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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. S. 5
  • Art. 159 of Sch. 1 to the Indian Limitation Act
  • Art. 159 of the Limitation Act.
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 3 of the Limitation Act,
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. S. 5
  • Art. 159 of Sch. 1 to the Indian Limitation Act
  • Art. 159 of the Limitation Act.
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 3 of the Limitation Act,
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition for revision arises from orders made in I.A. No. 1102 of 1954 in O.S. No. 603 of 1954 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras. O.S. No. 603 of 1954 was a summary suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure based on a promissory note. The defendant was served with summons and engaged an advocate to obtain leave to defend, but the petition for leave to defend was not filed despite two adjournments. Consequently, the suit was decreed ex parte on 20 September 1954.

The defendant subsequently moved (I.A. No. 1100 of 1954) to set aside the ex parte decree and separately sought leave to defend (I.A. No. 1102 of 1954). In the supporting affidavit the defendant stated that illness prevented his appearance and filing on 20 September 1954; he then described his defence and prayed for the decree to be set aside and for leave to defend. The plaintiff (or petitioner in revision) raised a legal objection that the application for leave was barred by Article 159 of the Limitation Act.

The City Civil Court set aside the ex parte decree (order dated 2 September 1955) on the ground that there was sufficient cause for the defendant's non-appearance. That order was not revised and became final. The Court then considered I.A. No. 1102 of 1954 and, overruling the limitation objection, granted leave to defend. The present revision challenges the jurisdiction of the Court to make that order granting leave under Order 37, Rule 4.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction under Order 37, Rule 4, C.P.C. to set aside an ex parte decree and grant leave to defend after decree when an application for leave to defend under Order 37, Rule 3 was not filed within the ten-day period prescribed by Article 159 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the limitation prescribed by Article 159 and the inability to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act (as explained in Shah Mahomed Khan v. Woodfall) restrict the exercise of the power under Order 37, Rule 4 to grant leave to defend post-decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (plaintiff's) Arguments / Counsel for the petitioner

  • The application I.A. No. 1102 of 1954 for leave to defend was barred by Article 159 of the Limitation Act (10-day period from service of summons).
  • It was argued that if there is no power to extend time for filing an application under Order 37, Rule 3, then the Court should not be able to use Order 37, Rule 4 after decree to grant the same relief; specifically, Rule 4 should be construed narrowly so it applies only when there has been no proper service of summons and not when the defendant, who was served, had sufficient cause for non-appearance.

Respondent's (defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant alleged illness prevented appearance and filing the application for leave to defend by 20 September 1954; he sought setting aside of the ex parte decree on that ground and leave to defend thereafter.
  • The defendant presented an affidavit setting out facts of his defence and asserting unavoidable reasons for not filing within the ten-day period; he relied on the Court's discretion under Rule 4 after decree to be allowed to defend.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shah Mahomed Khan v. Woodfall Explained that Order 37, Rule 3 applications are governed by Article 159 (10-day period) and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to extend that period; distinguished Order 37, Rule 4 (post-decree power) from the Rule 3 limitation question. The Court relied on the reasoning in this decision to affirm that an application under Order 37, Rule 3 cannot have its ten-day period extended by Section 5, but also analyzed that Rule 4's separate, wide post-decree power must be construed on its own terms.
Murahari Rao v. Bapayya Earlier opinion (Mack, J.) relating to the power to condone delay under Order 37; the opinion was discussed and disapproved by the Court in Shah Mahomed Khan. The Court noted that the opinion expressed by Mack, J. in this case was disapproved and hence did not accept that case as supporting a power to extend time under Rule 3 by reference to Rule 4.
Srinivasa v. Baktavatsalu Naidu Earlier opinion (Govinda Menon, J.) touching on the construction of Order 37 provisions; referenced and disapproved in Shah Mahomed Khan. The Court recorded that the opinion in this case was disapproved and therefore did not follow it in construing the scope of Rules 2–4 of Order 37.
James Manickam v. Jayanarayana Daga The decision of Chandra Reddi, J. in this case was approved; related to the power of the Court under Order 37 rules and limitations on condoning delay. The Court approved Chandra Reddi, J.'s approach as summarised in Shah Mahomed Khan and relied upon that approval in considering the separate operation of Rule 4.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the language and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. The Court set out the statutory framework: Order 37 provides a summary procedure for suits on negotiable instruments. Order 37, Rule 2 treats allegations in the plaint as admitted unless the defendant obtains leave to defend; Rule 3 prescribes the procedure (application on affidavits disclosing facts showing a prima facie defence) and allows the Court to give leave, unconstrained or on terms; Rule 4 empowers the Court, after decree and under special circumstances, to set aside the decree and give leave to defend on such terms as it thinks fit.
  2. The Court recognized Article 159 of the Limitation Act prescribes a ten-day limitation (from service of summons) for filing an application for leave to defend under Order 37. It noted existing authority (Shah Mahomed Khan v. Woodfall) holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to extend that ten-day period for applications under Rule 3, and that therefore applications under Rule 3 filed after ten days are barred unless some other exception (for instance fraud under Section 18) applies.
  3. The Court confronted the petitioner's argument that, because Rule 3 applications cannot have their time extended, Rule 4 should be read narrowly so that after decree the Court would not be able to grant leave to a defendant who had been served and allowed the ten-day period to expire. The petitioner contended that Rule 4 should apply only where there was defective service (i.e., the defendant had not been effectively before the Court).
  4. The Court rejected that construction. It observed that Rule 4's language is unambiguous and of "wide amplitude": it states that after decree the Court may, under special circumstances, set aside the decree and give leave to the defendant to defend on such terms as it thinks fit. The Court held this leaves no room to read in the restriction the petitioner sought to impose.
  5. The Court considered the precedents referred to in Shah Mahomed Khan (including disapprovals of earlier opinions by Mack, J. and Govinda Menon, J., and approval of Chandra Reddi, J.'s view) and concluded that those decisions do not logically require the narrow construction urged by the petitioner. Specifically, the fact that Rule 4 cannot be used to condone delay for Rule 3 filings does not mean Rule 4 cannot be invoked after decree to grant leave in appropriate cases.
  6. Because the issue was not covered by any binding authority directly deciding the precise point (the Court characterized the question as res integra), the Court resolved it by construing the text of Rule 4 itself and held that the lower Court had jurisdiction under Rule 4 to grant leave to defend after setting aside the ex parte decree.

The Court expressly limited its consideration to the question of jurisdiction (whether the Court had power) and did not decide whether the jurisdiction had been properly exercised in respect of the facts — the sole issue before the Court was jurisdictional.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction under Order 37, Rule 4 to set aside the ex parte decree and to grant leave to the defendant to defend the suit in I.A. No. 1102 of 1954.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The revision petition (C.R.P.) challenging the jurisdiction of the lower Court failed and was dismissed.
  • The order in I.A. No. 1102 of 1954 granting leave to defend therefore stands; the earlier order setting aside the ex parte decree also remains final as it was not revised.
  • The Court noted that the particular point was not covered by authority (res integra) and, because no authority directly governed it, there was no order as to costs. The opinion does not purport to establish a broader precedent beyond the instant ruling; it rested its decision on the unambiguous language of Order 37, Rule 4 and the construction thereof as explained in the opinion.

    M.A Ethirajulu Naidu v. T.K.C.K Panikkar.

    This is a petition to revise the order passed in I.A No. 1102 of 1954 in O.S No. 603 of 1954 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras. O.S No. 603 of 1954 was a suit filed under the summary procedure prescribed under O. 37 of the C.P.C on foot of a promissory note executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. When the defendant was served with notice of summons in the suit he instructed an Advocate to appear on his behalf in order that he might obtain leave to defend the suit. The petition for leave to defend was not immediately filed notwithstanding the adjournment of the suit twice to enable this to be done. Thereupon the suit was decreed ex parte on 20th September 1954.

    The next proceeding in the suit was an application by the defendant I.A No. 1100 of 1954 for setting aside the ex parte decree along with an application I.A No. 1102 of 1954 for the grant of leave to defend the suit. In the common affidavit in support of these petitions, the defendant stated that he was unable to appear in Court on 20th September 1954 and file the application for leave to defend the suit because of his illness and an ex parte decree was passed on that date because of the refusal of the Court to adjourn the suit to another date. On this ground he stated that he was prevented by unavoidable reasons from filing the petition for leave to defend the suit by 20th September 1954. He then set out the details of his defence to the action and prayed for setting aside the ex parte decree and granting leave to defend the suit. Besides controverting the facts the legal objection raised to the grant of the prayers in I.A No. 1102 of 1954 was that the application was barred under Art. 159 of the Limitation Act. The learned City Civil Court Judge held that there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the defendant on 20th September 1954 and set aside the ex parte decree by order dated 2nd September 1955. No revision is preferred against this order which has become final. The Court then proceeded to consider I.A No. 1102 of 1954 and overruling the objection on the ground of limitation granted the defendant leave to defend the suit. The jurisdiction of the Court to make this order is challenged in this revision petition.

    Order 37, C.P.C provides for a summary procedure in suits on negotiable instruments by reason of which when a suit is filed under this chapter the facts stated in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree on his pleading unless the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a tenable defence and the Court is pleased to grant him leave to defend the suit which it might do either unconditionally or subject to such reasonable conditions as it might deem fit to impose. This is provided for by O. 37, R. 2, the material portions of which are:

    “(2)(1) All suits upon bills of exchange, hundies or promissory notes may, in case the plaintiff desires to proceed hereunder, be instituted by presenting a plaint in form prescribed; but the summons shall be Form No. 4 in Appendix B or in such other form as may be from time to time prescribed.

    (2) In any case in which the plaint and summons are in such forms, respectively the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend; and, in default of his obtaining such leave or of his appearance and defence in pursuance thereof, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree.”

    and this sub-rule provides for the amount for which a decree might be passed. The procedure for leave to defend referred to in paragraph 2 of the sub-rule which I have extracted above is to be found in R. 3 which is in these terms:

    “3(1); The Court shall, upon application by the defendant, give leave to appear and to defend the suit, upon affidavits which disclose such facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration, or such other facts as the Court may deem sufficient to support the application.

    (2) Leave to defend may be given unconditionally or subject to such terms as to payment into Court, giving security, framing and recording issues or otherwise as the Court thinks fit.”

    This is followed by R. 4 reading thus:

    “(4) After decree the Court may, under special circumstances, set aside the decree, and if necessary stay or set aside execution and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit, if it seems reasonable to the Court so to do and on such terms as the Court thinks fit.”

    The time which a defendant, on whom summons is served as provided under O. 37, R. 2 paragraph 1, has to file an application for leave to appear and defend the suit is to be found in Art. 159 of the Limitation Act which prescribes a limitation of ten days commencing from the time when the summons is served, it might now be taken as settled that a Court has no power to extend the period of ten days prescribed by Art. 159 of the Limitation Act within which an application for leave to defend the suit Under O. 37, R. 3 could be filed into Court. Rajamannar, C.J, delivering the judgment of the Bench of this Court in Shah Mahomed Khan v. Woodfall (1), explained the position thus:

    “Under O. 37, R. 3, C.P.C, the Court shall upon application by the defendant, give leave to appear and defend the suit, after the defendant satisfied the Court by facts disclosed in affidavits that there is prima facie defence. O. 37, R. 2 (2) of the Code provides that in any case in which the defendant has not obtained such leave, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and that the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree. We are not now concerned with the provision-in R. 4, of O. 37 which empowers the Court in special circumstances to set aside the decree and then give leave to the defendant to appear and defend the suit. Art. 159 of Sch. 1 to the Indian Limitation Act prescribes a period of ten days from the time when the summons is served for an application for leave to appear and defend a suit under O. 37, C.P Code, So an application filed after the prescribed period of ten days would be barred by limitation and will have to be rejected under S. 3 of the Limitation Act, unless the period is extended under any of the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. S. 5 is one such section. It runs thus: “Any appeal or application for review of judgment for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” This section has not been made applicable to an application under O. 37, R. 3 of the Code. Therefore, the Court would have no power to extend the period of 10 days prescribed by Art. 159. We are not aware of any other provision of law under which the period for filing an application under O. 37 can be extended, except no doubt where fraud is alleged, in which case S. 18 of the Limitation Act would apply.”

    The learned Judges held that S. 5 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable to applications under O. 37, R. 3 which were governed by Art. 159 and on that ground set aside the order of the lower Court which had excused the delay in filing that application. The learned Chief Justice has referred to the earlier decisions of this Court bearing upon the proper construction of O. 37, R. 2 and while disapproving the opinion expressed by Mack, J. in Murahari Rao v. Bapayya(2) and of Govinda Menon. J, in Srinivasa v. Baktavatsalu Naidu(3) approved the decision of Chandra Reddi, J. in James Manickam v. Jayanarayana Daga . All these however related to the power of the Court to condone the delay in filing an application for leave to defend under O. 37, R. 3. But learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that if the Court had no power to extend the time in a case governed by O. 37, R. 3, on the facts of the present case on 20th September, 1954 when the suit stood adjourned without an application for leave to defend the suit having been filed by the respondent, it would be illogical to hold that merely because a decree had been passed on that date and an application was made to set aside that ex parte decree the Court obtained power to grant leave to defend under O. 37, R. 4. In my judgment, however, the logic which the learned Counsel for the petitioner urges cannot Override the positive provisions enacted in O. 37, R. 4 and the matter must therefore be decided not by reference to the scope of O. 37, Rr. 2 and 3 as interpreted by this Court but on the terms of the language employed in the relevant provision—R. 4. The terms of R. 4 are not ambigious and leave no room for argument. It states that after decree the Court may under special circumstances, set aside the decree and give leave to the defendant to defend the suit—words of wide amplitude which place no restriction on the power of the Court. The discretion here vested in the Court is no doubt judicial. I might at once point out that the only question now urged before me is as regards the jurisdiction of the Court and not whether this jurisdiction was properly exercised. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that though the language of R. 4 was wide, it must be given a limited operation and the Court should by a process of construction read the provision as meaning that in cases where the defendant had appeared in answer to the summons under R. 2 and had allowed the period of ten days within which he could have filed an application for leave to defend, to expire, he could not be granted leave to defend under R. 4. In other words the construction for which learned Counsel contended was that R. 4 only applied to cases where the ex parte decree was being set aside on the ground that there had not been a proper service of summons and not to a case where the decree was set aside because the defendant who was served had sufficient cause for non-appearance. In my opinion to uphold this argument would be not to construe the section but to legislate, for without adding words to the rule the result which Counsel has in view cannot be achieved.

    Further it does not appear to me that the decisions of this Court which have all been referred to and summarised in Shah Mohammad Khan v. Woodfall (2) logically involve the conclusions urged by Mr. Rattan, Counsel for the petitioner. It is no doubt true that Mack. J. held that a Court derived the power to condone the delay in filing an application under R. 3 by reason of the provisions contained in R. 4 and the learned Judge was held to be wrong in his construction of O. 37, R. 3. But the converse does not follow that if an application under O. 37, R. 3 is barred by limitation, an application under O. 37, R. 4 should also be rejected on the same ground. The above reasoning was thus referred to by the learned Chief Justice at page 335:

    “We are unable to see how O. 37, R. 4 has any bearing on this question. That provision refers to a stage after decree.”

    It was the same reasoning that is to be found in the judgment of Chandra Reddi, J., in James Manickam v. Jayanarayana . Referring to O. 37, R. 3, the learned Judge said:

    “It does not follow that a Court has power to extend the time or condone the delay in filing an application for leave to defend within the prescribed time, merely because the Court is invested with power to set aside decrees under special circumstances under O. 37, R. 4.”

    It has to be admitted that the point urged by learned Counsel is not covered by any express decision and the matter is res integra. It has therefore to be decided on proper construction of the terms of the provision. Viewing it thus I have reached the conclusion that just as the existence of O. 37, R. 4 is not a ground for holding that there is a power to condone delay or extend the period of limitation for filing an application under O. 37, R. 3, the provisions of O. 37, R. 3 and the period of limitation prescribed within which an application could be filed, do not restrict the power of the Court to grant leave to defend when such an application has been preferred by a party who has entered appearance in pursuance of a notice under O. 37, R. 2 but as against whom an ex parte decree has been passed.

    The Court below had jurisdiction to pass the order in I.A No. 1102 of 1954. The C.R.P fails and is dismissed. As the point is not covered by any authority, there will be no order as to costs in this revision.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    M.A Ethirajulu Naidu v. T.K.C.K Panikkar.
    (Sep 27, 1956)