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  • provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952,
  • provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act
  • Employees Provident Funds Act.
  • S. 484 (b) of the Companies Act.
  • Employees' Provident Fund Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952,
  • provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act
  • Employees Provident Funds Act.
  • S. 484 (b) of the Companies Act.
  • Employees' Provident Fund Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Devi Press / Employees' Provident Funds Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

Devi Press (a registered partnership of two partners, commenced business 25 January 1957) purchased the machinery and assets of a former company, Devi Press Ltd., which had gone into voluntary liquidation. Prior to liquidation, a settlement between the workers and the management of the old company (dated 23 January 1957) provided that most workers would be re-employed by the new management as fresh entrants and that discharged workers would receive termination payments.

The Provident Fund Commissioner asserted that the Employees' Provident Funds Act applied to the petitioner with effect from 1 August 1956 (contending the firm had effectively completed three years by 31 July 1956), denied the petitioner's claim to infancy exemption under S.16(1), and treated the partnership as a successor because it occupied the same premises and acquired the old company's machinery. The Commissioner issued demand notices, threatened prosecution and initiated criminal proceedings against the partners; the partners were convicted under the Provident Fund Scheme in various criminal cases.

The petitioners filed writ petitions (one for certiorari challenging demand notices and another for prohibition restraining collection of contributions and incidental charges for the period from 25 January 1957 for three years). They also filed criminal revision petitions against their convictions. Proceedings included counter-affidavits by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and resulted in judgments addressing (a) applicability of S.16 infancy exemption, (b) liability to pay contributions for the contested period, and (c) liability to pay administration charges.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner partnership is entitled to the infancy exemption under Section 16(1)(b) of the Employees' Provident Fund Act (i.e., whether three years had elapsed since its "establishment") or whether the partnership is in substance a continuation of Devi Press Ltd., so that the Act applied from an earlier date.
  2. Whether acquisition of the old company's machinery, transfer of licences and occupation of the same premises make the partnership the successor of Devi Press Ltd. for purposes of the Act (and thus defeat the infancy exemption).
  3. Whether the Provident Fund Commissioner could lawfully demand administration charges for the period January 1957 to January 1960 when, allegedly, there were no contributions and no administrative work for that period.
  4. Whether the criminal convictions of the partners for failure to make contributions and for non-payment of administration charges were maintainable in light of the facts and the statutory scheme (including entitlement of re-employed workers to benefits only after 240 days of work in a year).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The partnership was formed on 25 January 1957 and therefore the Employees' Provident Funds Act would apply only after three years of its own existence — i.e., they are entitled to the infancy exemption under S.16(1)(b).
  • The old company had gone into voluntary liquidation; the partnership did not take over the prior company as a running concern — purchasing machinery alone does not make the partnership a successor of Devi Press Ltd.
  • Contributions on and after 1960 have been paid; for the earlier period (January 1957 to January 1960) the Provident Fund Commissioner lacked authority to demand incidental administration charges because, in the petitioner's submission, in the absence of any contributions the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner could not have incurred administration expenses to be recovered.
  • Where workers were re-employed as fresh entrants after having accepted termination and received compensation, their subsequent service should be treated as new employment (with entitlement to scheme benefits only after completion of 240 days in a year), which limits the demand for contributions for the initial year of their re-employment.

Respondent's (Regional Provident Fund Commissioner) Arguments

  • The Act applied to the printing industry with effect from 31 July / 1 August 1956; liquidation of the former company does not postpone applicability and the date of applicability cannot be shifted to 25 January 1957.
  • The partnership had effectively taken over the machinery, occupied the same premises and obtained transfers of factory and corporation licences; therefore the exemption under S.16(1)(b) (infancy protection) would not apply because there was effectively a change of ownership rather than a new establishment.
  • The Commissioner maintained that the protection contemplated by S.16(1)(b) is not available whenever there is merely a change of ownership and that the date of establishment of the factory does not change by reason of subsequent acquisition.
  • Consequently, the Commissioner issued demand notices, sought recovery and initiated prosecutions for alleged arrears and non-compliance with the Scheme and Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subbarama Chttti v. Zavier Ali Illustrates that where a partnership is dissolved and one partner restarts with part of the machinery and fewer employees, the question of whether the new entity is a new establishment entitled to exemption under S.16 depends on facts; dissolution not necessarily an attempt to defeat workers' claims. The Court noted the decision lends some support to petitioner's contention but emphasized that that case turned on factual findings (there was no intent to defeat workers' claims). The Court therefore treated it as persuasive only to the extent factual circumstances were comparable.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. L.R.E. Workers Change of ownership does not by itself alter the date of establishment; exemption is available only if three years have not elapsed since the establishment (taking original establishment date, not acquisition date). The Court cited this decision to support the general principle that mere change of ownership does not shift the date of establishment; but applied the precedent by weighing surrounding facts and concluded that in the present case the establishment had continued (not a genuinely new establishment), so the exemption did not apply.
Jamnadas v. R.P.F Commissioner Held that a new company taking over a factory does not shift the date of establishment to the date of takeover; resumption of production under a new name does not change the establishment date. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce the proposition that acquisition or change of name does not necessarily change the establishment date; used to examine whether the petitioner was truly a new establishment or a continuation.
N.K. Krishnamurthi v. Industrial Tribunal Addresses whether sale of a business causes discontinuance; establishes that the question of genuine closure versus temporary discontinuance requires consideration of multiple surrounding factors and cannot be decided solely by identity of business. The Court used this case to indicate that evaluating whether a partnership constitutes a new establishment requires assessing surrounding circumstances; factual matrix matters in distinguishing genuine closure from mere change of name/ownership.
In the matter of Mahalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd., in Liquidation Differentiates instances where a liquidator carries on a factory as a going concern (liability as employer) from cases where a liquidator simply winds up and closes down the factory (no liability as employer under the Provident Fund Act). The Court relied on this distinction to analyze whether the liquidation and subsequent sale here amounted to sale as a going concern; observed that in substance the business continued and the entirety of machinery and licences were transferred, supporting the view of continuity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis unfolded by first identifying the statutory provision at issue: Section 16(1)(b) of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, which exempts "any other establishment ... unless three years have elapsed from its establishment," and the Explanation that a change of premises does not change the date of establishment.

The Court examined factual matters that bear on whether the petitioner partnership was a genuinely new establishment or a continuation of Devi Press Ltd.: the timing of the voluntary winding up resolution (20 July 1956), the sale of the entirety (as represented in the sale agreement) of the printing machinery, accessories, types and furniture to the petitioners (who were managing agents of the old company), the transfer of factory and corporation licences to the partnership, the assistance by the liquidator to secure the lease of premises, and the re-employment of workers as fresh entrants after an amicable settlement.

The Court considered the relevant precedents. It recognized precedents that emphasize fact-sensitive inquiries (e.g., Subbarama Chttti) and others that articulate the general principle that mere change of ownership does not shift the date of establishment (e.g., Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. L.R.E. Workers; Jamnadas). The Court also noted authorities (N.K. Krishnamurthi and Mahalakshmi Cotton Mills) which stress that continuity or discontinuity of business depends on multiple factors and that whether a sale amounts to sale "as a going concern" is critical to determining liability.

Applying these principles to the admitted facts, the Court concluded that although the winding up and subsequent settlement with workers took place, the substance of the transaction showed continuity: the petitioners (former managing agents) acquired the entirety of the machinery and accessories, obtained transfer of licences, and effectively continued the factory in the same premises. The Court held that these facts indicated that the old establishment had continued under a different name; consequently the date of establishment was not the partnership's formation date (25 January 1957) but that of the old company.

On administration charges, the Court analyzed the nature of those charges — reimbursement of departmental administrative expenses — and determined that if, during the relevant period, no administration had been involved (because no contributions were received or there was no administration to perform), the department could not lawfully demand administration expenses for that period. Therefore, the Court held the demand for administration charges for the contested period could not be supported in law.

The Court further revisited the practical effect on the employees who had been re-employed after the liquidation and settlement. Even accepting continuity of the establishment for the purpose of S.16, the Court observed that the individual employment relationships had been terminated by voluntary settlement and the employees were re-engaged as new employees. Under the Scheme, an employee becomes entitled to benefits only upon completion of 240 days of work within one year of service. The Court therefore reasoned that contributions would be payable only in respect of those re-employed workers who completed that qualifying period during their first year. This consideration led the Court to re-evaluate the criminal convictions based on non-payment of contributions.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings emphasized):

  • The petitioner partnership is not entitled to the infancy exemption under Section 16(1)(b) because, on the facts, the new partnership amounted in substance to a continuation of the old establishment (Devi Press Ltd.) — the establishment's date is not the partnership's formation date.
  • The demand for contributions from 25 January 1957 was justified in principle insofar as the petitioner was a continuation of the earlier establishment and thus fell within the period when the Act was applicable.
  • The demand for administration charges for the contested period cannot be sustained because the Court found that, where no administration in relation to contributions was involved during the period in question, recovery of administration expenses for that period is not supportable in law; as a result, the Provident Fund Commissioner must revise the demand.
  • Criminal convictions relating to non-payment of contributions and administration charges were ultimately set aside to the extent that the petitioners were not liable for contributions for the first year of re-employed workers who had not completed 240 days of work in that year; convictions and sentences relating to administration charges were also set aside (the opinion records that several criminal revision petitions relating to administration charges were allowed).

Implications (consequences and scope):

  • Direct consequence for the parties: The writ petitions seeking to quash demand notices were dismissed insofar as they challenged the demand for contributions on the ground of infancy exemption; however, the Commissioner must revise his demand to exclude administration charges for periods where no administration occurred and to account for employees' actual entitlement (i.e., only those employees who completed 240 days in a year).
  • Criminal implications: Convictions for failure to make contributions (insofar as they related to re-employed workers who had not completed the statutory qualifying service) and convictions for administration charges (for the contested period) were set aside; the criminal revision petitions were allowed in those respects as explained by the Court.
  • Precedential effect: The judgment applies the existing line of authorities about continuity versus new establishment and reinforces that resolution of S.16 issues is fact-sensitive. The Court did not create a new statutory interpretation beyond applying established principles; rather it emphasized careful factual appraisal (transfer of machinery, licences, assistance obtaining lease, and re-employment arrangements) in determining whether an establishment is a continuation.
  • Limitation on recoveries: Even where an establishment is treated as continuous, employers may not be liable to make contributions for re-employed workers during their first year unless those workers meet the statutory qualifying condition (240 days) — this operational point was determinative for setting aside convictions based on non-payment of contributions for the initial year of re-employment.

Note: This summary adheres strictly to the matters and findings as stated in the provided opinion and does not introduce facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Devi Press, 83. Purasawalkam High Road, Kilpauk, Madras, By Partner Ct. Ve. Ve. Vairavan Chettiar v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras And Another.

    In the above two writ petitions, Devi Press is the petitioner. It is a registered partnership consisting of two partners which commenced business from 25th January, 1957. Earlier, there was a company known as the Devi Press Ltd., which went into voluntary liquidation. As a result of the winding up and closure of Devi Press Ltd., a dispute arose between the workers and the management. That was settled on 23rd January 1957. According to the settlement, it was agreed that all the workers except those in the binding department would be re-employed by the new management, Devi Press, as fresh entrants. It was also agreed that such of the workers as were discharged on account of the closure should be paid ten days' basic wages for each year of services plus one month's basic wage as ex gratia payment.

    Thereafter, the registered firm commenced, business. It acquired for the purpose of its business the machinery of Devi Press Ltd, which had been wound up. In 1959, the Provident Fund Commissioner called upon the petitioner firm to comply with the requirements of the Provident Fund scheme. His contention was that the firm had completed three years by the 31st July 1956. The petitioner pointed out that the firm came into existence, only in January 1957, and that the provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act would apply only after three years of its life had been completed. This claim of the petitioner was rejected, the respondent holding that the liquidation of the former company would not have the effect of postponing the applicability of the Act and that the Act would apply with effect from 1st August 1956. He also contended that as the petitioner firm had taken over the machinery of the former company and was also housed in the same premises as the old company the exemption contemplated by S. 16 (1) of the Act would not apply. The Provident Fund Commissioner also threatened to prosecute the petitioner and to take steps to recover the arrears of provident fund as arrears of land revenue. Subsequently, the Provident Fund Commissioner initiated prosecutions of the partners and the partners were also convicted under para 76 (a) of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme.

    In the writ petitions, the first of which is for certiorari to quash the demand notices issued in respect of the alleged arrears, and the second for the issue of a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent from collecting the contribution and other incidental charges for the period of 3 years commencing from the 25th January 1957, the contention advanced by the petitioner is that the petitioner firm is entitled to the exemption from the Act. The contributions on and after 1960 have been paid by the petitioner. It is also alleged that whatever be the position with regard to the contributions, the Provident Fund Commissioner has no authority to demand the payment of incidental administration charges for the period January 1957 to January 1960, for, in the absence of any contribution, no administrative charges could possibly be undertaken by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. It is urged that the old company had gone into liquidation and that the firm did not take over the previous company as a running concern. By mutual agreement, the service of all the employees ceased, and they became new employees in the service of the firm. The mere fact that it purchased the machinery of the old firm could not make the petitioner firm a successor of Devi Press Ltd.

    In each of the several criminal revision cases, the two partners are the petitioners. Their failure to comply with the demand of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner resulted in the prosecution and separate cases were launched in respect of different periods, but the point involved is identical. Even before the criminal Court, the petitioners claimed that they were entitled to the exemption under S. 16 (1) of the Act, which contention was, however, rejected, and the convictions followed.

    In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, it is stated that the provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952, were applied to the printing industry with effect from 31st July, 1956. On the petitioners claiming that the old company had gone into voluntary liquidation and they had purchased the press and the new firm had come into extistence only on 25th January, 1957, the department purported to shift the date of commencement of the applicability of the provisions of the Act to 25th January, 1957, that is, the date of the formation of the partnership. It is claimed that the petitioner firm is not entitled to the infancy protection contemplated by S. 16 (1) (b) of the Act, for the reason that the protection would not be available whenever there Was a change of ownership, which, according to the respondent, is all that took place in the present instance.

    It will accordingly be seen that the question that has to be examined in the present case is whether the exemption under S. 16 is available to the petitioner.

    Devi Press Ltd., was a public limited company. It went into liquidation in January 1957. The two partners of the present petitioner partnership were the managing agents. According to the admitted facts, these two persons purchased the machinery of Devi Press Ltd., and formed a partnership to carry on the business of printing. It is not also in dispute that whatever claims the workers of Devi Press Ltd., had against the defunct management were settled amicably and most of the workers were re-entertained as new employees under the partnership. It is stated further that prior to the commencement of the proceedings by the Provident Fund Commissioner, there was no provident fund account for any of the employees of the firm. That is not a very significant fact, because these presses were brought within the scope of the Act only with effect from 1st August 1956 and Devi Press Ltd, went into voluntary liquidation in January 1957. After the petitioners purchased the machinery, they got the factory licence transferred to their name and obtained lease of the premises also. It is also in dispute that the entirety of the machinery of Devi Press Ltd.. was purchased by these petitioners. Though the petitioners could have obtained a separate factory licence for the licence in respect of the premises where the factory is situated and is not personal to the owner or the lessees of the premises, what was actually done was to obtain a transfer of the licence in the name of Devi Press Ltd., to the name of the new partnership. On behalf of the petitioner, a copy of the proceedings of the meeting of the shareholders of the defunct company has been produced. The resolution passed at the meeting was that Devi Press Ltd., should be wound-up voluntarily as a members' voluntary liquidation under S. 484 (b) of the Companies Act. A liquidator was also appointed for the purpose of such winding up. This resolution was passed on 20th July, 1956, apparently a few days before the notification of the Government of India bringing the printing industry, within the scope of the Employees' Provident Funds Act. It was in the course of these winding-up proceedings that the machinery and the types and furniture were sold to the petitioners, who were the managing agents. The agreement of sale of the machinery covers the movable properties, the printing presses and the accessories. There was also a stipulation that the vendor, that is, the liquidator should transfer the licences for the working of the press, viz., the Corporation licence and the factory licence, in favour of the vendees. The vendor also agreed to assist the vendees to get the lease oi the premises from the owners thereof. The schedule shows that the entirety of the printing machinery and the accessories together with types and furniture was agreed to be conveyed to the purchasers.

    S. 16 of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, as it stood during the relevant period (it has been amended by Act XLVI of 1940) reads thus;

    16 (1) : “This Act shall not apply to-(b) Any other establishment before or after the commencement of this Act, unless three; years have elapsed from its establishment.”

    The Explanation to this section reads :

    “For the removal of doubts, it is herby declared that the date of the establishment shall not be deemed to have been changed merely by reason of a change of the premises of the establishment.”

    The word “establishment” has not been defined in the Act. But other defintions which make use of this expression give sufficient indication of what is meant. In the present case again, there is no dispute that the petitioner's establishment is a factory. The question for examination is accordingly whether, in the instant case, the data of the establishment of the petitioner concern has to be taken as the 25th January 1957. that is, the date on which the partnership started to function and operate the printing press, or whether, by reason of the incidents set out earlier, the partnership is in fact a continuation of the old company. If the former view should prevail, than the petitioner firm is entitled to the exemption till January 1960, while if it is held that the petitioner firm is only a continuation of the old company, the firm would not be entitled to the exemption, for it is common ground that Devi Press Ltd., had completed 3 years of its existence even by 25th January, 1957.

    Mr. R. Narayanan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has referred to Subbarama Chttti v. Zavier Ali(1). In that case, a partnership firm to which the Act was applicable went into dissolution. One of the partners started business in the old premises with assets falling to his share and employed less than 20 new workers. The previous partnership had employed more than 50 persons and the Act did apply to it.

    On the dissolution of the firm, the Provident Fund Commissioner had disbursed the provident fund accumulations to all the employees of the firm. When one of the partners restarted the business employing less than 20 persons, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner took proceedings against the partner for failure to submit returns with effect from 1st January, 1957, and also for having failed to remit the contributions and administration charges. The question which the Court was called upon to consider was whether the petitioner was a new factory entitled to the exemption under S. 16. The matter came before the High Court by way of a criminal revision petition against the conviction of the petitioner in the criminal Court. The learned Judge took the view that there was no suggestion that the dissolution of the partnership was an attempt to defeat the claims of the workers and that the workers had at no time lodged any complaint of that description. There Was no ulterior motive in the dissolution of the partnership. The contention advanced on behalf of the Provident Fund Commissioner that the liability to pay the employer's share of the provident fund attached to the machinery and wichever person used that machinery became subject to that liability was rejected by the learned Judge, who further observed :

    “It is further urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent that if one of the partners of the old firm starts a new business, as in this case, with a part of the machinery that fell to his share, it should be presumed that the new factory is part or the sub-division of the old factory and, therefore, is liable to contribute towards the provident fund of the employees, irrespective of the fact that the mumber of employets in the new firm started by him is less than 50. If the Legislature really intended that such consequences should follow, a provision to that effect should have been made in the enactment…”

    Though the observations in this case appears to lend support to the petitioner's contention, it will be seen that the question preceeded on the determination of the facts and upon a clear finding that a dissolution of the original partnership was not a device intended to defeat the claims of the workers.

    Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. L.R.E, Workers(2) deals with a case of change of ownership. The decision in that case was decision in that case was that mere change of ownership does not make any difference to the applicability of S. 16 and that what is exempted is only a factory which has not been established for more than 3 years. In that case, three companies had purchased three factories from the Government. On a demand being made upon them for payment of the provident fund contribution, they contended that the date of establishment of the factory should be taken to be the date on which the companies had purchased those factories. This contention was repelled. The learned Judges point out that the factories in question were established long ago, although by Government, and the protection could be granted only to factories in respect of which 3 years had not elapsed since the establishment. A like view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Jamnadas v. R.P.F Commissioner(3). This part of the head note will be sufficient :

    “The fact that a new company or concern subsequently takes over or acquires the factory does not shift the date of establisment of the factory to the date of its taking over or acquisition, nor does the fact matter that the factory had ceased to produce goods for a certain time before acquisition and resumed production under a new name as a result of the acquisition.

    In a decision of this Court in N.K Krishnamurthi v. Industrial Tribunal(4), the question had to be considered whether the sale of a business by one management to another company or management would not by itself constitute discontinuance of the business. This arose in the context of a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judges observe that the mere identity of the business carried on by the new management would not be the sole criterion to decide that there was no discontinuance of the business, but that the question whether the closure of the business was a temporary discontinuance or whether it was a genuine closure would ultimately depend upon a number of factors which would have to be taken into account by the Tribunal. Though this case does not deal directly with the point in issue, it indicates that even for the purpose of discovering whether the partnership firm does in fact represent a new establishment brought into existence all the surrounding circumstances should be had regard to.

    Mr. R. Narayanan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has referred to In the matter of Mahalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd., in Liquidation. In that case, the liquidator had been directed to carry on the factory engaged in the industry and to sell it as a going concern. The question arose whether the liquidator was liable as an employer and occupier within the meaning of the Employees Provident Funds Act. The distinction between a case where a liquidator was asked to wind up a factory and close it down and a case where a liquidator was directed to carry on the business of the factory was pointed out in this judgment. In the former case, it was held that he would not be liable to contribution, whereas in the latter case, his liability could not be questioned.

    These decisions give a clue to the manner in which the controversy in the present case has to be resolved. It has been pointed out that these two petitioners were the managing agents of the previous company. That business went into voluntary liquidation. The reasons for winding up that business are not apparent from the records or even the resolution passed by the members of that company. But that the dissolution took place a week or ten days before the issue of notification making the Act applicable to the printing industry is a patent fact. While in terms the business was not sold as a going concern to the petitioner firm, in effect that was what was done. The entirety of the machinery, its accessories and the furniture were taken over. The very factory and Corporation licences were transferred in the name of the petitioner partnership. The fact that the claims of the workers vis-a-vis the old company were settled up to the date of the winding up or that the workers were re-employed by the petitioner partnership does not in any way touch upon the question as to the date on which the establishment came into existence. In truth, the old establishment continued, although in a difierent name. If that is so, the date on which the establishment came into existence, is not 25th January, 1957, the date of the formation of the partnership and the carrying on of the business from that date, but the date on which the old Devi Press Ltd., came into existence. It should follow that the demand in so far as the contribution from 25th January, 1957, is concerned, that demand was rightly made, the petitioner firm not being entitled to the protection of S. 16 of the Act.

    I am however of the opinion that the demand in respect of administration charges cannot be sustained. These charges are clearly intended to reinburse the department in respect of expenses of administration. But, if during the period in question, no administration was involved, I fail to see how administration expenses can be demanded. To that extent, the demand made by the Provident Fund Commissioner cannot be supported in law.

    In the result, the writ petitions fail. But in view of what I have stated with regard to the administration charges, the Provident Fund Commissioner will revise his demand suitably.

    Criminal R.C Nos. 306, 500, 501 and 502 of 1962 are against the convictions of the petitioners for failure to make the contribution. These revision cases are dismissed. Crl. R.Cs 503 to 506 of 1962, which relate to conviction for non-payment of administration eharges, are allowed. Those convictions and sentences will be set aside.

    There will be no order as to cost in the writ petitions. (These cases having been set down for being mentioned the Court made the following Order :)—

    These petitions have been set down for being spoken to for further consideration. It has been held that the petitioner press is not entitled to the infancy protection but that does not dispose of one other substantial argument advanced. It has been mentioned that on the closure of Devi Press Ltd., the disputes that arose between the workers and management were resolved amicably. By an agreement, the workers received certain compensation. Thereafter, they were re-entertained by the petitioner press as new employees. The question then arises whether the provident fund contribution is liable to be paid by the Management during the first year of service of these workers. Quite apart from the infancy protection which was claimed and rejected, it is clear that under the provisions of the Act and the Scheme framed under the Act, a worker becomes entitled to the benefits of this Scheme only on his completion of 240 days of work within one year of service. That position is not disputed by the respondent. Notwithstanding the finding that Devi Press is a continuation of the old Devi Press Ltd., the nature of the employment of the workers is clearly altered. They can no longer be regarded as employees continuing under the same terms of employment. There had been e voluntary acceptance of the termination of their services and they had in fact been paid such compensation in that regard as they contended they were entitled to. The subsequent employment was therefore a fresh employment and unless the workers complete a service of 240 days in one year of the service, they would not be entitled to the benefits of the scheme. It would follow therefore that taking the date of the application of the Act as 25th January, 1957 (that is the view taken by the department), the computation of the contributions will have to be made only in respect of the workers who continue in the employment beyond one year from that date and who during the first year of service have worked for 240 days.

    It follows that as the petitioners are not liable to pay contribution during the period of the one year referred to their convictions leading to the above criminal revision petitions have to be, and are set aside. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner will take the above into consideration in revising his demand.

    V.C.S

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    Devi Press, 83. Pura... v. The Regional Provide...
    (Mar 9, 1964)