Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Art. 134 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 134. From the provisions of that Article
  • Art. 134 or 144 or 148 of the Limitation Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of the Limitation Act. Art. 134
  • S. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Art. 134 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Amending Act of 1929
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Art. 134 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 134. From the provisions of that Article
  • Art. 134 or 144 or 148 of the Limitation Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • provisions of the Limitation Act. Art. 134
  • S. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Art. 134 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Amending Act of 1929
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by Chandra Reddi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerns mortgaged immovable properties and competing claims to redemption and possession. In 1891 Sivanandi Thevar mortgaged the suit properties usufructuarily to Kamakshia Pillai for Rs. 225 with a redemption period fixed at 25 years. Subsequently, the mortgagee (Kamakshia Pillai) executed a simple mortgage (disputed whether of his othi/right or of the properties themselves) in favour of Periasami Odayar on 5-4-1898. Kamakshia Pillai also executed another simple mortgage in favour of Chidambara Aiyar for Rs. 290.

Periasami Odayar and Chidambara Aiyar each obtained decrees on their mortgages; properties were sold in execution and purchased at auction — the auction purchasers obtaining sale certificates marked Exs. D.1 and D.2 and remaining in possession. Those purchasers later sold the properties by private treaty to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants by instrument Ex. P.4 dated 24-9-1913. The plaintiff purchased the equity of redemption by sale deeds Exs. P.5 and P.6 in 1936 and 1943 and brought a suit for redemption of the mortgage dated 1691 and for possession in the District Munsif's Court, Mayavaram.

Defences included that (i) the mortgagee's entire interest had been sold in Court auctions in 1902 and 1904 and the mortgagee was dispossessed by auction purchasers who continued in possession as absolute owners (adverse possession and limitation), and (ii) if redemption were permitted, defendants should receive compensation for buildings they had erected.

The trial Court dismissed the suit as barred by Article 134 of the Limitation Act and awarded Rs. 1,000 by way of compensation in the event redemption were allowed. The Subordinate Judge, Mayavaram, affirmed that judgment. The plaintiff preferred this second appeal. The narrow controversy before this Bench is which Limitation Act article applies: Article 134, 144, or 148.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 134 of the Limitation Act applies to bar the plaintiff's suit (i.e., whether the relevant transfers fall within "transfer by the mortgagee" contemplated by Art. 134).
  2. Whether, alternatively, Article 144 applies on the ground of adverse possession (i.e., whether possession by purchasers was adverse to the mortgagor and known to the mortgagor, thus starting the running of limitation under Art. 144).
  3. Whether Article 148 governs the suit (i.e., whether the 60-year period under Art. 148 for suits "Against a mortgage to redeem or to recover possession of immoveable property mortgaged" is the applicable statute of limitation in this case).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Art. 134 is not applicable; instead Art. 148 governs the limitation period for the present suit.
  • What was purchased at the Court auctions (1902 and 1904) and what was later sold under Ex. P.4 in 1913 were only the mortgagee's rights (i.e., not full ownership), so Art. 134 should not be attracted.
  • The 1913 transfer under Ex. P.4 was not a transfer "by the mortgagee" within the meaning of Art. 134.
  • A transfer by a sub-mortgagee does not fall under Art. 134.
  • At the date of the 1913 transfer the mortgagor's cause of action to redeem had not accrued because a 25-year period of redemption had been fixed, so Art. 134 should not start the limitation running in any event.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Reliance on precedents (notably Kannusami Thanjirayan v. Muthuswami Pillai) for the proposition that an auction purchaser of mortgage rights steps into the shoes of the mortgagee and a subsequent private transfer by such purchaser can attract Art. 134.
  • Even if Art. 134 is inapplicable, the suit is barred by Art. 144 because (as found by the courts below) the properties were sold as absolute interests and the mortgagor was dispossessed; the purchasers and their successors enjoyed the properties as full owners and this dispossession was adverse to the mortgagor.
  • Consequently, Art. 148 should not apply.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ahmed Kutti v. Raman Nambudri Held that a purchaser at a Court auction of property in which the judgment debtor's interest was only that of a mortgagee could not be regarded as a purchaser from the mortgagee for the purposes of Art. 134; Art. 134 intended for voluntary disposals by mortgagee. The Court treated this Full Bench decision as authoritative: sales in execution (court auctions) do not constitute "transfer by the mortgagee" under Art. 134, so Art. 134 does not apply to involuntary sales in execution.
Mahant Sudarsan Das v. Mahant Rama Kirpal Das Privy Council acceptance of the principle in Ahmed Kutti (i.e., that auction purchasers under execution are not purchasers from the mortgagee for Art. 134). The Court noted the Privy Council accepted the Ahmed Kutti principle, reinforcing the conclusion that court-sales are outside Art. 134.
Kannusami Thanjirayan v. Muthuswami Pillai Ruled that where auction purchasers acquired only the mortgage rights, the purchaser steps into the shoes of the mortgagee and a subsequent transfer by them could attract Art. 134. The Court reviewed this decision but distinguished it: in the present case auction purchasers acquired full ownership (not merely mortgage rights), so Kannusami Thanjirayan was not controlling here.
Chasi Ram (Ghasiram) v. Krishna Single-judge ruling cited for the proposition that auction purchaser of a mortgagee's rights steps into mortgagee's shoes (supports Chamier J.'s view). The Court noted its citation in other decisions but observed that such single-judge rulings do not displace the Ahmed Kutti Full Bench principle and in any event are distinguishable on the facts here.
Sesha Naidu v. Periasami Odayar Referred to in discussion concerning Kannusami Thanjirayan; cited in relation to subsequent reliance on that case. The Court observed that Kannusami Thanjirayan was not referred to with approval in Sesha Naidu for the proposition now advanced by respondents; therefore Sesha Naidu does not bolster the respondents' position here.
Mathaya Shetti v. Kamhappa Shetti Referenced regarding points of good faith and limited relation to the present question. The Court stated this case was not pertinent to the central point now before it.
Abdul Aziz v. Munnilal (Allahabad single judge) Followed Ghasiram v. Krishna in holding auction purchaser may be treated as stepping into mortgagee's shoes. The Court remarked on this decision but did not treat it as displacing the Full Bench authority in Ahmed Kutti for the facts of the present case.
Ram Piari v. Budh Sen / Ram Piari v. Budh Ram Held Art. 134 excluded where vendors from a Court auction purchaser had not purchased from the mortgagee (i.e., they acquired rights by involuntary sale). The Court cited this as an illustration of the principle that involuntary sales/execution sales do not attract Art. 134 and as supportive of applying Art. 144 in some circumstances.
Hanawar Ali v. Jagilan Ram Followed the position that auction purchasers acquiring by execution sale do not bring Art. 134 into play. Noted by the Court as one of the Allahabad decisions that lend support to the appellant's contention (though the Court did not resolve the general correctness of Kannusami Thanjirayan).
Peria Aiyar Ambalam v. Shunmugasundaram Held dispossession of a mortgagee in possession becomes adverse to the mortgagor from the date the mortgagor has knowledge of hostile acts; adverse possession requires unequivocal ouster. The Court relied on this authority for the proposition that Art. 144 is engaged only when adverse possession is to the mortgagor's knowledge and the ouster is unequivocal.
Purmananddas Jiwandas v. Jamna Bai Referenced as an example where dispossession affected only the mortgagee's rights and thus was not adverse to the mortgagor. The Court cited this to illustrate that not every dispossession of a mortgagee will operate against the mortgagor; the character and knowledge of the mortgagor matters.
Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din Used in conjunction with Ahmed Kutti to support the view that court-sale purchasers do not attract Art. 134. Cited by the Court as part of a line of authority endorsing the non-applicability of Art. 134 to involuntary sales in execution.
Muthu v. Jambulinga Cited in discussion (as an example of reasoning questioned in Ahmed Kutti) about the character of court sales and whether they amount to exercise of mortgagee's power of sale. The Court cited the Full Bench's critique of reasoning in Muthu v. Jambulinga to support the Ahmed Kutti view that execution sales are not equivalent to voluntary transfers by a mortgagee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence addressing each Limitation Act provision pleaded or in issue:

  1. Interpretation of Art. 134 and temporal scope:
    • The Court set out Art. 134 as it stood prior to the 1929 Amendment (relevant because the disputed transactions predate 1929) and observed that Art. 134 prescribes 12 years for recovering possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for valuable consideration, starting from the date when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff (subsequent amendment notwithstanding).
    • From the Article's language, Art. 134 applies where a mortgagee disposes voluntarily of property or an interest larger than he holds.
  2. Court-sales in execution (1902 and 1904):
    • The Court relied on the Full Bench in Ahmed Kutti v. Raman Nambudri to hold that a purchaser at a court auction in execution could not be treated as a purchaser from the mortgagee for the purposes of Art. 134 — the Full Bench explained Art. 134 was intended for voluntary disposals by mortgagees and not involuntary court-sales.
    • The Privy Council's acceptance of that principle in Mahant Sudarsan Das was noted, reinforcing that sales in execution do not constitute "transfer by the mortgagee" under Art. 134.
    • Conclusion: the sales in execution (1902 and 1904) do not themselves attract Art. 134.
  3. Private sale in 1913 by the auction purchasers (Ex. P.4) — whether this transfer falls under Art. 134:
    • The pivotal question was whether the auction purchasers could be regarded as "mortgagees" within Art. 134 such that their subsequent private sale in 1913 would start the 12-year period under Art. 134.
    • Respondents relied on Kannusami Thanjirayan which held that where auction purchasers acquired only mortgage rights, they stepped into the shoes of the mortgagee and a subsequent transfer by them could attract Art. 134. The Court acknowledged that ruling but examined its applicability.
    • The Court distinguished Kannusami Thanjirayan on the facts: in that case the auction purchasers had acquired only mortgage rights. In the present case the documentary evidence and concurrent findings below established that auction purchasers acquired absolute title (full ownership), not merely mortgage rights.
    • On this factual distinction the Court concluded the expression "mortgagee" in Art. 134 cannot include a person who has acquired the full interest in the property rather than a limited mortgage right. Therefore the auction purchasers here were not mortgagees within Art. 134 and their 1913 transfer does not bring Art. 134 into play.
  4. Consideration of Art. 144 (residuary 12-year period) and adverse possession:
    • The Court turned to Art. 144, the residuary Article providing 12 years for suits for possession of immovable property or any interest therein not otherwise provided for, the period running from the time when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
    • The Court accepted the respondents' contention that where mortgaged properties are sold as absolute properties and the mortgagee is dispossessed and the vendee enjoys the properties as full owners, such dispossession may be adverse to the mortgagor — but only if the mortgagor had knowledge of the hostile acts or adverse possession.
    • The Court relied on Peria Aiyar Ambalam v. Shunmugasundaram for the proposition that dispossession becomes adverse as against the mortgagor from the date of the mortgagor's knowledge of unequivocal ouster; absent such knowledge, time will not run under Art. 144.
    • Therefore, the applicability of Art. 144 here depends on whether the mortgagor (or the plaintiff as successor-in-interest) had knowledge of the sales and adverse possession by purchasers and their successors.
  5. Findings of lower courts and evidentiary posture:
    • The trial Court found against the plaintiff on limitation (Art. 134) and also found (negatively) on adverse possession: the defence had conceded they could succeed on adverse possession only by proving possession was adverse to both mortgagee and mortgagor to the mortgagor's knowledge, and no attempt was made to show this.
    • The Subordinate Judge affirmed the trial Court's conclusions but made contradictory observations: on the one hand noting no attempt was made to prove adverse possession to the mortgagor's knowledge; on the other hand expressing disbelief that the plaintiff (being the mortgagor's nephew) could be ignorant of the transfers and possession and stating the plaintiff must be deemed to have known the relevant documents and transfers.
    • Because of these contradictory statements, the Bench required clarification — specifically a clear finding from the Subordinate Judge on whether the plaintiff was aware of the adverse possession of the defendants and their predecessors-in-interest.
  6. Practical consequence in the Court's reasoning:
    • If the Subordinate Judge finds the mortgagor (or plaintiff's predecessors) had knowledge of the sales and adverse possession, Art. 144 would bar the suit; if Art. 144 applies and the suit is barred thereby, Art. 148 would not be available.
    • The Court did not finally resolve whether Art. 148 applies; instead it focused on resolving the factual predicate (knowledge/adverse possession) necessary to decide whether Art. 144 applies and thereby exclude Art. 148.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core procedural direction): The Court declined to finally dispose of the appeal on limitation grounds and directed the Subordinate Judge to make a clear finding on whether the plaintiff (or his predecessors-in-interest) had knowledge of the adverse possession and the transfers (Court sales and subsequent private sale under Ex. P.4).

Specific directive given by the Court:

  • The Subordinate Judge is directed to submit a clear finding on whether the plaintiff was aware of the adverse possession of the defendants and their predecessors-in-interest within six weeks from receipt of the records in his Court.
  • Two weeks thereafter are allowed for objections, if any.

Implications (consequences articulated in the opinion):

  • The Court held that the sales in execution (1902 and 1904) were not "transfers by the mortgagee" under Art. 134 (relying on Ahmed Kutti and related authorities), and that the auction purchasers in this case acquired full ownership; therefore Art. 134 is not applicable on the present facts because the auction purchasers were not mortgagees within the meaning of Art. 134.
  • Should the Subordinate Judge find that the mortgagor/plaintiff had knowledge of the sales and adverse possession, Art. 144 would operate to bar the suit; in that eventuality Art. 148 would not be available to the plaintiff.
  • The Court did not set a new rule of law beyond applying existing authorities and distinguishing prior cases on their facts; it remitted the factual question of knowledge to the Subordinate Judge rather than pronouncing a final limitation-based disposal on the record before it.

Note: This summary is strictly limited to the material and findings contained in the provided opinion. No facts, rulings, or implications have been added beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion.

    Natesa Thevar v. Narayanaswami Padayachi And Others.

    (Delivered by Chandra Reddi, J.)

    This second appeal which was referred to a Bench by Satyanarayana Rao J. raises a question under the Limitation Act. The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and are not in dispute, the only controversy being whether it is Art. 134 or 144 or 148 of the Limitation Act that applies to this case. In order to appreciate the point involved in the second appeal, it is necessary to refer to the facts briefly giving rise to this litigation. The suit properties were mortgaged by one Sivanandi Thevar usufructuarily to one Kamakshia Pillai for Rs. 225 on 14-2-1891 the period fixed for redemption being 25 years. The mortgagee executed a simple mortgage of, his othi right over the suit properties to Periasami Odayar on 5-4-1898 according to the plaintiff, while it is the defendants' case that it was a mortgage of the properties themselves. Kamakshia Pillai executed another simple mortgage over the same properties to one Chidambara Aiyar for Rs. 290. Periasami Odayar filed a suit on his mortgage, obtained a decree and in execution of the decree brought the properties to sale which were purchased by one Venkatarama Aiyar at the auction. Chidambara Aiyar also laid an action on his mortgage and in execution of the decree purchased the properties himself. The auction purchasers obtained the sale certificates under Exs. D.1 and D.2 and got into possession of the properties. They continued to be in possession and enjoyment thereof till they sold them to the predecessors-in-interest of defendants under Ex. P. 4 dated 24-9-1913. The plaintiff who purchased the equity of redemption under two sale deeds Exs. P. 5 and P. 6 in 1936 and 1943 has filed the present suit for redemption of the mortgage of 1691 and for possession of the suit properties in the District Munsif's Court of Mayavaram.

    One of the defences to the suit was that as the entire interest in the suit properties was sold in Court auctions of 1902 and 1904 and the mortgagee was dispossessed shortly thereafter by the auction purchasers who continued to be in possession as absolute owners ever since, till the latter sold them to the predecessors-in-interest of defendants with absolute rights, any right which the original mortgagee had in those properties was lost by limitation and adverse possession. Another plea was that even if the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the mortgage the defendants should be paid compensation for the buildings erected by them on the suit properties.

    The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the suit was barred by Art. 134 of the Limitation Act as it was filed beyond 12 years from the date of the sale to the predecessors-in-interest of defendants on 24-9-1913. Another finding given by it was that in case the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the mortgage, he was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000 by way of compensation.

    On appeal, the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram confirmed that judgment agreeing with all the conclusions of the trial Court. The plaintiff who was dissatisfied with the decisions of the Courts below has preferred the second appeal.

    In this second appeal the correctness of the findings of the Courts below is assailed. It is urged by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar in support of the appeal that Art. 134 is not applicable to this case but it is Art. 148 that governs it. According to him the reasons for the non-applicability of Art. 134 are threefold. What was purchased at the Court auction in 1902 and 1904 was only the mortgage rights and similarly what was sold by the auction purchasers in 1913 to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants was only that right and therefore the provisions of Art. 134 are not attracted by this case. Secondly, the transfer under Ex. P.4 in 1913 was not made by the mortgagee within the meaning of Art. 134; thirdly, a transfer by a sub-mortgagee does not come under Art. 134 and lastly, on the date on which the transfer was effected in 1913 the right of action had not accrued to the mortgagor to sue for redemption in view of fixing a period of redemption.

    Before we examine the soundness of these contentions, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. Art. 134 prescribes a period of 12 years for recovering possession of imovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged, and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration from the date when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff. The third column “when the transfer is known to the plaintiff” was substituted by the Amending Act of 1929 for the words “the date of the transfer.” As the transactions in question were effected prior to the Amendment of this Article, we are concerned only with the Article as it stood prior to 1929. Art. 148 is in the following words:

    “Against a mortgage to redeem or to recover possession of immoveable property mortgaged. 60 years When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.”

    It is not nessary for the purpose of this enquiry to refer to the proviso.

    In view of the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents we will set out the provisions of Art. 144 also. Art. 144 is a residuary Article laying down a period of 12 years for a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein not otherwise specially provided for in the Act, the period of limitation starting from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

    We will first deal with the applicability of Art. 134. From the provisions of that Article it is clear that it applies to a conveyance by a mortgagee of an interest larger than he himself has in the property. This has not been disputed but how the learned Counsel for the appellant sought to get over this was by arguing that what was purchased in the Court auctions in 1902 and 1904 and what was sold by them in 1913 was only the right of the mortgagee and not the full ownership in the property. It looks to us that this is a futile attempt having regard to the terms of the various documents which fully support the concurrent finding of the Courts below that under the Court sales absolute title to the properties passed to the auction purchasers and they in their turn transferred the full ownership in the properties to their vendees in 1913. It follows that Art. 134 will govern the case if the other requirements of that Article are satisfied.

    The next point for consideration therefore is whether there was a transfer by the mortgagee within the meaning of Art. 134. We will have first to decide whether the sales of the properties in execution of the decrees on the mortgages obtained by Periaswami Odayar and Chidambara Aiyar in 1902 and 1904 amount to a transfer by a mortgagee so as to attract the provisions of Art. 134. An answer to this is to be found in Ahmed Kutti v. Raman Nambudri(1). It was laid down there that a person who purchased the immovable property of the judgment debtor in which the latter's interest was only that of a mortgagee, in Court auction could not get the benenfit of Art. 134 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act as such an auction purchaser could not be regarded as a purchaser from the mortgagee even if the whole interest in the property was sold at the auction. The Full Bench observed:

    “Art. 134 is in our opinion intended solely to apply to oases in which the mortgagee disposes of the property voluntarily. But in the case of the involuntary sale in execution of a decree the purchaser cannot be regarded as a purchaser from the judgment debtor.”

    This ruling of the Full Bench is still good law and its authority has been accepted by the Privy Council in Mahant Sudarsan Das v. Mahant Rama Kirpal Das(2). On these authorities there can be no doubt that so far as Court sales in this case are concerned, they are not transfers within the purview of Art. 134.

    We have next to consider whether the sale of the properties by the auction purchasers by private treaty in 1913 is a transfer within the meaning of Art. 134. If it is a transfer as contemplated by that Article, the period of limitation has to be reckoned from 24-9-1913 and the suit would be beyond time. The answer to this question depends upon whether the auction purchasers are mortgagees within the purview of Art. 134.

    For the proposition that the auction purchasers are mortgagees whose transfer to the predecessors-in-interest has the effect of attracting the provisions of Art. 134 reliance is placed by Mr. Bashyam, learned Counsel for the respondents on Kannusami Thanjirayan v. Muthuswatni Pillai. There one of the questions for consideration was whether Art. 134 applied to a transfer of absolute interest by a person who acquired only the mortgage rights in a Court auction. Spencer and Phillips JJ. before whom the matter came up finally, answered it in the affirmative. The ratio decidendi is contained in the following passage:

    “Against this it is argued that the purchaser of the mortgagee's interests is not himself a mortgagee within the meaning of the Article.

    In a similar case decided by Chamier, J. in Chasi Ram v. Krishna, it was held contra that the auction purchaser of the rights of the mortgagee steps into the shoes of the mortgagee and that the subsequent purchasers by private treaty from the auction purchaser can rely on Art. 134 to defeat a plaintiff seeking to redeem.”

    It should be observed that this is all the discussion on that question in that case. It was contended by Mr. Bhashyam that the correctness of this decision had not been doubted by our Court in any subsequent case, on the other hand it had been followed in two cases in Sesha Naidu v. Periasami Odayar(3) and Mathaya Shetti v. Kamhappa Shetti(4). An examination of the decision in Sesha Naidu v. Periasami Odayar, shows that Kannusami Thanjirayan v. Mulhusanti Pillai, was not referred to with approval by Spencer J. for the position now contended for by the learned Counsel for the respondents. In this context the observations of Spencer J. at p. 952 are apposite:

    “Kannusami Thanjirayan v. Muthuswami Pillai, was an instance of a conflict between Art. 134 and Art. 144. I then observed that it was clear that the plaintiff could not have resort to Art. 144 unless he first showed that Art. 134 was inapplicable, the reason being that Art. 144 is the residuary Article for suits for the possession of immovable property as is indicated by the words not hereby otherwise specially provided for.”

    Muthaya Shetti v. Kanthappa Shetti, has nothing to do with the question before us. Even in this case Kannusami Thanjirayan v. Muthuswami Pillai has been referred to only with reference to the question of good faith. Mr. Bashyam also drew our attention to a ruling of a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Munnilal(5), which followed the ruling of Chamier J. in Ghasiram v. Krishna(6). It may be remarked that there also there is no discussion on the question beyond merely citing Ghasiram v. Krishna.

    Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar the appellant's Counsel argued that Kannuswami Thanjirayan v. Muihtuswami Pillai, was not correctly decided and is opposed to the principle enunciated in Ahmed Kutti v. Raman Nambudiri(7), and some decisions of the Allahabad High Court and requires reconsideration. He also urged that the interpretation placed by the learned Judges on the word “mortgagee” in Art. 134 of the Limitation Act is not borne out by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It was maintained by him that if as decided in Ahmed Kutti v. Raman Nambudiri, a sale of the mortgaged properties in execution of a decree against the mortgagee is not a transfer which means that a purchaser at a Court auction is not a transferee from the mortgagee, such a purchaser cannot be described as a mortgagee within the meaning of that Article. He referred us to the following statement of the Full Bench in the above mentioned case and contended that a Court auction purchaser could not be turned a mortgagee for the purpose of Art. 134.

    “The decision in Muthu v. Jambulinga, proceeds, we think, on the erroneous assumption that the Court in selling the judgment debtors' property in which his interest is that of a mortgagee for the discharge of the debt due by Mm under the decree is exercising the potter of sale which the judgment debtor qua mortgagee possesses. Assuming he has power of sale, the Court may be regarded as exercising that power in a suit which the mortgagee may bring against the mortgagor for the recovery of the mortgage debt. Such power of sale cannot be exercised for the benefit of the mortgagee to enable him to discharge a debt due by him to a third party.”

    According to the learned Counsel these observations lend support to his argument. It has to be noted that it is the creditor of the mortgagee who brings the properties to sale and gets the properties sold through the intervention of the Court and this circumstance, so argues the learned Counsel, shows that the buyer of the properties at the Court auction is not a mortgagee. It is further maintained by him that a mortgage can be created only by contractual relations between the parties and not by operation of law and as substantiating this argument he invited our attention to S. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act which lays down as follows;

    “In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future to one or more other living persons or to himself, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and ‘to transfer property’ is to perform such act.”

    In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals. It is unnecessary to state that transfer of property includes a mortgage. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that it is manifest from the section that there can be no transfer of property within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act by involuntary sales such as sales in execution of a decree and a mortgage being a transfer of property it cannot be created by an executing Court bringing the properties to sale in execution against the mortgagee.

    There seems to be considerable force in the contention of Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar and this is supported by some of the decisions of the Allahabad High Court.

    In Ram Piari v. Budh Sen, it was laid down that Art. 134 was excluded by the fact that the vendors from the Court auction purchaser had not purchased from the mortgagee but that they had acquired rights by virtue of an involuntary sale. In support of this conclusion the learned Judges relied on Ahmed Kutti v. Raman Nambudiri and Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din which took the same view as in Ahmed Kutti v. Raman Nambudiri and another case. This ruling was followed by a single Judge of that Court in Hanawar Ali v. Jagilan Ram. However it is not necessary for us to consider whether Kannuswami Thanjirayan v. Muthuswami Pillai is correctly decided or not having regard to the fact that the present case is distinguishable from the (acts of that case. It has to be observed that in Kannuswami Thanjirayan v. Muthuswami Pillai what was acquired by the auction purchasers was only the mortgage rights and not the absolute title to the properties mortgaged. Whatever justification there might be for characterising the auction purchaser in such a case as one stepping into the shoes of the mortgagee, none exists in a case, as in the present one where the auction purchasers acquired full ownership in the suit properties and not a limited mortgage right and therefore could not be called mortgagees within the meaning of Art. 134. They never occupied such a position with reference to the suit properties, they having purported to have purchased not the limited mortgage interest but the whole interest in the property. The expression mortgagee cannot include a person who has acquired full interest in the property and not the limited mortgage right. This, in our opinion, is sufficient to dispose of that question.

    In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider the soundness of the contention that Art. 134 is not applicable to the case as at the time of the sale in 1913, cause of action had not accrued to the mortgagor to institute a suit for redemption and for possession by reason of the fixation of a period of 25 years for redemption, or to refer to the decisions which take the view that a suit for redemption has to be filed within 12 years of the transfer by the mortgagee of the properties in excess of the interest he has therein even if the cause of action had not accrued to the mortgagor or to the cases which take a contrary view.

    But this does not dispose of the appeal. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the respondents that even if Art. 134 is inapplicable, the suit should be held to be barred by limitation under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act and that in no event does Art. 148 apply to this case. His argument is that in view of the finding that it was not the mere mortgage right, but full ownership in the property that was sold both at the Court auctions in 1902 and 1904 and by the auction purchaser by private treaty in 1913 and there was dispossession of the mortgagee from the suit properties which were enjoyed ever since by their predecessors-in-interest and subsequently by the defendants as full owners the suit should be held to be barred under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act.

    We will have no hesitation in accepting the argument that the sale of both the mortgagee's and the mortgagor's interest in execution of the decree against the mortgagee and the dispossession of the mortgagee from the mortgaged properties will be adverse to the mortgagor also provided it is proved that the mortgagor had knowledge of the hostile acts or of the adverse possession. There is abundant authority for the proposition that Art. 144 is applicable to cases where the mortgaged properties are sold as absolute properties of the mortgagee without any limitation on the interests thus sold and subsequently the vendee enjoys the properties in his own right and to the knowledge of the mortgagor. It is not necessary to refer to the various cases cited in this regard. Ram Piari v. Budh Ram, which has already been referred to itself illustrates this principle.

    But before Art. 144 is applied it should be established that to the knowledge of the mortgagor the possession of the purchasers was adverse to the former. It was laid down in Peria Aiyar Ambalam v. Shunmugasundaram, that when a transferee dispossesses a mortgagee in possession and continues in possession of the property setting up a title adverse not only to the mortgagee but also to the mortgagor such a dispossession will become adverse to the mortgagor from the date of the latter's knowledge of such hostile acts. At page 913 of the report it is remarked by Sankaran Nair, J. who delivered the judgment of Full Bench thus:

    “If the mortgagee in possession is dispossessed on grounds affecting only his right, as for instance, his right as heir to represent the original mortgagee, or his right as in Purmananddas Jiwandas v. Jamna Bai, to possession in spite of a third party's lien on the property then the dispossession of the mortgagee obviously does not imperil or call in question any right of the mortgagor and the mortgagor is not concerned or entitled to insist on being immediately restored to posession; and the possession taken is not adverse to him and cannot cause time to run against him. To give the mortgagor a right to insist on immediate possession, there must be an unequivocal ouster preventing the possession of the mortgagor from continuing altogether by leaving no room for doubt that the person taking possession does not profess to represent the mortgagor but to hold in spite of him. In such a case, the mortgagor is as effectually and unmistakably displaced as if there had been no mortgage at all. When an ouster takes place in that manner the mortgagor knows that no one is in possession who can represent or continue his possession or who is entitled preferentially to possession and, therefore, he becomes entitled and it is necessary and his duty, if he does not want his right to be barred to claim possession immediately.”

    On these authorities it is clear that if the mortgagor had knowledge of the fact that the properties as such were sold in the Court auctions and subsequently by the Court auction purchasers to the predecesors-in-interest of the defendants the plaintiff's suit for redemption will be barred. If the suit is barred under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, there will be no scope for the applicability of Art. 148 of the Limitation Act.

    In these circumstances we have to consider whether either the plaintiff or his predecessors-in-interest the mortgagor had knowledge of these facts. Dealing with the question of adverse possession, the trial Court stated as follows:

    “It is conceded by Mr. Rajaram Aiyar for the defendants that he could not in any sense urge adverse possession in his clients with any effect. He conceded that he could succeed on this point only if he could show that the possession of Chidambara Aiyar and Venkatarama Aiyar was adverse both to the mortgagee and the mortgagors to the knowledge of the mortgagors. There was ho attempt to show any such thing. My finding on this issue is in the negative.”

    Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar calls in aid this finding in support of his contention that the suit is not barred under Art. 144 and invites us to hold that he is still in time having regard to the provisions of Art. 148. He also relies on the following statement of the lower appellate Court:

    “There is no question of adverse possession here since even in the trial Court the learned pleader for the defendants conceded that he could succeed on that point only if he could show that the possession of Chidambara Aiyar and Venkatarama Aiyar was adverse both to the mortgagee and to the mortgagors to the knowledge of the mortgagors and that there was no attempt to show any such thing.”

    But unfortunately further down the learned Subordinate Judge states something which is contradictory. In the same paragraph the Subordinate Judge remarks that he could not believe that the plaintiff who is no other than the brother's son of Sivanandi Thevar the mortgagor under Ex. P. 2 did not know about the transfer or the persons who had been in possession of the properties ever since the year 1891 and that he would not believe that the plaintiff had been ignorant of what was being done in respect of the properties which his uncle Sivanandi had mortgaged to Kamakshia Pillai in the year 1891. He further remarked:

    “Surely in the circumstances of this case he must be deemed to have known not only the simple mortgages executed by Kamakshia Pillai, Exs. P. 2 and P. 3, but also the subsequent Court auction sales Exs. D.1 and D 2 and the private sales under Exs. D.3, D.4, D.5 and D.6 Now he feigns ignorance of all these things and having obtained two sale deeds from the heirs of Sivanandi Thevar, tries a chance of obtaining the properties which are now said to be vary valuable on the doubtful non-applicability of Art. 134 to the facts of this case.”

    Having regard to the contradictory statements made by the learned Subordinate Judge, we are obliged to call for a clear finding from him as to whether the plaintiff was aware of the adverse possession of the defendants and their predecessors-in-interest. The Subordinate Judge is accordingly directed to submit a finding on that question within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the records in his Court. Two weeks thereafter for objections if any.

    V.C.S

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Natesa Thevar v. Narayanaswami Padayachi And Others.
    (Feb 28, 1952)