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Case Number

W.A No. 111 of 1954.

Advocates

The Advocate General and The Special Govt. Pleader for Appts.
Messrs. K.S Champakesa Ayyangar and K.C Srinivasan for Respt.

Judges

Rajamannar, C.J
Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.

Acts

S. 5(1) of the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption Act, Act 11 of 1947. S. 5(1) of that Act
Madras Civil Servants' Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948.The
Madras Civil Services Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948,
Madras Civil Services Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules
S. 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by the Chief Justice)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the judgment of Rajagopala Aiyangar J. in Writ Petition No. 844 of 1952, which sought to quash a Government order dated 7 June 1951 dismissing the respondent from Government service.

The respondent had joined Government service in the Revenue Department about 30 years earlier and was a permanent member of that department in Coimbatore district. He served as Stationary Sub-Magistrate at Pollachi from 14 March to 23 June 1949 and was engaged in the trial of a case of wrongful confinement and extortion.

Two disciplinary charges were framed and a Tribunal enquiry was directed:

Charge (1): that he demanded a sum of Rs. 10,000 as a bribe for acquitting the accused in the case before him;
Charge (2): that he demanded and received illegal gratification of two sums of Rs. 500 each from one Gopalaswami Gounder, promising to convict the accused concerned in the case filed by him against one Chinnaswami Gounder and others.

The Tribunal, after an elaborate enquiry, found as follows: in respect of charge (1) the charge was proved only to a limited extent—namely, that the accused-officer demanded a bribe of "Rs. 1,0000"—but found that no money was actually paid; and in respect of charge (2) the Tribunal held that the charge had not been proved at all. The Tribunal recommended dismissal from service.

The Government, after consulting the Board of Revenue, called on the respondent to show cause and sent him a copy of the Tribunal's report. After receiving his explanation, the Government accepted the Tribunal's findings and recommendations and, by order dated 7 June 1951, directed that he be dismissed from service with effect from 23 June 1949 (the date from which he had been under suspension). The respondent challenged that dismissal by filing the writ petition that led to Rajagopala Aiyangar J.'s decision.

Before the learned Judge, three contentions were advanced on behalf of the respondent: (1) the Disciplinary Tribunal had no jurisdiction because the respondent was an officer in the judicial department; (2) the Government had no power to refer the case to the Tribunal because it had previously decided that the matter should be tried in a Court of law and not by the Tribunal; and (3) the proven charge was not "corruption" within the meaning of Act 11 of 1947. The learned Judge upheld contentions (1) and (3), rejected (2), and quashed the dismissal. The State of Madras appealed from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the proviso to Rule 4 of the Madras Civil Services Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948 (excluding cases "arising in the judicial department") applied to the respondent's case—i.e., whether the respondent was an officer of the judicial department such that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.
Whether the Government had the power to refer the respondent's case to the Disciplinary Tribunal when it had previously decided that the matter should be tried in a Court of law rather than by the Tribunal.
Whether the charge found to have been proved by the Tribunal constituted "corruption" within the meaning attributed to that term (defined by reference to "criminal misconduct in the discharge of official duties" under S. 5(1) of the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption Act, Act 11 of 1947).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

The Disciplinary Tribunal had no jurisdiction to inquire because the respondent was an officer of the judicial department (and thus excluded by the proviso to Rule 4).
The Government had previously decided the case should be tried in a Court of law and not by the Disciplinary Tribunal, so the Government lacked power to refer the matter to the Tribunal.
The charge that the Tribunal found to have been proved did not amount to "corruption" under Act 11 of 1947 (the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption Act), because the Tribunal's finding related only to a single instance or attempt rather than the forms of "criminal misconduct" described in S. 5(1).
Counsel for the respondent relied on the definition of a "Judge" in the Penal Code to support the contention that the respondent was a judicial officer, and relied (as noted later in the opinion) on a decision of the Orissa High Court in Biswabhusnan Naik v. State.

State's Arguments

The Government validly referred the case to the Tribunal under Rule 4 of the Madras Civil Services Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948, either because the matter involved corruption or because the Government may refer "any other case or class of cases" under clause (c) of Rule 4.
Even if the Tribunal's findings established only a single act or attempt to obtain a bribe, the Government was justified in dismissing an officer for conduct making him unfit for Government service; the referral and dismissal were therefore competent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Judgment of Rajagopala Aiyangar J. in W.P. No. 844 of 1952 (the impugned judgment)	Held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under the proviso to Rule 4 and that the proven charge did not amount to "corruption" under Act 11 of 1947.	The appellate court reviewed and disagreed with the jurisdictional conclusion (that the respondent was in the judicial department) but agreed that the Tribunal's findings did not establish "criminal misconduct" as defined in S. 5(1). The appellate court nevertheless upheld the dismissal on other grounds.
L.P.A. No. 114 of 1955 (decision referred to by the Court)	Held that a permanent Tahsildar appointed as Additional First Class Magistrate is not appointed to a new civil post but is only invested with certain powers specified in Schedule III of the Cr.P.C., and continues to be a member of the Revenue Department appointed by the Collector.	The Court relied on this holding to support the conclusion that an officer performing magisterial functions (such as the respondent) may nonetheless remain a member of the Revenue Department rather than the Judicial Department for purposes of Rule 4's proviso.
Unreported Andhra High Court judgment, W.P. No. 462 of 1953	Expressed concurrence with the view of Rajagopala Ayyangar J. in the judgment under appeal.	The Court noted the concurrence but observed that it did not advance the respondent's case further; it did not change the appellate court's conclusion that the respondent was not a member of the judicial department.
Biswabhusnan Naik v. State (Orissa High Court)	Decision arising out of a criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act.	The Court held that this decision, relied on by respondent's counsel, did not bear on the present question because it concerned criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act rather than the disciplinary referral and dismissal issues before the Tribunal and Government.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main parts: (A) the jurisdictional question under Rule 4 of the Madras Civil Services Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948; and (B) whether the Tribunal's findings amounted to "corruption" as defined by reference to S. 5(1) of the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption Act, Act 11 of 1947, and whether that affected the Government's power to dismiss.

A. Jurisdiction under Rule 4

The relevant provision (Rule 4) permits the Government to refer to the Tribunal, inter alia, cases involving corruption and also "any other case or class of cases which the Government consider should be dealt with by the Tribunal," but contains a proviso excluding "cases arising in the judicial department" (and certain police ranks).

The short question was whether the proviso applied here—i.e., whether the respondent's case "arose in the judicial department." The learned Judge below held that it did because the charge related to conduct in the respondent's capacity as a Magistrate. The appellate court rejected a purely functional test (i.e., that performing magisterial functions by itself converts the officer into a judicial department member).

The Court explained that many Revenue officers exercise magisterial powers (e.g., Tahsildars with second-class magisterial powers) without thereby becoming officers of the Judicial Department. The decisive criterion the Court emphasized was administrative control: members of the Judicial Department are under the administrative control of the High Court, whereas revenue officers performing magisterial functions were not under such control (except after the Scheme of Separation was introduced).

The Court relied on the Madras Service Manual definition of "Deputy Tahsildars," which expressly includes "Assistant Tahsildars Stationary Sub-Magistrates," thereby showing that the respondent was a Deputy Tahsildar and thus part of the Revenue Subordinate Service. On that basis the Court held that the respondent was not a member of the Judicial Department at the time charges were framed and the enquiry was directed; therefore the proviso to Rule 4 did not exclude the Tribunal's jurisdiction in this case.

B. "Corruption" and the Government's Power to Refer and Dismiss

The Court examined the Tribunal's findings against the statutory definition of "criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty" in S. 5(1) of Act 11 of 1947, which the Tribunal Rules equate to "corruption." The Court reproduced S. 5(1)'s clauses (a)–(d).

The Tribunal's findings were that one charge (the demand of bribe amount) was proved only in a limited respect (an attempted demand) and that no payment was shown; the other charge was not proved. The Court agreed with the learned Judge below that, on these findings, the respondent was not guilty of "criminal misconduct" as defined in S. 5(1) (for example, clause (a) requires habitual acceptance or attempts to accept gratification; the Tribunal had found only a single instance or attempt).

However, the Court distinguished between absence of a criminal misconduct finding and the Government's power to refer or to take disciplinary action. Rule 4 expressly permits referral in matters involving corruption but also authorizes the Government, under clause (c), to refer "any other case or class of cases which the Government consider should be dealt with by the Tribunal." The Court observed that the fact that a particular form of criminal misconduct was not established on enquiry does not deprive the Tribunal or the Government of jurisdiction to enquire or of power to act.

The Court further reasoned that an officer may be dismissed not only for corruption but also for other misconduct or conduct making him unfit for Government service; therefore, even a single established act of bribery or an attempted demand could justify dismissal. On the Tribunal's finding that the respondent had demanded a bribe in a pending case, the Government was justified in dismissing him.

Finally, the Court explained that the Orissa High Court decision relied on by respondent's counsel did not apply because it concerned a criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act rather than the administrative/disciplinary context before the Tribunal and Government in this matter.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal was allowed and the writ petition (W.P. No. 844 of 1952) was dismissed. The Court held that the Government's order of dismissal dated 7 June 1951 could not be impugned on the grounds advanced by the respondent.

The Court reached the following specific conclusions:

The respondent was not a member of the Judicial Department for purposes of Rule 4's proviso; the Tribunal's jurisdiction to enquire was therefore not excluded by the proviso.
Although the Tribunal's findings did not establish "criminal misconduct" under S. 5(1) of Act 11 of 1947, that did not render the Tribunal's enquiry or the Government's subsequent disciplinary action invalid.
The Government was entitled to dismiss the respondent on the basis of the Tribunal's finding that he had demanded a bribe, since an officer can be dismissed for conduct (including a single established act of bribery) that makes him unfit for Government service.
There will be no order as to costs in this appeal or before the learned Judge below.

Implications: The direct effect is that the respondent's dismissal stands. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader new precedent beyond applying the existing Rule 4 structure, the administrative-control test to determine departmental classification, and the principle that disciplinary jurisdiction and the Government's power to act can extend beyond the precise statutory definition of criminal misconduct.

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State Of Madras v. C.S. Rajagopala Ayyar

(Delivered by the Chief Justice.)

This is an appeal from the judgment of Rajagopala Aiyangar J. in W.P No. 844 of 1952. That petition was filed by the respondent for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Government dated 7th June 1951 dismissing him from service. The petitioner joined service of Government in the Revenue department about 30 years ago and he was a permanent member of that department in the Coimbatore district. He was Stationary Sub Magistrate, Pollachi, from 14th March to 23rd June 1949. As such he was engaged in the trial of a case of wrongful confinement and extortion. Two charges were framed against him and an enquiry was directed to be made by the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings. The two charges were: (1) that he demanded a sum of Rs. 10,000 as a bribe for acquitting the accused in the case before him, and (2) that he demanded and received illegal gratification of two sums of Rs. 500 each from one Gopalaswami Gounder promising to convict the accused concerned in the case filed by him against one Chinnaswami Gounder and others. The Tribunal, after an elaborate enquiry, found in regard to charge (1) that the charge was proved to the limited extent, namely, that the accused-officer demanded a bribe of Rs. 1,0000. The Tribunal, however, found that no money was actually paid. The Tribunal held that the second charge had not been proved at all. The Tribunal recommended that the officer may be dismissed from service. On receipt of the report, the Government, after consultation with the Board of Revenue, called upon the respondent to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. A copy of the Tribunal's report was also sent to him. The respondent then sent in his explanation, but the Government by their order dated 7th June 1951, accepted the findings and the recommendations of the Tribunal and directed that he be dismissed from service with effect from 23rd June 1949, the date from which he had been kept under suspension. It is to quash this order that the writ petition was filed Three contentions were raised on behalf of the respondent before Rajagopala Aiyangar J. who heard and disposed of the petition, namely, (1) that the Disciplinary Tribunal had no jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint against the petitioner because the petitioner was an officer in the judical department; (2) that the Government had no power to refer his case to the Tribunal because they had previously decided that the case against the petitioner should be tried in a Court of law and not by the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings, and (3) that the charge found to have been proved against him was not “corruption” within the meaning of Act 11 of 1947. The learned Judge upheld the first and third contentions, but rejected the second contention. In the result he held that the order of dismissal was invalid and quashed it. The State of Madras hits filed the above appeal from the said order.

For a consideration of the first contention it is sufficient to refer to R. 4 of the Madras Civil Services Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948, made by the Government in exercise of the power vested in them by S. 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935. That rule runs as follows:

“The Government may subject to the provisions of R. 5 refer to the Tribunal:

(a) cases relating to Government servants on a monthly salary of Rs. 150 and above in respect of matters involving corruption on the part of such Government servants in the discharge of their official duties;

(b) all appeals to the Government from Government servants against disciplinary orders passed by heads of departments and other competent authorities on charge of corruption, and

(c) any other case or class of cases which the Government consider, should be dealt with by the Tribunal provided that cases arising in the judicial department and against Government servants in the subordinate ranks of the Police forces of the rank of Sub Inspector and below shall not be referred to the Tribunal.”

The short question for decision is whether the proviso to the rule applies to this case, that is, whether this is a case arising in the judicial department. The learned Judge was clearly of the opinion that the case fell within the said proviso and therefore it would not be a matter which could have been sent up for inquiry to the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings. The reason for this opinion of the learned Judge was that the charge against the officer was not in relation to anything done by him as an officer of the Revenue Department but in his character as a Magistrate and, therefore, an officer of the judicial department. We must confess that the matter did not appear to us to be so clear as it appeared to the learned Judge. After some deliberation we have formed a contrary opinion. We do not think that the true test is functional. That is, it is not in every case where a particular officer is exercising his powers as a Magistrate that the proviso is attracted. There are many Tahsildars in the State on whom second class magisterial powers have been conferred. In discharging such powers they do not become officers of the Judicial Department and while discharging executive functions should be deemed to be officers of the Revenue Department. We have held in L.P.A No. 114 of 1955 that a permanent Tahsildar appointed as Additional First Class Magistrate, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government by S. 12 of the Crl. P.C, is not appointed to a new civil post but is only invested with certain powers specified in Schedule III of the Crl. P.C and that he continues to be a member of the Revenue Department appointed by the Collector. The learned Judge was impressed by the fact that the salaries of the Sub Magistrates, along with officers in the civil judicial department, are listed in the budget estimates under head 27 Administration of Justice, and by the heading of the form in Board's Standing Order 163, for investing magisterial powers on the members of the subordinate magistracy, namely, “the judicial department”. Before the Scheme of Separation was introduced, several Revenue Officers were appointed Magistrates. In some cases they were in charge of revenue duties as well as magisterial duties but in some other cases they were Der. forming only magisterial duties. This circumstance, however, did not make any difference as regards the appointing and controlling power which continued to be with the Collector subject to further control of the Board of Revenue. These revenue officers who were performing either wholly or partly magisterial functions were not subject to the administrative control of the High Court. It is only when the Scheme of Separation was introduced that all Subordinate Magistrates who were constituted into a separate cadre for each district came completely under the administrative control of the High Court.

In the Madras Service Manual, Vol. III, in the section dealing with the Madras Revenue Subordinate Service the following definition of “Deputy Tahsildars” is given, namely.

“Deputy Tahsildars shall mean and include Taluk Deputy Tahsildars, Assistant Tahsildars Stationary Sub-Magistrates, Huzur Head Clerks, Forest Panchayat Deputy Tahshildars, Inspecting Deputy Tahsildars, Special Deputy Tahsildars on settlement duty and Deputy Tahsildars on other special duties.”

According to this definition the respondent was undoubtedly a Deputy Tahsildar and therefore a member of the Revenue Subordinate service, In our opinion the fact that a member of the Ravenue Department is discharging judicial functions does not make him a member of the judicial department. All members of the judicial department are under the administrative control of the High Court and admittedly persons in the position of the respondent did not come within the administrative control of the High Court.

Mr. Champakesa Aiyangar, learned Counsel for the respondent, relied on the definition of a “Judge” in the Penal Code. That definition is for a special purpose and has no bearing on the question whether a particular officer belongs to the Revenue Department or the Judicial Department. Our attention was drawn to an unreported judgment of the Andhra High Court in W.P No. 462 of 1953. In that case the learned Judges expressed concurrence with the view of Rajagopala Ayyangar J. in the judgment now under appeal; so this does not carry the matter any further. We hold that the respondent was not a member of the judicial department at the time when charges were framed against him and the enquiry was directed to be made by the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal, and, therefore, his case does not fall within the proviso to R. 4 of the Madras Civil Servants' Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1948.

The next ground on which the order of dismissal is impugned is bassed on the findings of the Tribunal which were accepted by the Government. As already mentioned, the Tribunal found that the charge of bribery, that is, charge No. 2 had not been proved, and even in respect of charge No. 1, the Tribunal's finding was that payment of money was not proved. “Corruption” is defined in the Madras Civil Services Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Rules as having the same meaning as “criminal misconduct in the discharge of official duties” under S. 5(1) of the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption Act, Act 11 of 1947. S. 5(1) of that Act runs as follows:

“A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty:

(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code; or

(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned; or

(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or

(d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage,”

As the finding of the Tribunal related only to a single instance of attempt to obtain a bribe, it was contended that Cl. (a) would not apply. Nor would Cl. (d) apply. Of course Cls. (b) and (c) cannot possibly apply. The learned Judge held, and we agree with him, that on the findings of the Tribunal the respondent was not guilty of the offence of “criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty” which is designated as “corruption” in the Disciplinary Proceeding Tribunal Rules. The question however is whether on this ground the enquiry by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction and whether consequently the order of dismissal was invalid. Now R. 4 provides for cases which may be referred to the Tribunal by the Government. One category of cases relates to Government servants on a monthly salary of Rs. 150 and above in respect of matters involving corruption on the part of such Government servants in the discharge of their official duties. It cannot be disputed that the second of the charges framed against the respondent would fall within Cl. (d) of S. 5(1). The fact that on enquiry the Tribunal found that the charge had not been established would not take away the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to make the enquiry. Apart from this, there is C.(c) of R. 4 under which the Government have got the power to refer “any other case or class of cases which the Government consider should be dealt with by the Tribunal.” It surely cannot be contended that an officer of Government cannot be dismissed if even a single act of bribery has been established against him. An officer can be dismissed from service not only for corruption but also on other grounds and for conduct which makes him unfit to be in Government service. It follows that the reference by the Government to the Tribunal in this case was quite competent. In this case the Tribunal found, and the Government accepted the finding, that the respondent had demanded a bribe in a case which was pending before him. On that finding the Government was perfectly justified in passing an order of dismissal. The decision of the Orissa High Court in Biswabhusnan Naik v. State (1), relied on by the respondent's Counsel, does not bear on the question before us, as that case arose out of a criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Curruption Act.

In the result, we hold that the order of dismissal, dated 7th June 1951, cannot be impugned on any of the grounds put forward by the respondent. The appeal is allowed and the Writ Petition No. 844 of 1952 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs here and before Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.

V.C.S

State Of Madras v. C.S. Rajagopala Ayyar

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by the Chief Justice)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

State's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

A. Jurisdiction under Rule 4

B. "Corruption" and the Government's Power to Refer and Dismiss

Holding and Implications

State Of Madras v. C.S. Rajagopala Ayyar

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