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  • Section 608 of the old Code, corresponding to Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C.,
  • Section 2(2) read with Section 47, C. P. C.,
  • Section 47 of the Code of 1908.
  • Code of 1882, in Section 244
  • Section 2(2) of the C. P. C.
  • Order 41, Rule 6 (2), C. P. C.,
  • Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C.,
  • Order 41, Rule 5, C. P.
  • Section 2(2), C. P. C.,
  • Order 41, Rule 5,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 608 of the old Code, corresponding to Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C.,
  • Section 2(2) read with Section 47, C. P. C.,
  • Section 47 of the Code of 1908.
  • Code of 1882, in Section 244
  • Section 2(2) of the C. P. C.
  • Order 41, Rule 6 (2), C. P. C.,
  • Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C.,
  • Order 41, Rule 5, C. P.
  • Section 2(2), C. P. C.,
  • Order 41, Rule 5,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Subordinate Court had passed a decree in O. S. No. 39 of 1948 (C. S. No. 39 of 1948). By an order dated 23-9-1953, Ramaswami J. directed that the taking of an account under Clause (1) of that decree be stayed pending App. No. 1097 of 1952 on the High Court file, but that there would be no stay regarding any other portion of the decree. The principal item for which stay of execution was refused was a direction that defendants 1 to 4 pay Rs. 7,707 with interest at 6% per annum from 17-2-1947. That amount represented sales-tax the plaintiff had to pay to the Government because an "A" licence stood in the plaintiff's name while the business was conducted by a partnership of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4, and the defendants were in management and alleged to be responsible for those taxes.

The Subordinate Judge ordered both the taking of accounts for a period (subsequent to 7-11-1945) and payment by defendants of the Rs. 7,707 with interest. The defendants applied for a stay of further proceedings relating to the taking of accounts and for a stay of execution in respect of the Rs. 7,707. Ramaswami J. stayed the further proceedings for accounts but refused to stay execution of the decree insofar as the Rs. 7,707 was concerned. The defendants appealed against that portion of the order. The appeal raises, inter alia, whether the refusal to stay execution is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and related questions about appealability and the character of such orders under the Civil Procedure Code.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the portion of Ramaswami J.'s order refusing to stay execution of the decree (ordering payment of Rs. 7,707 with interest) is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and therefore appealable to a Division Bench.
  2. Whether an order by an appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C., staying or refusing to stay execution of a decree amounts to a "decree" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. (and thus is appealable under provisions applicable to decrees).
  3. On the merits, whether the order of Ramaswami J. (staying accounts but ordering payment of the full Rs. 7,707) should be sustained as made or requires modification.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Defendants (as presented in the opinion)

  • The defendants sought a stay of the further proceedings relating to the taking of accounts and a stay of execution of the decree for payment of Rs. 7,707.
  • Counsel (Mr. S. T. Srinivasagopalachari) advanced a substantial argument that the decision appealed against should be characterized as a "decree" within Section 2(2), C.P.C. (read with Section 47), so that an appeal would lie; he relied on authorities (including Mt. Durga Devi v. Hans Raj, AIR 1930 Lah 187) to support the proposition that an order staying execution until decision of an appeal falls within Section 2(2) read with Section 47 and is appealable.

Respondent / Plaintiff

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tuljaramraw v. Alagappa Chettiar, 35 Mad 1 (FB) (A) Held (Full Bench) that an order of a single Judge refusing stay of execution is a "judgment" within Clause 15 and appealable; laid down essentials of a judgment; treated as binding. The Court held it was bound by this Full Bench decision and repeatedly relied upon it as controlling authority on appealability; it formed the central basis for treating orders refusing stays as "judgments".
Justice of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Co., 8 Beng LR 433 (B) Obiter by Sir Richard Couch C.J. suggesting that orders made in execution might come within the definition of "judgment" in Clause 15. Noted as an obiter that earlier judges had expressed; mentioned in context of historical views, but the Court followed 35 Mad 1 rather than this obiter as decisive authority.
Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Malikarjuna Prasada Nayadu, 24 Mad 358 (C) Took the view that an order refusing stay of execution by a single Judge is not a "judgment" under Clause 15. The Court rejected and criticises this view as not approved by the Full Bench in 35 Mad 1 (FB) and treated it as wrongly decided for purposes of the High Court's practice.
Kodiba Sahib v. Rahimatulla Sahib, 3 Mad LT 307 (D) Followed the view in 24 Mad 358 that such an order is not a judgment. Regarded as following the criticized 24 Mad 358 decision and therefore open to the same criticism; not followed.
Mohabir Prosad Singh v. Adhikari Kunwar, 21 Cal 473 (E) Held that an order under old Code Section 608 (corresponding to Order 41, Rule 5) directing security for costs in execution was not a judgment. Not treated as persuasive authority for the High Court on the specific question, as the Court found later decisions following 35 Mad 1 more authoritative.
Vairavan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, 14 Mad LW 701 (F) Held that an order of a single Judge sitting in the Admission Court dismissing a petition for stay of execution is not a "judgment" within Clause 15 (an exception noted). Not accepted as controlling; treated as an exception and distinguished from the larger body of case law favouring appealability.
Mt. Brijcoomaree v. Ramrick Pass, 5 Cal WN 781 (O) Related to an order by a single Judge refusing to stay the issue of probate and discharge of a receiver; cited as an authority alternative view in 35 Mad 1 (FB). Not adopted as preferable; mentioned as another case considered in 35 Mad 1 but the Court preferred the Full Bench's reasoning.
Srinivasa Iyengar v. Ramaswami Chettiar, AIR 1916 Mad 1220 (2) (FB) (H) Full Bench followed observations in 35 Mad 1 (FB) (A) and considered it binding on the Full Bench. Referred to as a subsequent Full Bench decision that accepted the rule in 35 Mad 1; supports the proposition that such orders are judgments.
Venkata Chinnayamma Rao v. Subbamma Rao, 1935 Mad 586 (J) Held that an order of a single Judge pending disposal of a second appeal on application for interim injunction amounts to a judgment under Clause 15, guided by 35 Mad 1. Noted and followed as consistent with 35 Mad 1; the Court found no substantial distinction between interim injunction pending second appeal and stay of execution pending appeal.
Sonachalam Pillai v. Kumaravelu Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 597 (J) Laid down categorically that an order of a single Judge refusing stay of execution of a decree of a mufassal Court pending appeal is a judgment under Clause 15; relied on 35 Mad 1. The Court agreed with the discussion and reasoning in this decision and treated it as authoritative and longstanding; followed on principle of stare decisis.
Desouza v. Coles, 3 Mad HCR 384 (K) Referenced among earlier authorities considered in Sonachalam Pillai and related decisions. Mentioned as part of the background of authorities considered; no new application beyond noting its place in prior discussions.
Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh, AIR 1922 Lah 380 (L) Discussed earlier cases on the point and followed 35 Mad 1 (FB) (A). Referred to as supportive of 35 Mad 1 and as part of the body of consistent decisions.
Jeeyan-garlavaru v. Krishnamacharlu, AIR 1927 Mad 398 (M) Rejected the argument that Privy Council observations overruled earlier Madras decisions; expressly followed 35 Mad 1 and AIR 1924 Mad 597, holding appeals lie against orders staying or refusing stays. Used as a further example of consistent practice in the High Court; the Court relied on it as confirming continuous acceptance of 35 Mad 1.
Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. Dakore Temple Committee, AIR 1925 PC 155 (N) Mentioned in argument that Privy Council observations might have overruled High Court decisions. The Court found that Jeeyan-garlavaru showed nothing in the Privy Council decision had overruled the local practice; the Privy Council decision did not displace 35 Mad 1.
Pethaperumal Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1927 Mad 592 (O) Followed the view that an order of a single Judge staying execution by injunction is a judgment. Noted as another decision following 35 Mad 1 and consistent with the majority approach.
Simrathmull v. Jugraj (P) Recent (to opinion) decision cited as following 35 Mad 1; on facts held no appeal lay though the principle of appealability was accepted. Referred to as recent confirmation (March 1953) of the continued acceptance of the Full Bench's view.
Nageswara Aiyar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1929 Mad 197 (Q) Made a distinction between cases where a stay has been refused and where it has been allowed (a discordant note). The Court considered this distinction unsound and rejected it in favour of the uniform view that orders refusing or allowing stay are appealable under Clause 15.
Mt. Durga Devi v. Hans Raj, AIR 1930 Lah 187 (R) Expressed the opinion that an order staying execution till decision of appeal falls under Section 2(2) read with Section 47, C.P.C., and is therefore appealable as a decree. Not accepted by the Court for appellate orders under Order 41, Rule 5; the Court held such appellate orders are not "decrees" under Section 2(2) though they may be "judgments" under Clause 15.
Krishnan Nair v. Kavalappara Moopil Nair, AIR 1915 Mad 41 (S) Authority for the proposition that orders under Order 41, Rule 5 are not decrees within Section 2(2) C.P.C. The Court accepted this as the correct view (and preferred to follow it), holding that appellate orders under Order 41, Rule 5 are not "decrees" under Section 2(2).
Veera Raghavayya v. Koti Rattamma, AIR 1948 Mad 524 (T) Horwill J. had dissented, treating an order staying execution by the executing Court as falling under Section 2(2) read with Section 47. The Court observed that on the facts Horwill J.'s conclusion might be justified but rejected extending that reasoning to appellate orders under Order 41, Rule 5.
Desikachariar v. Ramachandra Reddiar (Full Bench) (U) Full Bench doubted the correctness of Horwill J.'s view (Veera Raghavayya). Referenced in support of the Court's view that Horwill J.'s approach should not be extended to appellate orders under Order 41, Rule 5.
Shamsuddin Ahmed v. Charu Chandra Biswas, AIR 1934 Cal 713 (V) Calcutta decision cited by counsel but not directly concerned with staying or refusing to stay execution of decrees. The Court noted these Calcutta decisions do not improve the situation because they are not on point regarding stay or refusal of stay of execution.
Lea Badin v. Upendra Mohan Roy, AIR 1935 Cal 35 (W) Another Calcutta decision cited; also not concerned with stay or refusal to stay execution. Mentioned as not directly addressing the specific issue; therefore not treated as decisive.
Ganpatrao Pande v. Gangadhar Gita-ram, AIR 1943 Nag 282 (X) Nagpur High Court held an order under Order 41, Rule 5 staying or refusing to stay execution of a decree is not a "decree" within Section 2(2) C.P.C. The Court agreed with this view and cited it in support of the conclusion that appellate orders under Order 41, Rule 5 are not "decrees" under Section 2(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in two interrelated strands: (A) the character of an appellate-order refusing or granting stay of execution for purposes of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (i.e., whether it is a "judgment" from which an appeal lies), and (B) whether such an order amounts to a "decree" within Section 2(2), C.P.C., for substantive appealability under the Code.

(A) On the "judgment" question the Court stated it was bound to follow the Full Bench decision in Tuljaramraw v. Alagappa Chettiar (35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)), which, by express observation, treated an order refusing a stay of execution by a single Judge as a judgment under Clause 15 and therefore appealable. The Court surveyed a long line of subsequent High Court authorities and concluded that the overwhelming trend supports appealability: many Madras decisions and Full Benches (including Sonachalam Pillai AIR 1924 Mad 597 and Jeeyan-garlavaru AIR 1927 Mad 398) adopt this view. The Court rejected earlier contrary decisions such as 24 Mad 358 and 3 Mad LT 307 as not approved by the Full Bench and therefore not authoritative for its purposes. It also rejected attempts to distinguish the orders (for example between interim injunctions pending second appeal and stays of execution), treating such distinctions as lacking substance for the present purpose. The Court therefore concluded that an order of a single Judge refusing stay of execution is a "judgment" under Clause 15 as interpreted in 35 Mad 1 (FB).

(B) Addressing the alternative contention that the order should be treated as a "decree" under Section 2(2) C.P.C. (so that appeals lie as from decrees), the Court analyzed the statutory text and relevant authorities. It noted that in the Code of 1882 Section 244 contained express words making stay of execution appealable; those words were omitted from Section 47 of the Code of 1908. The Court accepted the established distinction: where the executing Court (the court that passed the decree) itself stays or refuses to stay execution that may amount to an act within the phrase "execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree" in Section 47; but where the appellate Court acts under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C., either staying or refusing to stay execution, that order does not fall within the definition of "decree" in Section 2(2). The Court relied on Krishnan Nair v. Kavalappara Moopil Nair (AIR 1915 Mad 41) and Ganpatrao Pande v. Gangadhar (AIR 1943 Nag 282) in support, and refused to generalize the reasoning of Horwill J. (in Veera Raghavayya) to appellate orders. Thus the Court concluded appellate orders under Order 41, Rule 5 are not "decrees" under Section 2(2), though they may be "judgments" under Clause 15.

(C) On the merits of the particular order of Ramaswami J., the Court found the order unsustainable "in toto." The learned judge had stayed the taking of accounts but at the same time ordered payment by the appellants of the whole Rs. 7,707 with interest. The Court considered that either the entire decree should have been stayed or there should have been no stay at all; it was not appropriate to saddle the appellants immediately with the whole payment while other proceedings were stayed. Accordingly, the Court exercised its discretion to modify the order substantially.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court modified the order of Ramaswami J.: instead of paying the whole amount of Rs. 7,707 with interest, the appellants (defendants) are directed to pay half that amount (i.e., Rs. 3,853.50) with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from 17-2-1947 on or before 31-7-1954. The judgment of the learned Judge is modified accordingly. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

Implications:

  • The Court affirmed the view that an order of a single Judge refusing (or allowing) a stay of execution, when made by an appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 5, is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and thus appealable to a Division Bench, following 35 Mad 1 (FB) and subsequent consistent authorities.
  • The Court held that such appellate orders are not "decrees" within Section 2(2) C.P.C.; it accepted the distinction between actions of the executing Court and those of the appellate Court for purposes of Section 47 and Section 2(2).
  • The direct practical effect in this case is that the appellants' liability to pay the full sum immediately was reduced: they are to pay half the taxed amount with interest by the specified date; the earlier order is modified. The Court expressly did not award costs in the appeal.
  • The opinion relied on and reinforced established High Court authorities (notably the Full Bench in 35 Mad 1) rather than creating a novel precedent; the decision follows stare decisis and treats contrary older Madras decisions as no longer authoritative for the High Court.

    K.G Rangaswami Chettiar And Company And Others v. K.R Eswaramurthi Goundar.

    1. By his order dated 23-9-1953, Ramaswami J. directed that the taking of an account under Clause (1) of the decree in C. S. No. 39 of 1948 on the file of the sub Court of Coimbatore will be stayed pending App. No. 1097 of 1952 on the file of the High Court and that there would be no stay regarding any other portion of the decree In O. S. No. 39 of of 1948.

    The main item of the decree in which stay of execution has been refused is one relating to the direction to defendants l to 4 to pay a sum of Rs. 7707 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from 17-2-1947 till the date of realisation. It is alleged that this amount was due to the plaintiff because he had to pay sales-tax to the Government on account of the fact that the A licence was in his name though the business was conducted by the partnership consisting of plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4. During the period for which these amounts were due from the partnership, defendants 1 to 4 were in management and it was their duty to pay that sum though the licence stood in the name of the plaintiff.

    On account of the failure of the defendants to pay that amount, the plaintiff was compelled to discharge the liability due to the Government arid the suit was, in addition to the prayer for taking of accounts, for payment of this amount from the defendants.

    The Subordinate Judge, in addition to the direction to take accounts for a period subsequent to 7-11-1945, further ordered that defendants should pay that sum to the plaintiff with interest thereon. There was a further direction that in taking the accounts, the sales-tax due by the plaintiff for that period for his share be also taken into account. In the application by the defendants, the prayer was for a stay of the further proceedings relating to the taking of accounts and for execution of the decree regarding the Rs. 7707.

    As stated, the learned judge stayed the further proceedings but refused to grant a relief to the defendants regarding the payment of Rs. 7707. It is against that portion of the order that the defendants have preferred the appeal and the question is whether that portion of the order refusing to stay the execution of the decree is a "Judgment" or not within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

    We do not propose to advert to all the cases, cited before us, but it becomes necessary only to consider the observations contained in the decisions subsequent to -- "Tuljaramraw v. Alagappa Chettiar', 35 Mad I (FB) (A) though there has been a body of case law prior to that taking a view that such an order would not amount to a judgment within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, despite the fact that in -- 'the Justice of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Co.', 8 Beng LR 433 (B), Sir Richard Couch C. J. expressed an opinion 'obiter' that in cases where orders have been made in execution they would come within the definition of the word "judgment" in Clause 15.

    The cases reported in -- 'Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Malikarjuna Prasada Nayadu', 24 Mad 358 (C> and -- 'Kodiba Sahib v. Rahimatulla Sahib', 3 Mad LT 307 (D) have taken the view that an order refusing stay of execution passed by a single Judge of the High Court would not amount to a judgment under Clause 15.

    To the same effect are the observations of Petheram C. J. in -- 'Mohabir Prosad Singh v. Adhikari Kunwar', 21 Cal 473 (E), though that was a case where Section 608 of the old Code, corresponding to Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C., a single Judge had directed security for costs in execution to be given and it was held that such an order was not a judgment.

    The trend of decisions subsequent to -- '35 Mad 1 (PB) (A)' in this Court is consistently to the effect that an order of a single Judge refusing stay of execution is a judgment though there is to be seen a very minor discordant note that where execution has been stayed, it may not amount to a judgment. But there is one exception to that rule in the case reported in -- 'Vairavan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar', 14 Mad LW 701 (F), where Oldfield and Ramesam JJ. have held that the order of a single Judge sitting ia the Admission Court dismissing a petition for stay of execution is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 and no appeal lies therefrom to a Division Bench on the ground that the earlier decision in -- '24 Mad 358 (C)' which took a similar view has not been overruled by the 'obiter dictum' in --'35 Mad 1 (PB) (A)'.

    But, as will be shown presently, the large catena of case law subsequent to -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' is in favour of allowing an appeal against such an order under Clause 15.

    We have already stated that this Bench is bound to follow the decision in -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' and as such it is now necessary to see how far even statements which may be 'obiter' in that case have been consistently not departed from in later cases. At p. 8 of -- '35 Mad 1 (PB) (A)' Sir Arnold White C. J. says thus :

    "I should be prepared to hold that an appeal lay from an order refusing a stay of execution (the application for stay being an ancillary proceeding) though a contrary view was taken in -- '24 Mad 358 (C)'."

    Prom this observation it is clear that the Pull Bench has not approved of the dictum in -- '24 Mad 358 (C)', and the view taken in -- '14 Mad LW 701 (P)' that the so-called 'obiter dictum' has not overruled -- '24 Mad 358 (C)' does not appeal to us. The decision in -- '21 Cal 473 (E)' has been followed in -- '24 Mad 358 (C) which, as we have shown, has not been approved in -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' and therefore so far as this Court is concerned, -- '21 Cal 473 (E)' cannot be deemed to be any authority.

    The decision in -- '3 Mad LT 807 (D)' simply follows -- '24 Mad 358 (0)' and as such is open to the same criticism. Even Krishnaswami Ayyar J. at pp. 19 and 20 of -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' does not approve of -- '24 Mad 358 (C)' and -- '21 Gal 473 (E)', but would prefer as sounder view the expression of opinion in -- 'Mt. Brijcoomaree v. Ramrick Pass', 5 Cal WN 781 (O), though the latter decision related to an order made by a single Judge refusing to stay the issue of probate and the discharge of a receiver appointed in a probate action.

    Discussing the Madras cases which have taken the view tnat an appeal lies under such circum-stances in a chronological order we have next to refer to -- 'Srinivasa lyengar v. Ramaswami Chettiar', AIR 1916 Mad 1220 (2) (FB) (H) where, though the question that arose before the Full Bench was whether an order of a single Judge rejecting a petition to send for the records and to revise the judgment of a lower Court exercising small cause jurisdiction is a Judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as it then stood and was therefore appealable, the Court, in deciding the point followed the observations in -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)'; and Seshagiri Aiyar J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench stated that -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' was binding on them.

    When the question arose subsequently as to whether an order of a single Judge pending disposal of a second appeal on an application for interim injunction amounts to a Judgment under Clause 15, it was held by Spencer and Devadoss JJ. in --'Venkata Chinnayamma Rao v. Subbamma Rao', Am 1935 Mad 586 (J) that the Bench should be guided by the observations of White C. J. in-- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' & as such an order would amount to a judgment. The learned Judges distinguished -- '14 Mad LW 701 (P)' and -- '24 Mad 358 (C)', by stating that the orders in those cases were passed in execution and did not directly affect the question before them, nor did they diminish the authority of -- '35 Mad 1 (PB) (A)'.

    How far the distinction is justifiable need not concern us at this stage for we are unable to find any substantial difference between an application for an order of interim injunction pending a second appeal and one for stay of execution. In any event -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' has been accepted as binding authority.

    2. An important pronouncement where the point is practically 'ad idem' has been made by Krishnan and Waller JJ. in -- 'Sonachalam Pillai --v. Kumaravelu Chettiar', AIR 1924 Mad 597 (J), where it has been categorically laid down that an order of a single Judge of the High court refusing stay of execution of a decree of a mufassal Court pending an appeal to the High Court is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

    For that dictum the authority given is -- '35 Mad 1 (PB) (A)'. The learned Judges referred to -- 'Desouza v. Coles', 3 Mad HCR 384 (K) and -- '8 Beng LR 433 (B)' before discussing the observations of the Full Bench in -- '35 Mad 1 (PB) (A)'. After extracting a passage from the Judgment of the Full Bench at p. 7 of the report, where Sir Arnold White C. J. lays down the essentials of a judgment and nothing what Krishnaswami Alyar J. has also held in that case, they have stated that the observation at p. 8 that an appeal lay from an order refusing stay of execution, though in the nature of an 'obiter dictum', was binding on them.

    As almost all the cases which discussed this question prior to that date have been amply considered in--'AIR 1924 Mad 597 (J)' and as we are in agreement with the discussion and reasoning therein, it is unnecessary for us to dilate at any length upon the reasoning given by the learned Judges. They also referred to -- 'Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh', AIR 1922 Lah 380 (2) (L) where the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court elaborately discussed all the cases on the point and followed -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)'. We agree with the learned Judges who decided -- 'AIR 1924 Mad 597 (J)' in their view that -- '24 Mad 35a (C)' and -- '14 Mad LW 701 (P)' have been wrongly decided and are no longer authority. No decision has been brought to our notice in our Court which has so far either expressly or by necessary implication, dissented from the view taken in--'AIR 1924 Mad 597 (J)' which has stood the test of time for more than 30 years and on the principle of 'stare decisis' at least we should follow that decision.

    3. Three years later, a Bench consisting of Wallace and Madhavan Nair JJ. in -- 'Jeeyan-garlavaru v. Krishnamacharlu', AIR 1927 Mad 398 (M) was confronted with the argument that the series of decisions of this Court up till then had been overruled by the observations of the Privy Council in -- 'Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. Dakore Temple Committee', AIR 1925 PC 155 (N); but the learned Judges held that nothing like that has happened. The learned Judges expressly followed the observations in -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' and the decision in -- 'AIR 1924 Mad 597 (J)' and have also Stated that -- '24 Mad 358 (C)' and -- '14 Mad LW 701 (F)' are no longer good law. At p. 402 of the report Madhavan Nair J. observes thus: "So far as I can speak from experience, I may state that the practice in this Court ever since -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' has always been to allow appeals against orders like the one before us." The facts of the case before the learned Judges showed that it related to an order staying execution of a decree of a lower Court, by suspending an injunction, pending an appeal to the High Court. We are in agreement with the observations of the learned Judges. Wallace-J. at pp. 399-400 of the report refers to the large body of case law subsequent to -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' which took the view that orders by which either stay of execution has been refused or allowed are appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and most of those cases have already been considered by us. One significant fact, as pointed out by the learned Judge, is that despite the repeated rulings of various High Courts regarding the definition of the word "judgment" even when the Letters Patent was amended in 1919, no attempt was made to clarify what that word meant and it is all the more interesting to note that subsequent to --'AIR 1927 Mad 398 (M)' when the Letters Patent was amended in 1929, there was no idea of making any clear exposition of the meaning of the word "judgment" or under what circumstances an appeal would lie from the decision of a single Judge.

    On the whole the consensus of opinion in our High Court up to -- 'AIR 1927 Mad 398 (M)' has been to consider that an order refusing stay of execution, or allowing stay' of execution, by a single Judge, pending an appeal, is a Judgment within the meaning of the term. All that we need say is that even after the lapse of more than 27 years since that decision was rendered, there Is no divergent path followed in this Court, to compel us to take a different view of the meaning of the word "judgment".

    The above decision was followed without discussion by Ramesam and Madhavan Nair JJ. in --'Pethaperumal Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1927 Mad 592 (O) by holding that an order of a single Judge of the High Court issuing an injunction and thereby staying execution proceedings of a decree obtained by one of the parties is a judgment.

    4. The decision in -- '35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)' has been consistently and continuously followed in this Court and even as recently as March 1953, Rajamannar C. J. and Venkatarama Aiyar J. have delivered a judgment to that effect in -- 'Simrathmull v. Jugraj', (P), though on the facts of that case they were of opinion that no appeal lay. The only discordant note that has been struck against the view of appealability where execution of a decree has been stayed is by Wallace and Thiruvenkatachariar JJ. in -- 'Nageswara Aiyar v. Ramanathan Chettiar', AIR 1929 Mad 197 (Q), where they make a distinction between cases in which a stay has been refused and those in which a stay has been allowed. With due respect to the learned Judges we are unable to see the point of distinction. It has to be remembered that Wallace J. himself was a party to --'AIR 1927 Mad 398 (M)' where on the facts the Bench held that an appeal lay against an order staying execution. The more respectable (reasonable?) view seems to be that expressed in -- 'AIR 1927 Mad 398 (M)' and not what is expressed in -- 'AIR 1929 Mad 197 (Q)'.

    5. The second line of argument of Mr. S. T. Srinivasagopalachari to bring the order appealed against within the definition of the word "judgement" is that such a decision amounts to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2), C. P. C., and where a decree has been passed by a single Judge, an appeal lies. The expression of opinion of Tek Chand and Johnstone JJ. in--'Mt. Durga Devi v. Hans Raj', AIR 1930 Lah 187 (R)' to the effect that an order staying execution of a decree till the decision of the appeal clearly falls under Section 2(2) read with Section 47, C. P. C., and is appealable is cited before us to show that in the present case the order refusing stay of execution must also amount to a decree.

    In the Code of 1882, in Section 244 the words "or to the stay of execution thereof" were present, which would make such an order appealable. What has to be considered is the effect of the omission of those words in Section 47 of the Code of 1908. The generally accepted view is that when an executing Court stays, or refuses to stay, the execution of the decree, such an order, if it is final, would come within the definition of the term execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree in Section 47; but where an appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C.. either stays or refuses to stay, that would not come within the definition of "decree" in Section 2(2) and as such would not be appealable.

    'Krishnan Nair v. Kavalappara Moopil Naif', AIR 1915 Mad 41 (1) (S) is an authority for the proposition that orders under Order 41, R, 5 would not be decrees though that view has been somewhat dissented from recently by Horwill J. in -- 'Veera Raghavayya v. Koti Rattamma', AIR 1948 Mad 524 (T). , Again in -- 'Desikachariar v. Ramachandra Reddiar', (FB) (U) the Full Bench doubted the correctness of the view taken by Rorwill J, in the case cited above. On the facts, the conclusion of Horwill J., might be justified because what happened in the case decided by Horwill J. was that a Court-which passed the decree was requested to stay the execution under Order 41, Rule 6 (2), C. P. C., pending an appeal from the decree itself. Here therefore it is the executing Court that functioned and not the appellate Court that restrained, or refused to restrain, the hand of the executing Court. Viewed in that light, nothing can be said against the decision of Horwill J.

    If on the other hand, the order has been made by the appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 5, we are of opinion that the principles enunciated by Horwill J. cannot be extended to such circumstances. At p. 58 of -- (FB) (U)' Subba Rao J. in delivering the opinion of the Full Bench doubted the correctness of -- 'AIR 1948 Mad 524 (T)'. But the learned Judge has not referred to the fact that the application for stay was made to the executing Court pending an appeal against the decree and on that ground the decision of Horwill J. can be supported. We are in agreement with the learned Judge in thinking that if an application under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C., is made to an appellate Court then it would not amount to a decree. The correct view, as we have already stated, seems to be what is laid down in -- 'AIR 1915 Mad 41 (l) (S)' and not -- 'AIR 1930 Lah 187 (R)', The Calcutta decisions, viz., -- 'Shamsuddin Ahmed v. Charu Chandra Biswas', AIR 1934 Cal 713 (V) & -- 'Lea Badin v. Upendra MohanRoy', AIR 1935 Cal 35 (W) which Mr. Srinivasagopalachari brought to our notice do not improve the situation any further, as they are not concerned with staying, or refusing to stay, execution of decrees.

    6. That an order under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C., staying or refusing to stay execution of a decree is not a "decree" within the meaning of &. 2 (2), C. P. C., has been laid down by the Nagpur High Court in -- 'Ganpatrao Pande v. Gangadhar gita-ram', AIR 1943 Nag 282 (X) and this view being in consonance with that we think right, we are in agreement with it. We are therefore of opinion that where an appellate Court purports to act under Order 41, Rule 5 and refuses to stay, or stays, the execution of a decree, such an order could not be a decree within Section 2(2) of the C. P. C. and the second argument of Mr. Srinivasagopalachari therefore fails, though we are in agreement with him that it would amount to a Judgment under Clause 15, Letters Patent, as interpreted in --'35 Mad 1 (FB) (A)'.

    7. On the merits it seems to us that Rama-swami J.'s order cannot be sustained 'in toto'. The learned judge has stayed that portion of the decree by which accounts were directed to be taken. But at the same time he ordered the appellants to pay the sum of Rs. 7707 with interest. Either the entire decree should have been stayed or there should have been no stay whatever, is what we feel in the circumstances, In any event the appellants need not be saddled with the responsibility to pay the entire sum now.

    We therefore direct that Instead of paying the whole amount of Rs. 7707 with Interest thereon, the appellants do pay the respondent half that amount with interest at the rate of six per cent.

    per annum from 17-2-1947 on or before 31-7-1954.

    The judgment of the learned Judge is modified accordingly. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

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    K.G Rangaswami Chettiar And Company And Others v. K.R Eswaramurthi Goundar.
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