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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Town Planning Act, where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
  • S. 9 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947,
  • provisions of the Town Planning Act.
  • S. 18 of of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • Art. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • S. 48 of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • S. 34 of the Town Planning Act
  • S. 14 of the Town Planning Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Town Planning Act, where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
  • S. 9 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947,
  • provisions of the Town Planning Act.
  • S. 18 of of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • Art. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • S. 48 of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
  • S. 34 of the Town Planning Act
  • S. 14 of the Town Planning Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment (Delivered by Govinda Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four small plots in Salem Town were the subject of acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in order to lay out certain roads as part of a town-improvement scheme made under the Town Planning Act. A notification informing parties of the intended acquisition was published on 6 September 1932. An award fixing the price of the lands was made on 26 August 1935. The owners sought reference to Court under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act on 16 October 1935.

The Municipality took possession of all four plots on 18 December 1936; parts were later converted into a public road. Owners of two plots previously filed suits contesting legality of acquisition and taking of possession and were successful in those suits.

The present plaintiffs (appellants in these second appeals) filed two suits (O.S. No. 487 of 1948 and O.S. No. 759 of 1948) on 24 June 1948 and 4 December 1948 seeking recovery of possession, contending that the acquisition was not completed within three years from the date of the notification and hence the proviso to S.34 made the award void and entitled them to vacant possession.

The trial Court and the District Judge dismissed these suits, reasoning that because the award had not been set aside within the time allowed by law the proviso to S.34 could not operate. The Government Pleader questioned the correctness of the decision in P.S.B. Bommanna Chettiar v. Province of Madras and the matter reached this Bench on reference by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proviso to S.34 of the Town Planning Act (providing that if land is not acquired within three years from the date of the notification, it shall cease to have effect as a declaration under S.6 of the Land Acquisition Act) entitles the plaintiffs to recover possession.
  2. How the word "acquired" in the proviso to S.34 is to be interpreted — does it refer to the making of the award (S.11 of the Land Acquisition Act) or to the completion of the entire acquisition process culminating in taking of possession (S.16, etc.)?

Arguments of the Parties

Learned Government Pleader (for the State)

  • Contended that the word "acquired" in the proviso to S.34 refers to the point of time when title vests in the Government, which occurs as a result of the making of the award under S.11 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • On that basis argued that because no suit had been filed within three years of the award, the plaintiffs' suits were barred and the proviso could not operate to void the declaration.

Counsel for the Appellants (Mr. Ramaswami Aiyangar)

  • Advocated an interpretation that "acquired" contemplates the entire acquisition process beginning from notification and enquiry and culminating in taking possession; hence the three-year period should be measured with reference to completion of that process (possession), not merely the making of an award.
  • Relied on prior decisions and statutory context to support the view that making of an award is only a part of the acquisition process.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.S.B. Bommanna Chettiar v. Province of Madras Supported the interpretation that the proviso to S.34 can operate to void an award without its being set aside in certain circumstances (as applied in that case). The Bench regarded the decision of Somayya, J. in that case as correct on the facts and found it to be an answer to the Government Pleader's contention; the Court followed it for the present facts.
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Discussed the meaning of "acquisition" (in context of Art.31), describing it as "coming into possession of", "gaining or getting as one's owner". The Court relied on this characterisation to support the view that "acquired" contemplates coming into possession and thus the whole process culminating in possession, not merely the making of the award.
Manthard Vadi Venkayya v. The Secretary of State for India in Council Was cited with reference to interpretation of related terminology under the Land Acquisition Act (Art.18 in that context). The Court stated that no useful guidance could be derived from that judgment for the present issue and therefore did not apply it to change the Court's interpretive conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the interplay between the Land Acquisition Act and the Town Planning Act, and examined the relevant statutory provisions before addressing the core interpretive question.

Key statutory provisions reviewed by the Court included:

  • Under the Land Acquisition Act: S.4 (preliminary notification), S.6 (declaration land required for public purpose), S.11 (Collector's award after enquiry), S.12 (finality of award in certain respects), S.16 (taking possession and vesting of land in Government), and S.48(1)-(2) (withdrawal from acquisition where possession not taken and compensation where withdrawn).
  • Under the Town Planning Act: S.14 (sanctioning of scheme and notification), S.33 (treating town-planning land as land needed for public purpose within Land Acquisition Act), S.34 (operation of a S.14 notification as a declaration under S.6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the proviso that if land is not acquired within three years from the date of notification it shall cease to have that effect), and S.35(2) (use of expression "land acquired").

The Court considered competing interpretations of the word "acquired" in the proviso to S.34:

  1. The Government's position that "acquired" refers to the making of the award under S.11 (i.e., title vesting upon award), and therefore the three-year period should be measured from the award.
  2. The appellants' position that "acquired" must be understood as the entire acquisition process beginning with enquiry/notification and culminating in the taking of possession, so that acquisition is complete only when possession is taken.

In support of the latter interpretation the Court:

  • Relied on the ordinary/dictionary meaning of "acquired" as "coming into possession of" or "gaining or getting as one's owner" (as discussed in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal).
  • Observed that the statute itself (S.48 of the Land Acquisition Act) distinguishes between withdrawal from acquisition of land "of which possession has not been taken" and other situations, indicating that possession and acquisition are related but distinct incidents; this suggests that acquisition is not exhausted by the award alone.
  • Characterised the making of an award as only a partial incident in the acquisition process, with taking of possession being another necessary incident for completion of acquisition.
  • Found that interpretation of "acquired" as covering the entire process better accords with the statutory language and scheme of the Acts concerned.

The Court expressly stated that certain other authorities (including Manthard Vadi Venkayya and an English statute comparison) did not provide useful guidance for this interpretive issue. The Court accepted Somayya, J.'s decision in P.S.B. Bommanna Chettiar as correct on the facts and followed it for the present case, although it clarified that it did not go so far as to hold that taking possession alone is acquisition in every circumstance.

The Court also noted a practical point raised by the Government Pleader — that the land had been converted into a road and that restoration of possession might prejudice inhabitants — and observed that the Government could, if advised, make a further notification and take possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeals are allowed and the plaintiffs are given decrees for possession.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The plaintiffs are granted decrees for possession of the plots;
  • No damages were awarded to the plaintiffs (the Court agreed with the lower Court on this point);
  • There will be no order as to costs throughout;
  • The decree for possession is conditional upon the plaintiffs re-depositing the amount withdrawn as a result of the award.

Broader implications:

  • The Court adopted an interpretation of "acquired" in the proviso to S.34 that treats acquisition as the entire process ending with taking possession; on the facts before it this interpretation permitted the proviso to operate so as to enable the plaintiffs to recover possession. The Court followed the earlier decision in P.S.B. Bommanna Chettiar on the facts of the present case.
  • The Court explicitly limited itself and did not hold that taking possession alone will always constitute acquisition in every context; it confined its conclusions to the interpretive issue as applied to the statutory scheme considered.
  • If the outcome prejudices local inhabitants because the land has been converted into a road, the Court noted the Government may make another notification and proceed accordingly.
V.C.S

    V. Chockalinga Mudaliar v. State Of Madras

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by Govinda Menon, J.)

    Krishnaswami Nayudu J. before whom the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the State questioned the correctness of the decision in P.S.B. Bommanna Chettiar v. Province Of Madras (1), has referred these second appeals to the Bench, as in his opinion there seemed to be scope for argument, and that is how these appeals have come before us.

    Though it is unnecessary to state in any detail, the facts, which are undisputed, for a proper appreciation of the points of law, arising it is just necessary to refer to them in a cursory way. Four small plots in Salem Town were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, in the process of laying out certain roads in pursuance of the improvement of the town under the provisions of the Town Planning Act. For that purpose the notification informing the parties that these plots are to be acquired was made on 6th September 1932, and an award fixing the price of the lands was made on 26th August 1935. Not being content with the value fixed by the Collector, the owners of the land requested for reference to the Court under S. 18 of of the Land Acquisition Act, which was made on 16th October 1935. We do not think that any detailed reference to the subsequent proceedings regarding the fixation of value by Court, and the appeal therefrom is of any use for the point involved here.

    On 18th December 1936 the Municipality took possession of all the four plots and the learned Government Pleader informs us that parts of them have been converted into a public road, named after a previous Chairman of the Municipality. Subsequently the owners of two of the plots filed a suit contesting the legality of the acquisition, and the taking over of possession by the Government. In those suits they were successful. Animated by a desire that such success would ensue for the present appellants also, they filed O.S No. 487 of 1948 on 24th June 1948 and O.S No. 759 of 1948 on 4th December 1948, for the recovery of possession of the plots taken away from them, on the ground that there has been no acquisition within three years of the notification, and such being the case, the award given was void, with the result that the plaintiffs were entitled to get vacant possession of the land. The learned District Judge in agreement with the trial Court held that since the award has not been set aside, within the time allowed by law proviso to S. 34 of the Town Planning Act cannot come into play, and therefore, the suits were dismissed. Hence sent these second appeals.

    The decision of Somayya J. in Bommanna Chettiar v. Province of Madras , if correct, is an answer to the contention raised by the learned Government Pleader, who has not been able to convince us that it is necessary to set aside the award. Since we are of opinion that if proviso to S. 34 applies the award becomes void and need not be set aside, the only question that need be considered is, whether the proviso to S. 34 of the Town Planning Act allows the plaintiffs to recover possession of the land. Before we deal with that decision we shall refer to the scheme and scope of the two Acts, with which we are concerned and which for the purpose of the present litigation are inter-connected.

    Firstly, reference may be made to the Land Acquisition Act. The scheme of it need not be elaborately considered. S. 4 refers to the publication of the preliminary notification, and the power of the officers thereupon. There is no dispute in the present case, that the provisions of S. 4 have been complied with. The next section to be considered is S. 6, which deals with the declaration that the land is required for a public purpose, and S. 11 lays down that when such declaration and notification have been made as contemplated by S. 6, the Collector shall fix a day on which he shall enquire into the objections, if any, which any person interested has stated pursuant to the notification, and he shall then make an award regarding the true area of the land, the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed to the land, etc.

    S. 12 lays down that such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall be final and conclusive, except as stated in the latter parts of the Act, between the Collector and the persons interested whether they have appeared before the Collector or not; and what is final and conclusive is with respect to the true area and value of the land, and an apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The next section which is to be considered is S. 16 which deals with taking possession, and it lays down that when the Collector has made an award under S. 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. In this case we are not concerned with S. 17, which deals with the Collector's power to take possession of the land in case of emergency, even before making an award.

    The next section to be considered is S. 48, Cl. (1), which is to the effect that except in the case provided for by S. 36, which is inapplicable here, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of land, of which possession has not been taken, and the result of such a withdrawal is mentioned in S. 48, Sub-S. 2. When the Government withdraws from such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation for damage suffered by the owner in consequence, and the Government shall pay such amount with interest and costs to the person.

    Now we shall consider the provisions of the Town Planning Act, where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been made applicable. S. 14 of the Town Planning Act speaks of the sanctioning of the scheme by the Government, with regard to the Town Planning and Sub-S. 3 of S. 14 is to the effect, that the State Government may after considering the objections and suggestions, if any, and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit, sanction the scheme with or without modification, or may refuse to sanction the scheme etc. Sub-Cl. 5 of the same section is to the effect, that the sanction of the State Government to a scheme under Sub-S. 3 shall be published by a notification in the Official Gazette, and such notification will stare at what place and time the scheme will be placed for inspection to the public etc., and Sub-S. 6 says that a notification published under Sub-S. 5 shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly made and sanctioned. 1 he scheme shall have the effect from the date of publication of such notification, and the scheme shall be commenced forthwith. This shows how a scheme has to be initiated and sanctioned.

    Chapter VII deals with Land Acquisition and it contains two sections, which are important so far as this case is concerned, and they are Ss. 33 and 34.

    Sec. 33: Immoveable property required for the purposes of a town-planning scheme shall be deemed to be land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and may be acquired (a) under the said Act or (b) under the said Act as modified in the manner hereinafter provided in this chapter.

    Sec. 34: In cases falling under Cl. (b) of S. 33 a notification under S. 14 shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, operate in respect of any land for the purposes of the scheme as a declaration under S. 6 of the said Act and no further declaration shall be necessary, but it shall not be incumbent on the State Government or officer authorised in that behalf, to take immediate steps for the acquisition of such land. Provided that if the land is not acquired within three years from the date of the notification, it shall cease to have effect as a declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

    We may also refer to S. 35 (2), where the expression used is “land acquired.” The argument on behalf of the learned Government Pleader is, that the word “acquired” in the proviso to S. 34 refers to a point of time when the title in the land vests in the Government, and that is as a result of the making of the award under S. 11, and since no suit has been filed within 3 years of that award, the suit is barred. In our opinion, the word “acquired” in the proviso contemplates the entire process, beginning from enquiry and notification and ending up with the taking up of possession. The dictionary meaning of the word “acquired” is the “action of gaining possession” etc., and it has been the subject of consideration with respect to the meaning of the term in Art. 31 of the Constitution, in the decision in the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal , at pages 98 and 99. There His Lordship the Chief Justice says that the word “acquisition” is not a term or act, and it obviously means “coming into possession of”, “gaining or getting as one's owner.” That being the dictionary meaning of the term, the question that has to be considered is, whether taking possession as argued by Mr. Ramaswami Aiyangar for the appellants is the acquisition or whether the making of the award is the acquisition as is urged by the learned Government Pleader. We have no doubt whatever that the word “acquired” in the proviso should be understood as referring to the entire process beginning with the ‘enquiry and notification and culminating with the taking of possession. The making of the award is only partial acquisition, and the acquisition is complete only when possession is taken. Otherwise in S. 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, the legislature would not have used the expression “shall withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.” They make a distinction between taking possession and acquisition. Taking possession is one of the incidents necessary for acquisition, just like making an award another incident necessary for acquisition. Our attention has been drawn to S. 9 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in English Statutes, but we do not think that any useful information can be got from a comparison of that Act.

    Mr. Ramaswami Aiyangar, for the appellants, has invited our attention to the decision in Manthard Vadi Venkayya v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (2), where a question regarding the meaning of the term in Art. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was the subject of discussion. We do not think that any useful guidance can be got from that judgment also. It seems to us that, as we have stated already, mere giving of the award is not acquisition; nor is taking possession alone acquisition and if the interpretation which we have put upon the term “acquisition” as contemplating the entire process from the enquiry right upto taking possession is the correct one, the suit is not barred. We are of opinion that the decision of Somayya J. in P.S.B. Bommanna Chettiar v. Province Of Madras(3) is correct on the facts of the case, though we do not go to the extent of holding, that taking possession alone is acquisition.

    It has been represented to us by the learned Government Pleader that the land had been converted into a road for a long time, and that the result of our decision would be very much to prejudice the inhabitants of locality. If that is so there is no reason why the Government, if so advised should not make a further notification and take possession of the land.

    The second appeals are allowed, and the plaintiffs are given decrees for possession. We agree with the lower Court, that no damages are allowable to the plaintiffs. There will be no order as to costs throughout. The decree for possession will be conditional upon the plaintiffs re-depositing the amount withdrawn as a result of the award.

    V.C.S

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    V. Chockalinga Mudaliar v. State Of Madras
    (Feb 2, 1956)