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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889 (52 and 53 Vict 69), the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 (6 Edw. 7, c. 34) and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916 (6
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, or the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889,
  • India, the Indian Evidence Act, by V.V Chitaley and S. Appu Rao, Volume 7, S. 133,
  • provisions of S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947. S. 4
  • S. 161 I.P.C and S. 5 (1) (d) read with S. 5 (2) of Act II
  • 565. S. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916,
  • S. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)
  • S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II
  • Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916,
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, page 23
  • Prevention of Corruption Act P. 195
  • S. 4 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
  • S. 4 of Act II of 1947
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889 (52 and 53 Vict 69), the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 (6 Edw. 7, c. 34) and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916 (6
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, or the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889,
  • India, the Indian Evidence Act, by V.V Chitaley and S. Appu Rao, Volume 7, S. 133,
  • provisions of S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947. S. 4
  • S. 161 I.P.C and S. 5 (1) (d) read with S. 5 (2) of Act II
  • 565. S. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916,
  • S. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)
  • S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II
  • Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916,
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, page 23
  • Prevention of Corruption Act P. 195
  • S. 4 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
  • S. 4 of Act II of 1947
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal brought by the State of Madras against the acquittal granted by the learned Special Judge of Chingleput in C.C. No. 8 of 1955. The prosecution alleged that the accused, a wireless licensing Inspector named Thomas, demanded and accepted an illicit payment of Rs. 20 from the complainant (Rajabadar, P.W.2), the owner of a tea stall in Saidapet, in relation to a radio licence matter. The complainant alleged repeated visits and demands by inspectors, correspondence showing demands for licence fees and penalties, and a final incident when the accused allegedly demanded Rs. 20 to avoid prosecution. The complainant reported the demand to the Special Police Establishment; a trap was arranged, the marked notes were supplied by P.W.2 and recovered from the accused's left trouser pocket during an apprehension by Sub-Inspector Balasubramanian (P.W.7). The trial court (Special Judge) had acquitted the accused. The State appealed to the High Court under Section 417 Cr.P.C seeking to set aside the acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court should interfere with the Special Judge's acquittal under the scope and standards applicable to appeals from an acquittal (Section 417 Cr.P.C).
  2. Whether, on the proved facts, the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, II of 1947 arises (i.e., whether proof that the accused accepted a gratification gives rise to the statutory presumption and shifts the onus to the accused to disprove corrupt acceptance).
  3. Whether the trap witness (the complainant/citizen who delivered the marked notes under police direction) is to be treated as an accomplice whose testimony requires corroboration, or as a non-accomplice (decoy/spy) whose evidence may be relied upon subject to close scrutiny and some corroboration.

Arguments of the Parties

State / Prosecution (Appellant)

  • The prosecution relied on the sequence of correspondence between P.W.2 and the Wireless Department, the statements of P.W.2 that he had been repeatedly asked about the radio and licence, and the trap operation culminating in recovery of the marked notes from the accused's left trouser pocket.
  • The prosecution argued that the learned Special Judge erred in failing to apply the statutory presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act once it was proved that the accused had accepted the gratification.
  • The prosecution maintained that the trap witnesses (P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5 and P.W.7) provided reliable evidence which, taken together, supported conviction and justified drawing the Section 4 presumption.

Accused / Defence

  • The accused denied making a demand or accepting Rs. 20; he contended that he did not request money and that he was astonished when the Sub-Inspector confronted him and that the notes were found in his pocket—his explanation was that P.W.2 must have thrust the currency notes into his pocket.
  • The defence produced two witnesses (D.W.1 and D.W.2) who gave accounts suggesting someone else (a “tall man”) prompted the accused to take money out of his pocket and that the accused said the short man (P.W.2) must have thrust the money. The trial judge found these defence witnesses untrustworthy.
  • The defence relied on the Special Judge's conclusions that Mahazar witnesses P.W.3 and P.W.4 were not independent, that procedural defects (timing and place of mahazar preparation) undermined reliability, and that P.W.2 was an accomplice and required corroboration in material particulars.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nur Muhammad v. Emperor Cited among authorities on scope of appellate interference with acquittal. Listed as an authority illustrating principles governing appeals from acquittal under S.417 Cr.P.C.
Sheoswarup v. Emperor Cited among authorities on scope of appellate interference with acquittal. Listed alongside other decisions to show established principles on interfering with trial court findings.
Surajpal Singh v. The State Authority on appellate caution in disturbing acquittal. Included to support the High Court's articulation of restraint in appeals from acquittal.
Biyabani v. The State of Madras Authority on appellate review of acquittal. Identified as one of the Supreme Court decisions embodying the relevant principles.
Zuingle Aret v. State of M.P. Authority on appellate interference with acquittal. Referred to as part of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic.
Wilayat Khan v. U.P State Authority on appellate review principles. Cited as part of the cluster of Supreme Court precedents the Court relied upon.
Trimbak v. State Of Madhya Pradesh Authority on appeal from acquittal. Listed among Supreme Court authorities supporting the High Court's approach.
Ajmer Singh v. State Of Punjab Authority on appellate review of acquittal. Included in the list of higher court authorities cited by the High Court.
Aher Rajakhima v. The State of Sourashtra Authority on appellate interference with acquittal (including commentary on "compelling reasons"). Referenced, including mention of a dissent explaining scope of "compelling reasons".
Public Prosecutor v. Lakshmamma Decisions of the court (this Court) cited for the principles about appeals from acquittal. Used as part of the body of local authority confirming the principles stated by the High Court.
Public Prosecutor v. Ramudu Court authority cited regarding evidence and findings. Listed among earlier decisions of this Court bearing on appellate review.
Public Prosecutor v. Kandaswami Mudaliar Local authority on appellate standards. Included as part of the jurisprudential background on interference with acquittal.
Public Prosecutor v. Mayandi Nadar Local authority on appellate review. Cited as one of the precedents supporting the articulated standard of review.
R. v. Kakelp (1923) 2 K.B 793 English authority cited regarding statutory presumptions and burden. Cited as an illustration in the discussion of legislative allocation of onus in certain offences.
R. v. Briant (1943) 2 All. E.R 156 English authority on statutory presumptions/burden and bribery law. Cited to illustrate English authorities on presumptions in corruption/bribery contexts.
R. v. Carr-Briant (1943) K.B. 607 Authority on the quantum of proof required by an accused to rebut a statutory presumption. Quoted to explain that the accused's burden under such a presumption is less than criminal standard and corresponds to preponderance of probabilities.
R. v. Jenkins; R. v. Evans-Jones (1923, 87 J.P. 115) English authorities cited regarding onus when payment has been proved. Mentioned in the context of comparative English law on bribery and the burden on the defendant.
Promod Chandra Shekhar v. Rex (1951 A.I.R All. 546) Interpretation of S.4 (presumption) — presumption arises once acceptance of gratification is proved. Quoted for the proposition that the presumption under S.4 arises as soon as the prosecution proves acceptance of gratification (subject to provisos).
State v. Minaketen (1952 A.I.R Orissa 267) Requirement that prosecution prove 'consenting mind' or the accused accepted gratification as such. Cited to show that proof of passing of money alone may be insufficient; the prosecution must show acceptance with a consenting mind (but S.4 affects the allocation of burden).
Mahfuz Ali v. State (1953 A.I.R All. 110) Presumption under S.4 not confined to charges under S.161 IPC; available in analogous offences. Used to support that S.4 presumption may apply in cases charged under other sections with similar gravamen.
Ouseph Varkey v. State (1954 A.I.R T.C 492) Application of S.4(2); small sums are not necessarily trivial for the saving provision. Cited to illustrate that modest sums may still attract S.4 presumption.
Mehr Singh v. State of Pepsu (1955 A.I.R Pepsu 156) How an accused may rebut presumption under S.4 by establishing probability of innocent receipt. Cited for the proposition that an accused need only satisfy the judge of the probability of innocence to rebut the presumption.
Krishnabiharilal v. State (1956 A.I.R M.B 86) S.4 presumption arises once receipt of money from complainant is proved; burden on accused to prove contrary. Used to support the proposition about the moment the statutory presumption arises and the burden it creates.
Lalchand v. State (1956 A.I.R Orissa 201) Scope of presumption under S.4 — it does not create presumptions beyond corrupt receipt or inadequacy of consideration. Cited to explain the limits of S.4 (e.g., it does not presume relationships between parties).
Ram Krishnan v. Delhi State (1956 M.W.N 480) Trap operations: not to be absolutely prohibited; traps may be necessary to detect corruption. Quoted to show the Court's acceptance that traps may be permissible and necessary in corruption cases.
R. v. Mullins (Maule, J.) (1848; 3 Cox. C. C. 526) Distinction between accomplices and spies/decoys; police traps and their treatment. Cited in the discussion of whether trap witnesses are accomplices requiring corroboration.
R. v. Bickley (1909) 2 Cr. App R. 53 Police spies and informers distinguished from accomplices. Used in the treatise-based discussion supporting non-application of accomplice corroboration rule to decoys in certain instances.
R. v. Houser (Heusor?) (1910/194? 6 Cr. App. R. 76) Police assent to informer action and its evidentiary consequences. Cited as part of English authority discussing trap/evidence of spies.
R. v. Carr-Briant (1943) K.B. 607 (also cited above) How the burden of proof on an accused to rebut a statutory presumption corresponds to civil standard. Discussed to explain the nature of the accused's burden under S.4.
Prominent treatises and English statutes (Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889; Prevention of Corruption Acts) Comparative law on bribery and presumptions. Referred to for comparative background on statutory presumptions and bribe-detection law.
Rex/State decisions such as Promod Chandra Shekhar; State of Vindhya Pradesh v. Shiva Bahadur Singh Authorities describing gradations of trap witnesses and accomplicehood. Quoted at length to justify treatment of trap witnesses and need for scrutiny/corroboration.
King v. Mortimer; Brannan v. Peek; other English and Indian authorities (e.g., Hazura Singh, In re Koganti Appaya, In re Mohiddin, Mitra v. State) Authorities evidencing caution about police-induced offences and use of traps. Cited in the discussion that while traps are sometimes necessary, their use is looked upon with disfavour and evidence requires close scrutiny.
Ambujammal v. The State (1953 M.W.N 424) Discusses indispensability and historical basis of trap witnesses and the standards of scrutiny/corroboration. Relied upon to summarise the law that trap witnesses are not necessarily accomplices but their evidence must be carefully scrutinised and corroborated.
State of Vindhya Pradesh v. Shiva Bahadur Singh (1951 A.I.R V.P 17) Describes the spectrum of trap witnesses and their differing reliability. Quoted to characterise various types of trap witnesses and how the law treats them.
King v. S.N. Singh Roy (AIR 1951 Orissa 297) Cited in support of principles on trap evidence. Included among authorities addressing evidence of decoys and trap witnesses.
Various American and Canadian authorities (Wigmore; 14 Am. Jur.) and Canadian cases cited Comparative law supporting the proposition that feigned accomplices/detectives are not true accomplices. Used to bolster the Court's exposition that trap witnesses may be treated differently from genuine accomplices.
Numerous treatises (Roscoe, Phipson, Halsbury, Corpus Juris India, Sarkar, etc.) Textual and doctrinal support for treatment of trap witnesses and corroboration requirements. Cited extensively to explain how courts should approach trap evidence and corroboration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court undertook a structured analysis organized around three main tasks: (1) remind the scope and standard for appellate interference with an acquittal under Section 417 Cr.P.C; (2) assess whether the statutory presumption in Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act arises on these facts and, if so, whether the accused rebutted it; and (3) analyse whether the trap witness(es) constituted accomplices whose uncorroborated testimony would be inadmissible or unreliable.

On the scope of appeal, the Court reiterated established principles: though the High Court has broad powers under S.417 to review evidence, the presumption of innocence and the trial Judge's advantage in seeing witnesses require appellate restraint; interference is warranted only for substantial and strong reasons where the lower court is manifestly wrong or has obstinately blundered.

On the facts, the Court accepted the Special Judge's primary factual findings that a trap was arranged by Sub-Inspector Balasubramanian (P.W.7), that P.W.2 produced marked currency notes which were noted and attested (Ex. P-13), and that during the staged meeting the accused accepted and later removed those notes from his left trouser pocket in the presence of police and witnesses. The High Court found the testimony of P.Ws.2–5 and 7 to be coherent and not discredited on cross-examination; it rejected the Special Judge's doubts about independence of the mahazar witnesses (P.W.3 and P.W.4) after reviewing their occupations, means, and motives and found no reason to treat them as police stooges.

The Court turned then to Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After setting out the text of S.4 and related interpretive material (including Indian and English authorities and commentaries), the Court explained the legal effect: proof that the accused accepted a gratification gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the acceptance was corrupt (i.e., as motive or reward covered by S.161 IPC), and that the onus then shifts to the accused to rebut that presumption on the balance of probabilities (a lesser burden than the prosecution's burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt).

Applying that rule to the facts, the Court concluded that the presumption under S.4 did arise because it was proved that the accused had accepted the marked notes. The accused had not discharged the burden of rebuttal: his story (that P.W.2 had thrust the notes into his pocket) was found improbable by the Court (for example, because of the accused's dress—wearing a coat—and practical implausibility of such a surreptitious act). The Court also found independent corroboration of the trap witness's testimony in material particulars (the presence and attestation of marked notes, the conduct of the Sub-Inspector and the mahazar, the chain of correspondence), and concluded that the Special Judge's reasons for acquittal (concerns about mahazar timing and accomplice status of P.W.2) were not persuasive.

On the legal question whether trap witnesses are accomplices, the Court surveyed a large body of authorities and treatises (English, American, Canadian and Indian). It restated the legal position that a person who becomes an agent for the prosecution before associating with wrongdoers (a decoy/spy) is not an accomplice in the technical sense, but that such evidence is regarded with caution and generally requires some corroboration. The Court emphasized that each trap witness must be evaluated individually, and that corroborative evidence need not be strong or conclusive but must legitimately tend to connect the accused to the offence; mere suspicion is not enough.

Assessing the evidence under that standard, the High Court found: (a) the trap witnesses were not accomplices; (b) the testimony of P.W.2 was corroborated in material particulars by other witnesses and documentary items; (c) procedural criticisms of the mahazar's preparation did not render the mahazar unreliable; and (d) the accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption. Consequently the Court found the trial court's acquittal to be manifestly perverse and unjustified.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court set aside the Special Judge's order of acquittal and convicted the accused. The precise conviction was recorded under the provisions alleged: S.161 I.P.C and S.5(1)(d) read with S.5(2) of Act II of 1947 (Prevention of Corruption Act).

Sentence imposed: Taking into account mitigating circumstances urged on appeal, the Court did not impose imprisonment but sentenced the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 200, or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months; time to pay the fine was fixed at one month.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The acquittal was set aside; the accused was convicted and sentenced as above. The Court noted that conviction could lead to consequences for the accused's service (the defence had acknowledged dismissal was a possible outcome), but the Court's order itself imposed the fine/alternative imprisonment as the penal consequence.
  • On doctrine: The opinion applied established principles concerning (a) appellate restraint in appeals from acquittal under S.417 Cr.P.C, (b) the operation of the presumption under S.4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the reduced evidentiary burden on an accused to rebut it, and (c) the legal characterization of trap witnesses (not automatically accomplices) and the degree of corroboration their evidence requires. The Court relied on existing authorities and treatises in reaching its conclusions; it did not purport to announce a novel rule of law beyond the articulated application of those authorities to the facts before it.

Other Observations Recorded in the Opinion

  • The High Court commended Sub-Inspector Balasubramanian's (P.W.7) investigation as scrupulous and thorough.
  • The Court praised the citizen-witness Mitran (who advised P.W.2 to report the demand) for civic courage, though Mitran died before trial and did not give evidence.

Note: This summary has been prepared strictly on the basis of the content contained in the provided opinion. Where the opinion itself set out or summarized authorities or principles, those summaries have been reflected here without addition of facts or reasoning not present in the original text.

    The Public Prosecutor v. A. Thomas

    JUDGMENT

    This is an appeal preferred by the State of Madras against the acquittal by the learned Page: HC118Special Judge of Chingleput in C.C No. 8 of 1955.

    The case for the prosecution is : The complainant Rajabadar, P.W 2 is the owner of a tea stall in the bazaar road in Saidapet, a suburb of the City of Madras. He has been carrying on this tea stall for the last ten years. P.W 2 is the owner of a house in the same street bearing door No. 111, worth Rs. 5000. P.W 2 was getting from his tea stall business a monthly income of Rs. 100.

    Five years ago P.W 2 had installed a raido set in the tea shop. In fact in the City of Madras such radios which are played practically during the working hours have become the standard equipment. P.W 2 was taking out licence for two years and was using the radio with the help of the electric connection from a neighbouring house. But later that neighbour is said to have refused to give the electric connection and the radio also is said to have gone out of order. P.W 2 did not apply for a licence.

    In the month following Pongal of 1954 one Inspector came and asked on seeing the ariel as to where the radio was and where was the licence. P.W 2 showed the old licence and also told him that the radio was in repair and he had also no electric connection and that therefore did not renew the licence. That Inspector asked him to give a letter to that effect. So a neighbour was called for reducing into writing this information as P.W 2 is an unlettered man and can only sign his name. The neighbour wrote down the statement, read it out to P.W 2 and it was signed by P.W 2 and handed over to the Inspector. The letter is Ex P. 2.

    Four months later another Inspector turned up. P.W 2 told him the same thing and gave also a statement written down by one Mitran. It is Ex. P-3.

    One month later for the third time the Inspector who came first and this accused Thomas who is a wireless licencing Inspector came to P.W 2 and asked him where the radio was P.W 2 took them to his house and showed the radio. Ten days later he received a cover from the post office containing 4 or 5 papers. On showing them to a friend he was told that Rs. 45 were required to be deposited for the radio licence at the rate of Rs. 15 per year for two years with penalty of Rs. 15. The letters received by P.W 2 are Exs. P-4 and P-5 of which the latter consists of four sheets. P.W 2 sent a reply Ex. P-6. Then he received a further notice demanding the amount, Ex. P-7. Subsequently he received by registered post Ex. P-8 and P.W 2 sent the reply Ex. P-9. Then he got a peremptory demand Ex. P-10. P.W 2 applied for three month's time for payment under Ex. P-11.

    A week or 8 days thereafter the accused came to the shop of P.W 2 and told him that the festival was approaching and that he wanted Rs. 20 and that he would see the radio matter being closed without P.W 2 paying any penalty. P.W 2 told the accused that he had no money and that if he had money he would have paid. Thereupon the accused left the place.

    In the month of Pongal of 1955 on the last Thursday of the month viz., 27th according to the English date, the accused came and adopted a minatory tone and addressed P.W 2 saying that he was neither paying the money into the office nor the douceur for the festival to himself and that the net result would be that he (P.W 2) was going to be prosecuted. P.W 2 appealed to him to put off of the Prosecution saying that he would pay him the douceur sometime later. The accused thereupon asked P.W 2 to see him near the office as it was Saturday and half-holiday for him and come with Rs. 20. P.W 2 agreed reluctantly.

    P.W 2 then went and consulted his friend Mitran about what the accused told him. That Mitran advised P.W 2 to go and inform the Special Police Establishment, Purasawalkam which has been set up for putting down offences of this kind by public officials. Unfortunately this Mitran could not be examined as he had died before the case came up for hearing in the lower court. P.W 2 took the advice in good part and in good earnest and for which we must congratulate both that Mitran who as a citizen with sound civic consciousness gave proper advice and P.W 2 for not complying with the illegal demand of the accused and taking the things lying down but had the courage to go and inform subsequently the Special Police Establishment notwithstanding the fact that he knew that he was heading for a very unpleasant time at the hands of accused's lawyer in Court. It is only when citizens have got the courage to withstand certain unpleasantness and discharge their duties that our welfare State can flourish.

    On Saturday morning at about 10 A.M P.W 2 went to the Special Establishment Page: HC119Police Office at Purasawalkam and met the Sub-Inspector-Balasubramanian P.W 7 in the office. P.W 7 patiently enquired P.W 2 and asked him to reduce his information into writing and give a written complaint. This precaution has apparently been taken because it is notorious that such complainants are subsequently won over or get cold-feet and resile from their complaint and deny even having made such a complaint. Inasmuch as this P.W 2 is an unlettered man, he got the information written down by another Sub-Inspector who was in the premises of the Court when this P.W 2 gave evidence. Then after this information was reduced into writing conformable to what P.W 2 told the Sub-Inspector, it was read over to him and admitted by him to be correct and in token thereof he has affixed his signature : Ex. P-42.

    Ex. P-12 gives a precis of the information reproduced above and winds it up by saying that he P.W 2 consented to meet the accused on Saturday at about 1-30 p.m and that he did not want to give the bribe and therefore informing the Sub Inspector for taking suitable action.

    Thereupon P.W 7 devised a trap to catch the accused redhanded. He asked P.W 2 to bring Rs. 20 and the correspondence that passed between him and the Wireless Department and meet him at 1 p.m at the Mount Road Police Station. In the meantime the Sub-Inspector obtained the permission of the Chief Presidency Magistrate to investigate the case. He secured three witnesses P.Ws 3 to 5 to be near about the Mount Road. Then he went to the Police Station where P.W 2 was waiting with the money and papers. In the presence of the witnesses the Sub-Inspector received the money produced by P.W 2 in the shape of one ten-rupee currency note and two five rupee currency notes. P.W 7 noted the numbers in a paper and got it attested by the witnesses see Ex. P-13. Then he searched P.Ws 2 and 3 to ensure that nothing was planted on them. Then he asked P.W 2 to go to the Postmaster-General's Office and give the amount to the accused as and when he made the demand. P.W 3 was instructed to follow closely P.W 2 and watch the transaction and to show by signal by tying a turban over his head or by going over to him and informing him in person as soon as the money was paid to the accused. P.Ws 4 and 5 were instructed to follow behind P.Ws 2 and 3 and observe what went on. Then as to what happened we have the evidence of P.Ws 2 to 5 and 7. They all went to the Post Master General's Office in White's Road branching off from the Mount Road, P.W 2 first entered the gate followed by P.W 3. The accused on sighting P.W 2 made signs to him to go out and wait for him. Immediately the accused came outside and went along talking with P.W 2. P.W 3 unknown to the accused was closely following them. The accused naturally would have not suspected P.W 3 at that stage and must have mistaken him for one of the usual passers by on the road. Further behind P.Ws 4, 5 and 7 were following at a discreet distance to avoid making themselves prominent and scaring away the accused. The accused and P.W 2 went to Woods Road and stopped near a hotel called Swami's Cafe. The accused asked P.W 2 whether he had brought the money. Thereupon P.W 2 gave him the currency notes which the accused saw, took and put them inside his left trouser pocket. The accused then went to the opposite shop to purchase a cigarette and lit it. By this time P.W 7 came near the accused and disclosed his identity and asked him to take out the money received as bribe from P.W 2. The astonished accused at being caught so neatly and immediately had no option but to put his hand inside his left trouser pocket and take out the currency notes and give them to the Sub-Inspector. The Sub-Inspector gave the currency notes to the witnesses whom he had arranged before hand and were shadowing this accused and who had joined the Sub-Inspector for comparing the numbers with the numbers already noted down and attested by the witnesses (Ex.P-13). The numbers in the currency notes were found to tally with the numbers noted in Ex. P-13. Thereafter the Sub-Inspector took the accused and the witnesses P.Ws 2 to 5 to the Police Station and there prepared a Mahazar for the seizure of the money from the accused. The person of the accused was searched and a chalan was recovered and another Mahazar for seizure of the same was also prepared. After examining the witnesses and obtaining the sanction to prosecute (proved through P.W 1) the Sub Inspector laid a charge sheet on 10-9-1955. The various post office papers are proved through P.W 6, the Wireless Investigating Inspector.

    The case for the accused is that he did not demand Rs. 20 and did not accept the amount from P.W 2, that when he came out Page: HC120of the office at 2 O'Clock he saw P.W 2 near the clock tower, that P.W 2 followed him and requested him to help him in respect of the radio case, that he (accused) told him that he was unable to do anything in the matter, that in spite of that P.W 2 was following him and that he was completely shocked when the Sub-Inspector approached him and demanded him to hand over the money and that he mechanically put his hand in his trouser pocket as demanded by the Sub-Inspector and found to his surprise some currency notes and that his conclusion is that those currency notes must have been thrust into his left trouser pocket by P.W 2.

    On behalf of the accused two D.Ws were examined. D.W 1 was a neighbour of this accused living in No. 177 in Portuguese Church St., George Town. He has subsequently left for Bangalore. He is stated to be a mechanic. The testimony of this D.W 1 was that he happened to be present at the psychological moment, he was coming out of Swami's Cafe that then a tall man came near the accused and asked him to hand over the money given to the accused by the person who was on his side and who was short, that he did not know either the tall man or the short man, that the accused stated that he did not know what the tall man was talking about, that then the tall man said “It is in your left hand pocket”, that then the accused put his hand in his trouser pocket and took out currency notes and told the tall man that the short man who was coming along with him should have thrust the money, that the accused asked the tall man to enquire the witness and others who were present there, that the tall man did not accede to his request and that the accused was taken to the Police Station.

    D.W 2 who is stated to be an unemployed graduate of the Madras University of whom we have got a plentiful number in the city of Madras says that he also happened to be present at the psychological moment and saw a tall man whom he came to know later as the Sub Inspector approach the accused and ask him if he bad received money from the short man pointing to the person by his side, that the tall man then asked the accused to take out money from his left side trouser pocket, that the accused blinked and then put his hand into his left side trouser pocket and took out money, that he (witness) could not say how much it was, that the accused said that the short man must have thrust the money into his pocket, that the accused then said something to the Sub-Inspector pointing to the witness and that he did not hear distinctly what he stated, that the accused was then taken by the Sub-Inspector to the Police Station, that a month later the accused who knows witness for the previous two years and his friend, told him that he was citing him as a witness. In cross-examination he made admissions showing that his happening to be present at the spot and witnessing what he had stated he witnessed are pure inventions. I find from page 35 of the printed papers that this witness has agreed “The accused told me one month latter that he asked the short man to give money and that he thrust money and he was being prosecuted. My elder (some relative) did not get employment in the G.P.O with the influence of the accused. It is not true that at the instance of my father and brother who are known to the accused I am deposing falsely”.

    In short, this defence evidence can hardly be described to be helpful to the accused. In fact this is the opinion of the learned Special Judge also. He writes :

    “The defence witnesses are not trustworthy. They are said to be persons known to the accused very well. When the accused was caught hold of by the Sub Inspector of Police and the money was recovered, these persons appear to have remained at a distance and watched the transaction without asking a single question as to what was happening. When the Sub-Inspector took the accused, they did not remonstrate. Could it have been the conduct of the persons known to the accused so well? They are persons who have been brought by the accused to oblige him and to extricate him from the charge. I do not attach any weight to their testimony”.

    But this need not detain us because it is for the prosecution to affirmatively and satisfactorily establish the guilt of this accused and it is not for him to prove his innocence. It is on that, foot that I shall examine the evidence in this case.

    It is proper at this stage that I should indicate the scope of an appeal from an acquittal and in regard to which the principles are really well settled. Though the High Court has full power under S. 417 Cr. P.C to review at large the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded and to reach its conclusion yet the presumption of innocence of the accused being further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, the findings of that Court can be reversed only for substantial and strong reasons. In exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon Page: HC121fact, the High Court should, and will, always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. The powers conferred by this section should be confined to cases in which lower court has obstinately blundered and produced a result mischievous to the administration of Justice and interests of public. This Court will not allow an appeal against acquittal merely because it would have come to a contrary conclusion but only if lower Court is manifestly wrong. Powers under S. 417 should and would always be sparingly used by this Court.

    These principles are embodied in the following decisions of (a) the Privy Council (b) Supreme Court of India (c) and this court.

    (a) Nur Muhammad v. Emperor1, Sheoswarup v. Emperor 1934 M.W.N 1017.

    (b) Surajpal Singh v. The State 1952 M.W.N 156, Biyabani v. The State of Madras 1954 A.I.R.S.C 645., Zuingle Aret v. State of M.P 1954 A.I.R.S.C 15., Wilayat Khan v. U.P State 1953 A.I.R S.C 122. Shir Bahadur Singh7, Trimbak v. State Of Madhya Pradesh 1954 A.I.R S.C 39., Ajmer Singh v. State Of Punjab 1953 M.W.N 215. Aher Rajakhima v. The State of Sourashtra 1956 M.W.N 665, (see the dissenting Judgment of Venkatarama Iyer, J. explaining the scope of “compelling reasons”.)

    (c) Public Prosecutor v. Lakshmamma 1930 31 L.W 715., Public Prosecutor v. Ramudu 1931 M.W.N 729, Public Prosecutor v. Kandaswami Mudaliar 1933 M.W.N 242., and Public Prosecutor v. Mayandi Nadar 1933 A.I.R Mad. 230..

    That a trap had been arranged and that as a result of that trap being sprung the accused was discovered with the money inside his left trouser pocket, and that the marked currency notes therein had not been surreptitiously placed there without the knowledge of the accused by P.W 2 is the considered finding of the learned Special Judge and with which I entirely agree. The learned Judge writes :

    “I do not think that by coincidence P.W 2 would have met the accused at that juncture had it not been a pre-arranged plan. In Woods Road near the hotel called Swami's Cafe P.W 2 is said to have paid the money and the payment is said to have been witnessed by P.Ws 3 and 4 and the Sub-Inspector P.W 7. The accused no doubt denies that he made a demand on P.W 2 for payment or that any money was paid to him. He would have the Court to believe that money was put into his trouser pocket. It would rather look highly fantastic that P.W 2 would have thrust the currency notes into his left trouser pocket especially when he was wearing a coat and the trouser pockets would undoubtedly have been closed by the coat.” How dexterous and skilful one should be so as to reach his trouser pocket and insert money without his knowledge? I am not at all convinced with the explanation offered by the accused that to his utter surprise and bewilderment, he found currency notes in his left trouser pocket when he put his hands into the pocket at the behest of the Sub-Inspector. The accused is said to be always wearing suit with tie and collar. D.W 2 speaks to the fact that on the date of the incident also he was wearing a coat. Therefore, the story that P.W 2's hand could have reached his left hand trouser pocket is highly improbable. I think as contended for the prosecution the payment should have been made to him only in pursuance of the demand made by the accused. But the important point to be determined is whether there is sufficient legal evidence to base a conviction though there may be moral conviction as regards the receipt of the bribe amount by the accused…..”.

    There can be no doubt that these findings correctly flow from the evidence of P.Ws 2 to 5 and 7, which there is no reason whatsoever to doubt because nothing has been elicited in cross-examination to discredit their testimony.

    Having come to that conclusion the learned Public Prosecutor states that the learned Special Judge erred in refusing to invoke the presumption under S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947.

    The learned Public Prosecutor seeks to bring to his aid the provisions of S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947. S. 4 states :

    “ (1) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under S. 161 or S. 165 of the Indian Penal Code it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or Page: HC122attempted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said S. 161, or, as the case may be without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate.

    (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under S. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code or, as the case may be without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate.

    (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the Court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no “inference of corruption may fairly be drawn”.

    The term “shall be presumed” means that the Court is bound to take the fact as proved until evidence is adduced to disprove it and the party interested in disproving it must produce such evidence if he can. The word is explained in S. 4 of the Indian Evidence Act as “Whenever it is directed under the Evidence Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved” and a fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. S. 4 of Act II of 1947 which deals with drawing of presumption where a public servant has been shown to have accepted gratification other than legal remuneration, lays down a special rule of evidence in favour of the prosecution and against the accused, to facilitate the proving of the prosecution case. In the case of an offence under S. 161 or 165, I.P.C the burden of proving that the gratification obtained by the public servant was as a motive or reward such as is mentioned under S. 161, always lies on the prosecution, so also the burden of proving that the gratification was without consideration or for a consideration which the public servant knew to be inadequate lies on the prosecution. In view of the special rule of evidence, however, the prosecution has been relieved of its difficult task of proving this; in fact a presumption is to be raised in favour of the prosecution and the burden lies on the accused to disprove the same. To quote Halsbury (Simmonds) Third Edition. Vol. 10 Part 5 sec. 4. page 437 :

    “In relation to certain statutory offences the onus of proof as to part of the issue may be expressly placed by the statute on the accused”. (See R. v. Kakelp (1923) 2 K.B 793 C.C.A : R. Van v. Briant (1943) 2 All. E.R 156.

    See discussion in Bayes-A commentary on the Prevention of Corruption Act, page 23 and following; Aggarvala. The Prevention of Corruption Act page 77 and follows :

    The analogous English Law relating to bribery and corruption is found in the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889 (52 and 53 Vict 69), the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 (6 Edw. 7, c. 34) and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916 (6 and. 7 Geo 5, 64); see Stone's Justices' Manual, 88th Edition, Volume I (1956) at pages 562 to 565. S. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916, states that where in any Proceedings against a person for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, or the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, it is proved that any money, gift or other consideration has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of Her Majesty etc., the money, gift or consideration shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as such inducement or reward as is mentioned in such Act unless the contrary is proved. When the payment etc. of the money has been proved the onus is on the defendant : R. v. Jenkings :R. v. Evans-Jones (1923, 87 J.P 115). In regard to evidence required to rebut the presumption, see R v. Carr-Briant (1943) K.B 607 : (1943) 2 All. E.R 156. In this case, which was under the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916, the Court of Criminal Appeal in England held that in a case where, either by statute or common law, some matter is presumed against the accused, unless the contrary is proved, the burden of proof on the accused is less than that required at the hands of the prosecution in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt; and that that burden is discharged by evidence satisfying the jury of the probability of that which the accused is called upon to establish. That is the test which is applied in a civil proceeding, namely, the preponderance of probability one way or the other. The Court further observed that the rebuttable presumption created by that section should be construed in the same Page: HC123manner as similar words of other statutes or similar presumptions at common law. To quote Halsbury once again

    “In such cases the burden of proof is less stringent than that laid on the prosecution in proving guilt and corresponds to that which rests upon a plaintiff or defendant who is required to prove an issue in Civil Proceedings” (P. 437).

    The Indian Case-law on S. 4 may now be briefly discussed. In Promod Chandra Shekhar v. Rex 1951 A.I.R All. 546. it was held as follows :

    “In our opinion the presumption referred to in S. 4 arises as soon as the prosecution has proved that the accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person any gratification in the sense in which we have defined it in this judgment, or any valuable thing, from any persons provided (however illogical it may be) that in the former case it has further proved that such gratification was not accepted or obtained, or agreed to be accepted or attempted to be obtained by way of legal remuneration” (Per Mootham and Wanchoo, JJ.).

    In State v. Minaketen 1952 A.I.R Orissa 267. it was held : S. 4 of Act II of 1947 requires that the prosecution should prove that the accused accepted or agreed to accept the amount as gratification. ‘Accept’ means ‘to take or receive with a consenting mind’. It is, therefore, upon the prosecution to prove not only the passing of the money into the hands of the accused, but also that he took it with a ‘consenting mind’. This would necessitate proof of either an agreement to accept prior to the actual acceptance, or if his consent to accept the same as gratification at the time the money was offered.

    In Mahfuz Ali v. State 1953 A.I.R All. 110. it was held the presumption available under S. 4 is not confined to those cases only where the accused is, in fact, charged under S. 161, I.P.C but it is also available in cases where the accused is charged under some other section. S. 5 (1) provides for the same type of offences the gravamen of the charge being the same as in S. 161, I.P.C and therefore, where the accused is charged under S. 5 (1) of the Act, the trial Court is fully justified in relying upon the presumption available under S. 4.

    In Ouseph Varkey v. State 1954 A.I.R T.C 492. it was held that in the nature of the prosecution evidence in that case the court was fully justified in drawing the presumption as provided for in S. 4 (2) and that the sum of Rs. 35 tendered by the accused to P.W 1 in that case could not be taken to be so trivial as to attract the saving provision contained in sub-section (3).

    In Mehr Singh v. State of Pepsu 1955 A.I.R Pepsu 156. Mehar Singh, J. held that all that is required from the accused in a bribery case and having regard to S. 4, is to establish by evidence satisfying the Judge of the probability that the amount he received or obtained was received or obtained by him innocently and that if he establishes that probability he has rebutted the presumption and is entitled to be acquitted.

    In Krishnabiharilal v. Sate 1956 A.I.R M.B 86. it was held that it is clear from S. 4, that the moment it is proved that the accused has received a sum of money from the complainant it shall be presumed unless contrary is proved that he accepted it as a motive or reward such as one mentioned in S. 161, I.P.C and that this presumption being there, the burden lies heavily upon the accused to prove the contrary.

    In Lalchand v. State 1956 A.I.R Orissa 201. it was held that the only presumption which can be drawn by virtue of S. 4 (1) is that the thing was obtained without consideration or for a consideration which the accused knew to be inadequate, that a presumption that it was obtained from any person whom he knew to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, is not covered by this provision and that it is for the prosecution to prove by positive evidence that the accused obtained the thing from a person who is known to be related to the concerned person.

    In Ram Krishnan v. Delhi State 1956 M.W.N 480 the Supreme Court has held that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule that the laying of traps must be prohibited on the ground that by so doing an invitation is held out for the commission of offences and that the detection of crime may become difficult if intending offenders, especially in cases of corruption, are not furnished opportunities for the display of their inclination and activities and that whatever the ethics of the question might be, there is no warrant for the view that the offences committed in the course of traps are less grave and call only for lenient or nominal sentences.

    To sum up : S. 4 expressly places the onus of proof as to part of the issue on the Page: HC124accused. The presumption under S. 4 arises as soon as the prosecution has proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept an amount not covered by the proviso as gratification. If unrebutted and until the contrary is proved the gratification will be deemed to have been paid or given or received corruptly as inducement or reward as is mentioned in the Act. But in such cases the burden of proof on the accused is less stringent than that laid on the prosecution in proving guilt and correspond to that which rests upon a plaintiff or defendant who is required to prove an issue in a civil proceeding i.e, preponderance of probabilities.

    Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case we find that the presumption under S. 4 arises in this case and the accused not having rebutted the same in any manner it has been established that the accused has accepted the amount of Rs. 20 as illegal gratification from P.W 2.

    The learned Sessions Judge has acquitted this accused notwithstanding these findings on the grounds that the Mahazar witnesses P.Ws 3 and 4 are not independent witnesses; secondly that the Mahazar should have been written then and there squatting in the main road in the midst of the surging traffic and not going to the nearby Police Station and writing it there and thirdly, that the testimony of P.W 2 which is that of an accomplice has not been corroborated by independent evidence in material particulars. The first two grounds can be easily disposed of.

    P.W 3 is a brass worker making Andas, Gundans, etc. on contract work and is making a comfortable livelihood. Good artisans nowadays earn more than the white-collared brigade who have their educational qualifications to flaunt and nothing more. He is not in any way found to be a stooge of the police. In fact he has assisted this Sub-Inspector only when he disclosed to him his identity card as the C.I.D Inspector and requested his help. P.W 4 is another artisan employed in the well-known local firm Radio Electrical Institute of Messrs. V.S Rajagopalan and Company at the time of his giving evidence. He owns properties worth Rs. 20000 in Velacheri and Kumbakonam. He is also not a stooge of the Police and in fact he has helped the Sub-Inspector when the latter met him on his way to Central Auto Parts to see the proprietor of Southern Accumulators and requested him to assist him in the detection of this crime. The fact that subsequently he seems to have been convicted for a prohibition offence is certainly neither here nor there. In fact many people in fairly important stations in life and pass as respectable and dependable citizens in the metropolitan area would be found to have been convicted in regard to prohibition offences. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws 3 and 4 cannot with any legitimateness be described as either not independent or respectable.

    In regard to the writing of the Mahazar, the learned Special Judge seems to have extraordinary ideas regarding its being reduced into writing without practicable delay and with which latter part we all agree. In this case it will be the height of folly to expect the Sub Inspector to sit on the pavement in Woods Road which is the centre to vehicular and passenger traffic, obstructing the same and drawing a crowd around him and busily draft a Mahazar for which the immediate requirements which the shadowing detective unless he is a moron will not carry thereby drawing attention of himself are paper, pencil, pad, etc. This recording would not make the mahazar any more sacrosanct because the Sub-Inspector bent upon concoction could easily stage-manage one, There is no reason for us to make such remarks regarding Police Officers who are just as respectable and responsible officials as ourselves Judges, discharging as we all do only different aspects of public work. Therefore before implying that officers go in for concoction there must be plenty of materials and special pleadings for acquittal should not be built upon cobweb speculations of this nature.

    Therefore, we have finally to examine the question how far the trap witness is an accomplice and secondly, what is the nature of the scrutiny we have got to make of his evidence.

    In regard to the corroboration of trap witnesses it is interesting to find out what the standard treatises English, American, Canadian and Indian have got to say.

    Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, Sixteenth Edition, Page 145 :

    “Agents provocateus, spies, informers, detective, etc., not accomplices. Such persons employed in entrapping criminals ‘are entirely distinguished in fact and in principle for accomplices’, per Maule, J., Mullins (1848; 3 Cox. C. C 526; spy on Chartists; ‘and I do not see that a person so employed deserves to be blamed if he instigates Page: HC125offences no further than by pretending to concur with the perpetrators'. Followed in Bickley (1909) 2 Cr. App R. 53. Woman police spy buying noxious drug. Where a watchman agreed, with his master's consent, to let thieves into the premises at night, it was argued that what they did was not invito domino and so not larceny; But though nothing was taken, the judges held otherwise; Egginton, etc. (1801) 2 Lea, 913; 2 B, & P-508. See A. Chandler (1912). On the other hand, where on the master's instructions, the servant handed over the property to the thief, held there was no asportation invito domino and conviction quashed; Turkey (1946) 31 Cr. App. R. 154. In B. Mortimer (L.J) Lord Alverstone, C.J said : ‘I do not like police traps any more than does anybody else; but at the same time there are some offences the commission of which cannot be found out in any other way, any unlawful acts done in consequence of the trap are none the less unlawful'. So Heusor (1910) 6 Cr. App. R. 76 : Police officers assenting to informer-who was held to require corroboration repeating gross offence; and cf. Confessions and Aiders”.

    Phipson on Evidence, Ninth Edition, at page 510 :

    “The rule requiring the corroboration of accomplices does not apply to two classes of accomplices : (a) Informers - i.e, person who have joined in, or even provoked, the crime as police-spies (R. v. Bickley 73 J.P 239 : or the police, who have assented thereto R. v. Houser 6 Cr. App. R. 76)…..”

    The American Law of evidence is also the same. 14 American Jurisprudence, S. 113 page 843, has the following to say :

    “Feigned Accomplices : - Since criminal intent is essential to render one an accomplice, it follows that a feigned accomplice is not within the rule that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice will not support a conviction. Thus, a detective who, for the purpose of discovering crime, ostensibly aids, in its commission or in a conspiracy to commit it, or is a ‘spotter’ or paid informer, or the purchaser of liquor, unlawfully sold for the purpose of detecting the seller, or one buying a lottery ticket for the purpose of detecting and punishing the vendor, where the sale is prohibited, or one who, not knowing of larceny until after it has been committed, purchases the stolen goods under the direction of an officer with money furnished by the latter, with a view to detect the thief is not an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated, of course, evidence coming from such contaminated sources should be closely scrutinized by the jury; but if they are satisfied of its truth, they may base a conviction upon it”.

    Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Volume VII, S. 2060 at pages 339 to 342 :

    “ (d) The case of a pretended confederate, who as detective, spy, or decoy, associates with the wrong doers in order to obtain evidence, is distinct from that of an accomplice, although the distinction may sometimes be difficult of application :

    1948, Maule, J., in R. v. Mullins, 7 State Tr. N.S 1110, 3 Cox. Cr. 756 :‘An accomplice is a person who has concurred in the commission of an offence…. But such are different from spies, that is, persons who take measures to be able to give to the authorities information so as to prevent those who are disposed to break out from effecting their purpose….. In the case of an accomplice, he acknowledges himself to be a criminal; in the case of these men, they do not acknowledge anything of the kind’.

    The line should perhaps be drawn in this case : When the witness has made himself an agent for the prosecution before associating with the wrongdoers or before the actual perpetration of the offence, he is not an accomplice; but he may be, if he extends no aid to the prosecution until after the offence is committed. A mere detective or decoy or paid informer is therefore not an accomplice; nor an original confederate who betrays before the crime is committed; yet an accessory after the fact would be, if he had before betrayal rendered himself liable as such. (See State v. McMean 14 Am. Rep. 539 : Wright v. State 32 Am. Rep. 599; Grimm v. U.S 156 U.S 604).

    (e) The burden of proving the witness to be an accomplice is of course upon the party alleging it for the purpose of invoking the rule, namely, upon the defendant. Whether the witness is in truth an accomplice is left to the jury to determine, and if they conclude him to be such, then and then only are they to apply the rule requiring corroboration. If they are in doubt, and unable to decide, the rule is not to be applied; but they need only believe by the preponderance of evidence”.

    The leading treatise on Canadian Criminal Evidence, besides Wigmore on Evidence (Third Edition), which deals with the Canadian Law of Evidence is Popple's Canadian Criminal Evidence (Second Edition). At page 45 it is said :

    “Police constables who act as agent provocateur to obtain evidence of keeping a bawdy house are not to be considered as ‘accomplices’, and their evidence does not require corroboration : Rex v. Clay 1 C.R 327, 1946 Can. Abr. 288. No narrow or precise definition of an ‘accomplice’ can be laid down and much depends on the facts : Rex v. Mudgett, 19 M.P.R 111, 1946 Can. Abr. 287, see also Chapter VII”.

    The Indian Law of evidence is also the same. Chief Justice Monir's Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence, Third Edition, at page 1085 (s. 133) has the following to say :

    “The rule requiring corroboration does not apply to informers, i.e persons who have joined in, or even provoked or instigated, the crime as police spies, as the object of the instigation in such cases is not the perpetration of the offence, but the detection of it, not the transgression of law, but the securing of evidence for the enforcement of public justice”.

    (R. v. Bickley, 73 J.P Rep. 239; See Govinda Balaji v. E. 1936 Nag. 245; E. v. Chatarbhuj Sahu, 38 Cal. 96; Bhuneshwari Pershad v. E. 1931 Oudh 172; but see Hari Lal Gardhan v. E. 1937 Bom. 385; Q.E v. Javecharan 19 B. 363; Suraj Bahadur v. E. 1925 Oudh 158 : Hazura Singh v. E. 1929 L. 436).

    V.B Raju, I.C.S in his Evidence Act, at page 1188 on ‘trap witnesses’ :

    Page: HC126“A person who makes himself an agent for the prosecution with the purpose of discovering and disclosing the commission of an offence either before associating with wrongdoers or before the actual perpetration of the offence, is not an accomplice but a spy, detective, or decoy whose evidence does not require corroboration though the weight to be attached to it depends upon the character of each individual witness in each case”.

    Sarkar on Evidence, Ninth Edition, at page 1079, mentions :

    “It may sometimes be necessary to employ spies or decoys for detection of offences which cannot be detected in any other way, but the practice is looked upon with much disfavour and in their enthusiasm these men soon degenerate into agent provocateurs instigating or provoking the commission of crimes. (See the observation, of Lord Alverstone in King v. Mortimer, 1911, 1 K.B 70). The authorities indicate that if a man makes himself an agent for the prosecution before associating with the wrongdoers or before the offence is committed, or if with a view to protect his own interest or that of others pretends to associate with such persons with the object of preventing the commission of an offence by giving timely information to the authorities, he is not an accomplice. But however good the motive may be, if such a person or a spy or an informer in the exuberance of his enthusiasm actually instigates another to commit a crime even if it be for detection of an offence or to get the credit of having him arrested, he is an abettor under the penal law and his position cannot be anything other than that of an accomplice (See R. v. Jhavi Charan 19 Bom. 363; In re Koganti Appaya, (A.I.R 1938 Mad. 893). So, when officials lay trap and indicate bribery, the officials and bribe givers would be in the position of accomplices (In re Chandrasekhara Iyer, 1951 1 M.L.J 45 (N.R.C) in Brannan v. Peek 1947, 2 All. E.R 572 : 63 T.L.R 592, Lord Goddard, C.J observed :

    “The court observes with concern and disapproval the fact that the police authority at Derby thought it right to send a police officer into a public house to commit an offence. It is wholly wrong for a Police Officer or any other person to be sent to commit an offence in order that an offence by another person may be detected… I hope the day is far distant when it will become a common practice in this country for police officers to be told to commit an offence themselves for the purpose of getting evidence against some one; if they do commit offences, they ought also to be convicted and punished for the order of their superior would afford no defence”.

    Great disapprobation was expressed of the practice of requisitioning the service of magistrates as witnesses of police traps Mitra v. State 1951 A.I.R Cal. 524.. Though the detection of crimes by laying traps is not deemed commendable and may be justified in cases of peculiar difficulty and though a mere spy or detective or decoy may not be an accomplice in law, the evidence of such a person or an agent provocateur is looked upon with suspicion and cannot be relief upon for a conviction (Hazura v. R., A.I.R 1929 Lah. 436; See Vankatarao v. R. 5 D.L.R (Cut) 23; R. v. Anwar Ali A.I.R 1948 Lah. 27); the weight to be attached depends on the character of each individual witness (R. v. Chaturbhuj, 38 Cal. 96). A distinction has been drawn between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate trap’ in the latter case persons taking part in tempting the accused are all accomplices (In re Mohiddin. AIR 1952 Mad. 561).” When the trap witness becomes the instigator of the offence is brought out in Hosen v. U.S (40 L.ed 606); Andies v. U.S (41 L. ed. 727); Grim v. U.S (39 L. ed. 550); Montgomery v. U.S (40 L. ed. 1023); Price v. U.S (40 L. ed. 1020); Sorrelly v. U.S (77 L. ed 413); discussed by me Sundaravadivelu Chetty v. State 1955 M.W.N 26.

    Corpus Juris of India, the Indian Evidence Act, by V.V Chitaley and S. Appu Rao, Volume 7, S. 133, No. 17, part 7, sums up this aspect of the law of evidence in the words of the decision in State of Vindhya Pradesh v. Shiva Bahadur Singh 1951 A.I.R V.P 17. as follows :

    “There is at one end the unblushing giver, who pays the bribe and gets an advantage, and subsequently gives evidence for some ulterior purpose. He is an accomplice of the darkest kind. At the other extreme is the person who, from the very beginning has no intention of giving a bribe, but makes a show of doing it, so as to bring the dishonest public servant to book; such a man far from being an accomplice is a good citizen, to be respected and encouraged. Between the two, there are many gradations of accomplicehood, and consequent legal infamy, and need far more or less corroboration. There is the giver, who goes half way with the intention of paying, but for some reasons beyond his control thinks it wise or safe to report to the authorities and becomes a witness. He is only a less infamous accomplice than the extreme type. Another, who changes his mind without external pressure, is still technically an accomplice, but not as unreliable as the two other types. Then there is the decoy or the spy, who with no intention to pay the bribe, makes himself the instrument of the authorities in tracking the dishonest public servant. The professional spy or decoy, doing this for pecuniary or other advantages though not an accomplice, is suspect all the same, and requires corroboration. If on the other hand, the decoy is not acting for gain, but being himself the victim of the demand helps the authorities spontaneously from a sense of citizen's duty, he is a reliable and respectable witness”.

    (See also The King v. S.N Singh Roy (AIR 1951 Orissa 297).

    These principles have been embodied in two recent decisions of the Supreme Court Page: HC127Rao Shri Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhaya Pradesh 1954 17 S.C.J 362 and Ramakishen v. The State of Delhi.

    For a discussion of trap cases and value of evidence of trap witnesses see Kapur & Pandit. The Prevention of Corruption Act P. 195 and foll; Haripal Varshni. The Law relating to bribery and Corruption. P. 99.

    To sum up as pointed out by me in Ambujammal v. The State 1953 M.W.N 424 unfortunately owing to the increasing nature of the special enactments and the impossibility of procuring evidence in any other way and the paramount necessity of putting down offences of this kind, the use of trap witness has become widespread and indispensable. The employment of trap witnesses is in accordance with the best Hindu and Muslim administrative traditions. I have traced its historical genesis in the aforesaid decision. A trap witness is not an accomplice - and he does not come under the category of persons whose evidence cannot be accepted in the absence of material corroboration. But at the same time as the system of employing trap witness will lend itself to abuses, Court will closely scrutinise his testimony. The weight to be attached to his evidence will depend upon the character of each individual trap witness. Prudence at the same time requires that the courts should demand and the prosecution should adduce some corroborative evidence. That evidence adduced to corroborate this trap witness in the language of 16 corpus Juris P. 711 need not be strong, absolutely convincing or sufficient in itself to support a verdict of guilty, nor even equivalent to the swearing of one credible witness; any corroborative evidence-documentary or oral direct or circumstantial-legitimately tending to connect the accused with the commission of the offence may be sufficient to warrant a conviction although standing by itself it would be only slight proof of accused's guilt and entitled to but little consideration and even though it is not wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. On the other hand evidence which merely raises a suspicion that accused is the guilty party is not sufficiently corroborative of the testimony of a trap witness to warrant a conviction nor will uncertain or equivocal corroboration suffice. No general rule can be stated with respect to the quantum of evidence corroborating a trap-witness's testimony. Each case must be governed by its own circumstances keeping in view the nature of the crime, the character of the trap-witness's testimony and the general requirements necessary to sustain a conviction.

    Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find that first all this trap witness is not an accomplice and secondly scrutinising with very great care his evidence and it is found that, it is well corroborated in material particulars not only by P.Ws 3, 4, 5 and 7 but also by the defence evidence as found by the learned Special Judge in regard to the recovery of the marked currency notes from inside the left trouser pocket of the accused. The evidence of P.W 6 shows that the opportunity afforded to this accused to extract a bribe from P.W 2, viz., to cough up Rs. 20 or face a prosecution.

    In these circumstances we can legitimately describe this acquittal as manifestly perverse, singularly mischievous and totally unmeritted.

    The order of acquittal is therefore set aside and the accused is convicted under S. 161 I.P.C and S. 5 (1) (d) read with S. 5 (2) of Act II of 1947.

    The learned advocate Mr. K.S Jayarama Ayyar who conducted the defence of this accused in this appeal with conspicuous moderation and ability, frankly conceded that he was seeking only to support the acquittal on other grounds and was not relying upon the judgment of the learned Special Judge whose reasoning he stated he was not in a position to support, made an eloquent plea for a lenient punishment having regard to the facts that this offence took place in 1955 and that in the event of my convicting the accused he would get dismissed from service. Taking into consideration these extenuating factors, I am not sending this accused to jail and I sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or in default to undergo R.I for six months. Time to pay the fine is one month.

    The Sub-Inspector Balasubramanian's investigation was both scrupulous and thorough and is commended.

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    The Public Prosecutor v. A. Thomas
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