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citation codes
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  • Sub-section (1). of the new Section 13-A, enacted by Section 5 of the impugned Act, the rest of the provisions of the impugned Act
  • Section 5 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948
  • Section 5 (2) of Act XI of 1948
  • MINIMUM WAGES ACT 1948
  • rule in Section 5 (2)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Sub-section (1). of the new Section 13-A, enacted by Section 5 of the impugned Act, the rest of the provisions of the impugned Act
  • Section 5 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948
  • Section 5 (2) of Act XI of 1948
  • MINIMUM WAGES ACT 1948
  • rule in Section 5 (2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed by Messrs. T.P. Sokkalal Ramsait Factory (Private) Limited, Mukkudal, through its Managing Partner, seeking a writ of certiorari to declare ultra vires and to quash a Government of Madras notification. The impugned notification is G.O. Ms. No. 2098, Industries, Labour and Housing (Labour) dated 30th May, 1968, published in the Fort St. George Gazette (Extraordinary) on 31st May, 1968; it fixed minimum rates of wages for various classes of employees in the beedi-manufacturing industry and purported to come into force on 30th May, 1968.

Procedurally, a Minimum Wages Advisory Committee had been constituted by G.O. Ms. No. 5539, Labour dated 26th November, 1965; that committee reported on 15th May, 1967 recommending wage revisions. The Government issued the contested notification on 30th May, 1968 (published 31st May, 1968). The petitioner challenged the notification on several grounds, and the court considered those challenges and delivered the opinion summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government could validly give the impugned notification retrospective effect (i.e., make it operative from 30th May, 1968, when publication in the Gazette was on 31st May, 1968), having regard to Section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
  2. Whether fixation of scales of wages for types of beedies without accounting for differing conditions and cost of living in different parts of the State, and without regard to employers' capacity to pay, violated Article 14 of the Constitution or other legal principles.
  3. Whether the legal relationship between employer and employee, for the purposes of entitlement to benefits under the Act, was correctly determined or was in dispute in this context.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The impugned notification is ultra vires and unconstitutional because it purports to fix minimum wages retrospectively even by one day (making it effective from 30th May, 1968, though published on 31st May, 1968).
  • The fixation of scales of wages for beedi types without accounting for regional differences in conditions and cost of living violates Article 14 and imposes unequal burdens on manufacturers across the State.
  • The failure to take into account the capacity to pay of different employers was argued to be contrary to law.
  • The petitioner also questioned the relationship of employer and employee relevant to entitlement under the Act.

Respondent (State/Government) Arguments

  • The Government asserted that minimum wages were fixed after considering conditions, cost of living, and the circumstances of manufacture in different parts of the State.
  • The State argued that the fixation did not place an unequal burden and that employers' capacity to pay need not be considered because employers are bound to pay the minimum wages prescribed by the Act.
  • As to the retrospective point, the State maintained that the notification, even if not retrospective, should be construed as taking effect from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette (31st May, 1968) rather than being wholly inoperative.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
D.C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib & Sons v. United Bidi Workers' Union (1964) 2 L.L.J. 633 Authority on the question of the relationship between employer and employee under the relevant legislation. The court noted that the Supreme Court decisions on the employer-employee relationship had clearly stated the position; counsel for the petitioner could not contest that the relationship existed, and this precedent supported that conclusion.
Indramani v. W. R. Natu That a statute which validly enacts a law with retrospective effect can, in express terms or by necessary intendment, confer upon a rule-making authority power to make rules with retrospective operation. The court used this principle to explain that retrospective power must be conferred by the statute; it concluded the Minimum Wages Act does not confer such power, so retrospective notification is invalid.
Stewart v. Brojendra Kishore, A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 628 Principle that a statutory order stating an earlier commencement date may, where not known to the public, be severed and given effect from the later date (publication date) when it became known. Cited in the severability discussion; the court considered whether the invalid retrospective element could be severed and the notification given effect from the date of Gazette publication.
Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh (1946) 1 M.L.J. 426; (1946) F.C.R. 1; L.R. 73 I.A. 59; A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 66 Held that a retrospective element in an enactment may be easily severable so that the rest of the provisions operate validly after excision. Used to illustrate severability where retrospective words were deleted and the remaining provisions were left valid; considered in assessing whether severance here would yield a valid operative notification.
Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras (1967) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 67; (1967) 1 An. W.R. (S.C.) 67; (1967) 1 S.C.J. 404 Illustrates that where an order has two separable parts (action and retrospective operation), the retrospective part may be invalid while the operative part can stand from the date of the order. The court examined whether the impugned notification could be read in a similar separable manner; it concluded that the notification could not be read or severed in the same way to avoid modifying Section 5(2) by judicial amendment.
Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer, A.I.R. 1953 Ajmer 65 Notification directing that it shall be deemed to have come into force from an earlier date was found to be in excess of powers and was expunged; the notification was held to come into force under the statute's terms. Cited as authority where retrospective words were expunged and the notification treated as taking effect under the statute (i.e., after the period provided by statute).
Narottamdas v. P. B. Gowarikar Notification giving retrospective operation to fixed rates was defective; severance led to the application of the statutory commencement rule. Cited to support the proposition that retrospective elements can be severed and that, after severance, statutory commencement rules (three months) apply.
Gairkhatta Tea Co. v. State of West Bengal Restrospective (retrospective) operation is not valid; notification is valid prospectively. Used to support the view that retrospective elements are invalid but that prospective operation of a notification may remain valid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two linked stages: first, whether the impugned notification's retrospective commencement (30th May, 1968) was permissible under Section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948; and second, whether, if the retrospective portion was invalid, the remainder of the notification could be severed and read so as to take effect at an earlier date than would otherwise follow from Section 5(2).

On the first issue, the court examined Section 5(2), which provides that after considering the advisory committee's advice or representations, the appropriate Government may by notification fix or revise minimum wages, and "unless such notification otherwise provides, it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue." The court observed that the notification for the purpose of Section 5(2) is the publication in the Official Gazette; here the Gazette publication was dated 31st May, 1968, even though the notification itself was dated 30th May, 1968.

The court stated the settled law that a rule-making authority cannot give retrospective operation to a rule unless the parent enactment expressly or by necessary intendment confers that power. The court referenced Indramani v. W. R. Natu for that principle and concluded that the Minimum Wages Act does not confer such retrospective power on the Government either expressly or by necessary intendment. Consequently, the part of the notification making it come into force on 30th May, 1968 (a date prior to publication) was retrospective in operation and therefore could not be upheld.

The court then considered whether the invalid retrospective element could be severed so that the notification would be operative from another date (for example the publication date) or otherwise modify the statutory rule that a notification comes into force after three months. The court reviewed authorities (Stewart v. Brojendra Kishore; Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh; Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras; Edward Mills Co.; Narottamdas; Gairkhatta Tea Co.) dealing with severability and the effect of expunging retrospective words.

Applying those precedents, the court found difficulty in accepting the State's position that severance would leave wording sufficient to indicate an intention that the notification take effect from publication or earlier than the statutory three-month period. The court explained that after removing the retrospective date ("on the 30th May, 1968"), the remaining phrase would read only "the notification shall come into force," which cannot properly be read as an expression of intention to displace the Section 5(2) rule requiring a three-month period unless there are words to that effect. The court emphasised that courts are not empowered to effect amendments of statutory notifications or to read into them an intention to modify a statutory commencement rule.

Therefore, the court concluded that severance would not produce an operative modification of Section 5(2), and the notification could come into force only in accordance with the statutory rule (i.e., after the expiry of three months from the date of its issue).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed to the limited extent that the retrospective element of the impugned notification (making it come into force on 30th May, 1968) is invalid; the notification can only come into force in accordance with Section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, i.e., after the expiry of three months from the date of its issue.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the Government notification's purported retrospective commencement is struck down; the notification cannot take effect from the date preceding its Gazette publication and must await the statutory commencement period (three months) from the date of issue.
  • In other respects the petition was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs.
  • The opinion applies existing principles on retrospective rule-making power and severability but does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this notification; the court emphasised that modification of the statutory commencement rule by judicial construction is not permissible.

This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities and holdings that appear in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

    M/S. T.P Sokkalal Ramsait Factory Private Limited v. Government Of Madras By The Secretary, Department Of Industries, Labour And Housing, Madras-9

    1. This Writ Petition is filed by Messrs. T.P. Sokkalal Ramsait Factory (Private) Limited, Mukkudal, by its Managing Partner for the issue of a writ of certiorari to declare as ultra vires the notification of the Government of Madras by the Secretary, Department of Industries, Labour and Housing, Fort St. George, published in the Fort St. George Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 31st May, 1968, G.O. Ms. No. 2098, Industries, Labour and Housing (Labour) II--I No. 2448 of 1968 and to quash the same.

    2. The notification published on 31st May, 1968, and which provides that it shall come into force on the 30th May, 1968, is challenged as ultra vires and unconstitutional. It is contended that the respondent has no power to fix the minimum wage retrospectively even by a day, and inasmuch as the impugned notification purports to do so, it is illegal and liable to be struck down. It is further contended that the fixation of scales of wages for types of beedies alone without taking into account the conditions and cost of living obtaining in different parts of the State violates Article 14 of the Constitution and throws an unequal burden on manufacturers in different parts of the State. The failure to take into account the capacity to pay of the different employers, it is submitted, is contrary to law. The relationship of the employer and the employee relating to the persons entitled to the benefits under the Act is also questioned.

    3. By G.O. Ms. No. 5539, Labour, dated 26th November, 1965, a Minimum Wages. Advisory Committee was constituted to consider the revision of the minimum wages for employment in tobacco including beedi making manufactory. The committee submitted its report on 15th May, 1967, recommending the revision of minimum wages for various classes of workers employed in beedi making. After considering the report of the committee, the Government of Madras by a notification issued in G.O. Ms. No. 2098, Industries, Labour and Housing (Labour) dated 30th May, 1968, fixed the minimum rates of wages to various classes of employees in the said industry to be effective from 30th May, 1968.

    4. The challenge to the validity of the fixation of minimum wage is resisted on the ground that wages were fixed taking into account the conditions and cost of living and the circumstances under which the products were manufactured in different parts of the State. The plea that the fixation of the minimum wages throws an unequal burden on manufacturers in different parts of the State cannot be accepted. In determining the minimum wages, the capacity of the different employers to pay need not be taken into account, as the employers are bound to pay minimum wages as provided for in the Act. The question as to the relationship between the employer and employee has been the subject-matter of a, number of decisions of the Supreme Court, and the position has been clearly stated in the decision in D.C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib & Sons v. United Bidi Workers' Union (1964) 2 L.L.J. 633. Learned Counsel for the petitioner was unable to say how he can contend that the relationship does not exist.

    5. The only point that was stressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the notification dated 31st May, 1968, was given retrospective effect from 30th . May, 1968, and as such was unconstitutional. Section 5 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 provides that after considering the advice of the committee or the representations, the appropriate Government may by notification in the Official Gazette fix, or, as the case may be, revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of each scheduled employment, and unless such notification otherwise provides, it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. The effect of the sub-section would be that the notification in the Official Gazette will come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue, unless otherwise provided for. The impugned notification which is dated 30th May, 1968, and which was published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated 31st May, 1968, provides that the notification will come into force on 30th May, 1968. The notification contemplated in the section is the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette. As the publication in the Gazette is dated 31st May, 1968, though the notification is dated 30th May, 1968, the notification for the purpose of Section 5 (2) of the Act will only be on 31st May, 1968. The question is how far this notification can be regarded as modifying the general rule that the notification will come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. It cannot be disputed that the Government has power to provide that the notification will come into effect before the expiry of three months. It is settled law that the rule making authority cannot give effect to any notification retrospectively unless the enactment specifically provides for it. The Supreme Court in Indramani v. W. R. Natu , has held that . a statute which could validly enact a law with retrospective effect could in express terms validly confer upon a rule-making authority a power to make a rule or frame a bye-law having retrospective operation. Such power can also be conferred not only by express words, but by necessary intendment of the Act. The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 does not confer on the rule making authority power to give effect to any notification retrospectively either by express words or by necessary intendment. Giving the natural meaning to Section 5 (2) of the Act, it is clear that the Government may provide that the notification will come into force earlier than three months, but the section cannot be read as giving an implied power to the Government to enact a rule retrospectively. So far as the notification provides that it shall come into force on 30th May, 1968, when the notification was published in the Official Gazette on 31st May, 1968, it is retrospective in operation, and it cannot be upheld.

    6. The next question that arises is whether the provision that the notification shall - come into force on 30th May, 1968, will have the effect of modifying the rule that the notification shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the provision that the notification shall come into force on 30th May, 1968, is inoperative the notification can come into force only on the expiry of three months from the date of issue. On the other hand, it was contended by the State that the notification even if it had no retrospective effect should be construed as having come into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette on the 31st May, 1968. The answer to this question will depend upon whether the retrospective element in the impugned notification is easily severable from the rest of the provision, and construed as taking effect from the date of notification in the Official Gazette. In Stewart v. Brojendra Kishore A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 628, the notification dated 12th January, 1938, provided that the Act shall come into force from 5th November, 1937. In that case, the retrospective operation was held to be not valid. In discussing the question as to when the Act took effect, it was held that where a statutory order is made on a certain date, Courts can sever it and give effect to it as and from a subsequent date on the ground that it was not known to the public until the latter date. The Court held that the impugned Act was not known to the public as having been in force until 12th January, 1938, and therefore on the above principle, it can be given effect to as and from that date instead of 5th November, 1937, which was the date mentioned in the notification. In Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh (1946) 1 M.L.J. 426; (1946) F.L.J. 41 : (1946) F.C.R. 1 : L.R. 73 I.A. 59 : A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 66, the Privy Council held that:

    the retrospective element in the impugned Act is easily severable, and by the deletion of the words 'either before or' from the early part of Sub-section (1). of the new Section 13-A, enacted by Section 5 of the impugned Act, the rest of the provisions of the impugned Act may be left to operate validly.

    The Supreme Court in Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras (1967) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 67 : (1967)1I An. W.R. (S.C.) 67 : (1967) 1 S.C.J. 404, had to consider the effect of an order which directed the dismissal of a public servant with effect from the date of his suspension, and the retrospective operation of the order from the date of the suspension was found to be invalid. The Court held that the two parts of the order were clearly severable. The Court was of the view that the order in substance was an order of dismissal as from the date of the order with the super-added direction that the order should operate retrospectively from the date of suspension of the civil servant concerned. The order dated 17th October, 1950, directing that the appellant be dismissed from service with effect from the date of his suspension, that is to say, from 20th May, 1949, was construed as directing, (1) that the appellant be dismissed, and (2) the dismissal do operate retrospectively as from 20th May, 1949. Holding that the two parts of the order are separable, the Court held that the first part of the order operates as & dismissal of the appellant as from 17th October, 1950, and it could be given effect to.

    7. There is some difficulty in invoking the decision cited above in favour of the Government, for, the impugned notification which provides that " the notification shall come into force on the 30th May, 1968," after severing the invalid part " on the 30th May, 1968," would read that "the notification shall come into force." The notification may validly come into force from the date of publication in the Official Gazette if it is so provided. But in order to modify the rule in Section 5 (2) that the notification shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue, there must be words to that effect. It is difficult to read the words " the notification shall come into force " as otherwise having the effect of modifying the rule that the notification shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. The intention that the notification shall come into force on the date of publication in the Gazette cannot be read into the severed portion. Courts arc not empowered to legislate involving an amendment of the notification, which is beyond the competence of the Courts. The impugned notification cannot be read in the way in which the order before the Supreme Court in Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras (1967) 1 M.L J. (S.C.) 67 : (1967) 1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 67 : (1967) 1 S.C.J. 404, was read, where it could be read as dismissing the public servant from the date of the order. In Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer A.I.R. 1953 Ajmer 65, the notification which directed that it shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 1st September, 1952 was found to be in excess of the powers and was expunged, and the notification was found to come into force in terms of Section 5 (2) of Act XI of 1948 on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. In Narottamdas v. P. B. Gowarikar , the notification dated 30th December, 1958, was found to suffer from the defect that it gave retrospective operation to the rates of wages fixed by it. As the notification dated 30th December, 1958, was published in the Gazette on 1st January, 1959, it was held, severing the invalid portion, the notification would bring into force the minimum rates of wages on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. In Gairkhatta Tea Co. v. State of West Bengal , the Court took the view that restrospectivc operation is not Valid, but that the notification would be good so far as prospective operation is concerned.

    8. On a consideration of the cases cited, I am of the view that the severed portion of the notification will not have the effect of " otherwise providing for and therefore the notification can come into force only after the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. The writ petition is allowed to this limited extent, and in other respects it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

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