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  • Employees' Provident Funds Act might impose.12.
  • Employees' Provident Funds Act 19 of 1952,
  • Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 16(b) of that Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Employees' Provident Funds Act might impose.12.
  • Employees' Provident Funds Act 19 of 1952,
  • Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 16(b) of that Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ proceeding was instituted by the managing partners of Lakshmibai Jagannathadas & Co. seeking a writ of mandamus (or other appropriate writ) restraining the 1st respondent, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (RPFC), from collecting contributions under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (Act 19 of 1952). The respondents in the matter were the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and the Collector of Madras.

The dispute arises from the history of the Maharani Talkies premises on Tiruvottiyur High Road (No. 149). The proprietors/lessors (a Hindu joint family including Jagannadhadas Govindas) owned the building, projector equipment, furniture and fittings. Over time the premises and equipment were leased to successive lessees. From about 1948 S. Raja Chetty and G. V. Narasimhalu Chetty were lessees; that lease ended and the theatre was closed for a period until March 1953.

After April 1953 the premises (including machinery and furniture) were leased to Munirathnam Naidu at Rs. 2450 per month; he conducted the cinema business and employed staff until the lease expired on 31-3-1962. During his tenure the Employees' Provident Funds Act became applicable and, after any infancy protection expired, the lessee would be liable to make provident fund contributions for employees.

After Munirathnam Naidu ended his business, discharged employees and delivered possession of the premises and equipment back to the owners, the owners executed a fresh lease in favour of Messrs. Lakshmibai Jagannathadas & Co., represented by the writ petitioners (a partnership registered under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act). The new lease provided different terms, including rent increased to Rs. 3500 per month.

The RPFC took the view that the present lessees constituted the same continuing establishment (despite change of lessee) and that infancy protection having expired, the present lessees were bound to make provident fund contributions on behalf of their employees. The writ petitioners disputed liability and maintained that their firm was an independent legal entity unconnected with the previous lessee.

The affidavits show that the writ petitioners employed nineteen employees, many of whom had been employed by the previous lessee. The factual assertions advanced by the writ petitioners were noted as not being substantially controverted by the respondents' counter-affidavit. The Court ultimately allowed the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purposes of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, a change of lessee (or owner) of an industrial establishment or factory results in a new "establishment" so as to attract infancy protection, or whether the Act attaches to the continuing establishment irrespective of change in ownership.
  2. Whether the writ petitioners (as the new lessees and a partnership registered under Section 69, Indian Partnership Act) are liable to make provident fund contributions for employees on the ground that they are a continuation of the prior establishment.
  3. Whether the Court may look beyond the formal legal form (i.e., pierce the veil) to determine whether a purportedly new establishment is in reality a continuation of the old one, so as to prevent evasion of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Writ Petitioners' Arguments

  • The firm Messrs. Lakshmibai Jagannathadas & Co. is a partnership registered under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act and is an independent legal entity distinct from the previous lessee (Munirathnam Naidu).
  • The new lease contained different terms (including higher rent) and the business run by the partnership is legally separate from that of the prior lessee.
  • They asserted that their establishment employed fewer than twenty employees (a fact noted as not being controverted in the counter-affidavit), which would affect liability under the Act if applicable.

Respondents' / Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's Position

  • The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner treated the present lessees as operating the same continuing establishment and therefore liable for provident fund contributions because the period of infancy protection had expired.
  • The Commissioner relied on the continuity of the establishment, including the use of the same premises, equipment and the employment of many ex-employees of the prior lessee, to support the view that the obligation continued.

Additional Government Pleader / Respondents' Additional Submission

  • An argument was advanced that a stratagem of formal dissolution and reconstitution of an establishment just before the expiry of infancy protection could enable permanent evasion of the Act; the Court was warned against recognizing such devices.
  • However, it was acknowledged (by concession) that where the old establishment had genuinely come to an end and a new establishment truly existed, infancy protection would properly apply to the new entity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kunnath Textiles…* v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1959 Ker 3 (Kerala High Court) The Act applies to the establishment (factory) and not to the owner; mere change of ownership does not affect obligation to make contributions once infancy protection has expired. Cited to support the proposition that continuity of the establishment governs liability, not change of proprietorship.
Robindra Textile Mills v. Secy., Ministry of Labour, AIR 1958 Punj 55 (Punjab High Court) Temporary closure of a factory does not affect its continuing legal existence; emphasis is on the factory/establishment and the employees, not on ownership. Used to show that cessation and resumption of work do not defeat the continuity principle under the Act.
Hindustan Electric Co. v. Regional Provident Fund Commr., AIR 1959 Punj 27 (Punjab High Court) Subsequent events such as cessation of work, resumption of production or change of ownership do not affect the date of establishment. Relied upon to affirm that date of establishment is not shifted by later changes in ownership or temporary stoppages.
Regional Provident Fund Commr. Punjab v. Lakshmi Ratten Engineering Works Ltd., AIR 1962 Punj 507 (Division Bench) Affirmation (on appeal) of the principle that changes like cessation/resumption/ownership do not alter establishment's date. Noted as an appellate affirmation of the single judge's principle regarding continuity of establishment.
Bharat Board Mills Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commr. (S), AIR 1957 Cal 702 (Calcutta High Court) Date of commencement of the establishment is when the factory begins to function; subsequent takeover by a new company does not shift that date. Invoked to underscore that the Act's impact is on the establishment and not on changes of owner.
Jamnadas v. Regional Provident Fund Commr. West Bengal, AIR 1963 Cal 513 (Calcutta High Court) A purchaser of a company cannot obtain infancy protection merely because he has stepped into the shoes of the previous owner. Used to reinforce that mere succession by purchase/transfer does not automatically confer infancy protection.
R. L. Sahni and Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1964 Mad 451 (Madras High Court; Srinivasan J.) A fresh lease does not necessarily create a new establishment; an establishment which is leased out from time to time does not come into existence afresh with each new lessee. The Court reproduced and relied on an extract from this judgment as elucidating the ratio applicable to a cinema theatre leased to successive lessees; it formed a central part of the reasoning.
Devi Press v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras (unreported decision of Srinivasan J.) Considered whether liquidation proceedings nonetheless involved continuance of the old establishment in different form; facts determine continuity. Referenced as an unreported decision of Srinivasan J. bearing on continuity versus fresh establishment issues.
W.P. No. 1333 of 1961 (Mad.) — unreported judgment of Srinivasan J. Distinguished between transfer of a business as a running concern and transfer of a few assets; closure that is genuine (and not to avoid liabilities) means a new establishment may be entitled to infancy protection. Cited for the proposition that genuine closure and genuine new commencement can entitle a new concern to infancy protection; on its facts the RPFC's refusal was quashed.
C.S. No. 472 of 1949 (this Court) Reference to earlier proceedings relating to the theatre and earlier lessees (contextual factual history). Mentioned in the factual narrative; used to show prior litigation/history concerning the premises.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured analytical manner:

  1. Recognition of the core conceptual difficulty: the term "establishment" is not defined in the Act; consequently the inquiry focuses on what constitutes an "establishment" for the purposes of the Act.
  2. The Judge found the most helpful definition (in context) to be that from the Oxford Dictionary — "organized body of men maintained for a purpose" — and adopted the approach that the Act primarily attaches to the factory/establishment or organized industrial organization rather than to the owner as such.
  3. The Court surveyed and applied existing authorities from various High Courts and decisions of Srinivasan J. to distil the governing principle: continuity of an establishment (even across temporary closures or changes in ownership/lessees) will ordinarily mean continuation of the obligation, unless on the facts it is clear the old establishment came to a genuine end and a new one began.
  4. The pivotal factual-legal test articulated was whether, on the totality of facts, "the legal entity, 'the establishment' came totally to an end, and was succeeded by a fresh legal entity." If so, the fresh entity can claim infancy protection; if not, continuity will impose liability on the successor.
  5. The Court acknowledged the risk of formal devices to evade liability (e.g., dissolution and re-creation immediately before infancy protection expiry) but emphasized that such stratagems would be matter of factual determination; where sham or evasion is apparent the court can look through form to substance and treat the concern as a continuing establishment.
  6. Applying these principles to the facts before it: the Court noted (i) the writ petitioners were related to the lessor family, (ii) that many employees of the prior lessee were employed by the writ petitioners, and (iii) that the writ petitioners claimed (and the respondents did not controvert) that they employed fewer than twenty persons. Despite relation to the lessors and overlap of personnel, the Court found that the writ petitioners had sufficiently established that their concern was a new establishment for the purposes of the Act on the facts of the case.
  7. The Court therefore concluded that the writ petitioners were entitled to relief and issued a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from collecting provident fund contributions from them.
  8. The Court also observed that to prevent possible evasions in other cases, consideration might be given to legislative amendment of Section 16 of the Act — a suggestion left to the legislature rather than adopted as a judicial rule.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition allowed. A writ of mandamus was issued restraining the respondents (including the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner) from collecting contributions from the writ petitioners in respect of the establishment now operated by Messrs. Lakshmibai Jagannathadas & Co.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The writ petitioners were relieved of the immediate demand for provident fund contributions; the respondents were restrained from collecting those contributions in this case. Parties were to bear their own costs.
  • Legal principle applied: The opinion reiterates and applies the established principle that the Employees' Provident Funds Act attaches to the establishment or factory (the organized industrial organization) rather than automatically to changes in ownership; whether a new entity is entitled to infancy protection depends on whether the old establishment has, in substance and reality, come to an end.
  • On broader ramifications: The Court did not purport to create a novel rule beyond existing authorities; it highlighted the factual nature of continuity inquiries and suggested that if evasions are possible under the present statutory formulation, remedial legislative amendment to Section 16 might be considered.

All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion. No information was inferred beyond what the opinion itself contains.

    Vittaldas Jagannathadas And Another v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras And Another

    1. This Writ proceeding by the managing partners of the Lakshmibai Jagannathadas and Co., praying for the issue of a Writ of Mandamus or other suitable writ inhibiting the 1st respondent. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner from collecting from the writ petitioners contributions towards the Employees' Provident Fund, involves a certain question of considerable significance and interest, bearing upon the Industrial Law. The matter is not res integra, and there are several decisions available at the Calcutta, Punjab and Kerala High Courts, as well as one reported decision of Srinivasan J., and two unreported decisions of the same learned Judge. There are also available other decisions of this Court which relate in the Industrial Disputes Act and not to the Employees' Provident Funds Act 19 of 1952, which is the legislation that now concerns us, but which are helpful as enunciating the basic principle involved. Since the very formulation of that principle requires a background of the facts, I shall first not them forth. I may immediately add that they are to be found in some elaboration in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Writ Petitioners and that they have hardly been controverted in the counter-affidavit of the respondents namely. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (Respondent 1) and the Collector of Madras (Respondent 2). On the Tirnvottiyur High Road, bearing No. 149, certain buildings are situate on private properly, designed for a cinema theatre and known as the Maharani Talkies. The proprietors who are lessors of this building constitute a Hindu joint family of a certain Jagannadhadas Govindas and two other members of the same family; admittedly, the lessors were leasing out to successive lessors not merely the building, Maharani Talkie, but also the projector equipment (machinery) furniture and other suitable fittings designed for the exhibition of cinema pictures. But the very important fact running throughout the history of the leases, is that the lessors (Jagannadhadas Govindas and members of his family) were not the persons actually exhibiting films to the public for profit, or maintaining an establishment of personnel in connection therewith.

    2. Originally a certain S. Raja Chetty and G.V Narasimhalu Chetty were the lessees from about the year 1948. That lease terminated, and the proprietors (Lessors) obtained vacant possession of the premises, equipment and machinery and furniture. A certain decision of this Court C.S No. 472 of 1949 relates to this matter. For some time till March 1953, the theatre appears to have been closed.

    3. After April 1953 there was a fresh lease of the theatre, machinery and furniture, by the proprietors (Lessors) to a certain Munirathuam Naidu on a monthly rental of Rs. 2450. The relevant terms and conditions are to be found in the document of lease, and the lease was renewed for a subsequent period. Muniratlmam Naidu was conducting the business of exhibition of films at the theatre and paying the rent for lease of the premises and machinery till 1961. It is indisputable that in the meantime Act 19 of 1952 became applicable to this establishment and also that the ‘infancy protection’ enacted in S. 16(b) of that Act enured for some period, after which there was the full liability of the Lessee, the person conducting the business and the head of the establishment, to make the relevant provident fund contributions on behalf of the employees. But the more important fact is that the lease in favour of Munirafhnam Naidu expired with effect from 31-3-1962. According to the affidavit, the lessee thereupon ended his business, discharged all his employees after notice and payment of bonus due, liquidated the business outright and deliverer over possession of the leasehold premises and machinery to the owners. The owners took possession of the properties, the Maharani Talkies, buildings and the equipment. After this, there was a fresh lease in favour of Messrs Lakshmibai Jagannatbadas and Co., represented by the writ petitioners as managing partners. We have a fresh lease deed, with different conditions of lease: for instance, the rent is to be enhanced to Rs. 3500 per mensem and there are other conditions.

    4. The firm itself had been registered as a partnership under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. It is claimed for Writ Petitioners that this is an independent legal entity, with no relationship in law to the earlier concern of Munirathnam Naidu, or to the lease in favour of that individual. But there are two facts which do appear to justify in some measure, the view taken by the Provident Fund Commissioner. The first is that these. Writ Petitioners are themselves related to the family of the Lessors, the proprietors of the buildings and the equipment. That relationship is admitted, and not in dispute. The second is that, after commencing the fresh business, the present writ petitioners did employ 19 employees in their establishment, many of whom were the discharged ex-employees of the previous lessee Munirathnam Naidu. Presumably bearing these considerations in mind, the Provident Fund Commissioner took the view that it was the same continuing establishment, though the owners were different, and that the period of infancy protection having expired, the present lessees; are bound to make the provident land contributions on behalf of their employees under the Act. The simple question is whether this; view is correct, and what are the principles of law applicable to a case of this character.

    5. The matter is one of a considerable interest. It could be viewed from another perspective, namely, whether the Court would not be justified in piercing through the veil or semblance of a particular legal entity, to the reality thereof, and holding in terms of that reality, that a legal obligation has subsisted unimpaired, though if the form alone were to be taken into account the obligation need not be strictly applicable. As I stated earlier, there are decisions impinging on this aspect and I shall very briefly refer to them before enunciating what appears to me to be the true guiding principle on facts of this character.

    6. Several decisions of Court have held that the Act applies to the establishment or to the factory in question, and not to the owners, and that a mere change of ownership cannot suffice to modify or affect the obligation to make contributions on behalf of the members of the establishment towards provident funds benefits, once the period of infancy protection has expired. This was laid down by a Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kunnath Textiles…* v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner…., AIR 1959 Ker 3. In Robindra Textile Mills v. Secy. Ministry of Labour, Govt. of India, New Delhi, AIR 1958 Punj 55 a single Judge of that Court held that even the temporary closure of a factory will not affect its continuing legal existence, and that the emphasis in the Act is on the factory which carries on the process and on the employees who benefit not on the mere forum of proprietorship or changes in ownership. Additions to or subtractions from a factory, however large, cannot affect the continuance of the establishment. In Hindustan Electric Co. v. Regional Provident Fund Commr., AIR 1959 Punj 27 a single Judge of that Court again laid it down that subsequent events merely of the character of cessation of work for a period, resumption of production or change of ownership will not affect the date of establishment of the factory. This decision was affirmed in Regional Provident Fund Commr. Punjab v. Lakshmi Ratten Engineering Works Ltd., AIR 1962 Punj 507 by Division Bench on appeal.

    7. Now, turning to the; decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Bharat Board Mills Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commr. (S) AIR 1957 Cal 702 the learned Judge of that Court held that the date of commencement of the establishment is, when the factory begins to function, and the fact that a new company subsequently takes over or acquires the factory, does not shift the date of the establishment. The criterion will be unaltered, even if the factory ceases production of goods for a certain time, and resumes production later. In other word the impact of the Act is upon the factory or establishment and not on the owner.

    8. In Jamnadas v. Regional Provident Fund Commr. West Bengal, AIR 1963 Cal 513 the same principle of law was re-emphasised, and it was held that the purchaser of a company cannot obtain infancy protection merely because he has stepped into the shoes of the previous owner.

    9. Coming now to the decisions of this Court, the matter was considered upon certain of its aspects by Srinivasan J., in R.L Sahni and Co. v. Union of India, (1964) 2 Mad LJ 191 : (AIR 1964 Mad 451). I think that I can best elucidate the ratio of this decision by setting forth an extract from the actual text of the judgment, which is as follows:

    “It seems to me that looking at the matter broadly, where an establishment, such as a factory, has been set up the owner of the factory does not run the business on his own but chooses to lease the factory from time to time, every fresh lease cannot give rise to the setting up of the factory afresh. The case may undoubtedly be different if the factory itself was closed down for some reason or other and it is started afresh under certain circumstances. Equally it seems to me that the establishment here is the organization which has brought into existence the Cinema theatre along with the equipment and other amenities for the exhibition of films. That is being leased from time to time. The mere fact that there is a new lessee at different points of time does not mean that the establishment of the cinema theatre comes into existence each time a new lease is created. In a manner of speaking the cinema theatre may be likened to a factory which has the necessary equipment for the purpose for which it was brought into existence and that it is the hand of A or B that actually fulfils that object has no real relevance to the point of time when the establishment can be deemed to have been set up.”

    10. Earlier, the learned Judge referred to the difficulty which really lies at the root of the entire matter viz. “What is an establishment?” and observed:

    ‘Unfortunately the expression establishment is not defined.”

    11. My attention has been drawn to two subsequent unreported decisions of the same learned Judge. One of them relates to the question of liquidation proceedings, and whether there was a continuance of the old establishment, though in a different form or name: Devi Press v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras. 225 and 226 of 1962: (reported in AIR 1900 Mad 462). The other judgment W.P No. 1333 of 1961 (Mad.) is of greater interest and significance. On the facts of that case, the learned Judge stated:

    ‘That the same premises was used does not mean that it was the same business. There is a vital distinction in law between the transfer of a business as a running concern and the transfer of a few of the assets of the business, which has been wholly ignored by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner…….. It must also be mentioned that in so far as the closure of the business by Narayana Iyer was concerned, the genuineness of that closure was never in dispute. It was not closed down with a view to escaping any liability which the application of the Employees' Provident Funds Act might impose.”

    12. In effect, the learned judge quashed the orders of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner declining to give infancy protection to what was virtually a new concern.

    13. I was also aware of the central difficulty stressed by Srinivasan, J., and evident in all the decisions to which my attention has been drawn. After reference to several authorities and “Words and Phrases Judicially Defined” by Burrows, Vol. 2, I find that the most helpful definition of ‘establishment’, at least in the context of the usage of that word in the present Act 19 of 1952, is that available in the Oxford Dictionary, namely “Organized body of men maintained for a purpose”. Once we have this definition in perspective, and also keep in mind the principle that the Act really applies to the factory or establishment or industrial organization, whichever it might be termed, and not to changes in ownership, or to the history of the organization which might include temporary closures, it seems to me that the true way of looking at the liability becomes fairly clear. On the entire complex of facts of a given case, can we conclude that the legal entity, ‘the establishment’ came totally to an end, and was succeeded by a fresh legal entity? If that be the case, then that fresh entity is the entity to which the Act applies as a first impact and, if that entity is entitled to infancy protection that protection will have to be granted as a matter of course.

    14. The learned Additional Government Pleader has only one argument to urge in this connection. He pleads that it might be possible for any ‘establishment’ to be maintained upto the verge of the expiry of infancy protection, to be formally dissolved and then for an establishment apparently different in semblance though not really so, to come into existence again, claiming the benefit of infancy protection if such a stratagem is to be recognized, it will mean a permanent evasion of the Act. Obviously this will be akin to Benami, and everything will depend on the facts of the individual case, if in a particular case, it appeals that the new establishment is not genuinely such, but is only an old one formally resuscitated in order to avoid the legal obligation, it is always open to the Court to hold that it is the old establishment which is substantially continuing, and that the liability to contribute must be affixed to the apparently new form also. But where, in reality, the old establishment has come to an end, and there is a new establishment, this establishment is entitled to infancy protection in its own right, even if it happens by coincidence to have employed a large part of the personnel of the previous establishment. Actually, if the writ petitioners are entitled to the claim that their establishment is a new one, as the Additional Government Pleader concedes, they would escape liability on another ground also, since they claim to employ only less than 20 persons; that claim has not been controverted in the counter-affidavit. On the present facts, I think that only confusion can result if we confound the lessors with the lessee who is conducting the business of exhibiting the films in the theatre, and employing personnel as an establishment for that purpose. As far as I can see, this has nothing to do with the lessors who are merely leasing the theatre and the machinery and furniture, and there has never been any question of an ‘establishment’ appertaining to the lessors at all.

    15. Under the circumstances, the writ petitioners are undoubtedly entitled to relief, and a writ of mandamus will issue restraining the respondents from collecting the contributions. Before leaving this matter, I may add that if possible evasions of the law, in this respect, are to be checked or avoided, it may be necessary to consider suitable legislative amendment of Section 16, in order to effect that purpose. Parties will bear their own costs.

    GI/D.R.R

    16. Petition allowed.

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    Vittaldas Jagannathadas And Another v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras And Another
    (Sep 11, 1964)