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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These two revision petitions concern claims for damages arising from malicious prosecution attempts to have the petitioning plaintiffs adjudicated as insolvent. The petitioners alleged that the creditor acted maliciously and without bona fide grounds, causing injury and humiliation by successfully obtaining insolvency adjudication. However, in both cases, the defendant alleged to have committed the wrongful act died before the conclusion of the suit. The key procedural question was whether the actions for damages could be continued against the legal representatives of the deceased wrong-doers with respect to their assets.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit for damages arising from malicious prosecution or malicious acts can be continued against the legal representatives of a deceased defendant.
  2. Whether the right to sue survives under Order 22, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code in cases involving personal injuries not causing death.
  3. The applicability and scope of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona in Indian law concerning suits for personal injury damages.
  4. Whether any benefit or enlargement of the deceased wrong-doer's estate affects the survivability of the action against legal representatives.
  5. Whether the question of survivability should be decided at the interlocutory stage or postponed until trial.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rustomji Borabji v. Nurse (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 357 : 40 M.L.J. 173 Right to sue for damages for malicious prosecution does not survive against legal representatives under Order 22, Rule 1 CPC; personal injuries not causing death do not survive. Held binding by the Court; established that actions for personal injuries of this nature cannot be continued against deceased’s legal representatives unless estate benefited.
Palaniappa Chettiar v. Raja of Ramnad (1926) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 208 : 50 M.L.J. 34 A suit for damages for malicious prosecution abates on the death of the plaintiff. Used to reinforce the principle that personal actions die with the person, especially when defendant dies pendente lite.
Mahtab Singh v. Hublal (1926) I.L.R. 48 All. 630 Affirmed the principle that personal actions die with the defendant unless the estate benefits from the wrongful act. Referred to in support of the Full Bench decision and the limitation on survivability of personal injury claims.
Phillip v. Homfray (1883) 24 Ch.D. 439 Only where the estate of the deceased wrong-doer is swelled by proceeds of wrongful act can the action be pursued against the estate. Quoted to clarify the limits of actio personalis moritur cum persona and survivability of claims.
Bhupendra v. Chandramani A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 277 Suggested that actio personalis moritur cum persona may not be part of Indian law and negligence claims might survive. Discussed but distinguished by the Court, noting the wide statement was qualified and not controlling.
Arunachala v. Subramania Referred to Bhupendra v. Chandramani concerning the rule of survivability of personal actions. Used to show that the earlier broad statement was qualified and not absolute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the principle actio personalis moritur cum persona, which means a personal action dies with the person, and applied established Full Bench rulings from this Court. It held that suits for damages arising from malicious prosecution or malicious acts do not survive against the legal representatives of a deceased defendant unless the estate of the deceased has been enhanced or benefited by the wrongful act. The injuries claimed were personal and not related to any damage to the estate of the plaintiff. The Court found no evidence that the deceased wrong-doer's estate had been enlarged or benefited in any way that would justify continuing the suit against their legal representatives. The Court also rejected the respondents’ reliance on UK law reforms that modified the common law rule, emphasizing that such enactments do not apply in India. Finally, the Court decided that the issue of survivability should be decided at the interlocutory stage rather than postponed to trial, to avoid uncertainty and because the law under Order 22, Rule 1 CPC is clear.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the revisions, held that the suits abate on the death of the defendants, and dismissed the suits accordingly.

The direct consequence is that actions for damages for malicious prosecution cannot be continued against the legal representatives of a deceased wrong-doer unless the estate has benefited from the wrongful act. This decision reaffirms the binding Full Bench precedent and does not set any new precedent. In the circumstances of these cases, parties were directed to bear their own costs.

    R. Kandaswami And Others v. R. Thirugnanasambandam And Others.

    1. These two revision petitions involve a point of some interest, but upon which, there are clear authorities of this Court available deciding the issue. Very briefly stated, the facts are that, in both these revision petitions, the concerned party was attempting to obtain damages for what was essentially a malicious prosecution, viz., a malicious attempt to obtain the adjudication of the concerned plaintiff as an insolvent, which, for the time being at least, succeeded. In each of these cases, the averment were that the concerned petitioning-creditor was not acting bona fide but was acting with malice and without due cause for the alleged ground relied on as an act of insolvency, in order to get the concerned debtor adjudicated, thereby inflicting considerable injury and humiliation upon him. In each of these cases, which in substance was an action for damages for the injury inflicted by malice on a person, of course, in the wide sense, and not merely in the sense of a physical injury, the concerned defendant (wrong-doer) died pendente lite. The simple question is, whether the action can be continued against the legal representatives of the wrong-doer with regard to the assets of the wrong-doer that might be in their hands.

    2. This matter came up for decision in Rustomji Borabji v. Nurse (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 357 : 40 M.L.J. 173, and it was held by the Full Bench that where the defendant dies before judgment is given in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, or a malicious act, the right to sue does not survive within the meaning of Order 22, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. In other words, the right of suit cannot be continued against the legal representatives of the wrong-doer, with regard to the assets of the wrong-doer in their hands. The expression ' personal injuries not causing the death of the party ' in Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act, which is also to be found in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, did not imply injuries to the body merely, " but all injuries " which do not necessarily cause damage to the estate of the person wronged."

    3. In laying down the law, on the subject, Kumaraswami Sastriar, J., referred to the maxim " actio personalis moritur cum persona "and also to Phillip v. Homfray (1883) 24 Ch.D. 439. The dicta of Lord Bowen were quoted to the effect that the only case in which a remedy for a wrongful act could be pursued against the estate of the deceased person who has done the act, is the case where that estate has been swelled by the proceeds of the injurious or mischievous action. The learned Judge (Kumaraswami Sastriar, J.) said:

    When there is nothing amongst the assets of the deceased that in law or equity belongs to the plaintiff and the damages which have been done to him are unliquidated and uncertain, the executor of a wrong-doer cannot be sued merely because...an indirect benefit may have been reaped thereby.

    4. There is no doubt whatever that, as far as this Court is concerned the judgment of the Full Bench is binding and that it continues to be the law. In Palaniappa Chettiar v. Raja of Ramnad (1926) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 208 : 50 M.L.J. 34, it was held that a suit for damages for malicious prosecution of the plaintiff abated on his death. That, of course, is the converse case, but it seems to me to be clear that the principle actio personalis moritur cum persona applies with even greater force to the case where it is the defendant who dies pendente lire, and the legal representatives of the wrong-doer are sought to be made answerable to a claim arising from a personal injury committed by the defendant alone. In Mahtab Singh v. Hublal (1926) I.L.R. 48 All. 630, the same principle was affirmed and Rustomji Dorabiji Nurse (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 357 : 40 M.L.J. 173, has been referred to. The text of Phillips v. Homfray (1883) 24 Ch.D. 439, has also been made available, and, the true limit and meaning of the rule that a personal action dies upon a defendant's death has been carefully enunciated in this decision. It is where the estate of the deceased wrong-doer has benefited from the wrongful act, in any manner, in any form of enlargement, that the original action can be continued notwithstanding the death of the defendant.

    5. Learned Counsel for the respondents has largely relied upon a passage in Paton's jurisprudence, 3rd edition, page 355, wherein, the author observes that the common law rule actio personalis moritur cum persona was modified by a series of exceptions and left only as almost a vestige by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1934. But, I am unable to follow why that state of affairs, which prevails in the United Kingdom by virtue of a specific enactment, should be brought into the picture here and applied to the present situation. In Bhupendra v. Chandramani A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 277, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in one part of the judgment observed that the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona is not part of the law in India, and, in any event, the learned Judges felt inclined to hold that a cause of action for negligence, in the circumstances of that particular case, fell clearly within the rule of survival. But, in Arunachala v. Subramania , Rajamannar, C.J., referred to Bhupendra v. Chandramani A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 277, in the particular context of the discussion of the actio personalis moritor cum persona rule, and pointed out that the statement of Page, J., appeared to be very wide, and that there were qualifying passages elsewhere.

    6. The true construction, obviously, is that already enunciated by our Full Bench, to which I have referred. I have carefully gone through the pleadings, in these two cases, and, substantially they amount to averments of considerable personal injury inflicted on each plaintiff by the malicious act of obtaining an adjudication in insolvency. The damages are not related, per se, to any injury to the estate of the person wronged, and, on the contrary, the damages are broadly claimed, without any specific demarcation related to any property, loss, as damages for personal injuries sustained by the malicious prosecution. The Full Bench decision is the authority for this view that such an injury need not at all be a bodily injury and hence, I am of the opinion that these suits would fall within the excepted matters in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. In any event, there is not a little of evidence in support of the criterion laid down by Kumaraswami Sastriar, J., in the Full Bench decision referred to.

    7. Even if the vesting of the estate in the Official Receiver, for sometime, caused some conceivable injury, which also affected the property of the person wronged, there is not the slightest averment that a dividend was declared or that anything was done by which the wrong doer materially benefitted or by which the assets of the wrong doer were enhanced. Had there been such evidence, or, even if the enhancement or enlargement has been minimal or marginal, I would have been inclined to hold that, on facts of that character, there may be a possibility of continuing the action against the legal representatives. But, there is not the slighest iota of such evidence, and hence, following the Full Bench and the case law relevant to this respect, I am of the view that, on the facts of these two cases, the action cannot be continued against the legal representatives of the deceased defendant either by the plaintiff or by his legal representatives. I must add that in one of the two cases, it is reported that the plaintiff is also dead.

    8. The final question that has been agitated is whether the matter should not be left to the trial of the suit, or suits, after impleading the representatives or whether it should be decided now under Order 22, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. I think that there will be considerable uncertainty if the matter is not now decided, and, I am unable to see any justification for postponement of the decision. Order 22, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, is very clear that if the right to sue does not survive, or the right to be sued does not survive, the suit abates either on the death of the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be. Since the suits abate, in these cases, there can be no justification for postponement of the decision.

    9. I allow the revisions, hold, that the suits abate, and dismiss them accordingly. In the particular circumstances of these cases, parties will bear their own costs.

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    Comments

    R. Kandaswami And Others v. R. Thirugnanasambandam And Others.
    (Apr 11, 1969)