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  • provisions, S. 235 of the Indian Companies Act, VII of 1913 (S. 543 of the Companies Act
  • S. 49 of the Co-operative Societies Act,
  • S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act,
  • S. 38 of the Co-operative Societies Act.
  • S. 51(1), the provision in the section
  • S. 235 of the Companies Act,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions, S. 235 of the Indian Companies Act, VII of 1913 (S. 543 of the Companies Act
  • S. 49 of the Co-operative Societies Act,
  • S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act,
  • S. 38 of the Co-operative Societies Act.
  • S. 51(1), the provision in the section
  • S. 235 of the Companies Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion, delivered by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., concerns a group of writ petitions seeking writs of prohibition to restrain the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies from proceeding with certain plaints filed under S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act. The petitions arise from claims preferred by Special Officers appointed after the boards of two registered societies were superseded: the Sivaganga Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. and the Karaikudi Co-operative Stores Ltd.

Key procedural and factual points set out in the opinion include:

  • An enquiry under S. 38 of the Co-operative Societies Act was ordered into the affairs of the Sivaganga Co-operative Urban Bank on 17 January 1954; a board was superseded on 19 February 1954 and a Special Officer appointed on 26 February 1954. An interim enquiry report was submitted on 28 June 1954 and a further (interim) report on 12 November 1954.
  • The Special Officer of the Sivaganga Bank filed several plaints (A.R.C. Nos. 6239, 6244 and 6245 of 1953-54) under S. 51 alleging, among other things, misapplication of funds, discrepancies between the bank's books and college accounts (an alleged difference of Rs. 48,800 vs Rs. 14,100), wrongful issue of fixed deposit receipts (one example: fixed deposit receipt for Rs. 4,000 when only Rs. 672-11-6 was available), and misappropriation of other receipts.
  • Similar events occurred at the Karaikudi Co-operative Stores Ltd.: the board was superseded after an inquiry under S. 38 and a Special Officer's report disclosed alleged losses relating to sale/misappropriation of rice (505 bags), excess payments for transport charges, and payments on allegedly false receipts, forming the basis of A.R.C. Nos. 127, 128 and 129 of 1954-55.
  • The writ petitions (e.g., W.P. Nos. 853, 914, 915, 920 of 1955 and W.P. Nos. 258–263 of 1955) were filed by ex-directors and other persons impleaded as defendants in the respective A.R.C. plaints. The petitioners sought prohibition against the Deputy Registrar proceeding under S. 51.
  • All the plaints were brought under S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act, while the Court examined whether some or all of the claims also fell within S. 49 of the Act, which provides for Registrar's power to examine and order repayment/restoration or contribution where misappropriation, fraudulent retention or breach of trust is discovered in the course of an audit, enquiry, inspection or winding-up.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Deputy Registrar has jurisdiction to proceed with the plaints under S. 51 because the subject-matter does or does not fall within the definition of a "dispute touching the business of the society" in S. 51(1).
  2. Whether S. 51 is unconstitutional as contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution (as argued if the matters fall within S. 51).
  3. Whether, if a claim falls both within S. 51 and S. 49, the matter can be proceeded with only under S. 49 (a special provision) and not under S. 51 (a more general provision) — i.e., whether S. 49 excludes S. 51 for overlapping matters.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Appellants') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Rajah Aiyar

  • The Deputy Registrar lacks jurisdiction under S. 51 because the claims do not come within the definition of a "dispute touching the business of the society" in S. 51(1).
  • Even if the claims are disputes within S. 51(1), the relevant provision is unconstitutional as violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • If a matter is both within Ss. 49 and 51, it must be proceeded with only under S. 49; where both sections apply, S. 49 (a special provision) excludes S. 51 (a general provision), so the Registrar cannot choose to proceed under S. 51.

Respondents' / Special Officer's Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Naidu

  • The claims in the plaints are not within S. 49 because the conditions required by S. 49 are not satisfied: specifically, (a) the enquiry/audit/inspection requirement was not met at the time the claims were filed (the final report was submitted later), and (b) the alleged misconduct was at most gross negligence and did not amount to misappropriation, fraudulent retention or breach of trust as required by S. 49.
  • With respect to the meaning of "may" in S. 49, it was argued that the Registrar has an unfettered discretion to decide whether to act under S. 49; therefore the Court should not read S. 49 as mandatory in circumstances where its conditions are satisfied.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded principally by examining the interaction between S. 49 and S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act and by testing whether the facts pleaded in the plaints satisfied the conditions of S. 49. The reasoning and steps taken by the Court are summarized below, closely following the opinion:

  1. Initial approach: The Court noted the three principal contentions raised by petitioners but indicated that it would deal mainly with the third contention (the overlap and exclusivity of S. 49 relative to S. 51), although it rejected the first contention that the claims do not touch the business of the society and did not finally decide the Article 14 issue raised in the second contention.
  2. Interpretation of S. 51: The Court observed that S. 51 provides for reference of disputes touching the business of the society to the Registrar who may decide or transfer them, and that S. 51(6) bars calling such decisions in question in any civil or revenue court. Thus, S. 51 removes access to ordinary civil courts for disputes within its compass.
  3. Interpretation of S. 49: The Court set out the three prerequisites in S. 49(1):
    1. There must be an audit under S. 37, an enquiry under S. 38, an inspection under S. 39, or the society must be in winding up;
    2. In the course of such proceedings, a named person (one who has taken part in organisation/management or an officer) must have misappropriated, fraudulently retained money or property, or been guilty of breach of trust in relation to the society;
    3. If (a) and (b) are satisfied, the Registrar may (suo motu or on application) examine the conduct and make an order requiring repayment/restoration or contribution to the society's assets; S. 49(2) provides a right to have such an order set aside by the District Court (i.e., access to civil courts is preserved).
  4. Application of S. 49 to the facts — first condition: The Court rejected the argument that S. 49's first condition was not met because claims were filed before the final report. It held that the enquiry under S. 38 had been ordered on 17 January 1954 and an interim report dated 28 June 1954 disclosed matters which led to filing the A.R.C. plaints; S. 49(1) does not exclude matters disclosed in an interim report. Thus, the first condition was satisfied.
  5. Application of S. 49 — second condition (nature of misconduct): The Court examined the three categories of misconduct mentioned in S. 49(1): misappropriation, fraudulent retention, and breach of trust. It explained their distinct meanings (misappropriation = money/property absorbed/expended for own account; fraudulent retention = property intact but dishonestly kept; breach of trust = breach of fiduciary duty) and concluded that "breach of trust" must be read to include breaches of fiduciary obligation by directors. The Court compared S. 49 with the analogous provision in S. 235 of the Indian Companies Act (quoted in the opinion) to show that the statutory language covers breaches of fiduciary duty by directors and similar persons. After examining the plaints, the Court concluded they plainly involved charges of breach of trust within the meaning of S. 49.
  6. Application of S. 49 — third condition (who invoked Registrar's jurisdiction): The Court held that the Special Officer (appointed upon supersession of the committee under S. 43) constituted the "committee" for the purposes of S. 49 and was competent to prefer claims to the Registrar. Thus, the claim was invoked by a person entitled under S. 49 to move the Registrar. Therefore, all conditions of S. 49 were satisfied and the claims fell within S. 49 as well as S. 51.
  7. Construction and relationship between S. 49 and S. 51: The Court analyzed the relationship between the two provisions. It observed that S. 51 is a broad (general) provision covering many types of disputes and bars recourse to civil courts, whereas S. 49 is a special provision aimed at a narrower class of cases involving misappropriation, fraudulent retention or breach of trust discovered during audit/enquiry/inspection/winding up, and provides for access to civil courts (S. 49(2)). Applying the rule that special provisions exclude general ones, the Court held that where a matter falls within S. 49, S. 49 alone applies and S. 51, to the extent of overlap, is excluded.
  8. On the contention that the Registrar's use of "may" in S. 49(1) conferred an unfettered discretion not to act: The Court rejected that view. It held that "may" can be read as facultative but also as imposing an obligation when the statutory conditions are met; i.e., it would be a breach of duty for the Registrar to ignore misconduct falling squarely within S. 49. Thus the Court read S. 49 as obliging the Registrar to act when its conditions are satisfied.
  9. Practical effect of the construction: The Court concluded (a) the Registrar must treat and proceed with the claims against persons falling within S. 49 under S. 49 and not under S. 51; (b) where defendants named in the A.R.C.s do not fall within S. 49, the Registrar may proceed against them under S. 51 and such proceedings before the Deputy Registrar would be in order; and (c) the reference of matters to the Deputy Registrar under S. 51 in respect of persons covered by S. 49 was incompetent.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court held that where the statutory conditions of S. 49 are satisfied, S. 49 (the special provision) exclusively governs the Registrar's power to examine and order repayment/restoration or contribution; in such cases, S. 51 cannot be used to the exclusion of S. 49. Accordingly, the Deputy Registrar was restrained from proceeding under S. 51 in respect of defendants who are covered by S. 49, while the Deputy Registrar may proceed under S. 51 in respect of defendants who do not fall within S. 49.

Specific consequences and immediate effects on the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The plaints before the Registrar were properly filed by the Special Officers, but the Registrar was bound to treat those claims as invoking S. 49 in respect of the defendants who fall within that provision and proceed accordingly; those claims could not be proceeded against such defendants under S. 51.
  • Where the claims are within S. 51 but S. 49 is inapplicable to particular defendants, the Registrar may proceed under S. 51 in respect of those defendants; to that extent the rule nisi (issued in the writ petitions) is discharged.
  • For the petitioners who are persons covered by S. 49 (described in the opinion as "nil persons" in the sense that their cases are covered by S. 49), the rule nisi already issued in their writ petitions was made absolute and the Deputy Registrar is restrained from proceeding with the matters before him in respect of those defendants. The Court ordered no costs in the writ petitions.

The opinion set out the mapping of writ petitions, A.R.C. claims and the rank of certain defendants (as provided in the text), indicating which defendants the Court regarded as falling outside S. 49 and thus susceptible to proceedings under S. 51 and which defendants fell within S. 49 and must be dealt with under that section. The Court expressly authorized the Registrar to proceed under S. 51 against the defendants listed below and held that for the other defendants the Registrar must proceed under S. 49:

No. of Writ Petition.               Claim in A.R.C No.            Rank of the defendant in that claim

W.P Nos. 853 of 1955 and 920 of 1955
                                    6239 of 53-54                 D.2 Ex-cashier (K. Sundararajan)

W.P 914 of 1955
                                    6244 of 53-54                 D-1. Radhabai (member)
                                                                  D-2. K. Sundararajan (ex-cashier)

W.P 915 of 1955
                                    6245 of 53-54                 Defendant 4. K. Sundararajan (ex-cashier)

W.P 258 and 261 of 1955
                                    127 of 54-55                  Defendant 1. Satyamurthi Aiyangar (Purchasing agent)

W.P 259 and 263 of 1955
                                    129 of 54-55                  same as above

W.P 260 and 262 of 1955
                                    128 of 54-55                  same as above
  

Net result summarized: the Deputy Registrar may proceed under S. 51 as to those defendants whom the Court identified as not falling within S. 49, and is restrained (rule made absolute) as to the petitioners/other defendants who are covered by S. 49; no order as to costs.

    V. Sundaram Iyer v. The Deputy Registrar Of Co-Operative Societies, Ramanathapuram Dt. At Sivaganga And Others.

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.)

    These writ petitions are fox the issue of writs of prohibition restraining the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies from proceeding with certain plaints filed before him under S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act, and they raise for consideration mainly the proper construction of certain sections of that enactment to which we shall advert presently. These petitions fall into two major divisions and each relates to two Co-operative Societies which have now been superseded and whose management has now been vested in Special Officers appointed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. W.P Nos. 853, 914. 915 and 920 of 1955 arise out of claims made on behalf of the Sivaganga Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., while W.P Nos. 258 to 263 of 1955 relate to claims preferred on account of the Karaikudi Co-operative Stores Ltd.

    It will be necessary to set out in brief outline the facts and the allegations on the basis of which claims have been made against the petitioners in the several writ petitions, who are Ex-Directors of these societies, in order to appreciate the point raised on their behalf.

    W.P Nos. 853 of 1955 and 920 of 1955 seek the issue of writs of prohibition restraining the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, who have been impleaded as the first respondent, from proceeding with the enquiry in A.R.C No. 6239 of 1953-1954 filed by the Special Officer appointed to manage the affairs of the Sivaganga Co-operative Urban Bark Ltd., W.P No. 853 of 1955 being by the Ex-Director-President, while W.P No. 920 of 1955 is by eight other Ex-Directors who all have been impleaded as several defendants in this claim. The affairs of this banking institution appear to have given rise to a number of complaints with the result that an enquiry was ordered into the affairs of this institution by the Registrar on 17th January 1954 under S. 38 of the Co-operative Societies Act. The operative part of this section provides:

    “38(1): The Registrar may of his own motion, and shall on the request of the Collector, or on the application of a majority of the committee or of not less than one-third of the members, hold an enquiry, or direct some person authorised by him by order in writing in this behalf to hold an enquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of a registered society.”

    The Board was superseded on 19th February 1954 and a Special Officer was appointed in the place of the Board by an order of the Registrar dated 26th February 1954. The enquiring officer submitted an interim report on 28th June 1954 in the course of which he reported the irregularities, one of which is that which forms the subject-matter of the plaint A.R.C No. 6239 of 1953-1954 with which W.P Nos. 853 and 920 of 1955 are concerned. In this plaint under S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act filed by the Special Officer it is stated that the Secretary of the Bank, impleaded as the first defendant in the case, had advanced monies to the Secretary of the Raja Doraisingam Memorial College in breach of the rules of the society and that whereas the books of the society showed that a sum of Rs. 48800 was still outstanding from the college authorities, the latter's books showed only a sum of Rs. 14100 and the college authorities had dis-claimed liability for the rest. The Secretary of the Co-operative Society was charged with fraud and misappropriation of this difference and similar charges were made against the Directors, including the petitioners in W.P Nos. 853 and 920 of 1955. In paragraph 11 of the plaint, the Special Officer stated:

    “The directors have been privy to the fraud and have so contrived by their fraud to conceal it from the auditors, departmental officers and the general body and the bank in general and was revealed to the bank only sometime after the supersession of the board.”

    On this basis, a claim is made against the defendants, including the petitioner in W.P Nos. 853 and 920 of 1955, for a decree for this sum with interest.

    W.P No. 914 of 1955 is concerned with another claim made against the petitioner in W.P No. 853 of 1955, who was the president of the bank at the relevant period. The interim report of the enquiring officer showed that a fixed deposit receipt had been issued on 28th December 1953 to one Lakshmi Ammal for Rs. 4000 whereas the amount available to her credit was only Rs. 672-11-6. A.R.C No. 6244 of 1953-1954 has been filed for the recovery of Rs. 3327-5-6 the excess sum for which the fixed deposit receipt was wrongly issued. There are five defendants in this action and the petitioner in this writ petition is the fifth defendant. The charge against the defendants is that though the accounts showed a lesser amount as due to the depositor Lakshmi Ammal, the defendants had, either wantonly or grossly neligently, issued the fixed deposit receipt for a larger sum in favour of this constituent.

    The claim in W.P No. 915 of 1955 is very similar to that in W.P No. 914 of 1955, the petitioner being the same individual. In this also, the charge is that an amount of Rs. 1000 received from one N.S Ramaswami Chettiar had been misappropriated by the secretary and the cashier of the bank and that the petitioner in this writ petition participated in it or connived at it, and failing that, was grossly negligent in scrutinising the books of account before the issue of the fixed deposit receipt.

    W.P Nos. 258 to 263 arise, as we have mentioned earlier out of proceedings taken by the Special Officer of the Karaikudi Co-operative Stores Ltd. In regard to this society, the directors, of which were superseded after an enquiry under S. 38 and a special officer was appointed, the report of the special officer disclosed that losses had been incurred by this society in regard to three matters which form the basis of the claims put forward in A.R.C Nos. 127, 128 and 129 of 1954-1955. In A.R.C No. 127 of 1954-1955, a claim is made against serveral defendants for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 35578-1-7 stated to be due on account of the improper sale and misappropriation of the value of 505 bags (of 64 measures each) of rice by the permanent officials of the society with the connivance of the directors and the latter are the petitioners in W.P Nos. 258 and 261 of 1955. W.P Nos. 260 and 262 are concerned with the claim in A.R.C No. 128 of 1954-1955. This proceeding is for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 36790-11-11 treated as being excess payments of transport charges above those permited by the rules, and comprise also amounts due to the society because of wrong debits on the basis of false receipts for monies paid towards loading charges. The gravamen of the charge against the directors, who are the petitioners in these two writ petitions, is that they have connived at or participated in the fraud which resulted in this loss to the society. W.P Nos. 259 and 263 are directed to question the legality of the proceedings in A.R.C No. 129 of 1954 filed for the recovery of Rs. 474-4-0 stated to have been paid on receipts alleged to be false, the charge against the directors being identical with that in A.R.C No. 128 of 1954-1955.

    All these several claims have as stated before, been preferred under S. 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act. The relevant portion of S. 51 enacts:

    “51(1). If any dispute touching the business of a registered society (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid servant of the society arises (a) … … … …

    (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or servant of the society, or

    (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or servant, or any past officer, past agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant, of the society…………Such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision.

    Explanation: A claim by a registered society for any debt or demand due to it from a member, past member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not, is a dispute touching the business of the society within the meaning of this sub-section.

    (2) The Regisrrar may, on receipt of such reference—

    (a) decide the dispute himself, or

    (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the (State Government) with powers in that behalf, or. ………..

    (5) The Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of a party to a reference, revise any decision thereon by the person to whom such reference was transferred or by the arbitrator or arbitrators to whom it was referred.

    (6) (a) Any decision passed by the Registrar under clause (a) of Sub-S. (2) or under Sub-S. (5) shall be final and shall not be called in question in any civil or revenue Court.

    (b) Any decision that may be passed by the person to whom a reference is transferred or by the arbitrator or arbitrators to whom it is referred shall, save as otherwise provided in Sub-S. (5), be final and shall not be called in question in any civil or revenue Court.”

    In addition to the Registrar's powers of revision under S. 51(5) extracted supra the State Government harvested in it a power of revision under S. 57, which runs:

    “57. The State Government or the Registrar may call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. If in any case it shall appear to the State Government or the Registrar that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled, or reversed, the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may pass such order thereon as to it or him, may seem fit.”

    Mr. Rajah Aiyar who appeared for the petitioner in W.P No. 853 of 1955 and 914 and 915 of 1955 and addressed the main arguments in these petitions, raised three contentions:

    (1) The Deputy Registrar, before whom these claims have been preferred, has no jurisdiction to proceed with them since the subject-matter of the claims does not come within the definition of “dispute touching the business of the society” within the opening words of S. 51(1).

    (2) If these were disputes within S. 51(1), the provision in the section is unconstitutional as opposed to Art. 14 of the Constitution.

    (3) Assuming that the claim is a dispute within S. 51 and that provision is valid, still the claim is also one within S. 49 of the Act, and if a matter is both within Ss. 49 and 51, it can be proceeded with only under S. 49 and not under S. 51. This he urged as a matter of construction based upon general principles of statutory interpretation.

    In the view which we take of the last of these points it is not necessary for us to deal in any great detail with the other two urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. We have, however, pointed out that we are unable to agree with the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the subject-matter of the claim in these writ petitions is not a dispute touching the business of a society within S. 51. In the case of the society concerned in W.P Nos. 853. 920 etc. its business is that of banking. The dealings but of which the claims which form the subject matter of A.R.C No. 6239 6244, 6245 of 1953-1954 arise, touch and concern that business. They also arise between the parties mentioned in S. 51(1)(b) and (c). We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that it is not a claim which would fall within S. 51 of the Act. Nor are we able to agree with the learned Counsel that S. 51 contravenes Art. 14, though not having heard full arguments upon the point, we do not wish to state it finally.

    It is the third of the submissions of the learned Counsel that we consider is well founded. S. 49 enacts:

    “49(1): Where in the course of an audit under S. 37 or an inquiry under 8. 38 or an inspection under S. 39 or the winding up of a society, it appears that any person who has taken part in the organisation or management of the society or any past or present officer of the society has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property or been guilty of breach of trust in relation to the society, the Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of the committee or liquidator or of any creditor or contributory, examine into the conduct of such person or officer and make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof with interest at such rate as the Registrar thinks just or to contribute such sum to the assets of the society by way of compensation in respect of the misappropriation, fraudulent retention or breach of trust as the Registrar thinks just.

    (2) The order of the Registrar under Sub-S. (1) shall be final unless it is set aside by the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the headquarters of the society are situated or if the headquarters of the society are situated in the City of Madras, by the City Civil Court, on application made by the party aggrieved within 3 months of the date of receipt of the order by him.

    (3) Any sum ordered under this section to be repaid to a society or recovered as a contribution to its assets may be recovered on a requisition being made in this behalf to the Collector by the Registrar in the same manner as arrears of land revenue.

    (4) This section shall apply notwithstanding that such person or officer may have incurred criminal liability by his act.”

    We shall Erst consider the argument advanced by Mr. Naidu on behalf of the Special Officer of the Sivaganga Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., that the claims in these plaints are not within S. 49. S. 49 postulates three conditions before it could be brought into operation:

    (1) There must have been an audit under S. 37 or an enquiry under S. 38, or an inspection under S. 39, or the society must be in the course of winding up; (2) during the course of the proceedings set out in condition (1), a person who has taken part in the organisation, or management of the society or any past or present officer, must have (a) misappropriated, or (b) fraudulently retained any money or property, or (c) been guilty of breach of trust in relation to the society. If these two sets of conditions are satisfied, then (3) the Registrar may of his own motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator, creditor or contributory, examine into the conduct of such person, and may make the order requiring the person to repay or restore the money or property.

    Mr. Naidu, learned Counsel for the Special Officer of the Sivaganga Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. urged that conditions 1 and 2 above were not satisfied and so condition 3 could not come into play.

    Taking the conditions in that order, we are clearly of the opinion that the first condition is satisfied. Learned Counsel urged that the final report of the Special Officer was submitted only on 12th November, 1954, whereas the claims were preferred towards the end of July, 1954. But this ignores the fact that the enquiry under S. 38 was ordered on 17th January, 1954 and the enquiry officer made an interim report on 28th June, 1954 and it was as a result of the matters disclosed in this report that the claims in A.R.C Nos. 6239, 6244 and 645 of 1953-1954 were filed. No doubt, there was a further report on 12th November, 1954 and even this was only an interim report, the final report having been submitted long subsequently. S. 49(1) does not exclude matters appearing in an interim report under S. 38 from the purview of that provision. We, therefore, hold that the first condition is satisfied.

    Mr. Naidu urged that the charge made against the directors, i.e, the petitioners in the several writ petitions, did not amount to misappropriation, fraudulent retention of money or breach of trust, but was only, to gross negligence. He, therefore, urged that the second condition was not satisfied. In our judgment this contention also has to be repelled. The section names three kinds of wrong doing: (1) misappropriation, (2) fraudulent retention of money or property, and (3) breach of trust in relation to the society. In the context there is no basis for the argument that the last one is identical with the other two. Misappropriation is where the money or property has been absorbed, expended or dissipated on his own account by the wrongdoer. Fraudulent retention of money implies that the money or property is still intact though it is dishonestly kept back by the wrong doer, and this is the second head of misconduct. In the context of the preceding claims the expression “breach of trust” in the third of the above categories has to be read as exclusive of the two types of misconduct covered by one and two. The language of S. 49 may be usefully compared with that employed in somewhat analogous provisions, S. 235 of the Indian Companies Act, VII of 1913 (S. 543 of the Companies Act of 1956):

    “Where in the course of winding up of a company, it appears that any person who has taken part in the formation or promotion of the company, or any past or present director, or manager or liquidator or any officer of the company, has misapplied or retained or become liable or accountable for any money or properties of the company, or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the company, the Court may compel him to repay or restore the money etc.”

    That section applies to every act of commission or omission which is a breach of duty, the expression breach of trust being understood in the sense of a breach of duty in the case of persons like directors who occupy a fiduciary relationship to the company. If there is a breach of fiduciary obligation on the part of a person named in the section, the matter would be within S. 235 of the Companies Act, and in our opinion, also within S. 49 of the Co-operative Societies Act, so as to enable the Registrar to make an order directing the person to repay or restore the money or property to the society. We have examined the plaints in the several cases in the light of the above and have reached the conclusion that they clearly involve a charge of breach of trust in relation to the society as that term is used in S. 49.

    A further requirement of S. 49 is also satisfied in the present case in that the claim against the directors has come before the Registrar in the manner specified in S. 49. The section contemplates the claim against the delinquent personnel being taken cognisance of by the Registrar either suo motu or on application to him by the Committee or liquidator or creditor or contributory. The claim was preferred in this present case by the Special Officer who by statutory definition is the committee of the society. “Committee” is defined by S. 2(b) as meaning “the governing body of a registered society to whom the management of its affairs is entrusted.” The Board of Directors of the two societies involved in these writ petitions was superseded by the Registrar under S. 43(1) which runs:

    “If in the opinion of the Registrar, the committee of any registered society is not functioning properly, he may, after giving an opportunity to the committee to state its objections if any, by order in writing, dissolve the committee and appoint a suitable person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a specified period not exceeding two years. The period specified in such order may, at the discretion of the Registrar, be extended from time to time provided that such order shall not remain in force for more than four years in the aggregate.”

    and S. 43(2) provides:

    “The person or persons so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instructions as he may from time to time give, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee or of any officer of the society, and to take all such action as may be required in the interests of the society.”

    It was the Special Officer appointed who was invested with the power of a committee that preferred the complaint before the Registrar under S. 51 of the Act. The jurisdiction of the Registrar was therefore invoked by a person competent to move him under S. 49 and the relief prayed for was an order requiring the defendants so repay or restore or to contribute the sums named to the assets of the society by way of compensation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that all the conditions of S. 49 are satisfied, and from what we have stated above it would be seen that the claims in these several plaints fall both under S. 51 as also under S. 49.

    On this basis the question that has next to be considered is whether on a proper construction of the two provisions, the Registrar has jurisdiction to proceed under either and whether if such a construction were proper the unfettered discretion of the Registrar would not, attract the ban imposed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.

    We will now advert to the nature of the proceedings under S. 49 and S. 51. Under the latter provision, the enquiry and disposal is by an officer or other person nominated by the Registrar or by the Registrar himself and if he chooses the former course, the decision of the Deputy Registrar is subject to the revisional powers of the Registrar. In cases where he conducts the enquiry and decides the matter, the Local Government have revisional powers under S. 57. But in both the cases there is no right of recourse to the civil Courts, for Sub Ss. 6(a) and (b) of S. 51 expressly enact that the decisions of the authorities under S. 51 are not to be called in question in any civil Court. The parties aggrieved are, therefore, shut out from any access to the Courts, where questions of fact or even of law could be agitated. On the other hand, where the Registrar passes an order of surcharge under S. 49(1), the aggrieved party has a right of recourse to the civil Court under S. 49(2) and when once it reaches that forum, its decisions would be subject to the normal procedure and appeals applicable to such Courts. Thus, we have, on the one hand, a provision which removes from the jurisdiction of the civil Courts any interference with the decisions of the special forum, while on the other hand, a parallel procedure in which access is provided to the civil Court, where questions of fact and law could be agitated. In a case where the provisions of S. 49 are inapplicable, it is clear that recourse could be had to S. 51 and the procedure there contained would alone be applicable. But in cases falling within S. 49 S. 51 has no application and (2) cases where a matter falls both within Ss. 49 and 51 the normal rule of construction would be that the two provisions are not intended to operate on parallel lines, leaving it open to the Registrar or the departmental authorities to choose to act under either provision in his or their unfettered discretion. But that S. 51 which excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Court, will be strictly construed, and that in cases where S. 49 is applicable, S. 51 would for that reason be excluded.

    This matter may be viewed from another aspect, viz., by the application of the rule of construction that special provisions exclude general ones. S. 51 is a rule of general application. It provides for a variety of matters and is almost exhaustive of the parties between whom disputes could arise in Co-operative Societies. Out of this larger group some types of disputes which arise in exceptional circumstances, as indicated in the opening words of S. 49(1) are the subject of special treatment. The circumstances in which the provision could be invoked do not cover the entire field of the life of the society. The complaint is one special viz., the existence of misappropriation, fraudulent retention or breach of trust on the part of officers of the society heads which are very much narrower than the claims or disputes falling within S. 51. These cases are, so to speak, segregated and a special procedure is devised by which the Registrar is vested with jurisdiction to take up a matter even suo motu and pass an order if as a result of the enquiry which he conducts he is satisfied that the case discloses the existence of the type of misconduct specified against the persons named in the provision. From the order of surcharge after what must really be a summary enquiry the section provides for a resort to ordinary Courts for the aggrieved persons for redress. This, therefore, is a special rule applicable to particular persons and in particular circumstances. The rule of construction, therefore, that where there are two sets of provisions, the one general and the other special, the latter alone would apply to cases falling within it, notwithstanding the generality of the other provision, applies to the construction of these two provisions, and it has to be held that where there is overlapping of the terms of Ss. 51(1) and 49 (1), the latter alone would be applicable to cases covered by it. The reasonableness of such a construction is indicated by the fact, that in these cases of serious misconduct resort is permitted to the civil Court, a protection not available in the less serious ones dealt with by S. 51.

    Mr. Naidu, however, urged that the Registrar had an unfettered discretion under S. 49(1), indicated or provided for by the use of the word “may” in the expression “the Registrar may of his own motion etc.” to proceed under this section or not, and that the construction which we have indicated earlier would negative this discretion and should not, therefore, be adopted. We are not impressed by this argument, since the use of the word “may” does not connote the discretion of the type urged by the learned Counsel. On the other hand, the word “may” is consistent with its being read as compulsive or as “shall” if the conditions postulated by the section are satisfied. It would really be a breach of duty on the part of the Registrar if the type of misconduct set out in the section came to his knowledge in the manner provided in S. 49(1) and yet he refused to take any notice of it or pass an order which he might pass under the last portion of Sub-S. (1).

    As we have reached this construction of the two provisions, we are of the view that the Registrar could act in the case of the persons named in S. 49(1) against whom claims have been made in the several A.R.Cs only under S. 49(1) and not under S. 51 and that the reference to the “dispute” to the Deputy Registrar for disposal under S. 51(2)(b) is, therefore, incompetent. In view of what we have stated above as to the proper construction of Ss. 49 and 51, it is not very necessary to consider whether if a contrary construction were adopted, it would involve a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

    The result, therefore, is that though the plaints have been properly filed before the Registrar by the Special Officers who are vested with the powers of the committees under S. 43, the Registrar was bound to treat them as invoking his jurisdiction under S. 49 and proceed accordingly in the case of those of the defendants who fall within that provision and that these claims could not be proceeded against them under S. 51. Further in view of our conclusion that the claims covered by these several A.R.Cs are also within S. 51 of the Act, it would follow that be regards the defendants to whom S. 49 is inapplicable, the plaints invoking the Registrar's jurisdiction under S. 51 would be in order. Thus analysed the claims against the defendants named below in the several A.R.Cs do not fall within S. 49 and the Registrar can therefore proceed against them on the plaints as filed under S. 51 of the Act.

    No. of Writ Petition. Claim in A.R.C No. Rank of the defendant in that claim W.P Nos. 853 of 1955 and 920 of 1955 62395 of 3-54 D.2 Ex-cashier (K. Sundararajan) W.P 914 of 1955 6244 of 53-54 D-1. Radhabai (member) D-2. K. Sundararajan (ex-cashier) W.P 915 of 1955 6245 of 53-54 Defendant 4. K. Sundararajan (ex-cashier) W.P 258 and 261 of 1955 127 of 54-55 Defendant 1. Satyamurthi Aiyangar (Purchasing agent) W.P 259 and 263 of 1955 129 of 54-55 do do W.P 260 and 262 of 1955 128 of 54-55 do do

    In these several A.R.Cs the Registrar would be at liberty to proceed under S. 51 against the defendants named above and to this extent the rule nisi is discharged. In regard to the other defendants, however, the Registrar would have to proceed under S. 49 and deal with the claims against them accordingly. The petitioners in the several writ petitions are nil persons whose cases are covered by S. 49 and consequently the rule nisi already issued will be made absolute and the Deputy Registrar will be restrained from proceeding with the matter before him in respect of the defendants other than those whom we have tinted above under S. 51 of the Act. There will be no order as to costs in these writ petitions.

    V.C.S

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    V. Sundaram Iyer v. The Deputy Registrar...
    (Jul 31, 1956)