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    Alsidass Kaverlal v. J. Hiriya Gowder.

    This is an appeal by the petitioner decree holder against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ootacamund in an execution under O. 21, R. 46, C. P. C. The facts are simple and are as follows:

    Originally the appellant (decree-holder) prayed to the Court below for the issue of a prohibitory order in respect of certain amounts payable by the Garrison Engineer, Wellington, to the respondent (judgment debtor), apparently relating to certain contracts for the Army executed by the judgment debtor. It is not in dispute before me that this application under O. 21, R. 46, C. P. C. was perfectly maintainable and in order, and that it related to the sum payable by the Garrison Engineer to the judgment debtor upto the date of the application. As will be clear from a glance at O. 21, R. 46, C. P. C. that rule applies to attachment of certain kinds of property not in possession of the judgment debtor, including a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument [R. 46 (a)] and other moveable property [R, 46 (c)] not in the possession of the judgment debtor. The present application was clearly under R. 46 (c), as it related to cash payable to the judgment debtor by the Garrison Engineer. I further agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Alvares) that the application would be equally tenable under R. 46 (a), as this Is a case of a debt due by the Army Authorities to the judgment debtor not secured by the Negotiable Instruments Act. On 8th April, 1958, the Garrison Engineer wrote a letter to the Subordinate Judge, Ootacamund, in respect of his prohibitory order, informing the Court that an amount of Rs. 7,237-75 had been withheld in response to the order, that the balance payable, if any, was so far unascertained, and that the military authorities were therefore unable to state that any further specific balance was payable to the judgment debtor. There is another letter dated 16th May, 1958 from the Garrison Engineer, in similar terms, but also intimating the Court that

    “all amounts that become due to the contractor are being kept in deposit (in suspense account), and it has been ensured that Do payment is made to Sri J. Niriya Gowder (judgment debtor).”

    Now, what seems to have happened after this is that the Court, without taking evidence and without any further enquiry, merely confirmed the prohibitory order issued, in respect of the sum of Rs. 7,237-75 alone. The decree holder (appellant) was naturally aggrieved by this, as, in his view, nearly Rs. 20,000 was due to the Judgment debtor on the date of the attachment. He filed a fresh application under O. 21, R. 46, C. P. C. praying for a fresh attachment of bill amounts, deposit amounts etc., totalling to nearly Rs, 20,000. This application was resisted by the judgment debtor on several grounds, such as the ground that the decree was barred by limitation, and the ground that it was satisfied by private payments between the parties. These grounds were negatived on the merits. But the Court below held, upon the point of maintainability, that no such petition could lie for any amount exceeding the amount of Rs. 7,237-75 reported as the ascertained amount by the Garrison Engineer. The Court consequently dismissed the application as not maintainable.

    I find it difficult to follow the reasoning upon which the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is based. Even taking it that the first prohibitory order was enforced upto the extent of Rs. 7237 odd alone, I find nothing in the processual law to prevent a party situated like the present appellant from applying for a fresh prohibitory order with regard to any balance of monies still payable by the Army Authorities to the judgment debtor. Again, it is not as if any enquiry or evidence had established that, on the date of the application by the decree holder, no amount greater than Rs. 723 7 odd was payable to the judgment debtor. That is merely an uncorroborated statement by the Garrison Engineer, upon which there is no evidence whatever. Need-Jess to say, even the letter could not be accepted as evidence and acted upon, until it had been properly proved. As pointed out in Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, 12th Edn. page 822, even where a debt is being attached, it is not necessary that the exact amount of the debt should be stated, provided there is a debt actually due at the time of the attachment.

    This point is covered by authority-As learned Counsel for the appellant points out, O. 45, R. 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom has been framed upon the lines almost identical with our own O. 21, R. 46, C. P. C. An authority precisely in point, and relating to almost identical circumstances, is O'Driscoll v. Manchester Insurance Committee(1). What happened in that case was that a panel doctor had done certain work under agreement with an Insurance Committee which had received funds in respect of the medical benefit from the National Insurance Commissioners. The debt owing to the doctor was actually unascertained, but the Court nevertheless held that an attaching creditor could attach this liability under O. 45, R. 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, notwithstanding the fact that the share payable to the judgment debtor had not been ascertained at all. Again, it seems to me clear that the Court would not at all be justified in accepting the bare statement of the garnishee that no debt is due. Under those circumstances, on the contrary, the Court must clearly make an enquiry and come to its independent conclusion. For this proposition, reference might be made to Moideen Batcha v. Sulaiman Sahib(2), where Krishnaswami Nayadu J. held that, under the circumstances, the Court may even appoint a Receiver in execution and direct an enquiry, without acting upon the statement of the garnishee.

    Consequently, I allow the appeal to the limited extent of holding that the prohibitory order issued by the Court will operate to bar the payment to the judgment debtor by the Garrison Engineer of nll amounts payable as upto that date, whether Rs. 7237 alone, or aggregating to any higher figure. The order will obviously not operate in respect of further earnings, if any, by the contractor, beyond that date, f the decree holder desires to restrain the garnishee in respect of payment out of such future monies earned, he will have to take separate proceedings. The learned Subordinate Judge was hence not justified in dismissing the application outright, and in holding that the prohibitory order issued was effective only upto the extent of Rs. 7,237 odd and no more. The appeal is thus partly allowed. The parties will bear their own costs.

    V.C.S

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    Alsidass Kaverlal v. J. Hiriya Gowder.
    (Jun 20, 1960)