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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal instituted by the Management of United Bleachers (Private) Ltd., Mettupalayam, against the judgment of Veeraswami, J. in W.P. No. 129 of 1962 which quashed an award in I.D. No. 41 of 1961 made by the Labour Court, Coimbatore.

Relevant facts, stated in the opinion, are:

  • P. Krishnan was employed as a supervisor (shift supervisor) in the stitching department. By letter dated 3 October 1957 the management informed him that his post was abolished because both stitching machines were to be worked on the day-shift and the night-shift would be abolished.
  • The management offered P. Krishnan an alternative, lower post of helper. On 8 October 1957 the management terminated the services of C. Krishnan (then a helper) to create a vacancy for P. Krishnan. P. Krishnan declined to take the helper post and declined to accept a “show cause” notice; he was then dismissed.
  • P. Krishnan challenged the dismissal before the Labour Court and the Labour Court issued an award dated 10 March 1958 directing reinstatement.
  • A separate industrial dispute concerning the retrenchment of C. Krishnan (the helper) resulted in an award dated 15 May 1958 in favour of the workers. The coexistence of these awards caused implementation difficulties for the management.
  • There were prosecution proceedings (and an appeal) concerning alleged failure to implement an earlier award. The management was ultimately acquitted on appeal to the District and Sessions Judge.
  • Further industrial unrest and dismissals on 29 May 1958 led to additional disputes (e.g., I.D. No. 69 of 1958) and related litigation. Delay in reference and the question of laches were factual matters relied upon and debated in the proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dismissal/retrenchment of P. Krishnan was wrongful in breach of S. 25(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act (i.e., the “last in, first out” principle) and whether reinstatement is appropriate.
  2. Whether reinstatement could be ordered in an inferior category (helper) where the Labour Court recorded a concession by the worker but the vacancy was the subject of a separate industrial dispute.
  3. Whether the appellate court could consider laches/delay on certiorari when the Labour Court's award did not expressly deal with laches, and whether laches disentitles the worker to relief or to full back wages.
  4. To what extent delay between the occasion of dispute and the reference (or the delay in making the reference) affects entitlement to relief, particularly back wages.

Arguments of the Parties

Management's Arguments

  • The management contended retrenchment of P. Krishnan was technically justified if each separate section of supervisors in the stitching establishment were treated as an independent category.
  • The management argued laches and delay in raising the dispute (attributable to the worker/the Union) should disentitle the worker to relief or at least restrict relief (notably back wages).
  • The management asserted that it had raised the ground of laches in its affidavit before the Labour Court (paragraph 7) and that the Labour Court did not address this ground; therefore the learned Judge (Veeraswami J) erred in deciding issues founded on facts not appearing on the face of the award.
  • The management challenged the learned Judge’s direction to reinstate in the category of supervisor and to award full back wages, asserting laches should limit relief on the facts.

Union's (Workmen's) Arguments

  • The Union argued that, following established decisions, delay or laches in making the reference is not relevant and should not bar relief once an industrial dispute has been referred under S. 10.
  • The Union explained that the delay was occasioned by intervening criminal proceedings relating to alleged failure of the management to implement an earlier award, and by subsequent mass dismissals and agitation.
  • It was contended that once retrenchment is held wrongful (and therefore an unfair practice), reinstatement and relief should follow irrespective of delay or whether the worker had worked elsewhere.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vedachala Mudaliar v. Central Road Traffic Board (Madras) On certiorari the court cannot take notice of facts which do not appear on the face of the order (authority cited; references to Halsbury and King v. Liston). The court relied on this to conclude that the learned Judge could not properly dispose of the ground of laches by relying on facts outside the award; instead the Labour Court must address the matter unless laches is irrelevant as a matter of law.
King v. Liston (reference authority) Support for the proposition that certiorari courts should not rely on facts not appearing on the face of the order. Used as supporting authority (via Vedachala Mudaliar) to restrict the appellate court from deciding factual issues not present on the award.
Swadesamitran Ltd. v. Their Workmen Where retrenchment is unjustified, the court shapes relief (including reinstatement) irrespective of considerations such as employer convenience or that the workman may have been employed elsewhere. The court referred to this authority for the proposition that illegality of retrenchment can warrant relief even despite intervening events; however, applicability depends on facts and other authorities.
Shalimar Works Limited v. Workmen A converse instance where relief was declined after an unreasonable delay (a lapse of four years without particulars) — shows delay can in special circumstances disentitle relief. The court treated this decision as illustrating that, in some cases, unreasonable and unjustified delay is a relevant factor that may justify declining relief.
Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva Distinction regarding S. 33(c)(2) and that limitation/limitative considerations generally cannot be introduced to disentitle execution of an award; limitation must be by legislation. The court noted that limitation should not be imported as a factor to deny relief in execution of awards unless legislatively provided; used this to caution against treating delay as an automatic disqualification.
Management of Chandramalai Estate v. Its Workmen The Supreme Court held that a delay in raising a dispute (in that case, claims relating to 1949–1953 raised by workmen only in 1955) was not sufficient to decline relief. Used to support the view that delay per se is not necessarily an adequate ground to deny relief — context and facts matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual analyses anchored to the record:

  1. On the primary issue of retrenchment, the Labour Court had concluded that dismissal of P. Krishnan was wrongful for failure to observe S. 25(g) (the "last in, first out" principle). The management's narrower categorisation argument (treating separate sections of supervisors as independent categories) was specifically rejected by the Labour Court.
  2. The Labour Court, however, directed reinstatement in the inferior category (helper) because of a concession by P. Krishnan that he would accept such employment. The appellate judge (Veeraswami J) concluded that reinstatement in the helper category could not be ordered because the vacancy arose from dismissal of C. Krishnan, a matter already the subject of a separate industrial dispute and award; on the Labour Court's finding that the supervisor post should not have been retrenched, reinstatement should relate to the post actually occupied.
  3. The question of laches/delay was central: the management had pleaded laches in its affidavit (paragraph 7), but the Labour Court's award contained no explicit treatment of laches. The court invoked Vedachala Mudaliar and the principle that, on certiorari, a court should not decide facts not disclosed on the face of the order. Consequently, unless laches is legally irrelevant, the Labour Court must be directed to consider the objection on the merits.
  4. The court reviewed authorities showing divergent outcomes: some decisions (e.g., Swadesamitran Ltd.) support relief despite delay where retrenchment is wrongful; others (e.g., Shalimar Works) show delay may be decisive in special circumstances. Bombay Gas Co. emphasizes that limitation should not be imported to deny execution of an award unless provided by statute. Chandramalai Estate indicates delay alone may not suffice to deny relief.
  5. Synthesising these authorities, the court held that delay between the occasion of dispute and the raising of the dispute can be relevant (notably for the quantum of back wages), but delay as such is not invariably dispositive. Whether delay disentitles a workman to reinstatement or back wages depends on the length of delay, the factual reasons for it, and the degree of negligence attributable to organised labour — matters for the Labour Court to resolve upon the record.
  6. The court concluded that the direction of payment of back wages up to the date the dispute was raised was a matter primarily for the Labour Court and could not be sustained by the appellate court on facts outside the award.

Holding and Implications

Core ruling:

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART

The court made the following specific orders and immediate consequences for the parties (direct effects only, stated as in the opinion):

  • The finding of the Labour Court that the retrenchment of P. Krishnan was illegal will stand.
  • Reinstatement must be considered with regard to the post from which the worker was retrenched — namely, the supervisor post in the relevant category; reinstatement into the inferior category (helper) was not to be directed by the appellate court because that vacancy related to a separate dispute.
  • The claim for back wages cannot be defeated simply because the worker obtained other employment in the interim — the Labour Court had made specific factual findings on that point. However, the appellate court set aside the direction concerning payment of back wages up to the date the dispute was raised and held that the question of back wages must be confined to the period from discharge until the date the dispute was raised by the Union; the Labour Court must determine such back wages on the facts and in accordance with applicable principles.
  • Whether delay or laches on the part of organised labour disentitles the worker to reinstatement or back wages (or limits either) is a question left to the Labour Court to decide on the record, applying the guiding authorities referenced in the opinion.
  • Procedural consequence: parties will not be permitted to file additional pleadings in the remitted proceedings, but they are permitted to adduce additional evidence if they so desire.
  • The sum of Rs. 2,250 paid pendente lite to the worker will "abide the ultimate decision of the Labour Court," which will also determine any liability for repayment.

The opinion confines its pronouncements to the direct effects on the parties and remits contested factual determinations (notably laches and the precise quantum and period of back wages) to the Labour Court. The judgment applies and discusses prior authorities but does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond the principles synthesised from those authorities.

    The Management Of United Bleachers Private, Ltd., Metttupalayam v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore.

    (Delivered by Anantanarayanan, Offg. C.J)

    This is an appeal instituted by the Management of the United Bleachers (Private) Ltd. Mettupalayam, from the judgment of Veeraswami, J. in W.P No. 129 of 1962, which itself was a proceeding for the issue of a writ of certiorari, quashing the award in I.D No. 41 of 1961 on the file of the Labour Court, Coimbatore. The facts have to be set forth; first, with some precision and care, for a proper appreciation of the true scope of controversy before us. For the purpose of the disposal of this appeal, we are segregating certain essential facts alone for notice, and disregarding others. One P. Krishnan, employed as a workman in the organisation of the appellant institution, in a particular capacity of a supervisor of a shift, in the stitching department, was informed by a letter of the management; dated 3rd October, 1957, that his post was abolished. This was in consequence of a decision by the Management to work both stitching machines during the day-shift, and to abolish the night-shift. In order to lessen the hardship to the worker he was offered an alternative job of a helper in the same department, admittedly, a different and lower category. On 8th October, 1957, the Management terminated the services of another werker, C. Krishnan, in that lower category, so as to provide P. Krishnan with the employment offered. P. Krishnan declined, on 8th October, 1957, to leave his post of supervisor in the Stitching section, and to work as a helper. He also declined, according to the Management to receive a “show cause” notice for alleged misconduct. He was then dismissed from service, and a dispute was raised on this issue, which was the subject matter of a proceeding before the lower Court. It ended in an award dated 10th March, 1958, directing P. Krishnan to be reinstated in service.

    Meanwhile, the workers comprising the Union had taken up the question of the retrenchment of C Krishnan, in the inferior category of helper, on the ground that this was not justified. That separate industrial dispute also ended in favour of the contention of labour, and the lower Court gave an award to that effect, dated 15th May, 1958. According to the management, they then found themselves in a real difficulty in implementing the two awards, because the cumulative effect of the awards was that the Management could not offer the post of the helper to P. Krishnan, but had to retain or reinstate C. Krishnan, while the management was compelled to continue P. Krishnan as a supervisor in the stitching section, according to them, a post which ought to be retrenched in the interests of economy. Some correspondence followed, into the details of which we need not here enter. One matter stands clear, and that is that the award of the labour Court with regard to P. Krishnan was not implemented, according to the contents of Labour (I.D No. 1 of 1958) and that there were certain proceedings in consequence, a prosecution of the management under a relevant section of law, in the Court of the District Magistrate, Coimbatore. They resulted in a conviction; but on an appeal to the District and Sessions Judge, the Management was acquitted; throughout, the claim of the management was that there was no intentional failure to implement the award. On 29th May, 1958, the management dismissed a large number of workers of the establishment for alleged participation in a strike, and that gave rise to a third industrial dispute I.D No. 69 of 1958. That culminated in certain writ proceedings, and a pending writ appeal. According to the case of the Union, the delay in making the reference by the Sate Government, in the present industrial dispute, was on account of these circumstances, as we shall see later, the question of delay is one of the relevant facts in the present proceedings.

    The Labour Court held, by the award which was the subject of the writ petition before the learned Judge (Veeraswami J) that the dismissal of P. Krishnan, whose case alone now concerns us, was wrongful for failure of the Management to observe the provisions of S. 25 (g) of the Act, which relates to the principle of retrenchment that the last to come, or to be employed, must be the first to go, and that retrenchment can only be in that order. We might here conveniently note that the Management attempted to raise the argument that every separate section of supervisors in the Stitching establisment should be considered as an independent category, in which case the retrenchment of P. Krishnan could be technically justified. The Labour Court specifically overruled this contention, and came to the conclusion that dismissal of P. Krishnan was wrongful. But, curiously enough, the logical consequence of this conclusion was not embodied in the award, owing to one circumstance. It appears that, during proceedings in the Labour Court, there was an admission by P. Krishnan, or at least a concession, that he would be willing to be employed as a helper in the inferior category, even if he could not be reinstated in the grade of supervisor; the Labour Court hence directed the reinstatement of P. Krishnan, in the category of helper.

    In substance, Veeraswami J. held and, if we may say so with respect, justifiably on the record—that there could be no reinstatement of P. Krishnan, directed, with regard to the inferior category of helper. Actually that would complicate matters a great deal, for, the vacancy in that category was created by the dispensation of the Service of C. Krishnan, which has led to an independent industrial dispute, culminating in the award Once the Labour Court held that P. Krjshnnan was wrongly dismissed with regard to the post of supervisor, it followed that the erroneously retrenched employee would have to be reinstated in the post that he was occupying; the repurcussions of that measure on other persons in the same grade, would have to be worked out, and cannot concern the Court. But, with regard to one important ground raised by the management, viz, that the laches and negligence of the worker or the Union in advancing this industrial dispute, constituted a factor for consideration of Court, entitling the management to plead that, on that account, no relief should be given, the learned judge overruled the argument, upon considerations which find no place in the award itself. It is pleaded by learned Counsel on behalf of the management (Sri V. Thyagarajan) (1) that the question of laches is relevant, and, not merely this, but an adequate factor under certain circumstances which will disentitle the worker to any relief; (2) that this ground was specifically put forward by the Management in their affidavit in the Labour Court; (3) that this ground has not been referred to by the Labour Court anywhere, in its award; (4) that therefore, the learned Judge (Veeraswami J) was in error in referring to a matter which does not appear ex facie in the award, in canvassing facts not comprised in the award, and in condoning the laches as a consequence, and (5) that, similarly the learned Judge was in error in directing not merely the restoration of the worker in the category of supervisor, but also the payment of the entire back wages; the contention is that, on the aspect of back wages, the factor of laches or delay will be crucial.

    Per contra: learned counsel for the Union, Mr. Dolia, argues that on the strength of certain decisions which we shall immediately refer to, the aspect of laches or delay in making the reference cannot at all be relevant, and ought not to impede the court in granting relief. The argument of learned counsel is that delay occurred under circumstances of the criminal proceedings that we have earlier referred to, in the wake of the alleged failure of the management to implement the earlier award. Not merely this; but there was also the matter of the dispensation of the services of a number of workmen for an alleged strike and the agitation by organised labour in consequence. It is strenuously contended that, once, after the failure of conciliation, there is an industrial dispute raised by a reference made by the State Government under S. 10, the question of anterior laches or delay cannot be canvassed at all. It was also contended that the learned Judge was not in error in traversing facts not strictly appearing in the record, for the purpose of dealing with this matter of laches or delay. Authorities are cited for the proposition that, once it has been held that retrenchment was wrongful and that S. 25 (g) was infringed, this constitutes an use of the power of retrenchment, mala fide or as an “unfair trade practice”, which would entitle the workmen to reinstatement, irrespective of delay and whether the workman has found alternative employment elsewhere. We might briefly deal with the authorities on this aspect, to which our attention has been drawn before finally disposing of the writ appeal itself. In our view, the appeal seems to require only a certain clarification, in the light of the direction made by the learned Judge for reinstatement of the worker in the category of “supervisor,” and payment of back wages.

    In Vedachala Mudaliar v. Central Road Traffic Board, Madras(1) a Bench of Raja mannar C.J and Satyanarayana Rao J. held that it was well established that, in certiorari, the court could not take notice of any fact “which does not appear on the face of the order”. The authorities cited for this decision are Halsbury's Laws of England. Vol. IX page 889 and the King v. Liston.(2) Certainly we do not find in the Award itself any specific treatment of the question of laches, though there is one somewhat oblique reference. Equally, we must accept the contention of the management that, in paragraph 7 of the affidavit, the management did submit that the delay and laches on the part of the Union in raising the dispute, disentitled the worker to any relief. Under those circumstances, this much at least seems clear to us that, unless it can be shown as a question of law that the ground of laches is altogether irrelevant, it is the Labour Court that must now be directed to deal with that objection, upon the merits; the learned Judge could not really dispose of this ground on facts outside the award itself, and not specifically adverted to therein.

    Turning to decisions upon the question of the relevance of laches or delay, the first that may be cited is Swadesamitran Ltd v. Their workmen That is also a decision cited by the labour Court, and there is actually an extract from that judgment in the award. The decision is authority for the view that, once it is found that retrenchment was unjustified and improper, the Court alone is clothed with the duty of shaping the necessary relief, such as reinstatement, irrespective of other considerations like the convenience of the employer, the fact that he has engaged other workmen who might be affected, the lengthy nature of the litigation in regard to the dispute, or the fact that the workman himself has been employed elsewhere in the meantime. In Shalimar Works Limited v. Workmen we have what would appear to be a converse case of relief declined on the ground that the industrial dispute relating to non-employment of certain dismissed workmen was referred for adjudication after a lapse of four years, without specifying the names of the concerned workmen; but, indisputably, the facts appear to be quite special, and it is difficult to spell out any general proposition of law from the case. All that can be said is that, under such circumstances of unreasonable and unjustified delay in raising the dispute, that would be a relevant factor for the consideration of Court, and might even entitle the Court to decline relief altogether. The last case is Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva(3). That case really relates to S. 33 (c) (2) of the Act, and it makes a distinction between a claim under that provision of law, and other claims like a claim for bonus. Where a claim under S. 33 (c) (2) is in question, which was based in the case on an Award and intended as a mere execution of that Award, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that limitation cannot be introduced as a factor disentitling relief, on any academic ground of social justice. If limitation it to enter into the picture at all, it could only be by legislative enactment. The dicta in Management of Chandramalai Estate v. Its Workmen(4), are also relavant here, for, the Supreme Court held, on the facts of that case, that the mere circumstance that the workmen did not raise a dispute till 1955, though the arrears of allowance related to the period 1949 to 1953, was not a sufficient ground for declining relief.

    It appears to us that an analysis of these decisions leads to the conclusion that, while the time that subsequently elapses, once the industrial dispute has been raised, would, of course, be quite irrelevant in the consideration of relief, the delay that might have occurred between the occasion for the dispute, and the agitation or complaint by labour which leads to the reference, might be one relevant circumstance in shaping itself. For instance, it would have an obvious and indisputable significance with regard to the matter of the period for which tha worker, even if the Management is to be directed to reinstate him, might be entitled to back wages. But, while the ground of delay is relevant, there are decisions of the Supreme Court wherein delay per se has not been held to be any adequate ground for deelining relief, particularly where the dismissal or retrenchment is illegal, and, therefore, amounts to an ‘unfair trada practice’. But it is clear that everything will depend on the period of delay, the facts which occasioned the delay, and the degree of negligence with which organised labour could be rightly taxed. We agree that this is entirely a matter for the Labour Court to decide, upon the facts, and in the light of the guiding principles to be found in the authorities. When the ground was raised in the everments of the record, and the Labour Court did not deal with the ground, this Court would really have no jurisdiction to proceed with it in a matter of certiorari, and to hold that laches did not disentitle the concerned party to relief. Equally, the direction with regard to payment of back wages upto the time that the dispute was raised, would have to be set aside, as that is a matter primarily for the decision of the Labour Court.

    Under the circumstances, we dismiss thi appeal, subject to certain modifications of tha directions in the judgment of Veeraswami J. The finding that the retrenchment is illegal will stand. The relief of reinstatement has necessarily to be considered with regard to the post from which the worker was retrenched, namely, of supervisor in the concerned category. The claim for back wages cannot be questioned, on the ground that the concerned worker was employed elsewhere, or was engaged in other business during the period of his non-employment, for, we find that evidence was adduced, and there is a specific conclusion of fact of the Labour Court on that aspect. In the release of the proceedings occasioned by the judgment of the learned Judge, the parties will not be entitled to file any additional pleadings; but they will be entitled to adduce additional evidence, if desired. The question of back wages will have to be confined to the period from the date of the discharge of the worker till the date on which the dispute was raised by the Union; with regard to the subsequent period, there is really no room for controversy. The question whether there was delay or laches on the part of organised labour and whether this would disentitle the concerned worker to the relief either of reinstatement or of back wages or of both must be left to the decision of the Labour Court, upon the facte of record, and the principles applicable, as set forth in the authorities of the available case law. We have already referred to certain of the decisions cited before us. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part.

    The amount of Rs. 2250 paid to the worker towards back wages under directions of this Court pendente lite will abide the ultimate decision of the Labour Court, and its award as to any liability for repayment.

    V.C.S

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    The Management Of Un... v. The Presiding Office...
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