AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act
  • s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887.
  • 8, Part I, Section 3, sub-section 39,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act
  • s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887.
  • 8, Part I, Section 3, sub-section 39,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ananatanarayanan, O.C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a shareholder holding 2,001 shares in Sri Ambal Mills (Private) Ltd. (the first respondent), instituted O.S. 1441/64 in the court of the District Munsif, Coimbatore, against respondents 1 and 2 seeking a permanent injunction to restrain them from convening or conducting an extraordinary general meeting scheduled for 14-12-1964. Along with the plaint the petitioner filed I.A. No. 1840 of 1964 seeking an interim injunction. The learned District Munsif made an order in open court granting an interim injunction, with a notice returnable on 16-1-1965.

On 11-12-1964 (at 4 P.M.) the 11th respondent (an advocate and legal adviser of the company) appeared in court, filed a vakalat and an unnumbered application seeking advancement of the hearing of the application in which the interim injunction had been directed. The meeting convened for 9:30 a.m. on 14-12-1964; telegrams informing respondents 1 and 2 of the prohibitory order had been sent by the court and by the petitioner's counsel. The petitioner attended the notified meeting, found several shareholders and directors present (including respondents 3 to 6 and others), and stated the existence of the ex parte interim injunction. Despite this, the meeting proceeded and a resolution was passed; the petitioner entered his objection in the minutes and alleged contempt of court and sought punishment and the setting aside of the resolution.

Respondents filed counter-affidavits. The company (1st respondent) relied on a written legal opinion that the injunction orders were void. The 2nd respondent disclaimed attendance and instigation. The 3rd respondent admitted chairing and participating in the meeting but said he acted in bona fide reliance on the 11th respondent's written legal opinion and tendered an unconditional apology. Many other respondents gave similar explanations and unconditional apologies. The 11th respondent (legal adviser) explained that on examining the papers he considered the court to have no territorial jurisdiction (s.20(b), C.P.C. not complied with), relied on certain authorities (including A.I.R. 1949 Lahore 131), concluded the order was a nullity, communicated that opinion to the company, attended the meeting but did not participate, and did not retract his view.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Assuming on the face of the plaint the first defendant-company was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Munsif and leave under s.20(b), C.P.C. had not been obtained (nor was there acquiescence), would the interim injunction be void and a nullity?
  2. If such an order were void for lack of territorial jurisdiction, could parties upon whom it had been served lawfully flout it with impunity?
  3. Could the legal adviser of the company, acting on his opinion that the order was a nullity, assist (even by mere presence and silence) in holding the meeting in infringement of the order and thereby incur liability for contempt?
  4. Would the second respondent, who did not participate in the meeting, be guilty of contempt?
  5. Are the other respondents who participated in the meeting guilty of contempt?
  6. If any respondents are guilty of contempt, what would be the appropriate action to be taken against them?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted that the respondents deliberately flouted the interim injunction of the Court by convening/holding the extraordinary general meeting on 14-12-1964 despite being informed of the order.
  • The petitioner claimed that this conduct amounted to contempt of court and that the persons responsible should be punished for contumacy, and that the resolution passed at the meeting ought to be set aside as void.

First Respondent (Sri Ambal Mills (P) Ltd.)

  • Explained that the meeting was held notwithstanding the court's orders because of a furnished legal opinion that the interim injunction orders were null and void.

Second Respondent

  • Stated that he did not attend the meeting, disclaimed deliberate permission for the meeting to be convened, denied advising its holding, and denied any direct or indirect instigation of the meeting.

Third Respondent (Sri V. Ayyaswamy Naidu)

  • Admitted chairing and participating in the meeting, but said he genuinely believed, in light of the 11th respondent's written legal opinion, that the interim injunction order was without jurisdiction and therefore the meeting could be held.
  • Tendered an unconditional apology for any unwitting contempt he might have committed.

Other Participating Respondents (4–7, 9, 10, 12–17)

  • Their counter-affidavits followed an identical pattern: explanations of circumstances, claims of bona fides, and unconditional apologies for any unwitting contempt.

Eleventh Respondent (Advocate and Legal Adviser)

  • Explained that he examined the company's letter and papers, concluded the court lacked territorial jurisdiction (s.20(b), C.P.C.), and relied on authorities (including A.I.R. 1949 Lahore 131) to form a bona fide view that the injunction order was void.
  • Communicated that view to company representatives, attended the meeting though not a shareholder or director, did not participate in the meeting, and did not retract his opinion; he disclaimed any intention to disobey court orders or to connive in flouting them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.I.R. 1949 Lahore 131 Cited by the 11th respondent as one of the authorities he consulted in forming his view that the injunction was without jurisdiction. The court records that the 11th respondent relied on this authority when he concluded the interim order was a nullity; no further substantive application is recorded.
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Peswan, 1954 A.I.R. S.C. 340 Illustrates that defects in pecuniary jurisdiction (over- or undervaluation) are not to be treated as nullities; such defects do not amount to an assumption of jurisdiction that is void. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that lack of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction is not necessarily a fundamental nullity and can be cured; thus such orders are not automatically immune to contempt prosecution.
Kammaran Nambiar v. Valia Rammunni, 1938 A.I.R. Mad. 257 Observed that defects of jurisdiction (such as territorial or pecuniary) are not fundamental and are irregularities in the exercise of jurisdiction. Used to reinforce the distinction between curable jurisdictional defects and inherent lack of jurisdiction that vitiates an order absolutely.
State of U.P. v. Ratan Shukla, 1956 A.I.R. All. 259 Established that a court acting beyond its jurisdiction cannot necessarily be contemned with impunity; liability for contempt does not depend on whether the court was acting within its jurisdiction. Cited by the court to support the view that disobedience of an order cannot be excused merely because the issuing court may have lacked territorial jurisdiction.
Hira Kal v. Kali Natoi, 1962 A.I.R. S.C. 199 Distinguishes objection as to local jurisdiction (which can be waived) from incompetence or inherent lack of jurisdiction; orders passed despite possible local jurisdiction objections are not necessarily void in execution proceedings. Invoked to show that local/territorial jurisdiction objections can be waived and do not automatically render orders nullities, supporting the position that such orders must be obeyed unless inherently void.
Padam Sen v. State of U.P., 1961 A.I.R. S.C. 218 Example of an inherent lack of jurisdiction (trial court appointing a commissioner under s.151 C.P.C. where no such power exists) and the consequences thereof. Used by the court to delineate the category of cases where jurisdictional lack is inherent (and thus vitiates acts) as distinct from curable territorial/pecuniary defects.
M.Y. Shareef v. Dr. D.W. Kathalay, 1955 A.I.R. S.C. 19 Authorities emphasise that in response to a notice for contempt, one cannot both offer a legal justification and an apology together; the two are incompatible. The court cited the principle to explain that although respondents were guilty of contempt, their unconditional and sincere apologies could not be merged with a justificatory defence; the court accepted apologies as purging their contempt in the circumstances.
Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Ed., Vol. 8, Pt. I, §3(39)) and Oswald on Contempt (1910) Authority for the proposition that a stranger who aids and abets breach of a prohibitory order may be guilty of contempt; and that an order irregularly obtained is not a nullity and must be obeyed until discharged. The court relied on these authorities to support the conclusion that persons (including strangers to the suit) who knowingly participated in breaching a prohibitory order could be punished for contempt, and that irregular orders must still be obeyed until properly set aside.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first identified that the crucial legal distinction is between (a) defects of jurisdiction that do not go to the root of a court's powers (for example territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction), which are generally curable or waivable, and (b) an inherent lack of jurisdiction which goes to the organisation or scope of the court's power and which renders orders absolutely void.

The court reviewed authorities (Kiran Singh; Kammaran Nambiar; State of U.P. v. Ratan Shukla; Hira Kal; Padam Sen) to establish that mere absence of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction ordinarily does not proceed to the root of jurisdiction and is capable of being cured (by leave under s.20(b) C.P.C., by acquiescence, or other legal means). The court therefore treated a possible defect of territorial jurisdiction as not necessarily rendering the interim injunction a nullity for all purposes.

Applying these principles, the court held that even if the District Munsif might have lacked territorial jurisdiction on the face of the plaint, that circumstance did not permit the parties, with knowledge of the interim injunction, to flout it with impunity. Disobedience of a prohibitory order, when brought to a person's notice, would amount to contempt if done deliberately.

The court then applied these principles to the facts:

  • The second respondent was not present at the meeting and disclaimed instigation; there was no ex facie record proving his instigation. He was discharged from the contempt proceedings.
  • Other participating respondents had knowledge of the prohibitory order and participated despite that knowledge. The authorities establish that strangers who aid and abet such breaches can be guilty of contempt. However, the court found these respondents acted bona fide in reliance on the 11th respondent's legal opinion and tendered unconditional and sincere apologies. Given these facts and the explanations, the court accepted the apologies and discharged them from further proceedings.
  • The meeting and the resolutions passed at it were held in disobedience of the interim injunction and are therefore void; the court recorded that position.
  • Regarding the 11th respondent (the legal adviser): although his written advice denying territorial jurisdiction was bona fide and he had legitimately studied the papers and authorities, he attended the meeting and did not protest or voice apprehension that holding the meeting might amount to contempt. The court attributed this lapse largely to inexperience, accepted his unqualified apology, and discharged him from the proceedings.

The court expressly refrained from making any final pronouncement about cases involving an inherent lack of jurisdiction; it limited its conclusion to the distinction noted above and to the specific facts of this matter.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition:

  • The second respondent was discharged from the contempt proceedings because he did not participate and there was no prima facie material showing his instigation.
  • All other participating respondents (including respondent 3) were held to have committed contempt in participating in the meeting despite knowledge of the injunction, but the court accepted their unconditional apologies and discharged them; no further punitive action was taken against them.
  • The 11th respondent (the legal adviser/advocate) was discharged after the court accepted his unqualified apology, noting his bona fide written opinion and attributing his failure to protest at the meeting to inexperience.
  • The proceedings of the extraordinary general meeting and the resolutions passed at it were declared void because the meeting had been conducted in disobedience of the interim injunction; the court recorded that fact at law.
  • Costs: The petitioner was awarded his costs to be paid from the funds of the first respondent company.

Implications:

  • The court reaffirmed the principle, as applied in the opinion, that a mere lack of territorial (or pecuniary) jurisdiction does not automatically render a court's order a nullity in the sense that persons can disobey it with impunity; such orders are generally to be obeyed until set aside or cured by lawful process.
  • Persons who knowingly participate in breaching a prohibitory order (including strangers to the suit who aid and abet the breach) may be guilty of contempt. Nevertheless, the court in the present facts accepted unconditional apologies and discharged the respondents rather than impose punishment.
  • The court did not pronounce a definitive, all-encompassing rule about cases of inherent lack of jurisdiction; it distinguished those cases and left open points where inherent jurisdiction is lacking and might render an order a nullity.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the meeting and resolutions are void; no further punitive action was taken because apologies were accepted; costs were awarded to the petitioner from the company funds.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text.

    Nallah Senapathi Sarkarai Manradiar v. Sri Ambal Mills P. Ltd., & Others

    (Ananatanarayanan, O.C.J) — This proceeding is sought to be filed under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act against the respondents on record, of whom the first respondent is Sri Ambal Mills (Private) Ltd., a Company in Coimbatore, the second respondent is the Managing Director of the Company, the third respondent is another Director, and the eleventh respondent is an Advocate who is the legal adviser of the Company, The facts essential for an appreciation of the scope of this proceeding are simple, and, for the most part, not in controversy. It appears that the petitioner, who is a shareholder in this Company, holding 2,001 shares, instituted O.S 1441/64 in the court of the District Munsif, Coimbatore, against respondents 1 and 2 for a permanent injunction, restraining them from convening or conducting an extra ordinary general meeting which was to be held on 14—12— 1964 in pursuance of a notice issued by the second respondent. Along with the plaint, the petitioner filed I.A No. 1840 of 1964 for an interim injunction pending disposal of the suit, restraining respondents 1 and 2. The learned District Munsif, Coimbatore, made an order in open court for an interim injunction and notice returnable on 16-1-1965.

    At 4 P.M on that date (11-12-1964), the 11th respondent, viz., the advocate and legal adviser of this company, appeared in court, presented a vakalat and also an unnumbered application, requesting the court to advance the hearing of the application in which interim injunction had been directed to the 14th instant.

    It appears from the record that the extraordinary general meeting, the holding of which was inhibited by the interim injunction, had been convened for 9-30 a.m on 14-12-1964. That Court had issued two telegrams on 11-12-64 to respondents 1 and 2, informing them of the prohibitory orders. It is stated that learned counsel for the petitioner also sent similar telegrams. The petitioner himself went to the notified place of meeting at 9-30 a.m on 14-12-1964. He found several shareholders and Directors present, including respondents 3 to 6. Respondents 7 to 10 were also alleged to have been present. The third respondent (Sri V. Ayyaswamy Naidu, Director) occupied the chair, and the 11th respondent, the legal adviser, was by his side. The petitioner then informed those present of the exparte interim injunction directed by the orders of Court, and pointed out that holding and passing the contemplated resolution would amount to flouting the orders of Court and to contempt of court. In spite of this apparently due to an earlier written legal opinion furnished by the 11th respondent, concerning the validity and legal effect of the interim orders of injunction, the meeting was actually held, and the resolution passed. On these facts, and on the further fact that the petitioner himself entered his objections in writing in the Minutes Book on the occasion of the meeting, the petitioner claims that all the respondents have been guilty of contempt of court, since they deliberately flouted orders of Court, being very well aware of the facts of the prohibitory orders, that they should be suitably punished for their contumacy, and that the resolution passed at the extra-ordinary general meeting held on 14-12-1964 has to be set aside as void.

    These facts are adequate for a disposal of the proceedings, as far as the merits are concerned. We shall very briefly refer to the counter-affidavits of certain of the respondents. As far as the first respondent (Sri Ambal Mills (P) Ltd.) is concerned, the statement is that, in view of the furnished legal opinion that the orders of Court were null and void, the meeting already convened was held in spite of the orders. In the counter affidavits of respondents 2 and 3, there are further particulars. The second respondent did not attend the meeting, and he disclaims the averments that he deliberately permitted the meeting to be convened, and, at the same time, retrained from attendance; he did not, directly or indirectly, advise the holding of the meeting. The third respondent (Sri V. Ayyaswamy Naidu) admits the facts, broadly speaking, that we have set forth earlier. He concedes that he was the Chairman elected at the meeting; but he participated in the meeting, because he was genuinely of the view that, in the light of the written opinion of the legal adviser (11th respondent), the order of injunction was without jurisdiction, and the meeting could hence be held. He tenders an unconditional apology for any unwitting contempt of court that he might have committed. We are not referring to the counter affidavits of respondents 4 to 7, 9, 10 and 12 to 17 (respondent 8 having been subsequently exculpated), since they are upon an identical pattern, and, very tersely stated, all these counter affidavits explain the circumstances under which the meeting occurred, and these persons who participated therein claim bona fides, and make an unconditional apology for any unwitting contempt of court that they might have committed.

    The counter affidavit of the 11th respondent (legal adviser) alone requires some separate comment. The document is to the effect that the 11th Respondent had a letter from the Company for the examination of the matter of the interim injunction, along with the relevant documents, and he made a scrutiny; and found that the Court would have no territorial jurisdiction to pass any order, as the first respondent-company was not within the jurisdiction of the Court, and leave of Court had not been obtained under s. 20 (b), C.P.C, assuming that the second respondent (Defendant) was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court; nor had there been any acquiescence by the concerned defendant. The Advocate refers to certain authorities that he consulted, including the decision of the Full Bench in A.I.R 1949 Lahore, 131; he came to the bona fide and considered view that the order was without jurisdiction, and was hence void and a nullity. He communicated this view to the persons authorised to represent the Company. The Advocate concedes that he did attend the meeting, though he was neither a shareholder nor a Director, but he did not participate in the actual meeting. However he did not retract his opinion that the orders of injunction were null and void, since he bona fide thought so, and it is clear enough that he permitted the meeting to proceed without voicing any apprehension that the persons participating might, thereby, be guilty contempt of court. He disclaims all intention to disobey orders of court, or to connive in any manner at the flouting of an order of court. Finally, we may state that he was enrolled in 1957, and that his standing at the Bar dates from that year.

    Under these circumstances, and, as the matter was argued before us by learned counsel, several questions would appear to arise for our determination. Firstly, assuming that the ex-facie particulars in the plaint showed that the first defendant-company was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court of the District Munsif, and that neither leave of court had been granted under s. 20 (b), C.P.C, nor had the first defendant acquiesced in the assumption of jurisdiction by court, would the order of interim injunction passed by court thereby become void and a nullity ? Could such order be flouted, with impunity, by parties upon whom it had been served ? Could the legal adviser of the company, on the strength of his opinion that the order was a nullity, assist in the holding of the meeting in infringement of the order, at least to the extent of being present, and of not voicing a protest or apprehension that the holding of that meeting might amount to contempt of Court ? Would the second respondent, who did not participate in the meeting at all, be guilty of contempt ? Are the other respondents guilty of contempt, and is the 11th Respondent guilty of contempt, though not a party to orders of Court, because he abetted the commission of such contempt by others ? Finally, what would be the appropriate action to be taken if all or any of these respondents must be held guilty of contempt of Court?

    We have been at some pains to examine the law on this aspect of the flouting of an order of Court, which may be passed without territorial jurisdiction, for, it seems to us that this is of some importance, and cases might arise frequently in actual judicial administration. It seems to be abundantly clear that the question whether a Court has territorial jurisdiction or not, when one defendant indisputably resides within such jurisdiction and the other ex-facie does not, is primarily a question of fact for the court to decide. For instance, it may depend on such a matter of evidence, as the location of a particular mile-stone in relation to a house of business, or the house of a private individual. Even if such jurisdiction were altogether lacking, it could be clearly cured under s. 20 (b) C.P.C, either by an order of special leave of Court, or by the acquiescence of the concerned party. Where neither of these elements is available, we may assume that, prima facie, the Court has no territorial jurisdiction to exercise its powers over the concerned defendant, including a power to inhibit the acts of the defendant by an interim injunction. But we do think it is very important that a distinction should be made between a lack of jurisdiction which does not go to the root of the powers of Court, such as an absence of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, or an alleged absence in these respects, and a lack of jurisdiction which is basic to the very organisation of Court, or to the scope of its powers Authorities are available for the view that a mere absence of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction does not proceed to the root of the matter of jurisdiction and is capable of cure by acquiescence, by order of Court or, in other respects as provided for by law. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Peswan 1954 A.I.R.S.C 340 Their Lordships had to deal with the matter of pecuniary jurisdiction and the jurisdiction being affected by over-valuation or undervaluation; this was not to be treated as an assumption of jurisdiction which was null and void, and this is the principle underlying s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. The matter was considered at some length by Venkatasubba Rao J, in Kammaran Nambiar v. Valia Rammunni 1938 A.I.R MAD. 257 a Bench decision of this Court. The learned Judge has observed:

    “The principle that they (the provisions) appear to embody is that these defects of jurisdiction are not fundamental in character, and are no more than irregularities in the exercise of jurisdiction “

    The specific point whether flouting such an order of Court, though it may be lacking in pecuniary jurisdiction, with knowledge of the order and deliberately, would amount to a contempt or otherwise, was dealt with in State Of Uttar Pradesh…Applicant; v. Ratan Shukla…Opposite Party. 1956 A.I.R ALL. 259 where Desai, J., said:

    “It is not the law that a Court dealing with a matter which is beyond its jurisdiction can be contemned with impunity or that the liability of a person to be punished for contempt of a court depends upon whether the court was acting within its jurisdiction at the time when it is alleged to have been contemned”.

    Aagain in the decision of the Supreme Court in Hira Kal v. Kali Natoi 1962 A.I.R S.C 199 Their Lordships pointed out that objection as to local jurisdiction was different from an issue of competence of a Court, which is an inherent lack of jurisdiction. Objection as to local jurisdiction can be waived, and a decree passed under such circumstances of a possible absence of local jurisdiction cannot be challenged in execution proceedings as to its validity; only where inherent jurisdiction was lacking, could the decree be challenged in that manner. Another interesting decision which throws some light on the subject is Padam Sen v. State of U.P 1961 A.I.R S.C 218. That was a case in which the Court passed an order under s. 151, C.P.C, appointing a commissioner to seize account-books in the possession of the plaintiff on an application by the defendant, in a suit on a negotiable instrument. The Supreme Court pointed out that the court of trial has no such inherent power at all and that such a Commissioner appointed without jurisdiction was not a public servant under s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Obviously, this is an instance of an inherent lack of jurisdiction, and it has to be segregated from the quite different case of a mere lack of pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction, which does not proceed to the root of the power of the Court.

    In our view, therefore, and without expressing any final opinion upon the liability of the first defendant to be sued in the Court of the District Munsif, Coimbatore without re-course to the procedure under s. 20 (b) C.P.C even on the assumption that territorial jurisdiction was ex facie lacking, the interim order of injunction could by no means be flouted with impunity, by a party thereto, having knowledge of that order. On the contrary, such conduct would amount to deliberate contempt, of Court, and render that party liable for a contempt which affects the administration of justice., of course, we refrain from making any observation upon other cases, where there might be an absence of inherent jurisdiction in the Court, or such a point of view could be pleaded for; without expressing any final opinion, we might state that we are not here rejecting the argument of learned counsel that, where inherent jurisdiction itself is lacking, the order of court is a nullity, so that no contempt can be committed by the disregard or disobedience of such an order But it is interesting to note that the following observations occurs in Oswold on Contempt, 1910 page 107:

    “An order irregularly obtained cannot be treated as a nullity, but must be implicitly obeyed, until, by proper application, it is discharged.”

    We might immediately dispose of the case of the second respondent, before proceeding to the other instances. Since he was not a participant therein, and disclaims all intention to disobey the order of Court by instigating such a meeting, he has necessarily to be discharged in the absence of any ex-facie record proving his instigation. He is discharged accordingly.

    With regard to all the other respondents, including respondent 3, the fact is indisputable that they participated in the meeting, except the 11th respondent, whose case we shall consider separately, and that they had knowledge of the prohibitory orders of Court. It is not in dispute that a contempt of court might be committed even by a party who is not a party on record, in the order which is the subject of contempt. It is sufficient to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edition, Volume 8, Part I, Section 3, sub-section 39, (also see Oswald on Contempt, 1910 Edition page 106), which runs thus:

    “A stranger to an action who aids and abets the breach of a prohibitory order obstructs the course of justice, and this contempt is punishale by committal or attachment.”

    There are several English cases cited in the books in support of this authority. Hence, as far as these other respondents are concerned, they are undoubtedly guilty of contempt, whether they were parties to the order or otherwise, so long as it was brought to their notice that the meeting was prohibited, and, nevertheless, they participated in it. M.Y Shareef; v. Dr D.W Kathalay 1955 A.I.R S.C 19. Their Lordships have emphasised that in response to a notice for contempt, there cannot be both a justification and an apology, merged together. The two things are incompatibe, and an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence. In the present case, we are satisfied that the respondents, though guilty of contempt acted bona fide in participating in the meeting, apparently because of the legal opinion tendered by the 11th respondent, and again reinforced by his presence at the meeting without the utterence of any protest. We are satisfied that these respondents had no intention, or shadow of an intention, to deliberately flout the orders of Court, or to show any disrespect to judicial authority. We are further satisfied that those portions of their affidavits which relate to the actual details, are explanatory of their conduct and not a mere piece of justification in any of these cases. We are satisfied that their apology is unconditional and sincere, and that has been reinforced by arguments of learned counsel for these parties. In this view, we have come to the conclusion that the appropriate action, as far as these respondents are concerned, will be to accept the unconditional apology and to discharge them. No further action is called for, in the interests of justice with regard to their conduct. But most certainly, the proceedings of the meeting were void, the meeting itself having been conducted in disobedience of the interim injunction, and that will equally apply to the resolution or resolutions passed therein. We make a record to that effect; this situation at law has not been disputed by any of the learned counsel.

    Finally, we shall deal with the case of respondent 11, the Advocate who was the legal adviser of the Company. The legal advice that he tendered was in writing, and in response to a written request. We are fully satisfied that it was tendered by him bona fide, after a study of the papers and such authorities as he was able to consult. We do not think that it would be fair to tax this respondent with greater liability in the form of any possible acquiescence by the defendant-company in jurisdiction under s. 20(b) C.P.C merely because he (counsel) tendered a vakalat on the date of the order of interim injunction and filed an application for the advancement of the hearing. We may here add that the meeting to be held at 9-30 a.m on 14-12-1964 had been already notified, more than a month previously. Had matters stopped there, the 11th respondent would deserve an immediate discharge forthwith from these proceedings, without, any further comment. But the fact remains that he did attend the meeting, and did not raise any voice of protest against the conduct of the meeting; nor did he express an apprehension that the meeting might amount to contempt of court, and that it would be in the interests of the Company and persons present that it was not held at all. The 11th respondent is a young man, with a comparatively short experience at the Bar, and learned counsel have testified to his general sincerity and earnestness in the practice of his profession. We are fully satisfied that his somewhat imprudent conduct in not having advised those persons present against the holding of the meeting, must be attributed to his inexperience with regard to the running of such a hazard by his clients or others, and that he was entirely innocent of any intention either to flout the orders of Court, or to any disrespect of any kind to judicial authority. We are sure that the Advocate has now learnt, by this incident, a lesson of experience, which, we hope, will be of great value to him in future. With these observations, and accepting his unqualified apology also, we direct that he be discharged from these proceedings.

    The petitioner will have his costs, under the circumstances, from the funds of the first respondent company.

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    Nallah Senapathi Sarkarai Manradiar v. Sri Ambal Mills P. Ltd., & Others
    (Feb 3, 1965)