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  • Section 47 of the C. P. Code. Under Section 9(3) of the City Tenants Protection Act
  • provisions of Sections 6 to 8 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act
  • Section 41 of the Presidency Town Small Cause Courts Act. Section 9
  • provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, Section 4
  • Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938
  • Section 41 of the Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act,
  • provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act.
  • SECTION 41 PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Madras City Tenants Protection Act III of 1922
  • Section 19 of the Madras Act IV of 1938
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of the Madras Forest Act.
  • Madras City Tenants Protection Act
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 47 and 96 of the C. P. Code
  • Section 2(2) of the C. P. Code
  • City Tenants Protection Act
  • Section 47 of the C. P. Code
  • Madras Act XIX of 1955
  • Madras Act III of 1922
  • Madras Act 19 of 1955
  • Section 2(2) C. P. Code,
  • Section 47 C. P. Code
  • Section 98 C. P. C.
  • TRADE MARKS ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 47 of the C. P. Code. Under Section 9(3) of the City Tenants Protection Act
  • provisions of Sections 6 to 8 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act
  • Section 41 of the Presidency Town Small Cause Courts Act. Section 9
  • provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, Section 4
  • Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938
  • Section 41 of the Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act,
  • provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act.
  • SECTION 41 PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Madras City Tenants Protection Act III of 1922
  • Section 19 of the Madras Act IV of 1938
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of the Madras Forest Act.
  • Madras City Tenants Protection Act
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 47 and 96 of the C. P. Code
  • Section 2(2) of the C. P. Code
  • City Tenants Protection Act
  • Section 47 of the C. P. Code
  • Madras Act XIX of 1955
  • Madras Act III of 1922
  • Madras Act 19 of 1955
  • Section 2(2) C. P. Code,
  • Section 47 C. P. Code
  • Section 98 C. P. C.
  • TRADE MARKS ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition arises from a tenant's civil revision challenging an order of the lower court which held that the tenant was not entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act.

Key factual and procedural points as recited in the opinion:

  • In 1917 the respondent (landlord) granted a lease of land to the petitioner (tenant) for agricultural purposes.
  • After termination of the lease, the landlord filed a suit for eviction as O.S. No. 283 of 1945. The tenant raised various defences (denial of title, want of proper notice to quit, etc.) but did not plead entitlement under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act.
  • A decree for ejectment was passed on 20-8-1846 (as recorded in the opinion).
  • An appeal to this Court failed and the decree was confirmed in the Letters Patent Appeal. Proceedings concluded on 23-3-1950 when the tenant was given one year's time to vacate.
  • The landlord filed an application for delivery of possession in E.P. No. 1403 of 1951; while that application was pending a third-party injunction suit was dismissed on 20-5-1954; the pendency led to dismissal of E.P. No. 1403 of 1951 for statistical reasons.
  • The landlord then filed E.P. No. 157 of 1955; delivery was ordered on 29-9-1955.
  • The Madras City Tenants Protection Act (III of 1922) was amended by Madras Act XIX of 1955, which came into force on 10-9-1955 and extended benefits to tenants who had put up buildings on demised lands before that date.
  • Relying on the amended Act, the tenant filed C.M.P. No. 1693 of 1955 on 5-10-1955 in the lower court, alleging that he had put up a shed after the decree, that he was entitled to benefits under the Act, and asking that the land be sold to him under Section 9 of the Act.
  • The landlord contested the application. The Assistant Judge cum Registrar of the City Civil Court, Madras, held the petitioner not entitled to the benefits of the Madras Act 19 of 1955 and dismissed the application.
  • The tenant filed this civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking to revise that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there is a right of appeal against an order of the lower court which held that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act.
  2. More specifically, whether orders made under provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act (notably under Sections 4 and 9 or orders fixing compensation/value) amount to a decree or are otherwise appealable under the ordinary provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (including Sections 47, 96, 98 and the definition in Section 2(2)).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Telephone Co. v. Postmaster General, 1913 A.C. 546 (Viscount Haldane L.C.) When a matter is referred to an established court "without more", the ordinary incidents of procedure of that court attach, including the general right of appeal. Used to support the general proposition that where ordinary courts are given jurisdiction to decide statutory rights, the ordinary procedural incidents (including appeal) attach.
Secy. of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao, ILR 39 Mad. 617 (AIR 1916 PC 21) When proceedings of this character reach the District Court, the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply and appeals may lie even though the special statute is silent on further appeals. Quoted to show Privy Council authority that ordinary appellate procedure applies to statutory adjudications once they reach ordinary courts.
Hemsingh v. Basant Das, ILR 17 Lah. 146 (AIR 1936 PC 93) Affirmation that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court of record without further provision, the incidents of such jurisdiction (including right of appeal) remain. Referred to as additional Privy Council authority supporting the same principle about attachment of ordinary procedural incidents.
Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, 1948-1 Mad. LJ 41 (AIR 1948 PC 12) Where a legal right is in dispute and ordinary courts are seized of the dispute, ordinary rules of procedure apply and an appeal lies even if the special statute does not in terms confer a right of appeal; a refusal to grant relief under a special Act can amount to a decree under Section 2(2) CPC. Applied by analogy to hold that an order dismissing an application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Act on the ground that the tenant is not entitled to benefits would be appealable as a decree.
National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. (cited; Trade Marks Act context) Where statutory rights are civil rights and ordinary courts/High Court appellate jurisdiction is engaged, the appellate jurisdiction should be exercised in the ordinary way. Used to support the proposition that addition of a new subject-matter of appeal does not change the ordinary incident of appellate procedure.
Kasi v. Ramanatha Chettiar, 1947-2 Mad LT 523 It is possible to have more than one preliminary decree in a suit. Cited in relation to Section 4 of the City Tenants Act, which contemplates preliminary and final decrees; supports treatment of such orders under ordinary CPC concepts.
Desikachariar v. Ramachandra Reddiar (Full Bench) Not every order in execution is appealable under Sections 47 and 96 CPC; for appealability the order must determine the rights of the parties to the proceedings. Relied upon to explain when an order in execution will be appealable under Section 47 CPC (i.e., only if it determines rights of parties).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from statutory construction of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act and established principles concerning appealability when statutory rights are adjudicated by ordinary courts. The reasoning steps as set out in the opinion are:

  1. Identification of the relevant statutory scheme:
    • The Madras City Tenants Protection Act (III of 1922) originally protected tenants who had built structures on demised land before 8-2-1922.
    • Madras Act XIX of 1955 amended the Act to extend benefits to tenancies prior to 10-9-1955 and to specified localities.
    • The Act confers rights such as compensation on eviction (Section 3), a right in certain circumstances to purchase the land (Section 9), requirement of proper notice (Section 11), and jurisdiction to fix fair rent (Sections 6, 7 and 7-A). Section 4 contemplates preliminary and final decrees; Section 8 provides that certain orders have effect as a decree.
  2. General legal principle applied:
    • The court recalled the well-recognised rule that where a statute creates rights and confers jurisdiction on ordinary courts to adjudicate those rights, the ordinary procedural incidents applicable to those courts—including the right of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code—attach unless specifically excluded.
    • The court cited authorities (including Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions) to that effect, emphasising that the right of appeal becomes inherent when ordinary courts adjudicate legal rights created by statute and is not necessarily excluded by silence in the special statute.
  3. Application to provisions of the City Tenants Act:
    • Orders under Section 4: the Act contemplates a preliminary decree (determination of compensation) and a final decree; the court treated such decrees as subject to ordinary CPC concepts and therefore appealable.
    • Orders under Section 9: the court differentiated possible outcomes — if an application to purchase is dismissed on the ground that the tenant is not entitled to benefits, such a dismissal would amount to a decree and be appealable (relying on Adaikappa Chettiar).
    • Orders fixing price/compensation: such orders may be interlocutory and not of themselves a decree under Section 2(2) CPC; however, if the order has the effect of preventing execution of the existing decree or otherwise decides execution-related rights, it may fall within Section 47 CPC and be appealable.
    • Section 8's deeming provision: where the Act deems an adjudication to be a decree, an appeal would plainly lie.
  4. Synthesis and practical rule articulated:
    • An appeal will lie against orders made under the City Tenants Protection Act if (a) the adjudication amounts to a decree, or (b) the adjudication has the effect of deciding a question in execution (for example, whether the decree may be executed, discharged or satisfied), thereby falling within Section 47 CPC.
    • The court referred to Full Bench authority to stress that only those execution orders that determine rights are appealable under Sections 47 and 96 CPC.
  5. Application to the present case:
    • The court concluded that the order of the lower court in the instant matter, by overruling the tenant's objection and allowing execution to proceed (i.e., denying the tenant the benefit claimed under the Act), effectively had the consequence that an appeal would lie against that order.
    • Because an appeal lay, the civil revision under Section 115 CPC was not the appropriate remedy and was therefore incompetent.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final decision was to dismiss the civil revision petition. The core ruling is expressed as follows:

The civil revision petition is incompetent and is dismissed with costs.

Implications (as discussed in the opinion):

  • The opinion holds that when ordinary courts are given jurisdiction to adjudicate rights created by the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, the ordinary procedural incidents of those courts (including the right of appeal) apply in the absence of an express statutory exclusion.
  • Specifically, orders under the Act are appealable where the adjudication amounts to a decree (including where the statute so deems) or where the order effectively decides questions in execution (thus falling within Section 47 CPC).
  • In the present matter the practical consequence was that an appeal lay against the lower court's order denying the tenant the benefit of the Act; therefore the tenant's remedy by civil revision under Section 115 CPC was not competent. The petition was dismissed with costs.

The opinion does not record any separate order creating or announcing a new legal rule beyond the application and confirmation of established principles concerning appealability where statutory rights are adjudicated by ordinary courts.

    A. Arunachala Naicker v. Ghulam Mahmood Sahib.

    1. This Civil revision petition arises at the instance of the tenant against whom a decree has been passed in a suit for eviction. In 1917 the respondent granted a lease of a property, a land, for certain agricultural purposes to the petitioner. After the termination of the lease the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the tenant in O. S. No. 283 of 1945. The tenant set up various defences, namely, a denial of the title of the plaintiff, want of proper notice to quit etc. It is significant that there was no plea claiming that the tenant was entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. A decree for ejectment was passed on 20-8-1846.

    An appeal was filed against that decree to this Court which failed. That decree was further confirmed in the Letters Patent Appeal and the proceedings finally terminated on 23-3-1950 when the tenant was given one year's time to vacate the land. An application for delivery of possession was thereafter filed in E. P. No. 1403 of 1951. While that application was pending a suit was filed by a third party for an injunction to restrain the landlord from executing the decree hut the suit was dismissed on 20-5-1954. The pendency of the suit resulted in the dismissal of E. P. No. 1403 of 1951 evidently for statistical reasons.

    The landlord thereupon filed E. P. No. 157 of 1955 for obtaining delivery. Delivery was ordered on 29-9-1955. In the meantime the Madras City Tenants Protection Act III of 1922 was amended by the Madras Act XIX of 1955 and the amended enactment came into force on 10-9-1955. Under the Act as amended the benefits of the earlier Act were made available to tenants who had put up buildings on the demised lands before coming into force of the Madras Act XIX of 1955. Taking advantage of the provisions of the Act the tenant, namely, the present petitioner filed C. M. P. No. 1693 of 1955 on 5-10-1955 in the lower court stating that he had a shed put up on the land after the decree, that he was entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act and that the land should be sold to him under Section 9 of the Act.

    This was contested by the landlord on various grounds. The learned Assistant Judge cum Registrar of the City Civil Court, Madras, held that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of the Madras Act 19 of 1955 and dismissed the application. The tenant seeks to revise that order in this petition. This civil revision petition is sought to be filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    Under that section the High Court can entertain a revision against the order of a subordinate Court only in a case where there is no appeal provided under the law. The question, therefore, is whether there is a right of appeal against the order of the lower Court which held that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act.

    It is necessary in this connection to refer to certain provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. Under the general law if a tenant puts up any building or structure on a demised land the tenant has got to remove the super structure after the tenancy is determined and deliver vacant possession of the land to the landlord. The Madras City Tenants Protection Act III of 1922 was intended to protect the tenants who had constructed buildings on the lands leased out to them in the hope that they would not be evicted. Originally it applied only to tenancies created in the City of Madras before 8-2-1922 that is before coming into force of that Act.

    That Act has been amended by the Madras Act XIX of 1955 which applied the beneficial provisions of the Act to the tenancies prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act, namely, 10-9-1955 and also to places beyond the limits of the Madras City viz, specified villages within five miles of the City of Madras, or such municipal town which are notified by the Government by means of notification. Broadly stated the benefits conferred by the Madras Act III of 1922 are : (1) light of the tenant to obtain compensation on eviction for the building put up by him on the demised property (Section 3), (2) right at his option to purchase the land subject to certain qualifications and conditions prescribed (Section 9), (3) proper notice before eviction (Section 11), (4) determination of fair rent during the continuance of the tenancy by the Court on application therefor, (sections 6, 7 and 7-a).

    The provisions of the Act apply to all suits for eviction filed after the enactment to applications under Section 41 of the Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act, and to suits and applications for ejectment in which any decree or order had been passed but which decree or order had not been executed. (See Section 10). The procedure for working out the rights created by the Act has also been prescribed. Section 4 relates to a suit for ejectment against the tenant. It contemplates the determination of the compensation and the passing of a preliminary decree declaring the amount of compensation due to the tenant in respect of the building put up by him and directing that on such payment within three months from the date of the decree the tenant shall put the landlord into possession of the property; if however such payment was not made the suit was to stand dismissed and the landlord was disabled from filing a suit for ejectment for a period of five years thereafter.

    Similar provisions were made in respect of an application under Section 41 of the Presidency Town Small Cause Courts Act. Section 9 confers an additional right to the tenant to purchase the land from the landlord. This he could do by applying to the Court within one month after corning into force of the Act or within 15 days after the service of summons in a suit or application under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for ejectment by the landlord. On such an application the Court should ascertain the manner set out in that section and fix the market value of the property; if the tenant paid the same in accordance with the instalments to be fixed by the Court and within the time prescribed a final order is to be passed by the Court directing conveyance of the land by the landlord to the tenant.

    On such order being made the suit or application for ejectment is to stand dismissed and the decree or order for ejectment is to be vacated. In default of payment by the tenant the application by the tenant is to stand dismissed, the tenant being entitled to restitution in respect of any portion of the price that he might have paid. In that case the suit or application would have to he proceeded with in accordance with the law. sections 6, 7 and 7-a give jurisdiction to the Court for fixing fair rent in the circumstances set out therein. Section 8 stales that the order passed under the aforesaid sections shall have the effect as a decree in a suit. There is no provision in the Act providing any right of appeal as such in regard to orders passed under the provisions aforesaid.

    But it must be noticed that Sections 4 and 9 created new rights in tenants and extended the powers and jurisdiction of the Civil Court which entertains or could entertain a suit or application for eviction against a tenant. It is well recognised that the right of appeal should be given by a statute. It is also well recognised that if a right is granted by a statute and jurisdiction is given to ordinary courts to give effect to such a right, the procedure including a right of appeal that is applicable to the proceedings in such Courts would also apply for the enforcement of such rights. Appeals would therefore lie even if they are not specifically provided for by the statute creating the right, it in respect of those orders an appeal would lie if they were treated as a part of the ordinary jurisdiction of that Court. The right of appeal becomes inherent by virtue of the adjudication of rights and not by implication.

    2. In National Telephone Co. v. Postmaster General 1913 A. C. 546 Viscount Haldane L. C. observed thus:

    "When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches"
    .

    Lord Shaw of Dunfermline observed at page 557: ".....When it became possessed of the cause so referred, that cause fell to he determined according to the rules and methods of the ordinary procedure of the Commission and it became subject to all the provisions of the Acts of 1873 and 1888 including those as to appeal." Lord Parker of Waddington observed at page 562 thus: "Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record with no further provision the necessary implication is, I think that the Court will determine the matters as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged hut all the incidents of such jurisdiction including the right of appeal from its decision remain the same,"

    3. In Secy. of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao, ILR 39 Mad. 617: (AIR 1916 PC 21) the question arose whether an appeal lay to the High Court from an order of the District Judge under the provisions of the Madras Forest Act. Under that Act a right of appeal is provided to the District Judge from an order of the Forest Settlement Officer and no further appeal was provided in the statute from the order of the District Court on such appeal. The question arose whether there could be an appeal against the order of the District Judge. The Privy Council held that an appeal lay to the High Court notwithstanding the fact that the Forest Act did not provide for a right of appeal from the decision of the District Judge.

    Dealing with this aspect the Privy Council observed at page 624 (of ILR Mad): (at p. 23 of AIR) "it was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships' opinion this objection is not well founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the. ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply..... The claim was the assertion of a legal right to possession of and property in land; and if the ordinary courts of the country are seized of a dispute of that character, it word require in the opinion of the Board a specific limitation to exclude the ordinary incidents of litigations. The objection taken is accordingly repelled." To the similar effect is the decision of the Privy Council in Hemsingh v. Basant Das. ILR 17 Lah. 146 : (AIR 1936 PC 93). That decision related to a question whether an appeal lay from the judgment of the High Court to whom jurisdiction was conferred under section 34 of the gurudwara act viii of 1925. In Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar. 1948-1 Mad. LJ 41 : (AIR 1948 PC 12) the point that arose for consideration was as regards appealability of an order refusing to amend a decree under Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938 on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. The Privy Council held that such an order would be appealable as a decree. They stated the rule thus at page 44 : (of Mad. LJ) : (at p. 14 of AIR) : "The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal." It was further held that a refusal to grant the application under Section 19 of the Madras Act IV of 1938 would amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) C. P. Code, from which an appeal under Section 96 would lie. Such a refusal amounted to a formal expression of the adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determined the right of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit, namely, whether the judgment debtor was an agriculturist and entitled to have his debt discharged under the Act. The same principle was accepted by the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd., . That case arose under the Indian Trade Marks Act. Under Section 76 of the Act a right of appeal is conferred on the High Court against an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks. A question arose whether a decision of a single Judge of the High Court under Section 76 of the Act was subject to a further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Supreme Court held that such further appeal lay. In so holding the Supreme Court observed at page 222 (of Mad LJ) : (at p. 362 of AIR) :

    "The rights created by the Trade Marks Act are Civil rights for the protection of persons carrying on trade under marks which have acquired a reputation. The statute creates the Registrar a tribunal for safeguarding these rights and for giving effect to the rights created by the Act and the High Court as such without more has been given appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of this tribunal. It is not easy to understand on what grounds it can be said that the High Court while exercising this appellate jurisdiction has to exercise it in a manner different from its other appellate jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is merely an addition of a new subject-matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdiction already exercised by the High Court."

    4. In that view it was held that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent applied to the case and a further appeal lay to a Bench of the High Court against the judgment of a single judge. It therefore follows that when a right particularly a Civil right is created by a statute and jurisdiction is conferred upon ordinary Courts of the land for adjudicating upon such right, in the absence of any other statutory provision, the procedure that is applicable to the adjudication of rights by such Courts would apply for the adjudication of the now rights and a right of appeal would exist against the decision in regard to the matter.

    5. Taking up the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, Section 4 contemplates a preliminary judgment or a preliminary decree and a final decree. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would apply to such cases, namely, preliminary and final decrees and they would be appealable as such. In this connection I may refer to a judgment of this Court in Kasi v. Ramanatha Chettiar, 1947-2 Mad LT 523, where it was held that there can be more than one preliminary decree in a suit. A case under Section 9 of the Act presents some difficulty. Various orders are contemplated under that section.

    If the application for the purchase of land is dismissed on the ground that the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of the Act, the principle of the decision in 1948-1 Mad LT 41 : (AIR 1948 PC 12) would apply and the order would be appealable as a decree. If on the other hand the Court passes an order fixing the price for the building, that order as such may not amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the C. P. Code but in certain cases it may amount to an order under Section 47 of the C. P. Code. Under Section 9(3) of the City Tenants Protection Act final order dismissing the suit is contemplated.

    That undoubtedly would amount to a decree and be appealable as such. Therefore where the right to apply is negatived or where the application is granted, the conditions complied with and the suit is dismissed an appeal would lie under Section 98 C. P. C. But if an order is one merely fixing compensation or the value of the property, that would only be an interlocutory order but in certain cases the effect of that order would amount to an adjudication that the decreeholder would not be entitled to execute the decree according to its tenor. Such an order would in my opinion come within the terms of Section 47 of the C. P. Code and an appeal would lie as a decree.

    Therefore in a case where there is an order under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act which does not of its own force amount to a decree namely adjudicating on the rights of the parties the question would arise whether it is an order within the meaning of Section 47 of the C. P. Code. In this connection reference may be made to the decision, of the Full Bench in Desikachariar v. Ramachandra Reddiar, where it was held that it is not every order in execution that is appealable under Section 47 and 96 of the C. P. Code but an order in order to be appealable should amount to an order determining the rights of the parties to the proceedings.

    In such a case Section 47 C. P. Code would apply and an appeal would also lie from such an order. I have already referred to the provisions of Sections 6 to 8 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act which give power to the Court to adjudicate on application for fixing fair rent payable for the land. Section 8 states that such an adjudication is deemed to be a decree and therefore an appeal would lie. I am therefore of opinion that in regard to orders passed on applications under the City Tenants Protection Act an appeal would lie if the adjudication amounts to a decree or if the adjudication has the effect of deciding the question in execution in regard to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.

    The instant case within the principle laid down by the Privy Council in 1948-1-Mad LJ 41 : (AIR 1948 PC 12), and an appeal would lie against the order. Even otherwise I would hold that the effect of the order in the present case is to hold that execution should proceed by overruling objection to the execution and claiming benefits under the Act. An appeal therefore lay in the present case against the order of the lower Court and the civil revision petition is incompetent. The Civil revision petition tails and is dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    A. Arunachala Naicker v. Ghulam Mahmood Sahib.
    (Aug 21, 1958)