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Acts
  • S. 3(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, (hereinafter called the Act)
  • Rent Control) amendment Act. 1951.The
  • Rent Control) Act. 1951.Ss. 3(1), (3)
  • S. 23 of the Contract Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 3(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, (hereinafter called the Act)
  • Rent Control) amendment Act. 1951.The
  • Rent Control) Act. 1951.Ss. 3(1), (3)
  • S. 23 of the Contract Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Requisition under Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for a writ of certiorari to quash two orders of the Accommodation Controller dated 17 July 1951 and 4 August 1951. The petitioner is the owner of premises No. 1/3, Jones Street, G.T. Madras. On 15 January 1951 one Fernando wrote to the Accommodation Controller stating that he was a tenant and that he was vacating the premises on that date. After enquiries, on 7 February 1951 the Accommodation Controller issued a notice to the petitioner under S. 3(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, calling for particulars and intimating that the premises had to be kept vacant for seven days from the furnishing of particulars. The petitioner did not reply to that notice.

On 25 April 1951 a complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the petitioner was fined Rs. 75. The Accommodation Controller allotted the house to one Waters. Because the petitioner did not give peaceful possession, on 4 August 1951 the Accommodation Controller issued a notice under S. 3(8) of the Act directing delivery of possession and warning that steps would be taken to obtain vacant possession.

The petitioner asserted the premises was non-residential and had been let to one Abdulla Sait around the end of 1950, and alleged the monthly rent was under Rs. 50 so that, she contended, no notice to the Accommodation Controller was required. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised several legal contentions attacking the validity of the requisition; the court dealt with those contentions seriatim and ultimately set aside the Accommodation Controller's order for a specific procedural reason (see Holding and Implications below).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether occupation or letting of the building without compliance with S. 3(1) (notice of vacancy) constitutes a contravention of the Act permitting summary dispossession under S. 3(8).
  2. Whether S. 3(8), read with its Explanation making it retrospective, is constitutionally valid in relation to Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution (freedom to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business).
  3. Whether summary dispossession under S. 3(8) without provision for compensation contravenes Article 31(2) of the Constitution (requirement of compensation when property is taken or possession is taken for public purposes).
  4. Whether the retrospective operation (applicability to cases arising before the amendment) of S. 3(8) infringes Article 20 of the Constitution, by imposing a greater penalty for past conduct than was available when the act was committed.
  5. Whether S. 3(8)(a) should be denied retrospective effect despite the Explanation in the statute.
  6. Whether the Accommodation Controller had jurisdiction to requisition the building under S. 3(9) given the petitioner's claim that the premises are non-residential and the monthly rent is below Rs. 50.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (summarised)

  • The tenant has not occupied the building in contravention of S. 3(4) because, the petitioner argued, the statutory notice under S. 3(1) was not given and therefore the prohibition in S. 3(4) could not arise.
  • The retrospective operation of S. 3(8) (as applied by the Explanation) is constitutionally invalid as an unreasonable restriction on fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f).
  • Summary dispossession under S. 3(8) without provision for compensation violates Article 31(2) because a tenant has a legal interest in the leasehold and cannot be deprived of possession without compensation.
  • The retrospective application of S. 3(8) violates Article 20 because it imposes a greater punishment or penalty on past conduct than was available at the time of the act.
  • The Accommodation Controller lacked jurisdiction because the building was non-residential and the rent was below Rs. 50, which would exclude it from the section's operation under S. 3(9).
  • Factual assertion: the petitioner had let the premises to Abdulla Sait at the end of 1950 and it was being used for business (non-residential), and monthly rent was under Rs. 50.

The opinion does not contain a detailed catalogue of the respondent's adversarial arguments; the Accommodation Controller's actions (notice, allotment to Waters, issuance of S. 3(8) notice) are recorded but specific legal submissions by the respondent are not set out in detail in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.M.P. No. 6628 of 1951 Held that requisition of a house under the Act does not offend Article 19; the subject matter falls directly under Article 31 and Article 31 excludes the operation of Article 19 when the building is taken under valid law. The court followed this earlier decision to reject the petitioner's contention that S. 3(8) violated Article 19(1)(f). The judgment quoted and applied the reasoning that Art. 31 takes precedence over Art. 19 where the subject matter falls within Art. 31.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the statutory scheme of S. 3 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 and related provisions. Key features of the court's analysis were:

  1. Statutory construction and scheme: The court read S. 3(1), S. 3(3), S. 3(4) and S. 3(8) together and identified a five-stage requisition scheme:
    1. Landlord must give notice of vacancy within seven days under S. 3(1).
    2. Within ten days the State or authorised officer may intimate requirement for State purposes under S. 3(3).
    3. During the prescribed period the landlord is prohibited from letting the house (S. 3(4)).
    4. If no intimation is given within the prescribed period the landlord is free to let the building (S. 3(3)).
    5. If a person occupying the building fails to deliver possession in contravention of S. 3, an officer may summarily dispossess under S. 3(8).
  2. On the contention that the tenant was not occupying in contravention because the statutory notice had not been given, the court rejected that argument. The court treated the obligation to give notice under S. 3(1)(a) as an integral part of the requisition scheme. Occupation without issuing the notice required by S. 3(1)(a) amounts to contravention of the section; therefore, such occupation is within the scope of S. 3(8) and vulnerable to summary eviction.
  3. Article 19(1)(f) challenge: The court declined to consider the argument afresh in detail because it relied on the prior decision in C.M.P. No. 6628 of 1951, which held requisition under the Act did not offend Article 19 since the matter falls under Article 31. Following that judgment, the court held that no right under Article 19 had been infringed by the order.
  4. Article 31(2) (compensation) challenge: The petitioner argued that summary dispossession without compensation contravened Article 31(2) because a tenant has a legal interest. The court analysed whether the tenancy in question was a valid legal tenancy or a void agreement. The court concluded the lease was void because:
    • The letting occurred in express contravention of S. 3 (landlord liable to prosecution and actually fined),
    • The letting offended the object of the Act and, if permitted, would defeat the Act (invoking S. 23 of the Contract Act conceptually to treat agreements that defeat statute as void),
    • Because the landlord let her building committing an offence and in the face of an express statutory prohibition, the lease must be treated as void.
    Consequently, the occupant's possession was held to be permissive and effectively the possession of the landlord; the tenant had no separate compensable right under Article 31 in respect of that void tenancy.
  5. Article 20 (no greater penalty by subsequent law) challenge: The petitioner argued retrospective effect of S. 3(8) increased penalties for past conduct. The court explained that the criminal punishments prescribed in S. 16 (imprisonment or fine) were not changed by the amending Act (Madras Act VIII of 1951). What the amendment did was confer executive power to effect summary eviction where previously there was no effective administrative mechanism to put an allottee into possession. The court considered this filling of a lacuna rather than imposition of a greater criminal penalty and therefore held there was no breach of Article 20.
  6. Retrospective operation of S. 3(8) (Explanation): The court found the Explanation explicitly applied the clause to cases which arose before the commencement of the amendment Act and therefore rejected arguments that S. 3(8)(a) should not be given retrospective effect.
  7. Jurisdiction under S. 3(9) (residential/non-residential threshold): For the petitioner's contention that the premises was non-residential and the rent below Rs. 50 (which, if this were established, would exclude the building from the section's operation), the court examined the record. The petitioner's affidavit asserted non-residential use, while the counter alleged residential use, and the Accommodation Controller did not appear to have made a clear decision on that factual issue based on the materials. Because the Controller's jurisdiction to requisition depended materially on whether the building was residential or non-residential, the court held that the Controller's order must be set aside and directed the Controller to decide the question afresh on the materials the petitioner may place before him.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court set aside the Accommodation Controller's order (dated 17 July 1951 and 4 August 1951) insofar as it requisitioned the premises and directed the Accommodation Controller to decide, on the materials placed before him by the petitioner, whether the building is residential or non-residential.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Accommodation Controller's impugned order was quashed and remitted for fresh consideration limited to the factual question whether the premises is residential or non-residential (which determines jurisdiction under S. 3(9)).
  • The court ordered that the parties should bear their own costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion does not purport to create a novel constitutional precedent; it follows the earlier judgment in C.M.P. No. 6628 of 1951 on Article 19 and applies established statutory interpretation concerning the scheme of requisition, retrospective application under the Explanation to S. 3(8), and the distinction between void tenancies and compensable interests under Article 31(2). The court did not find it necessary to depart from those prior conclusions and primarily remitted the matter for factual determination on the residential/non-residential question.

V.C.S

    Fathima Bi v. State Of Madras

    This is an application for issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Accommodation Controller dated the 17th July 1951 and 4th August 1951. The petitioner is the owner of the house and premises No. 1/3, Jones Street, G.T Madras. On 15th January 1951 one Fernando wrote a letter to the Accommodation Controller stating that he was a tenant of the said premises and that he was vacating the same on 15-1-1951. After making some enquiries, on 7-2-1951, the Accommodation Controller issued a notice to the petitioner under S. 3(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, (hereinafter called the Act) calling for particulars and intimating her that the premises have to be kept vacant for seven days from the date of the furnishing of the particulars. The petitioner did not reply to that notice. On 25-4-1951 a complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the petitioner was fined a sum of Rs. 75.

    The Accommodation Controller allotted the house to one Waters. As the petitioner did not give peaceful possession, on 4-8-1951 the respondent issued a notice under S. 3(f) of the Act directing the petitioner to deliver possession and also stating that if no vacant possession was given necessary steps would be taken to obtain the same. The petitioner states that the said premises is a non-residential house and that she has let the same to one Abdulla Sait in or about the end of 1950 and since that time he has been carrying on business in the said premises. She further alleges that the monthly rent of the Building is less than Rs. 50 and therefore she is not bound in law to give the notice to the Accommodation Controller.

    Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner raised before me various legal contentions questioning the validity of the requisition. I shall proceed to deal with them in seriatim.

    The first argument is that the tenant has not occupied the building in contravention of the provisions of S. 3(4) prohibiting the letting of the building, which would come into play only if the statutory notice was given and that, in the instant case such notice was not given. This argument appears to be plausible, but, in my view, not sound. To appreciate this contention the following provisions of the Act may be read:

    “S. 3(I)(a): Every landlord shall, within seven days after the building becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, or by the termination of a tenancy, or by release from requisition give notice of the vacancy in writing to the Officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government (hereinafter in the section referred to as the ‘authorised officer’)

    S. 3(3): If, within ten days of the receipt by the authorised officer of a notice under Sub-S. (1) or Sub-S. (2), the State Government or the authorised officer does not intimate to the landlord in writing that the building is required for the purposes of the State or Central Government or of any local authority or any public institution under the control of any such Government or for the occupation of any officer of such Government, the landlord shall be at liberty to let the building to any tenant or to occupy it himself.

    S. 3(4): The landlord shall not let the building to a tenant or occupy it himself, before the expiry of the period of ten days specified in Sub-S. (3), unless in the meantime he has received intimation that the building is not required for the purposes or for occupation by any of the officers, specified in that sub-section.

    S. 3(8)(a): Any officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf may summarily dispossess—

    (i) any landlord, tenant or other person occupying any building in contraventron of the provisions of this section or any landlord who fails to deliver to the State Government possession of any building in respect of which they are deemed to be the tenant by virtue of this section……and take possession of the building including any portion thereof which may have been sub-let:

    Explanation: The provisions of this clause shall apply also to cases which arose before the commencement of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1951.”

    Ss. 3(1), (3) and (4) are component parts of the scheme of requisition. The scheme comprises five stages:

    (1) The landlord gives notice of the vacancy to the authorised officer within seven days of the vacancy;

    (2) Within ten days of the receipt of the notice the State Government or authorised officer intimates to the landlord in writing that the building is required for the purpose of the State;

    (3) During the prescribed period the landlord is prohibited from letting the house;

    (4) If no intimation is given within the prescribed period the landlord is at liberty to let the same to whomsoever he likes;

    (5) If the landlord or any person occupying the building fails to deliver possession in contravention of the provisions of the Act, an officer appointed by the State may summarily dispossess him.

    It will be seen from the other provisions of S. 3(8) that an officer appointed by the State can dispossess a person occupying a house in contravention of the provisions of the section, be it noted not in contravention of S. 3(3) or S. 3(4) alone. Occupation of the building by a landlord or his tenant without issuing notice under S. 3(1)(a), which as I already stated is a part of the general scheme of requisition, is certainly a contravention of the provision of the section. As the tenant is now in possession in contravention of that sub-section, he is liable to be summarily evicted under S. 3(8).

    Learned Counsel then questioned the constitutional validity of S. 3(8) read with its explanation giving it retrospective operation. He argued that the said section is bad as being an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to consider this argument as I held in C.M.P No. 6628 of 1951* that the requisition of a house under the Act does not offend the fundamental right under Art. 19, as the subject matter directly comes under Art. 31 of the Constitution. In that judgment I observed:

    “The subject matter directly comes under Art. 31. Art. 31 bring a special article, excludes the operation of a general article. Art. 19. As the building was taken possession under a law validly made, the petitioner is not protected by the provisions of Art. 19 for Art. 19(1)(f) can be invoked only if the petitioner is legally entitled to use his property. I therefore hold that no right under Art. 19 has been infringed by the order of the Accommodation Controller.”

    Following that judgment I negative this contention.

    Even so it was contended that the provisions of that section in so far they authorise an officer to take possession of the property from the tenant without paying or providing for the payment of the compensation contravene the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, ultra vires, the Constitution. Art. 31(2) reads:

    “No property, movable or immoveable including any interest in, or in any company, owning any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.”

    This article therefore prohibits taking possession of any property without compensation. The contention is that the tenant has a legal interest in the leasehold property and the State cannot dispossess him without paying, compensation. There would be considerable force in this argument if a person was in legal possession as a tenant and he was dispossessed; but if the tenancy was void, the possession of the tenant would only be permissive possession not in his own right, but for and on behalf of the landlord, in which case it would be the dispossession of the landlord who would be compensated under the provisions of the Act. The question therefore turns upon the subsidiary question whether the lease in contravention of the provisions of S. 3 was void. In my view, the object of the agreement of lease in the present case was not only forbidden by law, but if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of the Act within the meaning of S. 23 of the Contract Act, The landlord was prohibited from letting the building before the expiry of ten days from the receipt of notice by the authorised officer. She was liable to be prosecuted for contravention of Sub-Ss. (1), (2) and (4) of S. 3 of the Act and indeed she was prosecuted and fined. She therefore let her building by committing an offence and also in the teeth of an express prohibition not to let till certain conditions were complied with. The lease was therefore void. In the circumstances the possession of the tenant must be deemed to be the possession of the landlord. The tenant has no separate and distinct right to be compensated for within the meaning of Art. 31 of the Constitution.

    The constitutional competence of the impugned provision was also based on the provisions of Art. 20 of the Constitution of India. Under Art. 20,

    “No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.”

    Under this Article, a subsequent enactment cannot impose a greater penalty of an individual than that which could have been inflicted at the time he committed the offence. It was said that under Madras Act VIII of 1951, the provisions of S. 3(8) of the Act were given retrospective operation and the effect of the amendment was that for an offence committed prior to the passing of that Act, a person could not only be convicted but could summarily be evicted, and therefore the penalty was greater than that could have been inflicted on him at the time when he committed the offence. There would be force in this argument if the power of summary eviction conferred on an officer empowered by the State under S. 3(8) of the Act could be equated to the infliction of penalty for the commission of an offence. Under S. 16 of the Act, if any person contravenes any of the provisions of Sub-Ss. (1) (2), (4), (5) and (7) of S. 3 he shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with the fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both. That section was not amended by Act VIII of 1951. The punishment for the offence remains the same as it was before the amendment. The Amending Act only conferred the necessary executive power on the officer concerned to carry out the intention of the Legislature. Before the Amendment, the authorised officer can allot a house to an officer but cannot put him in possession if a recalcitrant landlord refused to comply with the order. The landlord might be punished in a criminal Court; but there was no procedure to expel him summarily. That power of summary eviction is now given under S. 3(8). An existing lacuna was filled up for the smooth working of the provisions of the Act. I cannot therefore hold that the impugned provision offends Art. 20 of the Constitution of India.

    It was then argued that S. 3(8)(a) should not be given retrospective operation. This contention is obviously untenable in view of the clear provisions of the Explanation which says “the provisions of this clause shall apply also to cases which arose before the commencement of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) amendment Act. 1951.”

    The last argument was that the house was a non-residential house and that the rent for the same was below Rs. 50 and therefore the Accommodation Controller had no jurisdiction to requisition the same.

    Section 3(9) says:

    “Nothing contained in this section shall apply—

    (a) to a residential building the monthly rent of which does not exceed twenty five rupees; or

    (b) to a non-residential building the monthly rent of which does not exceed fifty rupees.”

    In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it was specifically stated that the building is a non-residential building. In the counter though there is an allegation that the house has always been used for residential purposes, the Accommodation Controller does not say definitely that he has decided the question having regard to the materials placed before him. In this case the Accommodation Controller's jurisdiction to requisition the building mainly depends upon the question whether the building is a residential building; for it is not disputed that if it is a non-residential building, there is no power to requisition the same as the rent is below Rs. 50. His order, therefore, is set aside and he is directed to decide on the material that may be placed before him by the petitioner whether the building is a residential or non-residential building. As the petitioner failed on her main contentions, this is a fit case for directing the parties to bear their costs.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    Fathima Bi v. State Of Madras
    (Aug 7, 1952)