(N.S Ramaswami, J.)
Order of Referenc)
1. The appellant before me challenges an order of remand. The appellant claims that he is a cultivating tenant entitled to the protection of Act XXV of 1955. The first Appellate Court which remanded the suit for fresh trial has directed the trial Court to go into this question and given its finding. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that in view of the provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Act X of 1969, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question whether a particular party is a cultivating tenant or not and that that question can be decided only by the hierarchy of officers appointed under the abovesaid Act. It is also contended that the Record Officer under the said Act has alreaey entered the appellant as a cultivating tenant tn the record concerned, that that order has been confirmed even by the revisional authority under the said Act and that therefore, the civil Court has to accept the position that the appellant is a cultivating tenant.
2. On behalf of the respondent—landlord, the contention is that under the provisions of the said Act, the Record Officer is only to prepare a register giving the name or names of the cultivating tenants, that there is no specific provision in the said Act authorising anyone to decide the question whether a particular party is or is not a cultivating tenant and that, therefore, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain such a question is not ousted. It is also pointed out that under S. 15 of the said Act, only a presumption arises regarding the correctness of the entry made by the Record Officer, that such presumption is a rebuttable one and that the said Section itself contemplates an aggrieved party proving the contrary (in some other forum).
3. The question as to how far the provisions of Act X of 1969 oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the question whether a particular party is a cultivating tenant or not, is an important one which would arise in several litigations. In view of the importance of the question, I gave notice to the Advocates' Association as well as the Bar Association and counsel represent the said two Associations also. It is agreed by all the counsel before me that there is no decision of this Court so far regarding the above question of ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court by the provisions of the Act. Considering the importance of the question, I think it would be better if the same is decided by a Devision Bench, so that there would be an authoritative pronouncement for the guidence of the Courts below. Accordingly, the civil Miscellaneous appeal is referred to be deeided by a Division Bench.
Pursuant to the order of this Court, dated 30th September 1973 this appeal coming on for hearing before the Division Bench.
ORDER: (The Chief Justice)
4. The question in this case is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide whether a particular person is a cultivating tenant or not under Madras Act 10 of 1969. A suit was instituted for deciding that question, which was dismissed on the ground that S. 16-A barred the civil Court's jurisdiction to decide that matter. But an appeal against that order succeeded with a direction that the matter should be disposed of afresh. The present Appeal is against the order of remand by the lower appellate Court. When the matter came before N.S Ramaswami, J. in the first instance, he felt that the question as to how far the provisions of Madras Act 10 of 1969 oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide the question whether a particular party is a cultivating tenant or not, was an important one which would arise in several litigations. On that view, he gave notice to the Advocates' Association, and Bar Association and desired that the matter should be decided by a Division Bench, and that is how it comes before us. Madras Act 10 of 1969 provides for the preparation and maintenance of record of tenancy rights in respect of agricultural lands in the State of Tamil Nadu. While the Act extends to the whole State, it has a definition section. A tenant in relation to any land, to which the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, applies, means a cultivating tenant as defined in Cl. (aa) of S. 2 of that Act. The inclusive part of the definition takes in certain other tenures as well, with which we are not concerned at the moment. We have then the provision for preparation of record of tenancy rights. That is done by the Government by a notification directing the preparation of a record of tenancy rights for any specified village. Such record shall be preparsd, maintained and revised in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. That record should contain the survey number or sub-division number, extent and local name, if any, of the land, the name and address of the landowner, the name and address of the intermediary, if any, the name and address of the tenant cultivating the land and such other particulars as may be prescribed. Then a procedure is prescribed for modification of this record. Where subsequent to the publication of the approved record of tenancy rights any land has been let for cultivation, the landowner, intermediary or the tenant having interest in such land shall make an application to the Record Officer for inclusion of particulars relating to such land in the approved record of tenancy rights, and may have the land included in the approved record of tenancy. If any modification in the record of tenancy rights is required of, entries mentioned in S. 5, that is permitted by following the procedure provided therein. Against orders under sub-S. (8) of S. 3, Sub-S. 3 of S. 4 or sub-S. (3) of S. 5 appeals are provided with a period of limitation for fixed filing. A further remedy by way of revision also is provided. These are to be found in Ss. 6 and 7 of the Act. A further provision is made by S. 8 for amendment of approved record of tenancy rights to give effect to the orders under S. 6 or S. 7. There are then the provisions providing for obligation to furnish information, penalty for failure to furnish information as also for furnishing false information. S. 13 provides for certain cognizable offences, S. 15 lays down a rule of presumption, which says that any entry in the approved record of tenancy rights shall be presumed to be true and correct until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. As the Act stood originally before Act 34 of 1972, there was no specific bar of the Civil Court's jurisdiction to decide any matter which the Record Officer or the District Collector or other officer or authority empowered by or under the Act has to decide. We need not stop to consider whether, having regard to the scheme of the Act indicating matters to be decided, the officers who have the authority to decide and further remedies by way of appeal and revision, the Civil Court's jurisdiction, by necessary implication, would stand excluded in respect of matters which (hose officers have to decide.
5. But, S. 16-A, introduced by Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 1972, introduces such a bar, which reads;
“16-A. Bar of jurisdiction of civil Courts.—No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Record Officer, the District Collector or other officer, or authority empowered by or under this Act has to determine and no injunctson shall be granted by any Court in respect of any action taken or to be taken by such officer or authority in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.”
The section admits of no doubt that a civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide any matter which the Record Officer, District Collector of other Officer or authority empowered by or under the Act should determine. The Court is also forbidden from granting injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by such officer or authority in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act. We are told that what lead N.S Ramaswami, J., to make the reference to a Division Bench was a consideration of the latter part of S. 15. Apparently, he thought that if an entry in the approved record of tenaney rights should be presumed to be true and correct until the contrary was proved or a new entry was lawfully substituted therefor, to that extent the civil Court's jurisdiction should not be taken to have been excluded. In other words, evidently his impression was that a certain area of civil Court's jurisdiction was still available and the ambit of S. 16-A, should be read accordingly. We are of opinion that S. 15 is not jurisdiction Section. It only provides for a rule of evidence, namely, presumption of correctness of entries in the approved record of tenancy rights. This presumption can, of course, be rebutted until the contrary is proved or a new entry lawfully substituted therefor. The words “until the contrary is proved” and the words “or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor” are to be read with reference to the provisions of the Act. This is not as indicative of an act of jurisdiction still left with the Court to decide any matter which is entirely within the jurisdiction of the officers who are empowered by or under the Act to decide. As a matter of feet, S. 5, as we have already indicated, provides for modification of entries in the approved record of tenancy rights and if a decision of the record officer is taken up in appeal and a direction is given for modification, S. 8 provides for amendment to be made in the record of tenancy rights according to the appellate decision. Same thing applies also to a revision order. The Act, therefore, indicates and provides for the remedy to correct the record by following the procedure laid down. Until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor, the entry shall be presumed to be correct. It is perfectly clear and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.
6. The language S. 16-A, as indicated by us, admits of no doubt that the civil Court's jurisdiction is expressly excluded in respect of any matter which the Record Officer, District Collector or other officer empowered by or under the Act has to determine.
7. The order of the Munsif in this case dismissing the suit is restored and the appeal is allowed. No costs.