitled to a maintenance out of the income from the property.

    10. But since she is dead now, that question also does not arise. Thus John, the vendor of the plaintiff had one-third share in the suit properties which he could have legally conveyed under Exhibit A-11 dated 6-6-1962 to the plaintiff. Thus, though the plaintiff claimed the entirety of the suit properties, he had established his title to a one-third of the suit properties.

    11. It is well settled that when the plaintiff claims a larger interest but was able to establish a lesser interest, to the extent he was able to establish his interest, a decree could be granted. The plaintiff is accordingly, given a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of his one-third share in the suit properties, I may add that in the view that he will be a co-owner of the suit property, the defendants will not be entitled to any improvements even if they had made any such improvements.

    12. The second appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. No leave.

    13. Appeal partly allowed.

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    Visalakshi Ammal v. Narayanaswami Naidu And Others
    (Jul 6, 1976)