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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant was a consumer of electricity under the Madras State Electricity Department who entered into an agreement on 2 February 1954 for supply to a ten horse-power motor on land in Naduhalli village, Salem District. The agreement fixed a minimum annual charge of Rs. 350 for ten years from 18 July 1954 (the date when supply was available to the defendant at his end), payable whether energy was consumed or not, and contained a provision permitting disconnection of supply after seven days' notice for non-payment of bills within thirty days.

The defendant failed to pay current consumption charges for June 1957 and, after notice, supply was disconnected on 31 August 1957. The Madras State Electricity Board (whose rights vested in it on 1 July 1957) instituted suit to recover arrears amounting to Rs. 1,150.53 for the period 31 August 1957 to 17 July 1959. The matter reached the court on a second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint was properly signed and verified on behalf of the plaintiff Board (i.e., whether the Superintending Engineer had authority to sign and verify on behalf of the Board).
  2. Whether the contractual provision fixing a minimum annual sum (Rs. 350) payable irrespective of consumption was a penal clause (i.e., a penalty) and therefore unenforceable, or whether it was a lawful minimum charge/consideration for maintaining supply.
  3. Whether any defect in the cause-title (stating "The Madras State Electricity Board by the Superintending Engineer, Mettur Electricity System") rendered the plaintiff to be treated as the Superintending Engineer and thereby vitiated the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The plaint was not properly signed and verified on behalf of the plaintiff Board because it was signed by the Superintending Engineer rather than by a person specifically authorised to institute the suit for the Board.
  • The clause fixing the minimum annual charge of Rs. 350 was, in substance, a penalty clause or a pre-determined sum of damages for breach (i.e., for not consuming the guaranteed quantity) and thus the plaintiff could only recover reasonable compensation under Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, not the stipulated minimum in full.
  • As a further point (rejected by the court), it was argued that although the agreement was for supply to a ten horse-power motor, in fact only a five horse-power motor was installed and used, meaning the plaintiff had failed to act as per the agreement.
  • It was also argued (on statutory construction) that Section 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and its proviso excluded reliance on Sections 22 and 23 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, so the Board could not rely on those sections to justify a minimum annual charge.
  • It was contended that certain historical statutory provisions (clause XI-A of the Schedule to the 1910 Act) had been deleted and therefore earlier case-law relying on that clause could not be relied upon.

Respondent's (Madras State Electricity Board / Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaint was properly signed and verified because Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a principal officer of a corporation to sign and verify pleadings; the Superintending Engineer was a principal officer and, under administrative rules (Rule 122), empowered to accept agreements for low-tension supply.
  • The Board relied on a Board proceeding dated 6 July 1957 directing continuity of powers previously delegated to the Chief Engineer and subordinates (until regulations under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act were framed), thereby authorising the Superintending Engineer to sign and verify pleadings on behalf of the Board.
  • The minimum charge clause was not a penalty but was a consideration for keeping supply available and a guarantee of a minimum return on capital outlay for installing and maintaining the consumer's connection; this was supported by statutory provisions and established authority on electricity supply law and practice.
  • The Board further relied on statutory provisions (Section 22 and Section 23 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910) and on the fact that the original agreement was entered into by the State Government (i.e., with manifest State approval of the method of charging) to justify the minimum charge in the contract.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fatehchand v. Balkrishnadass (Supreme Court) Measure of damages for a stipulation by way of penalty: Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act allows reasonable compensation not exceeding the stipulated penalty. The court noted the appellant's reliance on this authority but held the clause in the agreement was not a penal stipulation; therefore the measure-of-damages principle under Fatehchand was not applicable to reduce the Board's claim to reasonable compensation.
The Land Electric Supply Corporation v. Priddis (1901) 18 T.L.R. 64-B Authority for the view that a minimum rent/charge may relate to the right to use supply (i.e., payment for the right to have current available) rather than to actual consumption. The court adopted Channell, J.'s approach from this case, treating the minimum charge as payment for the right to use current (i.e., for keeping supply available), and applied that reasoning to conclude the clause was not a penalty.
Mrs. Saila Bala Roy v. Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality, A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 265 Observation that minimum charge is not based on consumption but on providing a reasonable return on capital outlay for particular consumer's installation. The court cited and relied on this passage to support the proposition that minimum charges represent interest/return on capital investment and are legally recoverable rather than being penalties.
Waikins Mayor & Company v. Jullundar Electric Supply Company Discussion that provision for a minimum charge in any contract is to provide for a fair return on a licensee's outlay; the law allows such contracts. The court referred to this authority to support the view that contracts containing minimum charge clauses are permissible as a means to secure a fair return on capital and to justify enforcement of such clauses.
A.I.R. 1955 Punj. 133 Used in argument that clause XI-A (an express authorisation of minimum charge in the Schedule to the 1910 Act) was ex abundanti cautela and its deletion does not remove the licensee's right to levy minimum charges under Section 22. The court relied on the reasoning (as cited) to hold that deletion of clause XI-A did not take away the licensee's right to levy minimum charges because Section 22 of the 1910 Act independently permitted such a levy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the contested points in sequence, applying statutory provisions, administrative rules, evidentiary record and precedent to each:

  1. Signature and Verification of the Plaint: The court applied Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which permits a pleading in suits by or against a corporation to be signed and verified by the secretary or any director or other principal officer able to depose to the facts). It found that the Superintending Engineer was a principal officer of the Board (supported by the Board's administrative rules which placed the administration of an electricity system in charge of the Superintending Engineer and empowered him under Rule 122 to accept agreements for low-tension supply). The court also relied on a Board proceeding dated 6 July 1957 continuing pre-existing delegated powers to certain officers until regulations were framed under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Having regard to these materials and Section 13 of the Act (requiring authentication of orders and decisions by authorised members), the court concluded the Superintending Engineer was competent to sign and verify the plaint and dismissed the objection to verification.
  2. Cause-title Objection: Raised for the first time in the second appeal, the court treated the description "The Madras State Electricity Board by the Superintending Engineer" as a misdescription or a defect in form. Given that it was never contended that the Board was not the plaintiff and that proceedings had continued on the basis that the Board was plaintiff, the court found the defect to be formal and remediable (e.g., by deleting part of the description) and not a sufficient ground in a second appeal to set aside the decree.
  3. Nature and Enforceability of the Minimum Charge Clause: The court examined whether the Rs. 350 per annum minimum was a penalty or a lawfully enforceable minimum charge. It observed the following:
    • The clause must be understood in the context of electricity supply: the Board had to keep supply ready at the consumer's end irrespective of actual consumption, and the scheme for the defendant involved a capital outlay (noted as Rs. 10,967.07 exclusive of establishment charges).
    • The plaintiff's witnesses (P.W.2 and P.W.3 are cited) supported that the minimum charge represented the guaranteed minimum return on capital invested and the cost of keeping supply available.
    • The court reviewed relevant authorities and statutory provisions. It acknowledged the appellant's reliance on measures of damages under Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act (and the Supreme Court decision in Fatehchand v. Balkrishnadass) but found those principles applicable only where a stipulation is truly a penalty. Instead, the court found the clause to be consideration (payment) for the right to have energy available and a reasonable return on the licensee's capital, not a punitive pre-estimate of damages.
    • The court adopted the rationale in The Land Electric Supply Corporation v. Priddis (Chief Justice and Channell, J.'s observations) that a minimum rent/charge may relate to the right to use current rather than to actual amount used, and cited other authorities (Mrs. Saila Bala Roy; Waikins Mayor & Company v. Jullundar Electric Supply Company) which recognize minimum charges as providing a fair return on outlay.
    • On the statutory argument, the court noted Section 22 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, which (by proviso) contemplated the licencee's ability to require agreement for a minimum annual sum to give reasonable return and cover standing charges; Section 23(3) provides methods of charging (including approval by State Government). The court held there was nothing in the statutes or rules that made such a term ultra vires, and rejected the submission that the Board could not rely on Sections 22 and 23 because of Section 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The court reasoned that the proviso in Section 26 excluded certain duties and obligations but did not strip rights (such as the right to levy a minimum sum) and that Section 70 of Act LIV of 1948 preserves the 1910 Act provisions except as otherwise provided. The court also pointed to Section 49 of Act LIV of 1948, which authorises the Board to supply electricity upon such terms and conditions as the Board may fix (subject to non-preference).
    • Finally, the court addressed the contention about the deletion of clause XI-A of the Schedule to the 1910 Act (which had expressly authorised minimum charges): the court held that the earlier case law did not rest solely on that clause and that Section 22 itself provided statutory basis for minimum charges; deletion of clause XI-A therefore did not remove the right to levy a minimum charge.
    The cumulative effect of the statutory analysis, evidentiary findings and precedents led the court to conclude the minimum charge clause was enforceable and was not a penal stipulation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final decision was to dismiss the second appeal. The core ruling is expressed as: THE SECOND APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff (Madras State Electricity Board) is entitled to recover the arrears claimed under the agreement, including the agreed minimum annual charges; the procedural objections to signing and cause-title were rejected. The decree appealed from is upheld in substance and the appeal fails.
  • No broader precedent beyond the decision: The opinion applies existing statutory provisions and precedents to the facts and holds that a contractual minimum annual charge for electricity supply (as considered in the agreement) is not a penalty but a permissible mechanism to secure a reasonable return on capital and to pay for keeping supply available. The opinion does not purport to create a novel rule of law beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities and statutory provisions.

Disposition noted in the opinion: The second appeal was dismissed with costs and leave was granted.

    M.G. Natesa Chettiar v. The Madras State Electricity Board, By Its Superintending Engineer, Mettur Electricity System

    1. The defendant, a consumer of electricity under the Madras State Electricity Board, has filed this second appeal, challenging, inter alia, the claim for the recovery of the annual minimum amount guaranteed under an agreement for supply of electricity. The agreement was entered into on 2nd February, 1954, by the electricity department of the State of Madras and by and under the agreement the defendants had agreed to take supply of electric energy for a ten horse-power motor in his field bearing S. No. 726 in Naduhalli village, Salem District. The agreement provided that the defendant was liable to pay to the Government a minimum charge of rupees three hundred and fifty per annum for a period often years from 18th July, 1954, that is from the date on which the supply was available to the defendant at his end, whether electric energy was consumed or not. There was provision in the agreement for disconnecting supply after seven days notice for non-payment of bills within thirty days. The defendant failed to pay the current consumption charges for the month of June, 1957, and after due notice to the defendant, the supply was disconnected on 31st August, 1957. The suit has been filed for recovery of arrears to the tune of Rs. 1,150-53 for the period 31st August, 1957, to 17th July, 1959. It may be stated that on 1st July, 1957, the rights of the State Electricity Department vested in the Madras State Electricity Board, the plaintiff in the suit, and the suit has been instituted by the Board for the recovery of the arrears.

    2. Various defences were raised, but only two of them have been persisted in : (i) whether the plaint has been properly signed and verified on behalf of the plaintiff Board, and (ii) whether the provision for the payment of the sum of rupees three hundred and fifty, the minimum payable under the agreement by the defendant, whether he consumed electricity or not, was not a penalty clause and so unenforceable.

    3. A further point was raised that whereas the agreement was for the supply for a ten horse-power motor, actually the supply was only for a five horse-power motor. Therefore, it was argued that the plaintiff had failed to act in terms of the agreement. This last plea is wholly devoid of substance. P.W. 2, the supervisor, has deposed that while the department was in a position to give supply for ten horse-power motor, the defendant himself represented that he had installed only a five horse-power motor and wanted electricity to be supplied accordingly, though the sanctioned capacity was ten horse-power.

    4. To take-up the first point; the plaint has been signed and verified by the Superintending Engineer, Mettur Electricity System. The plaintiff Board came into existence on the 1st of July. 1957, under the Electricity (Supply) Act LIV of 1948. Under Section 12 of the Act the Board is a body corporate by name having perpetual succession and a common seal. The relevant provision applicable in the matter of signing and verifying pleadings is Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that any pleading in suits by or against a Corporation may be signed and verified on behalf of the Corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the Corporation, who is able to depose to the facts of the case. The Courts below have elaborately examined the position and pointed out that the Superintending Engineer is a principal officer of the Corporation who could depose to the facts of the case. Under the administrative rules governing the Corporation the administration of an electricity system is in charge of the Superintending Engineer and Rule 122 states that the Superintending Engineers of the power systems are empowered to accept an agreement for low-tension supply of power. In the instant case the Superintending Engineer alone has signed that suit agreement on behalf of the plaintiff Board. He is certainly a principal officer of the Corporation, and Order 29, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, does speak of the principal officer of the Corporation.

    5. The Board further relied on its proceeding, dated 6th July, 1957, which runs thus:

    The Madras State Electricity Board hereby directs that the powers delegated by the Government of Madras to the Chief Engineer (Electricity) and his subordinates prior to 1st July, 1957 be continued to be vested in them till the necessary regulations in this regard are framed by the Board under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.

    On the strength of this proceeding, the Board rested upon G.O.Ms. No. 336, Law, dated 10th August, 1956, whereby the Superintending Engineers to Government are authorised to sign and verify plaints and written statements on behalf of the Government. Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, provides for the Board making regulations not inconsistent with the Act, and the Rules, made thereunder, to provide inter alia in regard to the duties of officers and servants of the Board and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service, and in regard to matters arising out of the Board's functions under the Act for which it is necessary or expedient to make regulations. Learned Counsel for the Board contends that the proceeding, dated 6th July, 1957, should be considered to be regulation, and when so considered, the Superintending Engineer by the earlier Government Order gets authority to sign and verify plaints on behalf of the Board. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the proceeding could not be deemed to be a regulation as it contemplates the framing of regulations in future. Now no procedure is prescribed under the Act and no formality provided as to how a regulation is to be framed. The only proviso under Section 79 requires that certain regulation could be made only with the previous approval of the State Government and certain other regulations shall be made with the concurrence of the Central Electricity Authority constituted under the Act. It is not contended that the proceeding, in question, comes under any of the regulations contemplated in the proviso. Section 13 of the Act may be referred to, in this connection. It provides that all orders and decision of the Board shall be authenticated by the signature of the Chairman or any other member authorised by the Board in this behalf, and all other instruments issued by the Board shall be authenticated by the signature of such member or officer of the Board as may in like manner be authorised in this behalf. If the Board could frame a regulation, I do not see why, in the circumstances, the proceeding of the Board, dated 6th July, 1957, cannot be considered a regulation as contemplated under Section 79. May be the regulation is transitory in character, and contemplates detailed regulations in future. But there is nothing wrong in having a regulation for the time being tentatively adopting pre-existing rules to avoid any hiatus. It is not shown to be ultra vires of the Board. The point that the Superintending Engineer was not competent to sign and verify the plaint, therefore, fails.

    6. Another point was raised before me, and this for the first time in second appeal. The objection is to the frame of the cause-title, which runs, The Madras State Electricity Board by the Superintending Engineer, Mettur Electricity System. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff on the aforesaid description is the Superintending Engineer of the System, and not the Board. The argument runs : admittedly the Superintending Engineer has not been authorised to institute suits in his own name : at the most, he can claim authority to sign and verify pleadings on behalf of the Corporation : but the suit has been instituted by the Superintending Engineer no doubt on behalf of the Corporation. It has, therefore, to fail because he has no authority to institute the suit by himself. No ground in this form has been taken even in the memorandum of grounds of appeal to this Court. Advantage is obviously sought to be taken of what may be considered to be misdescription. It has never been contended that the plaintiff was not the Board. Proceedings have gone on title now on the basis that the Electricity Board is the plaintiff not only in substance, but also de facto. If the point had been taken at the earliest opportunity all that might have been necessary would be to delete part of the description in the cause-title. Obviously as the Superintending Engineer was signing and verifying the plaint, this was brought to the forefront by the description in the cause-title. Very likely the effect of using the preposition by which in the context means through the instrumentality o/was not considered. It makes the cause-title read as if the plaintiff is the Superintending Engineer, suing no doubt on behalf of the Board, while, in fact, what is meant is that the Board is suing, the Superintending Engineer signing and verifying the plaint on behalf of the Board. The intention being clear that it was the Board that has been suing, the defect is purely one of form and it cannot be made a ground for setting aside the decree and that in second appeal.

    7. To come to the substantial point the agreement provides that the consumer shall pay to the Government for electric energy supplied at the rates given in the schedule in accordance with the terms of the agreement and that the minimum rates specified should be paid irrespective of whether energy to that extent has been consumed or not. The monthly minimum whether electricity is consumed or not, is fixed at Rs. 29-2-8. The argument of learned Counsel is that the agreement must be read as a contract for supply of electric energy at specified rates and that the minimum charge is a penalty for breach of the agreement to consume energy. It is, therefore, argued that the plaintiff can claim only compensation for breach under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, that Section 74 of the Contract Act would apply and that the minimum charge fixed is only the maximum compensation that the plaintiff would be entitled to : in law the plaintiff cannot claim anything more than reasonable compensation for the breach : and he must establish the loss or damage consequential on the non-consumption of electricity by the defendant and claim only that amount.

    8. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Fatehchand v. Balkrishnadass . for the position that the measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by Section 74 of the Contract Act, reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. It was submitted that in assessing the damages the Court can, subject to the limit of the penalty stipulated, award only such compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. It is contended that the plaintiff has failed to prove specifically the loss suffered by it in consequence of the breach of the contract committed by the defendant. Learned Counsel would contend that the plaintiff has not made out that by the failure of the defendant to consume energy, energy was left in surplus. This argument, in my view, fails to take note of the true character of the relevant terms. The defendant would read the provision for minimum charge as the equivalent of the price paid for the guaranteed consumption. But, as pointed out by P.W. 3, the special guarantee is the minimum return anticipated on the capital invested by the Board irrespective of whether the consumer consumed energy or not. Whether the consumer takes energy or not, by reason of the covenant, the Board has to keep the supply ready at the defendant's end for being tapped by the defendant whenever he wanted. It is seen from the record that the scheme of supply was extended solely for supplying energy to the defendant at a total cost of Rs. 10,967.07, exclusive of establishment charges. A reference to Meat's Law relating to Electrical Energy in India and Burma, Sixth Edition, page 97, would show that the minimum charge has been customary and has long been in force. It is pointed out that it has a substantial foundation, namely, that every consumer's intallation involves the licensee in a certain amount of capital expenditure in plant and mains on which he is entitled to a reasonable return.

    9. Elaborate machinery is found in the Act and Rules for fixing the tariff. Section 23 (4) of Act IX of 1910 provides for certain factors to be taken into consideration. It cannot be, and it was not, contended that the term in the agreement itself is ultra vires of the Board. The argument has been that the minimum is the quantum of damages fixed in the agreement for not taking the guaranteed consumption, that it is a penal provision and that it is a case merely of breach of contract entitling the Board to claim only reasonable compensation in accordance with the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act. The agreement, no doubt, is just a contract and is binding between the parties like any other contract subject to the provisions of the Electricity Act of 1910, and the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948. True also, if there is breach by either party, there will be liability for damages. But the question is whether the provision for the minimum guarantee is just a stipulation by way of penalty or predetermined damages for breach on the part of the consumer or something else. In my view the minimum fixed is only consideration for keeping the energy available to the consumer at his end; it is not a penalty for not consuming a stated quantity of energy. I would view it as a concession shown up to the amount fixed, energy at the specified rates could be consumed free, consumption beyond only has to be paid for. In The Land Elec. Supply Corporation v. Priddis (1901) 18 T.L.R. 64-B, an installation was put in on the terms that the consumer should have the right to purchase the installation after five years, and during that period of five years the consumer should be liable to pay a minimum rent, whether the current was de facto used or not. The consumer had, until purchase, to pay quarterly to the supply company for the use of the installation 3/4 per Board of Trade Unit for every unit for electrical energy supplied to the premises and the minimum payment in any year had to be is. for each eight candle power lamp or its equivalent installed. In giving judgment the learned Chief Justice observed:

    The minimum rent had no reference to the amount of current used, and it was therefore clear that the mere fact that the defendant had not taken any current or a small current did not affect the case.

    Channell, J., concurring stated:

    The meaning of the clause was that the minimum rent did not merely cover the actual but the right to use the current. The customer had to pay for the right to use the current, although he did not in fact use it.

    10. I respectfully adopt the approach of Channell, J., to the matter. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the case was one where the consumer had agreed to purchase the installation ultimately. The feature of the agreement in that case does not, in my view, affect the ratio of the decision.

    11. In Mrs. Saila Bala Roy v. Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 265, 266, Mitter, J., said:

    A minimum charge is not really a charge which has for its basis the consumption of electric energy. It is really based on the principle that every consumer's installation involved the licence in a certain amount of capital expenditure in plant and mains on which he is to have a reasonable return. He gets a return when energy is actually consumed, in the shape of payments for the energy consumed. When no energy is consumed by the consumer or a very small amount is consumed in a long period, he is allowed to charge minimum charges by his licence, but these minimum charges are really interest on his capital outlay incurred for the particular consumer.

    12. The legality of minimum charge is discussed in extenso in Waikins Mayor & Company v. Jullundar Electric Supply Company , 136. The learned Judges observe:

    The whole scheme of the Act seems to show that the provision made in any contract for a minimum charge is really to provide for a fair return on the outlay of the licensee, and it is for this reason that the law allows a contract of this kind to be entered into....

    13. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the decision in Watkins Mayor & Company v. Jullundar Electric Supply Company , 136, is based upon clause XI-A of the Schedule to the Electricity Act of 1910 and that this clause which was inserted in 1922 has been omitted by Act XXXII of 1959. Therefore, it is argued that the decision cannot be of any help now. In my view the decision does not rest wholly on the now deleted clause XI-A of the Schedule. The provisions in the Schedule to the Act, it is provided in the Act are deemed to be incorporated with and to form part of every licence granted under Part II of the Act (IX of 1910) save in so far as they are added to varied or excepted by the licence. Clause XI-A of the Schedule ran thus:

    A licensee may charge a consumer a minimum charge for energy of such amount and determined in such manner as may be specified by his licence, and such minimum charge shall be payable notwithstanding that no energy has been used by the consumer during the period for which such minimum charge is made.

    14. It no doubt expressly authorised the levy of minimum charge. But to start with, there is no provision in the relevant Acts prohibiting or precluding the insertion of a clause for payment of minimum charge in any contract between a licensee or the Board and the consumer. Only the term has to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. If a statutory basis for the term is required, Section 22 of Act IX of 1910 itself provides it. Section 22 makes it obligatory on the licensee to supply energy to every person in the area applying, subject to the following proviso.

    Provided that no person shall be entitled to demand, to continue to receive from a licensee a supply of energy for any premises having a separate supply unless he has agreed with the licensee to pay him such minimum annual sum as will give him a reasonable return on the capital expenditure, and will cover other standing charges incurred by him in order to meet the possible maximum demand for these premises, the sum payable to be determined in case of difference or dispute by arbitration.

    15. The provisions contained in the Schedule to Act IX of 1910, are only deemed (to be incorporated with and to form part of every licence granted under that part, save in so far as they are expressly added to, varied or excepted by the licensee. When the section itself enables the licensee to levy a minimum charge, clause XI-A inserted in the Schedule is only a provision ex abundanti cantela A.I.R. 1955 Punj. 133, 136, and its deletion cannot take away the right of the licensee to levy a minimum charge granted under the section. For the Board reliance is placed also on Section 23 (3) of Act IX of 1910, which provides that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a licensee may charge for energy supplied by him to any consumer:

    (a) by the actual amount of energy so supplied for

    (b) ty the electrical quantity contained in the supply, or

    (c) by such other method as may be approved by the State Government.

    16. Learned Counsel for the Board relies on Clause (c) above set out and contends that in the present instance the agreement was entered into by the State Government itself originally. It is pointed out that the approval of the State Government to the method of charging found in the agreement, the subject of consideration in this case is manifest. It is stated that the rights of the State Government have since devolved on the Board and that, therefore, there is sufficient authority to levy the minimum charge claimed. This is an additional argument in support of the claim on the particular facts of the case.

    17. Learned Counsel for the appellant argues that in view of Section 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act (LIV of 1948), the Board cannot rely upon Sections 22 and 23 of Act IX of 1910. Section 26 of Act LIV of 1948 runs thus:

    Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board shall in respect of the whole State, have all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (IX of 1910), and this Act shall be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act:

    Provided that nothing in Sections 3 to 11, Sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 21 and Section 22, Sub-section (2) of Section 22-A and Sections 23 and 27 of that Act or in clauses I to V, clause VII and clauses IX or XII of the Schedule to that Act relating to the duties and obligations of a licensee shall apply to the Board.

    18. While learned Counsel for the Board contends that only the provisions of the; aforesaid sections relating to the duties and obligations of a licensee are made not . applicable to the Board by the proviso, the appellant's Counsel would contend that as every right in the case of statutory body may also be looked upon as a duty or obligation such rights also cannot be relied upon. There is a limitation of the right conferred when the right is specified in a statute. In my view, this is not the way of looking at the particular provision of section 26. At any rate a right conferred on a licensee to levy a minimum annual sum cannot be considered to be a duty or obligation of the licensee. In fact, under Section 22 of the Act, the duty or obligation to pay minimum annual sum is placed in the consumer. Now section 70 of act liv of 1948 also provides by Sub-section (2) that:

    Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act, shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.

    19. Section 49 of Act LIV of 1948, has also bearing on the subject now under consideration. It runs:

    Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any regulations made in this behalf the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board may from time to time fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and the purposes for which it is required:

    Provided that in fixing any such terms and conditions the Board shall not show undue preference to any person.

    20. Thus it is seen that there is a statutory basis also for the term in the agreement providing for a minimum annual charge. That apart as discussed earlier there is nothing illegal in the insertion of a term for payment of a minimum charge in the agreement for supply of energy, and it has not been made out that it is an unreasonable levy. I have held that it is not a penalty clause.

    21. In the circumstances, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    22. Leave granted.

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    Comments

    M.G. Natesa Chettiar v. The Madras State Ele...
    (Oct 14, 1966)