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  • S. 25 of the Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control) Act, Act 18 of 1960,
  • Sec. 25 of Madras Act 18 of 1960.
  • Rent Control Act. Eviction
  • Rent Control Act.
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  • S. 25 of the Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control) Act, Act 18 of 1960,
  • Sec. 25 of Madras Act 18 of 1960.
  • Rent Control Act. Eviction
  • Rent Control Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a revision petition under Section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960), withdrawn to the High Court for disposal along with Second Appeal No. 787 of 1965 because the matters are connected.

The dispute arose from a suit for recovery of arrears of rent based on an alleged oral agreement dated 8 February 1960 by which the tenant agreed to an increase of rent from Rs. 112-50 to Rs. 200 per month from Masi 1960. The tenant denied that a concluded contract for the enhanced rent existed.

The District Munsif of Karur (who also acted as Rent Controller) tried the civil suit for arrears and, by consent, treated the evidence as applicable to the rent-control proceedings. The plaintiff (landlord) sought eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. The District Munsif decreed recovery and ordered eviction.

The tenant appealed the Rent Controller's order to the Subordinate Judge (the appellate authority). The appeal against the decree for arrears proceeded to the District Judge (Tiruchirapalli). The tenant had agreed to abide by the decision of the District Court; nonetheless, the Subordinate Judge again considered the merits in the rent-control appeal and upheld the agreement's validity, dismissing the tenant's appeal without addressing whether there was wilful default.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was a true and valid agreement dated 8 February 1960 for enhancement of rent from Rs. 112-50 to Rs. 200 per month (a question decided in the connected Second Appeal and affirmed by the court).
  2. Whether the tenant's failure to pay the difference in rent constituted "wilful default" under the Rent Control Act and therefore entitled the landlord to eviction.
  3. Whether the appellate authority (Subordinate Judge) and Rent Controller properly considered and determined the question of wilful default in the rent-control proceedings.
  4. What is the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of Madras Act 18 of 1960 in relation to examining the propriety of lower courts' orders (including comparison with revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as referenced).

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's Arguments (as reflected in the record)

  • The tenant contended that there was no concluded contract to increase the rent to Rs. 200 per month (a wholesale denial of the agreement).
  • The tenant deposited monthly rents of Rs. 112-50 (the previously prevailing rent) into a bank (Karur Vysia Bank Ltd) without reference to the landlord after the landlord rejected a draft for Rs. 112-50 submitted immediately after 8 February 1960.
  • The tenant's case (as pleaded and in evidence) included that the enhanced rent was to be considered only upon delivery of vacant possession of two upstairs rooms — i.e., the alleged enhancement was linked to additional accommodation which had not been given.
  • The tenant argued, by implication, that there was a bona fide dispute about both the existence/scope of the agreement and the amount of increased rent (and that this dispute affected the characterization of any non-payment as "wilful").

Landlord's Arguments (as reflected in the record)

  • The landlord alleged that an agreement was reached in February 1960 that the tenant would pay Rs. 200 per month from 1st Masi 1960.
  • The landlord pointed to the tenant's initial sending of only a draft for Rs. 112-50 (rejected by the landlord) and subsequent deposits of Rs. 112-50 in bank as evidence of default in paying the agreed enhanced rent.
  • The landlord claimed that the tenant committed wilful default, entitling him to eviction under the Rent Control Act.
  • The landlord also asserted that the alleged agreement for enhanced rent applied to the suit premises (and, as he suggested, arguably to additional rooms), denying that the tenant's contention about upstairs rooms negated the enhancement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.R. Kuppuswami Iyer v. R.R. Harinarayanachari, 69 L.W. 72 at 73 Establishes that "wilful default" requires a determination of the tenant's state of mind, which is primarily a question of fact to be inferred from surrounding circumstances; mere failure to pay does not necessarily amount to wilful default. The court relied on the principle to explain that wilful default must be inferred from circumstances showing intentional violation of a clear obligation. The precedent supported the court's conclusion that where a bona fide dispute exists, non-payment of the disputed difference does not constitute wilful default.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in several analytic steps, grounded in statute and fact as found in the record:

  1. Jurisdictional scope: The matter was before the court in revision under Section 25 of Madras Act 18 of 1960. The court observed that revisional jurisdiction under S.25 allows examination not only of legality or regularity but also of the propriety of orders; moreover, the powers under S.25 are held to be wider than those in revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (as noted in the opinion).
  2. Clarifying the appellate posture: The Subordinate Judge in the rent-control appeal limited himself to the question whether the agreement of 8 February 1960 was true and valid and dismissed the tenant's appeal on that ground. The High Court found that the Subordinate Judge failed to address the separate but necessary question whether the tenant's non-payment constituted "wilful default" under the Rent Control Act.
  3. Statutory framework: The court set out relevant statutory provisions — notably S.10 (authorising a Controller to direct delivery of possession where a tenant has not paid rent, except where the Controller is satisfied that default was not wilful and therefore may grant a limited time to pay) and S.11(3) (authorising summary determination by the Controller or appellate authority where there is a dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited). These provisions require a determination of wilfulness and allow summary resolution of rent disputes.
  4. Nature of "wilful default": Relying on authority (K.R. Kuppuswami Iyer v. R.R. Harinarayanachari) and the statute, the court explained that wilful default concerns the tenant's state of mind and requires inference from circumstances; mere non-payment or arrears alone are insufficient to establish wilful default. The court emphasised that the amended Act introduced the requirement of wilfulness (in contrast to previous provisions that permitted eviction on mere default).
  5. Application to the facts: On the accepted finding (affirmed in the Second Appeal) that an agreement to enhance rent existed, the court nevertheless examined the attendant circumstances to determine whether the tenant's omission to pay the difference was intentional:
    • From the outset there was a dispute: immediately after 8 February 1960 the tenant sent only a draft for Rs. 112-50 (not Rs. 200) and then deposited rents in a bank without reference to the landlord.
    • The landlord did not act for nearly three years; the suit for arrears was filed about three years after the alleged repudiation and the eviction petition was filed months later. This delay weighed against a finding of wilfulness.
    • There was a genuine factual dispute over whether the enhanced rent was to include two upstairs rooms or was contingent on their delivery — the mediator's evidence (P.W.2) and other depositions suggested the rooms played an important part in the negotiations.
    • The landlord accepted deposits and later payments "without prejudice" to his claim for the difference; the acceptance and the course of conduct suggested the landlord was willing to receive the admitted part of rent while reserving a claim for balance, rather than immediately treating the tenant's conduct as wilful refusal.
    • Given these circumstances and the statutory mechanism in S.11(3) for summary determination where the amount of rent is disputed, the court found that the tenant's non-payment of the difference was part of a bona fide dispute and could not fairly be characterised as wilful default.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Because there was no finding of wilful default on the record and the Subordinate Judge had not addressed the question adequately, the court concluded that eviction could not be ordered on the basis before it. Accordingly, the order of the Rent Controller, as confirmed by the Subordinate Judge, had to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition for eviction is dismissed and the civil revision petition is allowed; the order of the Rent Controller (confirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge) is set aside.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The eviction order made by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Subordinate Judge is set aside; the tenant will not be evicted on the basis of the proceedings before this court.
  • The court expressly found that, although the agreement to enhance rent was true and valid (a finding affirmed in the connected Second Appeal), the existence of a bona fide dispute and other attendant circumstances precluded a finding of wilful default necessary to sustain eviction under the Rent Control Act.
  • The court noted that it is not concerned with any default subsequent to the civil court's decision; its decision addresses only the record and defaults considered in these proceedings.
  • Costs: The parties were ordered to bear their respective costs throughout.
  • No new precedent beyond applying the established principle that wilful default requires proof of intentional withholding was announced; the decision applied statutory provisions (S.10, S.11(3), S.25) and existing authority to the particular facts before the court.

Signed in the opinion: V.C.S.

    S. Venkataramanaswami Iyer v. S. Abdul Wahab.

    This revision petition is under S. 25 of the Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control) Act, Act 18 of 1960, and has beep withdrawn to this court for disposal along with S.A No. 787 of 1965, as the two are connected. The second appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, the claim being based on an agnesment by the tenant to the increase of rent from Rs. 112-50 to Rs. 200 psr month from Masi 1960. Ths tenant contended that there was no concluded contract to increase the rent to Rs. 200 per month. The District Munsif, Karur, who is also the Rent Controller under the Act, tried the suit for arrears of rent and the application for eviction of the tenant together, and, by consent of the parties, the evidence recorded in the suit was treated as evidence in the proceedings under the Rent Control Act. Eviction was sought on the basis that the tenant committed wilful default in the payment of rent. The agreement, according to the landlord, was in February 1960, and the tenant had to pay rent at Rs. 200 per month from 1st Masi 1960. But even for the very first payment, he sent only a draft for a sum of 112-50. This was rejected by the landlord. The tenant, without reference to the landlord, proceeded to deposit monthly rents at Rs. 112-50 per month in the Karur Vysia Bank Ltd, and when a notice was issued by the landlord on 20th February 1961, a year after the alleged first default, be forthwith sent a draft for the rents due till then, Rs. 1350. The landlord states that he accepted the same without prejudice to his contentions. For future months the tenant sent rents at the rate of Rs. 112-50 per month and they were also accepted by the landlord without prejudice to his claim. The suit for arrears of rent was in stituted on 5th February 1963, when three years were about a elapse after the repudiation, the arrears being the difference which the landlord claimed that he was entitled to. The petition for eviction was filed long after in August 1963. The District Munsif of Karur, who decreed the suit, upheld the contention of the landlord that there was wilful default in the payment of rent and ordered eviction as prayed for. The appeal from the order of the Rent Controller was laid by the tenant before the Subordinate Judge, the Appellate author ity, and the appeal from the decree for arrears the Subordinate Juge, the Appellate authority and the appeal from the decree for arrears of rent came up before the District Judge of Tiruchirapalli. As the tenant agreed to abide by the decision ia the District Court, the Rent Coatrol appeal was disposed by the learned Subordinate Judge after the decision of the learned Judge..

    Notwithstanding the agreement to abide by the decision of the District Court, I find that the question of arrears was argued on the merits over again before the learned Subordinate Judge. The learned Subordinate Judge set before himself for determination in the appeal only question whether the agreement dated 8th February, 1960 is true and valid. He found that the agreement is true and valid. Without further discussion as to the effect of the finding, he dismissed the tenant's appeal before him. Here the learned Subordinate Judge has overlooked one crucial aspect for consideration in the appeal before him. The tenant had, no doubt, agreed to abide by the decision of the District Court even in the rent control appeal before the Subordinate Judge. Actually, the order of the learned District Judge on the application for transfer of the appeal before him to the Subordinate Judge, to be heard along with the appeal under the Rent Control Act, runs thus:

    “ In view of the stand taken by the respondent (tenant) that he is prepared to abide by the decision of this court in respect of the C.M.A, that is pending before the Sub-Court, it is unnecessary to transfer this appeal to the Sab-Court.”

    Clearly this does not mean that if the appeal before the District Court is dismissed, the appeal under the Rent Control Act has also to be dismissed straight away. The decision In the District Court can only be as to the truth and validity of the agreement and the liability of the tenant to pay the difference in rent claimed as arrears. The learned Subordiate Judge has overlooked that the mere existence of arrears of rent or default in the payment of rent does not ipso facto entitle the eviction or the tenant under the Rent Control Act. There must be wilful default in the payment of the rent. The learned Subordinate Judge has failed to address himself to this question and proceeds in the view that, once it is found that the agreement for enhanced rent is true and valid; eviction should follow as a matter of course. In the second appeal, the finding of the courts as to the truth and validity of the agreement has been affirmed by me today. But that does not necessarily involve my rejection of the petition under S. 25, filed by the tenant from the order of eviction.

    Under S. 10 of the Act, the Controller can direct a tenant to put his landlord in possession of the building, if the tenant has not paid. or tendered the rest due by him in respect of the building, within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, but subject to the proviso that, if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender rent was not wilful, he may, notwithstanding anything contained in S. 11, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding 15 days, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto date the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected. It is relevant to refer, in this connection, to S. 11 (3) which provides that, where there is any dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under Sub-S. (1). the Controller of the Appellate authority, as the case may be, shall, on application made to him either by the tenant or by the landlord, and after making such inquiry as be deemed necessary, determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. Though the Rent Controller has addressed himself to the question whether there is wilful default in the payment of rent, the appellate authority, as pointed out above, has not examined that question. This question of wilful default was rot in issue in the appeal before the learned District Judge and the decision of the learned District Judge in the matter would be relevant and bind the parties in the appeal under the Rent Control Act to the extent to which the decision went and no further. It has, therefore, become necessary to examine this aspect of the question, as, in the absence of any finding as to wilful default on the part of the tenant, no eviction could be ordered.

    The matter it now before me in revision under Sec. 25 of Madras Act 18 of 1960. Though the jurisdiction is revisional and therefore not has wide in scope as an appellate jurisdiction, this court in this revisional jurisdiction, has to satisfy itself not only as to the legality or regularity of the proceedings or orders before the courts below but also as to their property. A part from the fact that the question whether there is wilful default or not is not a pure question of fact, the jurisdiction under S. 25 of the Act to examine the property of an order necessarily involves the power to canvass the correctness of the order and examine the circumstances in which it has been passed, the propriety of the order being something different from its legality or regularity.

    The powers under Sec. 25 are wider than those of this court in revesion under Sec. 115 C.P Code.

    On the finding I have given in the Second Appeal, it is now concluded that there has been an agreement between the parties as to the enhancement cf rent. To arrive at a finding that the tenant is in wilful default, the mere fact that the tenant is in arrears of rent would not be enough and the court has to consider whether there has been intentional violation of a clear obligation to pay the rent. To find whether the omission to pay rent is intentional the various attendant circumstances have to be examined, and, in a case like the present one where what is placed by the landlord is a subsequent agreement to pay enhanced rent, the questions whether there could have been any bona fide mistake about the agreement pleaded for enhanced rent and whether there are reasonable grounds for in ferirng the existence of a bona fide dispute in the matter of the enhancement have to be examined. As it is the state of mind of the tenant, with reference to the default, that has to be found, no direct evidence can be had on the matter, and, if there are circumstances from which the court can reasonably inf r that there was really no intention to with hold deliberately the rents wheh the tenant knew were due and payable, the court will not infer wilful default. In K.R. Kuppuswami Iyer v. R.R. Harinarayanachari 69 L.W 72 at 73. Rajagopala Ayyangar J. observed:—

    “The question whether the default is wilful involves the determination of the state of mind of the tenant and is thus primarily a question of fact. Of course, this has to be gathered from the circumstances, as no direct evidence is possible in regard to this matter. But in considering it to one has to take note of the fact that the condition that the default in the payment of rent should be ‘wilful’ has been introduced by way of amendment in the place of a provision with permitted eviction on mere default. Therefore, if there are circumstances from which it can be gathered that there was really no intention deliberately to withhold the payment. I am of opinion that there cannot be any wilful default which is necessary to constitute a ground for eviction under the Act as now amended. In other words, the distinction has to be drawn between mere failure to pay and a wilful default in payment

    Now, to examine the circumstances of this case, to find whether there has been wilful default in the payment of the difference between the sum of Rs. 200 per month as per the oral agreement on 8th February 1960 and the then prevailing rent of Rs. 112-50 per mensem: on the finding of the courts below as to the truth of the agreement which has been accepted here, there is default. That from the very beginning there has been a dispute between the parties about the defendant's liability for enhanced rent, is clear from the fact that even immediately alter 8th February 1960, on which date it is found that there was an agreement between the parties, the defendant had not remitted rent at Rt. 200 but only sent a draft for Rs. 112-50. This of course was not accepted. But immediately before, the tenant sent drafts for two sums for the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 112-50 per month upto Thai 1960 and an extra amount of Rs. 150. The landlord in his application for eviction, states that the tenant has set up an entirely different tenancy, as if the agreement for payment of rent at tne rate of Rs. 200 per mensem was not only in respect of the property in question already under lease, but also that the lease included two upstairs rooms in the occupation of others. That, there has been really a dispute between the parties about the scope of the terms of the agreement, is manifest from the fact that, notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to send the agreed rent, the plaintiff did not take any action for nearly three years. When the third year was about to expire, the landlord files the suit for recovery of arrears of rent in the civil court and appreaches the Kent Controller for eviction of the defendant some months after, after the dispute had been squarely put in issue in the civil suit. We have to bear in mind that originally the rent was Rs. 150 per month and admittedly it was subsequently reduced to Rs. 112-50 per mensem. The plaintiff's case is that on 8th February 1960 the defendant agreed to pay rent at Re. 200 per month from Masi 1960 onwards. In his disposition, be would state that the defendant offered to pay rent at Rs. 175 per month for the property already leased alone, but that he did not accept the same. The plaintiff would state that he never demanded higher rent at any time before 8th February 1960, and that he wanted a solatium just to accpt the enhanced rent of Rs. 200 per month. He admits in his deposition that •very time he had been waiting about the agreement, the defendant was denying the same. About the defendant's case that he wanted the two upstairs rooms also to be given possession, the admission of the landlord is that the defendant wanted the tenants of the two upstairs rooms to vacate and the rooms to be given to him. The plaintiff states that the agreement for payment of rent was concluded even before the defendant wanted these two upstairs rooms. But a reference to the deposition of P.W 2 Natesan Piliai, admittedly the mediator, leaves one with a different impression. According to P.W 2's version, the first had a discussion in the matter with the defendant, and after settling the matter with the defendant, he took tne defendant to P.W.1 P.W 2 admits that, when he asked for enhanced rent, the defendant wanted the two upstairs rooms also for his occupation. It is the version of P.W 2, that, when the defendant asked for the vacant possession of the upstairs rooms, P W. 1, said that he would consider it as and when the rooms fell vacant. In the connected Second Appeal, I have examined the defendant's case as to the negotiations that took place on 8th February, 1960, particularly with reference to the letters Ex. A. 7 and A. 8. The record, examined as a whole, leaves one with the impression that the truth lies mid way and that there is an exaggerated defence put forward by the defendant. It may be that, having set out his terms to p. W. 2, the defendant was not very articulate in presence of the plaintiff, due to the plaintiff's status. But the plea of the defendant is not one of want of mutuality or absence of consensus ad idem, but a whole sale denial of the agreement. In the absence of a specific defence in that regard, it was not for the court to examine any such plea. But one thing is clear that the placing of the defendant in possession of the two upstairs rooms must have played a prominent and important part in the negotiations that took place on 8th February, 1960, and that there was some kind of obligation, whether as a term of the contract for enhancement of the rent or otherwise for the plaintiff to put the defendant in possession of the two upstairs rooms. It is the admitted fact that, even at the time of the suit, the occupants of the upstairs rooms had not surrendered possession of the rooms eve to the plaintiff. The agreement was admittedly oral and P.W 2 says that, when he settled terms with the defendant, none else was present. The defendant, in bis evidence, states that P.W 2 suggested to him that he could pay higher rent, if the two upstairs rooms were given to him. According to the defendant, he did not give any final consent to P.W 2 with regard to the rent. P.W 1 had stated, in attempting to explain away Ex. B-2, that he wanted the defendant to take possession of the upstairs rooms on his behalf. As pointed out by me in the judgment in the Second Appeal, the language of the letters Ex. A-7 and B. 8 does not support it, and the defendant, in his desposition, states that P.W 1 asked him to take possession of the rooms for his own benefit and not for the benefit of the plaintiff. The following answers elicited from the defendant in cross-examination are significant :—

    “ It is not correct to say that Ex. B-8 is sent to me to help P.W 1 to get vacant possession of the upstairs rooms for my benefit …It is not correct to say that when the rent was fixed at Rs. 200 per mensem for the suit premises (it was not) for upstair rooms also.”

    One thing emerges from the evidence of the parties, oral and documentary, that there has been a dispute between the parties, the defendant contending that the enhanced rent should be considered on delivering of vacant possession of the two upstairs rooms to him by the plaintiff, while the plaintiff took the stand that without any reference to the upstairs rooms the rent was fixed at Rs. 200 per month. In the absence of proper pleas and the limited scope of the Second Appeal, I have confirmed the findings of the courts below. But the fact that the civil court holds that the rent payable right through from Masi 1960 has been enhanced to Rs. 200 per month, cannot, having regard to all the aspects of the case, make the non-payment of arrears of rent a wilful default. There has been a dispute between the parties and it cannot be said that the same is not bona fide. The hesitancy of the plaintiff to straightaway seek eviction before the Rent Controller itself, in a way, confirms that view. It is only long after the institution of the suit for arrears of rent and three years after the repudiation and default that the petition for eviction was filed. Here S. 11 (3) of the Act has a bearing. It provides that, where there is any dispute as to the amount of rent to the paid or deposited under Sub-S.(1), the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall, on application made to him either by the tenant or by the landlord, and after such enquiry as he deemed necessary determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. The dispute in this case between the parties set out by the defendant cannot be wholly false and the defence put forward cannot be said to be one just to drag on the proceedings. In the Second Appeal I have remarked that there is room for honest misunderstanding on both sides. The fact that an exaggerated defence has been raised cannot make the existing dispute farcial and frivolous. The other question as to the validity of enhancement of the rent by 80 per cent, mooted and decided in the connected Second Appeal, is not also a flimsy one. There was no additional accommodation and the court had to consider whether, the enhancement of rent was valid under the Rent Control Act. Certainly the dispute, both of law and fact, is genuine and it called for careful consideration and adjudication by the civil court. It must, therefore, be held that the non-payment of the difference in rent will not amount to wilful default, entitling the landlord to an order of eviction.

    A point was made that there was defendant in the payment of the admitted rent of R. 112-50 per month. After the return of the draft for Rs. 112-50, the defendant had been, without reference to the plaintiff, depositing the rents for a year in the Karur Vysia Bank Ltd. Once a demand was made therefor, the defendant sent the amount accrued without delay. No doubt It was accepted by the plaintiff without prejudice to his contentions and thereafter the defendant continued to seed the admitted rent to the plaintiff. In his deposition, the plaintiff has stated that the defendant has been fairly regular after the eviction order in the previous eviction petition. He admits, in his deposition that till the date of his giving evidence there were no arrears at the rate of R. 112-50 per month. No doubt, this court has held that, merely because the rest due for one month bad been improperly refused when tendered, it does not mean that the rent for the succeeding month is neither due nor payable, and that a duty is cast on the tenant to make payment or tender every month. The present Act prescribes the mode for the deposit of rent and discharge of the defendant's obligation, where the landlord refuses to accept the rent tendered. In the instant case, with reference to the admitted part of rent, it looks as if the landlord was prepared to waive the prior default, reserving his claim for the balance of rent due. The acceptance of the rents paid out of time with out prejudice in the context appears to be, without prejudice to claim the difference, as for more than two years after the acceptance of the delayed payment, no action for eviction was taken, and in the meanwhile the admitted rent was being received. The non-payment of rent on the due dates in the intervening period after the return of the first draft for Rs. 112-50, cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be held to constitute a wilful default.

    It follows that the order of the Rent Controller, confirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge, has to be set aside and the petition for eviction dismissed. There will be an order accordingly dismissing the petition for eviction. Of course, this court is not concerned with any default subsequent to the decision of the civil conrt. The civil revision petition is allowed. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    S. Venkataramanaswami Iyer v. S. Abdul Wahab.
    (Sep 20, 1968)