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  • provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act
  • provisions of the Madras Fair Rent Act (Act XXIV of 1956)
  • section runs:S. 14(1). The provisions of this Act
  • Ss. 3 and 9 of the Fair Rent Act,
  • Protection Act, 1955.
  • Rent Act by S. 14
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act
  • provisions of the Madras Fair Rent Act (Act XXIV of 1956)
  • section runs:S. 14(1). The provisions of this Act
  • Ss. 3 and 9 of the Fair Rent Act,
  • Protection Act, 1955.
  • Rent Act by S. 14
Smart Summary

Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition arises from a dispute about whether a land owner (respondent) may invoke the Madras Fair Rent Act (Act XXIV of 1956) to seek fixation of a fair rent against a cultivating tenant who owns or occupies more than one veli (6-2/3 acres) of wet land. The relevant facts, as stated in the opinion, are:

  • The petitioner obtained a lease in 1953 for a period of three years of 19.68 acres (part garden, part dry land with coconut trees) from Palani Chettiar at a rent of Rs. 625 per year. Although the lease expired, the petitioner continued in possession claiming protection under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955.
  • Palani Chettiar sold the lands to the respondent for Rs. 16,000.
  • Soon after purchase, the respondent filed a petition in the Rent Court (Tahsildar) at Pollachi under Ss. 3 and 9 of the Madras Fair Rent Act for fixation of a fair rent (claimed to be Rs. 3,416 per year).
  • The tenant (petitioner) resisted the application, raising, among other grounds, a preliminary objection that S. 14 of the Fair Rent Act excluded the tenant from the Act and therefore the Rent Court lacked jurisdiction to fix a fair rent.
  • The Rent Court rejected the tenant's preliminary objection. On appeal, the Rent Tribunal (District Munsif), Udumalpet, upheld the Rent Court's view and additionally held the appeal incompetent because a determination on a preliminary issue by the Rent Court did not amount to a decision susceptible to appeal.
  • The correctness of those decisions was challenged by the tenant in this civil revision petition, which the court ultimately dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a land owner may apply under the Madras Fair Rent Act to have a fair rent fixed against a cultivating tenant who owns or cultivates (as tenant or owner or both) land in excess of one veli (6-2/3 acres), given the language of S. 14(1) of the Act.
  2. Whether S. 14(1) of the Fair Rent Act excludes from the Act both (a) tenants who own or cultivate more than 6-2/3 acres and (b) land owners seeking fixation of fair rent, or whether it restricts only the tenant's right to claim benefits under the Act.
  3. Whether an appeal to the Rent Tribunal under S. 9(2) lies from an interlocutory or preliminary determination by the Rent Court, or only from a final decision.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (tenant) — Arguments

  • Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam) argued that S. 3 of the Act imposes an obligation on the tenant to pay fair rent and that S. 14(1), by stating that "the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any cultivating tenant who owns, or who cultivates ... an extent of land in excess of one veli," must be read literally to exclude altogether all cases where the tenant has more than 6-2/3 acres from the operation of the Act.
  • Petitioner's counsel contended that when the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to them even if doing so leads to unjust or absurd results; he relied on an authority (American Jurisprudence) asserting that plain statutory language controls.
  • Implicit in the petitioner's resistance was the contention that because S. 14 omitted any reference to the land owner, the legislature deliberately intended to exclude such cases entirely from the Act's operation.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the respondent in opposition beyond the respondent having filed a petition under Ss. 3 and 9 seeking fixation of a fair rent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Crawford v. Spooner (Privy Council) Judicial Committee's observation that Courts cannot "add and mend" a statute to make up legislative deficiencies; limitation on judicial construction. The court relied on this authority to acknowledge the limitation that it cannot rewrite the statute, while still recognizing that construction may be required if literal language causes manifest absurdity.
Gwynne v. Burnell Principle that courts should not speculate about what the legislature might better have done; emphasis on discerning legislative intent from the words of the enactment. The court cited this case to emphasise that interpretation must be grounded in the words of the statute and not in speculation about alternative legislative designs.
Queen v. Cleworth Where the legislature knew of a class of persons at the time of enactment and omitted reference to them, the omission may be presumed deliberate. The court noted the petitioner's submission based on this principle but applied it only after analysing whether S. 14 was intended to deal with tenants alone or both landlords and tenants.
Simms v. Registrar of Probates (Lord Hobhouse) Where two meanings are possible and one produces great harshness, that fact legitimately inclines interpretation to the meaning that offends less against justice. The court used this authority to support adopting a restricted interpretation of S. 14(1) when the literal reading would produce unjust results for land owners.
Santhanarama Iyer v. Somasundara Vanniar (Somasundaram, J.) Held that the term "decision" in S. 9(2) does not include interlocutory orders and so confers no right of appeal from such orders. The court applied this authority to hold that a preliminary determination by the Rent Court is not a "decision" capable of appeal under S. 9(2); appeal must await final disposal.
Lord Howard De Walden v. I.R.C. Observation about introduction of new words into a section altering meaning only where English language requirements permit and the sense of the section demands it; supports limited supplementation by courts. The court cited this to justify limited judicial supply of omitted words or restrictions where necessary to carry out legislative intent, rather than wholesale rewriting.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the dispute primarily as a question of statutory construction of S. 14 of the Madras Fair Rent Act, asking whether S. 14(1) excluded from the Act both tenants who own or cultivate more than 6-2/3 acres and land owners seeking fixation of fair rent, or whether it applied only to tenants claiming benefits under the Act. The court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Identification of ambiguity: The court found Sub‑section (1) obscure on first reading and recognised two possible readings: (a) the Act is inapplicable in all respects where the tenant owns or cultivates more than 6-2/3 acres, or (b) S. 14(1) merely prevents such tenants from claiming the benefits of the Act while leaving the land owner's rights under the Act intact.
  2. Context and scheme of legislation: The court observed that the Fair Rent Act is in pari materia with the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, and that both form part of a scheme to improve cultivating tenants' conditions. Because the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act prevents eviction on expiry of leases, the court reasoned there must be provision for a land owner to obtain a fair rent so as to avoid unjust results where market circumstances change (example: increased prices of crops and coconut yielding higher returns to tenant at old contractual rent).
  3. Reading Sub‑sections (1) and (2) together: The court gave weight to Sub‑section (2), which explicitly enables a cultivating tenant who owns or cultivates more than the specified extent (but not exceeding ten acres) to relinquish excess land to obtain the benefits of the Act. The presence of this tenant‑focussed provision led the court to infer that S. 14 contemplates limitations on tenants' claims to benefits, and not on the landlord's right to seek fixation of a fair rent.
  4. Statutory context and definitions: The court examined other provisions (short title, definition of "cultivating tenant" in S. 2(b), S. 3, S. 4 and S. 9). It noted that the definition of "cultivating tenant" is not limited by acreage, S. 3 binds cultivating tenants to pay fair rent, and S. 9 allows both land owner and tenant to apply to the Rent Court for fixation of fair rent. Reading these provisions together supported the interpretation that S. 14(1) limits tenant claims to benefits rather than extinguishing the landlord's statutory right under S. 9.
  5. Consideration of the literal‑meaning argument: The petitioner urged a strict literal reading of S. 14(1). The court acknowledged the general rule that plain statutory language should be given effect, but reiterated established qualifications: statutes must be read in context, with reference to the mischief intended to be remedied, and literal meaning may be restricted where it yields manifest absurdity, injustice or contradiction of the statute’s purpose. The court relied on cited authorities to delineate the boundaries of permissible construction.
  6. Conclusion on S. 14(1): Applying the contextual and purposive approach, and guided by the tenant‑specific nature of Sub‑section (2), the court concluded that S. 14(1) should be construed as applying only to tenants who claim relief under the Fair Rent Act and not to land owners wishing to obtain fixation of a fair rent against a cultivating tenant who owns or cultivates more than 6-2/3 acres.
  7. Consequences of that construction: The court explained that a land owner in such circumstances has two practical rights: (a) to recover contractual rent (because until fair rent is fixed the contract rent is taken as fair and reasonable); and (b) to apply under Ss. 3 and 9 for fixation of a fair rent. The court expressly held that the view taken by the Rent Tribunal (upholding jurisdiction in favour of the land owner) was correct.
  8. On appealability of preliminary determinations: Turning to S. 9(2), the court interpreted the word "decision" in the phrase "every decision of a Rent Court" as meaning a final decision. Relying on Santhanarama Iyer v. Somasundara Vanniar, the court held that interlocutory or preliminary determinations by the Rent Court are not appeals that lie to the Rent Tribunal under S. 9(2); aggrieved parties must wait till final disposal to appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is dismissed. The court held that S. 14(1) of the Madras Fair Rent Act applies to tenants seeking to claim benefits under the Act and does not prevent a land owner from applying under the Act for fixation of a fair rent against a cultivating tenant who owns or cultivates more than 6-2/3 acres. The court also held that appeals under S. 9(2) lie only from final decisions of the Rent Court and not from preliminary determinations.

Implications (as set out in the opinion)

  • A land owner whose tenant is a "cultivating tenant" even if that tenant owns or enjoys more than 6-2/3 acres has the right to apply under Ss. 3 and 9 of the Fair Rent Act for fixation of a fair rent.
  • Where the tenant owns or cultivates more than the specified extent, the tenant is excluded from claiming benefits under S. 14(1) unless he follows the option in S. 14(2) to relinquish the excess land; S. 14(2) offers the tenant a method to bring himself within the Act's benefits.
  • Until a fair rent is fixed, the court proceeds on the contractual rent as presumptively fair and reasonable; hence the land owner retains the option to claim contractual rent pending fixation.
  • Procedurally, appeals to the Rent Tribunal under S. 9(2) are available only from final decisions of the Rent Court; interlocutory or preliminary determinations are not immediately appealable.
  • The petition was dismissed with costs, and no alteration to the Rent Tribunal's view was made by this revision.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what is stated therein.

    Peria Maria Goundan v. P.K Ramaswami Goundar.

    This revision petition kaises the question whether a landlord would be entitled to take advantage of the provisions of the Madras Fair Rent Act (Act XXIV of 1956) (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act), and institute proceedings for fixation of a fair rent against a cultivating tenant who owns or enjoys as a tenant lands exceeding 6-2/3 acres. The petitioner obtained a lease for a period of 3 years from the year 1953, an extent of 19-68 acres of lands which were partly garden lands and partly dry lands with coconut trees from the owner, one Palani Chettiar. The rent reserved under the lease was Rs. 625 per annum. Although the period of the lease had expired, the petitioner continued in possession of the properties, claiming to be a cultivating tenant entitled to protection under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. Palani Chettiar sold the lands to the respondent for a sum of Rs. 16,000. Soon after the purchase, the respondent filed a petition before the Rent Court (Tahsildar) at Pollachi under Ss. 3 and 9 of the Fair Rent Act, for fixing a fair rent which, according to him, would be Rs. 3,416 per year. The tenant resisted the application on several grounds. One of the grounds taken, preliminary in nature, related to the objection of the tenant that the Rent Court had no jurisdiction to fix a fair rent, as the tenant was expressly excluded from the ambit of the Pair Rent Act by S. 14 thereof. The Rent Court rejected the plea. On appeal, the Rent Tribunal (District Munsif), Udumalpet, upheld that view. The appellate authority also held that the appeal before it was incompetent as a determination by the Rent Court on a preliminary issue would not amount to a decision; which alone would be subject to an appeal. The correctness of the decision is challenged in revision.

    The question whether, notwithstanding the fact that a cultivating tenant either owns or cultivates as tenant or owner or both, a greater extent of land than 6-2/3 acres, he can be proceeded against at the instance of a land-owner for fixation of a fair rent under the provisions of the Act, depends on the construction of S. 14. That section runs:

    “S. 14(1). The provisions of this Act shall not apply to any cultivating tenant who owns, or who cultivates either as tenant or owner or as both, an extent of land in excess of one veli (6-2/3 acres) of wet land.

    (2) Any cultivating tenant who owns, or who cultivates eitherlasjtenant or as owner or as both, an extent of land exceeding that specified in Sub-S. (1) but not exceeding ten acres of wet land may, by notice in writing addressed to the landowner, relinquish at the end of the agricultural year ending 1957 the tenancy, in respect of such portion of the land aforesaid as may be necessary to entitle him to all the benefits of a cultivating tenant under this Act. Such cultivating tenant shall be entitled to all the benefits of this Act till the end of the agricultural year ending in 1957 and shall thereafter be entitled to all the rights of a cultivating tenant under this Act only on such relinquishment.

    (3) omitted as unnecessary.”

    The provisions of the section are a little obscure, it is not dear from Sub-S. 1, whether the Legislature intended that a tenant owning or cultivating more than 6-2/3 acres of land was outside the Act altogether or what was intended was merely that he could not take advantage of the Act; that is to say, whether S. 14 (1) prevented both the land-lord and tenant from applying for fixation of a fair rent in a case where the latter owned or cultivated land in excess of 6-2/3 acres, or whether it had the effect of preventing only the tenant from so doing, the landlord's right being unfettered in that respect. If the former view were to be accepted, it would undoubtedly lead to inconvenient or unjust results.

    The Act is in pari materia with the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. It is part of a scheme of legislation for bettering the conditions of cultivating tenants. The Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act which would apply to all cultivating tenants defined thereunder, regardless of the question whether such a tenant was in occupation of a small extent of land or a large extent of land, prevents the land owner from evicting the tenant even after the expiry of lease except under the provisions of the Act. This enables a continuance of the original tenancy, so long as the cultivating tenant has not been evicted from his holding under the provisions of the Act. The landlord being thus prevented from exercising his right to get the property on the expiry of the case and lease it at competitive rates to the other people, the common sense and justice would require that there should be a provision for enabling the landlord to obtain a fair rent. The present case furnishes a good example of the injustice that might be done to the landowner in case the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act alone were to remain. The rent for the lands in the instant case was fixed at Rs. 625 in the year 1953. Since then, prices of the cash crops grown on the land and of coconut yielded by the trees have increased considerably. There is no justifiable reason why the landlord should not get his legitimate share of the value of the produce according to the changed circumstances, and why the tenant should alone be entitled to profit by it, holding the land at the original rent which was fixed in the context of the prices then prevailing. The injustice will be more apparent, when we take the case of a comparatively poor land owner leasing his properties on cash rent basis to a rich person who happens to satisfy the definition of the term “cultivating tenant”. The tenant will profit by the increase in price, while the unfortunate landlord will have to be content with the original rent. The Fair Rent Act provides for the payment of a fair rent. That legislation was not conceived in the interest of the tenant alone, as the words Fair Rent imply that rent should be of a just one judged from the point of view of the landlord as well as the tenant. S. 14 (1), if interpreted as excluding from the purview of the Act all oases where the tenant is in occupation of more than 6-2/3 acres, would some times lead to the anomaly of benefiting an affluent tenant at the expense of a poor landowner. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain what the intention of the legislature was, when it enacted S. 14 (1), as expressed in the statute itself.

    Sub-S. (2) to the S. 14 enables the cultivating tenant to obtain the benefit of the Act by surrendering any land that he bolds in excess of 6-2/3 acres. The provisions of Sub-S. (2) which, in my opinion, has to be read with Sub-S. (1) throws light on the question as to the category of cases to which S. 14 is intended to apply. If Sub-Ss. (1) and (2) of S. 14 are read together, it would be apparent that they relate only to cases where the tenant wants to take advantage of the provisions of the Act, and not to cases where the land owner wants to have a fair rent fixed. S. 14 contemplates a benefit claimed by the tenant and imposes limitation on the class of tenants who would be entitled to claim such benefits. Sub-S. (1) excludes the tenant owning more than 6-2/3 acres from such benefit. Sub-S. (2) gives him an option to renounce the excess land in order to claim the benefit. No reference is made in S. 14 to the land owner. The land owner cannot, for instance, say that he would be content to have a fair rent fixed for 6-2/3 acres alone out of the larger extent leased out to the tenant. He cannot obviously compel the tenant to renounce the excess land. Prima facie, therefore, S. 14 would relate only to the tenants who seek relief under the Act. The other provisions of the Act also support this view. The short title to the Act shows that it was passed to provide for the payment of fair rent by cultivating tenants. The definition of the term “cultivating tenant” in S. 2 (b) is not restricted to those tenants who cultivate or own less than 6-2/3 acres. A tenant who is in occupation of more than that extent, but who satisfies the definition of the term, will still come under it. S. 3 states that the cultivating tenant would be bound to pay to the land owner a fair rent, and the land owner, on his part, would be entitled to collect such fair rent from the cultivating tenant. S. 3 read in the light of the definition, would mean that the land owner would have a right to collect fair rent from a cultivating tenant, regardless of the question whether such a tenant has only 6-2/3 acres or more. S. 4 prescribes what a fair rent is, and how it has to be ascertained. S. 9 provides that, notwithstanding any agreement between the parties, or even a decree that might govern their relationship, the land owner and cultivating tenant may apply to the Rent Court for fixation of a fair rent. This section creates a right in the land owner to apply for fixation of fair rent. It also creates a similar right in the tenant. I cannot agree with the contention that S. 9 is merely a procedural one.

    The question to be considered is whether S. 14 (1) would apply to both the cases stated above, or only to that of the tenant alone. Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam, who appears for the petitioner, contends that S. 3 of the Act, on its terms, imposes a duty or obligation on the tenant to pay fair rent, that, when S. 14 (1) proceeds to state that the provision of the Act shall not apply to a cultivating tenant having more than 6-2/3 acres of land, it must be taken that the right and obligation created under S. 3 are curtailed by the later provision, and that all cases, where a tenant happens to cultivate more than the extent specified in Sub-S. (1) should be excluded altogether from the operation of the Act.

    It is contended that, where the terms of the statute are clear and explicit, the duty of the Court is to give effect to those terms, whatever the consequences may be, even when the giving effect to the literal meaning of the words leads to unjust or even absurd results. Learned Counsel contends that terms of S. 14(1) being clear and and unambiguous, and if construed in the ordinary sense, would render the Act inapplicable, wherever the tenant happens to possess more than the specified extent of land it would not be open to a Court under the guise of construing the section to exclude a particular category of person. Reliance is placed on the following passage in Art. 225 at page 205 in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 50:

    “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the Court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. In the case of such unambiguity, it is the established policy of the Courts to regard the statute as meaning what it says and to avoid giving it any other construction than that which its words demand. The plain and obvious meaning of the language used is not only the safest guide to follow in construing it, but it has been presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit terms of a statute express the legislative intention, so that such plain and obvious provisions must control.”

    This is only a statement of general rule, which is a part of more fundamental rule that, in the interpretation of a statute, the ascertainment of the intention of the legislature is paramount. Certain rules have now been firmly established as to how that intention is to be ascertained. One of the rules is that which is stated above. But that rule is subject to the qualification, namely, that the language in the statute has to be read in the light of the other provisions in the statute and the context in which it was made; that is to say, with reference to the then existing law and the mischief which the statue intended to cure. That however does not mean that a Court could indirectly legislate and as Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam aptly pointed out the observations of the Judicial Committee in Crawford v. Spooner(1), would negative any such power. The Privy Council observed:

    “We cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add and mend, and by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there.”

    The rule stated above cannot apply to cases where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning leads to a contradiction of the purpose of the enactment or to inconvenience or absurdity or hardship or injustice. (See page 229 in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn). In Lord Howard De Walden v. I. R. C., Lord Uthawast observed at page 830:

    “I agree with Court of Appeal to the extent that the introduction of new words into an existing section may alter the meaning of words already there. But no such alteration can result unless (1) the requirements of the English language demand it, or (2) those requirements permit it and the sense of the section demands it.”

    Those observations imply a power in Court to supply an an omission in a statute so as to bring out the real intention behind it. First thing to be done therefore is to ascertain the sense of the section after a consideration of the other relevant provisions of the Act. If after considering those matters it is found that there is manifest absurdity if the literal meaning were given to it, it would be open to the Court to give a restricted meaning to the section so as to apply it only to that case which must have been intended by the legislature. But in so doing the Court must be guided by the language of the Act and not by any speculative theories. In Gwynne v. Burnell(2), it was held that it would not be open to the Court to speculate what the legislature might better have done, but what the intention of the legislature was in the words of the enactment itself. In that case Coleridge, J. observed:

    “The principle then, on which I rely will not let in the consideration of particular circumstances in each case, or a regard to a greater or less degree of convenience, a more or less complete effect to be given to the presumed intent of the legislature. Nothing, in short, which is founded on what the legislature might better have done, nor simple even what the legislature intended; the sole legitimate inquiry is, I conceive, what intention is to be found in the words of the Act, expressed or implied; unless, by words written or words necessarily implied and therefore virtually written, the intention has been declared, we cannot give effect to it.”

    In Queen v. Cleworth(3), it was held that, where the legislature knew at the time when an Act was passed about the existence of a particular class of persons and the Act omitted any reference to the class, it must be supposed that the omission was deliberate and intentional. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner on the strength of the cases cited above that the legislature, (which was certainly aware of the existence of land owners) when it omitted to make any reference to them in S. 14, should be deemed to have intended that they were not to have any rights against the tenants who had more than the specified extent of lands. But before applying the principles stated above one has to see whether S. 14 (1) is a provision for the application of the Fair Rent Act generally or merely one specifying the class of tenants who would be entitled to the benefits of the Act. If the section is held to apply to cases of landlords and tenants, the absence of any provision in favour of the land owner like the one in Sub-S. (2) would certainly attract the application of the principles of construction contended for. If, on the other hand, it is to be held that S. 14 is intended to apply only to the case of tenants, the rights of the land owner under S. 9 would remain unaffected. The term ” fair rent “as stated earlier implies a just rent from the point of view of the tenant as well as the landlord. The legislature evidently thought that, in a case where the contractual rent was above the fair rent, a comparatively poor tenant should be relieved of his obligations under the Act. S. 14 (1), therefore, prescribed a class of tenants who would be entitled to the benefits of the Act. There is no reason to relieve a richer tenant from the obligations under the contract. S. 14, therefore, excludes him from the benefits of the Act. The same principle cannot apply to the case of a land owner. A land owner who is deprived of the right to recover possession by reason of the operation of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act should be enabled to obtain at least a fair rent. A land owner may be a small proprietor. To say that he Would not be entitled to fair rent because the tenant owns or enjoys more than 6-2/3 acres of land is so absurd, that it cannot be said that the legislature intended it. The words of S. 14(1), though wide, are capable of a restricted interpretation, namely, that they apply only to a case of tenant who claims benefits under the Act, and not to the landlord, who wants to claim benefits thereunder. In Simms v. Registrar of Probates Lord Hobhouse observed in the course of his speech:

    “Where there are two meanings, each adequately satisfying the meaning (of a statute), and great harshness is produced by one of them, that has a legitimate influence in inclining the mind to the other……It is more probable that the legislature should have intended to use the word (‘evade’) in that interpretation which least offends our sense of justice.”

    In my opinion, S. 14 (1) should be held to apply only to the case of a tenant claiming relief under the Fair Rent Act. That section will have no application to the case of a land owner whose tenant owns or enjoys more than 6-2/3 acres of land. S. 9 gives absolute right to the land owner to apply to the Court for fixation of fair rent, so long as the tenant is a cultivating tenant coming within the Act. There is nothing in the definition of the term “cultivating tenant “to show that he should have less than 6-2/3 acres of land. The result is that a land owner would have two rights, where his tenant, though a cultivating tenant, owns or enjoys more than 6-2/3 acres of land. (1) He would be entitled to recover the contractual rent, as S. 3 could not be invoked by a tenant by virtue of S. 14. This option to recover the contractual rent is not because that the Act does not apply to the land owner, but because of the rule that till fair rent is fixed the Court proceeds on the basis that the contract rent, agreed to voluntarily by the tenant, is fair and reasonable one. (2) The land owner can also apply under the Fair Rent Act for fixation of fair rent. This is by virtue of Ss. 3 and 9. The view taken by the Rent Tribunal is, therefore, correct.

    The other question relates to the maintainability of an appeal to the Rent Tribunal against the preliminary decision by the Rent Court. S. 9 (2) states:

    “From every decision of a Rent Court, an appeal shall within such time as may be prescribed, lie to the Rent Tribunal whose decision shall be final, subject to revision, if any, under S. 11.”

    The words “every decision “can only mean a final decision. In Santhanarama Iyer v. Somasundara Vanniar, Somasundaram, J. held that the term ” decision “in S. 9 (2) would not include interlocutory orders so as to confer a right of appeal therefrom. The same principle should apply to the case of the determination of a preliminary point by the Rent Court. The aggrieved party will have to wait till the application is finally disposed of, and can file an appeal only against the final decision.

    The civil revision petition fails, and is dismissed with costs.

    V.C.S

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    Peria Maria Goundan v. P.K Ramaswami Goundar.
    (Apr 21, 1961)