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  • section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
  • sub-section (2) of section 12;
  • section 10(2)(iii) or 12(2)
  • section 10(2)(iii)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
  • sub-section (2) of section 12;
  • section 10(2)(iii) or 12(2)
  • section 10(2)(iii)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from references made under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act concerning interest deductions claimed by the registered firm Messrs. Roopchand Chabildass & Sons and by its two partners, Milapchand R. Shah and Punamchand R. Shah. The firm carried on manufacture and sale of wheat and gram products, a flour-mill business and also engaged in money-lending. In October 1954 the partners transferred their flour-mill business (including building, machinery, plant and goodwill) to a limited company floated by them, South India Flour Mills Ltd., for Rs. 6,55,000 satisfied by allotment of shares (each partner credited with Rs. 1,87,500 as goodwill and debited with Rs. 3,27,500).

The firm had advanced money to another firm of the same name at Sangali (the "Sangali firm") and was owed Rs. 1,28,378; the Sangali firm had closed in 1948. The firm also paid Income-tax on behalf of the partners (kept in a separate account). For assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 the firm claimed interest deductions (Rs. 86,152 and Rs. 86,325 respectively) but the Income-tax Officer disallowed Rs. 76,675 (1958-59) and Rs. 74,496 (1959-60). The partners similarly claimed interest deductions of Rs. 38,338 each should the firm's claim be disallowed.

On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal confirmed the disallowances, concluding that the firm had stopped the flour-mill business after 1954, that borrowings were diverted for non-business purposes (including payment of partners' income-tax and advances to partners and to the Sangali firm), and that advances to partners were not part of the firm's business. The firm requested the Tribunal to state a case and the Tribunal referred specific legal questions of law for decision.

There is also reference to an earlier reference decided by this Court (Milapchand R. Shah v. Commissioner of Income-tax) dealing with the assessment year 1957-58, in which this Court had confirmed the Tribunal's decision on similar grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the disallowance of an interest payment of Rs. 76,675 or any part thereof in respect of the assessment year 1958-59 and the disallowance of an interest payment of Rs. 74,496 or any part thereof in respect of the assessment year 1959-60 was right in law?
  2. Whether the sum of Rs. 38,338 or any part thereof out of Rs. 76,675 paid by the firm of Roopchand Chabildass and Sons was allowable as a deduction under section 10(2)(iii) or section 12(2) in the assessment of the assessee (i.e., in the individual assessments of the partners)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee / Assessee's Counsel

  • Contended that the Tribunal's observation that "substantial portion of the earlier borrowing was for the purpose of this business" should lead to allowance of the interest payments claimed by the firm, relying on the Court's previous observations and on the decision in A. L. A. R. Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax for the proposition that interest on borrowed capital may be allowable even when the capital is lost, if the borrowing in origin was for the business and interest was in fact paid.
  • Argued that the partners should be able to claim deductions in their individual assessments (under section 10(2)(iii)) in any event, even if the firm's claim failed.
  • Advanced a claim (for the first time in the 1958-59 and 1959-60 assessments) that interest paid by them on loans advanced by the firm to the partners to enable purchase of shares allotted by South India Flour Mills Ltd. was deductible under section 12(2).
  • Contended before the revenue authorities that the loss represents excess of business receipts of the firm and that debits of losses to partners' accounts should not be considered non-business expenditure (this contention was treated as a fresh point involving new facts and was not considered by the revenue authorities).

Revenue / Income-tax Officer / Tribunal

  • Found that the firm had effectively stopped its flour-mill business after its sale in 1954 and that borrowings were diverted to non-business purposes (notably payment of Income-tax on behalf of the partners and advances to partner accounts and to the Sangali firm).
  • Held that moneys advanced to the Sangali firm (in which the partners were substantially interested) and advances to partners for payment of share value were not in the course of the firm's business.
  • Concluded that the interest debited in partners' individual accounts related to moneys used by partners personally, that partners were not charged interest in practice for those advances, and that these entries were not genuine liabilities of the partners to the firm.
  • Characterised the interest claimed as illusory and colourable on the materials: the borrowed capital had been used for non-business and personal purposes and the firm was not carrying on the flour-mill business during the relevant period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A. L. A. R. Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax The proposition (as cited by the assessee) that interest on borrowed capital may be allowable if the capital was in origin borrowed for the purpose of the assessee's business and interest was in fact paid, even if the capital was subsequently lost or not available during the assessment year. The Court explained and distinguished this authority: the rule cannot be applied where money was borrowed but never utilised for the purpose of the business except to a small extent and never even intended to be used for business. The Court required that it be shown that the money was in fact borrowed for the purpose of the business by evidence of its use; absent such use, interest on the unutilised portion cannot be allowed.
Milapchand R. Shah v. Commissioner of Income-tax (prior reference under s.66(2)) Applied to decide the assessment year 1957-58, confirming Tribunal's conclusion that the firm had ceased money-lending business, advances to partners were not in the course of business, the partners utilised borrowed capital for personal purposes, and partners were not charged interest. The Court relied on the reasoning and outcome of that prior reference in assessing the present years: the same principles (cessation of business, diversion of borrowed funds, absence of real charging of interest) supported disallowance of interest and rejection of partners' individual claims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the matter by focusing on the factual use of borrowed money and the character of entries in the firm's and partners' accounts. The essential analytical steps the Court followed (as stated in the opinion) are:

  1. Examination of the factual matrix: the sale of the flour-mill business in 1954 to a company floated by the partners; the allocation of shares to partners; advances by the firm to the Sangali firm (which had closed in 1948); and payments of Income-tax by the firm on behalf of the partners.
  2. Consideration of the Tribunal's observation that a "substantial portion of the earlier borrowing was for the purpose of this business" and the assessee's reliance on the Court's previous decision and on A. L. A. R. Brothers. The Court revisited its prior reasoning and the applicability of that authority.
  3. Distinction of A. L. A. R. Brothers: the Court emphasised that even if the test relates to the position at the time of borrowing, it must be shown that the money was actually utilised for the business at some point; if no such use is shown, interest on the portion never utilised cannot be allowed. The Court held that this was precisely where the assessee-firm's case failed.
  4. Review of the Tribunal's specific factual findings for the later years: after the transfer of the flour-mill business the borrowed money was not shown to have been used in any other business activity of the firm; substantial loans had been diverted to partners' accounts to pay Income-tax and meet liabilities of the Sangali firm; partners had effectively used firm funds to enable payment for shares in the company floated by themselves.
  5. Assessment of the bona fides of the interest entries: the Court observed that the firm did not in practice treat advances as charged with interest until after the firm's deduction was disallowed; the debits in partners' accounts were not genuine liabilities enforceable against the partners and thus were not proper expenditures of the partners nor proper liabilities of the firm.
  6. Application of legal tests for the statutory provisions invoked: for section 10(2)(iii) the Court noted that allowance relates to interest paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of business; the partners' use of firm funds for personal investments or purchase of property does not transform those withdrawals into borrowings for the partners' business. For section 12(2) the Court set out the four conditions required for a deduction under that provision (expenditure solely for purpose of making/earning income, not capital in nature, not personal, incurred in the accounting year) and found those conditions unsatisfied in relation to advances enabling partners to buy shares.
  7. Conclusion drawn from the facts and legal tests: the interest claimed by the firm was "illusory and colourable" because the firm had effectively ceased the flour-mill business, and the borrowed capital was diverted to non-business and personal uses; therefore the firm was not entitled to the interest deduction for the years in question. The partners' claims were rejected for the same reasons: the partners could not convert firm borrowings used for their own purposes into deductible interest under section 10(2)(iii), and the claimed interest entries did not meet the requirements of section 12(2).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered all references in favour of the department and against the assessee. The interest claims of the firm for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 were disallowed, and the partners' claims in their individual assessments under section 10(2)(iii) and section 12(2) were rejected. The decision was made with costs; counsel's fee ordered: one set Rs. 250.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The firm's claimed interest deductions for the specified years are disallowed and the partners' corresponding claims are rejected. Costs and a counsel fee were awarded in favour of the department.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies and reiterates the legal principle that to allow an interest deduction on borrowed capital the origin and actual utilisation of the funds for the business must be demonstrated; interest on sums never utilised for the business cannot be allowed. The Court distinguished A. L. A. R. Brothers where the funds were at least shown to have been borrowed for business purposes and/or used for that purpose at some time.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish any broader novel rule beyond applying existing principles to the facts; its effect is to reinforce the requirement that borrowed funds must be shown to have been used for business purposes (not diverted to personal uses) before interest deduction is permitted.

End of summary — prepared strictly from materials contained in the provided opinion.

    Roopchand Chabildass & Sons And Others v. Commissioner Of Income Tax Madras.

    - These are references under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The facts out of which the references arise are the followin : The assessee in T. C. No. 7 of 1963 is a registered firm, Messrs. Roopchand Chabildass & Sons, who will hereinafter be referred to as the firm. It consist of two partners, Milapchand R. Shah and Punamchand R. Shah, who are the assessee in T. C. Nos. 9 of 1963 and 14 and 37 of 1963, respectively. The firm was carrying on business in the manufacture and sale of wheat and gram products and also in money-lending. In the month of October, 1954, the said two partners of the firm transferred their flour mills business together with the building, machinery and plant including the goodwill to a limited company floated by the partners themselves called the South India Flour Mills Ltd. for a consideration of Rs. 6,55,000. The consideration was satisfied by the allotment of shares in the company. The partners were each debited with Rs. 3,27,500. Each partner was credited with his share of the goodwill amounting to Rs. 1,87,500. The two partners were also partners in another firm of the same name at Sangali, which will hereafter be called the Sangali firm. The assessee-firm advanced moneys to the Sangali firm with the result the Sangali firm owed the assessee-firm to the extent of Rs. 1,28,378. The Sangali firm closed its business in the year 1948. Further, this firm paid Income-tax on behalf of the partners which was kept in a separate account. Thus, for the years 1958-59 and 1959-60, the firms liability on which it paid interest was Rs. 10,75,228 and Rs. 9,67,675 respectively. It was for these amounts the assessee-firm claimed interest payments amounting to Rs. 86,152 and Rs. 86,325. The Income-tax Officer disallowed a sum of Rs. 76,675 for the assessment year 1958-59 and similarly, another sum of Rs. 74,496 for the assessment year 1959-60. Similarly, the two partners claimed in their individual assessments a deduction of interest amounting to Rs. 38,338 each, in case the interest payment by the firm was disallowed for the said assessment years.

    The main grounds of the authorities for disallowing the interest claim by the firm were due to the finding that the firm stopped its flour mill business from 1954, that the borrowings made by the firm were diverted for non-business purposes such as payment of income-tax on behalf of the partners of the firm, that the moneys advanced to the Sangali firm in which the partners were virtually the same was not in the course of the business of the firm, that a perusal of the accounts showed that the firm was taking steps to recover old advances with a view to close down the business, that the interest debited in the individual accounts of the partners was for moneys advanced to the partners themselves, that it was not the business of the firm to advance loans to it partners and that in no sense of the term could the moneys debited to the partners be taken as advances for interest. On further appeal, the Tribunal also found that the flour-mill business of the firm was sold with its goodwill in 1954 to a limited company for a consideration of Rs. 6,55,000 and the said consideration did not go into the firms account to reduce its liability. There was nothing on record to show that, after the transfer of the flour-mill business, the borrowed money was diverted to some other business activity of the firm; on the other hand, substantial amounts of loans had been diverted to the partner accounts to pay Income-tax and to meet the liabilities of the Sangali firm in which they were substantially interested. For these reasons, the Tribunal confirmed the finding Appellate Assistant Commissioner and rejected the claim of the firm. The assessee-firm requested the Tribunal to state a case, and inasmuch as in the opinion of the Tribunal a question of law did arise out of its order, the Tribunal has referred the following question of law in T. C. No. 7 of 1963 :

    "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the disallowance of an interest payment of Rs. 76,675 or any part thereof in respect of the assessment year 1958-59 and the disallowance of an interest payment of Rs. 74,496 or any part thereof in respect of the assessment year 1959-60 was right in law ?"

    Similarly in T. C. Nos. 9, 14 and 37 of 1963, the question referred to us for decision is :

    "Whether the sum of Rs. 38,338 or any part thereof out of Rs. 76,675 paid by the firm of Roopchand Chabildass and Sons was allowable as a deduction under section 10(2)(iii) or 12(2) in the assessment of the assessee ?"

    The firm as well as its partners made a similar claim of interest payment in their return for the assessment year 1957-58. The Income-tax Officer, for the same reasons mentioned above, disallowed a sum of Rs. 71,500. The Tribunal also held that the bulk of the borrowings was utilised for the purpose other than that of the business of the firm. When the matter was finally referred to this court under section 66(2) of the Act in Milapchand R. Shah v. Commissioner of Income-tax, a Bench of this court, to which one of us was a party, confirmed the decision of the Tribunal on the ground that, though the firm was doing some money-lending business at the beginning, during the relevant year it had ceased to do that business, that the major part of the amount was advanced to the partners of the firm themselves, that the advances made to the partners were not in the course of business activities of the firm, that the partners of the firm utilised the borrowed capital for their own purposes and that the partners of the firm were not charged interest for the moneys advanced to them by the firm. In the course of the arguments in that reference, learned counsel for the assessee cited the decision in A. L. A. R. Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax for the proposition of law that it could not be said that the capital which had been borrowed was employed for the purpose of business and was employed in the business for its purposes until it was lost and that never the less interest had to be paid on it and therefore the test was not whether it continued to be available for the purpose of the business during the year of assessment but whether it was in its origin money borrowed as capital for the assessees business and whether interest was in fact paid on that borrowed capital (existing or lost) during the year of assessment. There we sufficiently explained that it was obviously impossible to apply that decision to a case where money was borrowed but never utilised for the purpose of the business except to a small extent and never even intended to be used for the purpose of the business. We observed thus :

    ".... even giving full weight to that decision, it has yet to be established that the money was in fact borrowed for the purpose of business and that could be shown only by the use of the money, whether in the particular account year or during an earlier period....

    We are of the view that, though the test should relate to the position as at the time of the borrowing, if it is not shown that the money had been utilised for some time, at least some point of time, for the purpose of the business, the interest paid on that portion of the sum borrowed, which was never utilised, cannot possibly be allowed. It is precisely upon this point that the case of the assessee-firm breaks down."

    Now, when the matter came up before the Tribunal for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60, the Tribunal, while confirming the order of the revenue authorities, made an observation :

    ".... We have no doubt that substantial portion of the earlier borrowing was for the purpose of this business."

    Learned counsel for the assessee contended that the Tribunal having given the above finding should have allowed the interest payments claimed by the firm on the basis of the observations of this court in the previous reference. We have carefully gone through the Tribunals order. The Tribunal has observed that it was not shown to them that, after the transfer of the business, the borrowed money was diverted to some other business activity of the assessee and that, on the other hand, substantial amounts of the loans had been diverted to the partners accounts to pay Income-tax and to meet the liabilities of a firm in which they were substantially interested. Further, it is common case that the firm was carrying on wheat and gram products and also flour-mill business. In the year 1954, the partners of the firm sold away the flour-mill business. In effect, the firm as such was not carrying on business in flour-mill. The partners of the assessee-firm were also the partners of the Sangali firm. In 1948, the Sangali firm closed the business. The assessee firm attempted to treat the advances made to the Sangali firm as bad debts, which were rejected by the revenue authorities. The partners of the firm were taking steps to collect the outstanding debts due to the firm with a view to close down the money-lending business. The firm paid Income-tax due and payable by the partners of the firm from and out of the borrowed capital. The firm also made advances to its partners to enable them to pay the value of the shares allotted to them by the South India Flour Mills Ltd., a company floated by themselves. In effect, they advanced moneys to themselves from the borrowed capital of the firm. We consider that these facts provide material amply sufficient to justify the conclusion that the interest paid on the capital is illusory and colourable. It is clear from the materials on record that the assessee-firm was not carrying on any business after they converted the flour-mill business. In these circumstances, the assessee-firm is not entitled to claim deduction of interest for the period in question. Before the revenue authorities, it was also contended that the loss actually represents excess of business receipt of the firm and that such shares of losses debited to partners should not be considered as a non-business expenditure. They rightly considered these contention as fresh ones involving enquiry into new facts and refused to consider them.

    Once the firm failed to claim a deduction of interest on their borrowed capital, the partners of the firm contended that in any event they were entitled to claim a deduction of interest in their individual assessments. When a similar contention was put forward in the prior reference, we observed :

    "We can find no principle or authority which can possibly support this contention. The allowance under section 10(2)(iii) relates to the interest paid by the assessee on capital borrowed for the purpose of his business. That the partner made use of the moneys of the firm for their individual purposes and purchases properties or made investment of those moneys is not sufficient to bring the transaction within the scope of the expression capital borrowed for the purpose of business. It was never to contention, as far as we can see, that the partners in their individual capacity were in fact carrying on a business of the nature of investments or purchase of properties. Nor can it be said that it was at all a borrowing."

    For the same reasons, we reject the claim of the partners made in their individual capacity.

    Learned counsel for the assessee, however, contended that they were entitled to deduct interest paid by them on the loans advanced to the partners accounts by the firm for the purpose of purchasing the shares allotted by the South India Flour Mills Ltd. under section 12(2) of the Act. The assessee are claiming his deduction in their individual capacity for the first time in the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60. The firm sold away the flour mill business to the South India Flour Mills Ltd. in the year 1954. One of the terms of the agreement of sale was that the company should allot shares to the extent of Rs. 3,27,500 to each of the partners. Accordingly, whatever amount was advanced by the firm to the partners for the purpose of purchase of shares in the company was debited in the individual accounts of the partners in the firm. They were never charged any interest nor debited interest in their accounts of the firm till the assessment years in question. It was only when the firm failed to get a deduction of interest paid on the borrowed capital for the assessment year 1957-58 and when the partners in their individual capacity failed to get a deduction claimed by the firm, the firm began to make debit entries for the amounts advanced to the partners for the purchase of shares. It is clear that when an assessee wants any deduction to be made under section 12(2), he has to satisfy four conditions, viz., (1) the expenditure must be incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning income, (2) it must not be in the nature of capital expenditure, (3) it must not be in the nature of personal expenses of the assessee, and (4) it must be incurred in the accounting year and not in any prior or subsequent year. On the materials placed before us, it is clear that the firm was not purchasing shares as such allotted to the partners of the firm. It is the partner of the firm who in their individual capacity purchased the shares. There was no contract between the partners and the firm to bring the dividends into the firms account. The money advanced by the firm to the partners was to enable the partners to purchase shares allotted to them by the company in their personal and individual capacity. It cannot be said that they borrowed money for the purpose of investing in the shares of the company so as to earn income or dividend for the firm. From the year 1954 till the assessment years in question, the partners as such were getting dividends in their individual capacity without paying interest to the firm for the moneys advanced to them by the firm. Even assuming that for the first time the firm debited interest on the moneys advanced to them for the purpose of purchasing shares, it could not be said that interest was debited for the purpose of earning dividends. Although the firms accounts may disclose items of interest debited in their partners accounts, it is impossible to say that it is the liability of the assessee. It is not a payment which the assessee has to make nor is it a sum which could be sued. It would be nothing more than a capital expenditure within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 12; or the amounts withdrawn by the partners from the firm for purchasing the shares the shares of the company would at the most be their personal expenditure. It cannot, therefore, be said that the interest debited in the partners accounts of the firm could be regarded as expenditure solely for the purpose of earning any dividend on the shares allotted to them by the company. The sum of Rs. 38,338 cannot, therefore, be allowed as a deduction under section 12(2) in the assessment of the assessees.

    In the result, all the references are answered in favour of the department with costs and against the assessee. Counsels fee, one set Rs. 250.

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    Roopchand Chabildass & Sons And Others v. Commissioner Of Income Tax Madras.
    (Aug 6, 1965)