M. Kali Mudaliar v. A. Vedachala Mudaliar And Others., Madras High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Equivalent Citations

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Case Number

L.P.A No. 86 of 1951.

Advocates

The Advocate General and Mr. K. Bhathyam for Appt.
Messrs. S. Rangaewamy Ayyangar and N. Subramania Ayyar for Respt.

Judges

Rajamannar, C.J
Venkatarama Aiyar, J.

Acts

provisions of S. 72;(e) that the provisions of this Act
S, 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
provisions of Sub-rule (b).(b)
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns timing adjustments for stage carriage services and the availability of appellate or revision remedies under the Motor Vehicles Act. The first respondent held two stage carriage permits for the Vanangupet–Madras route with starting time 7:00 a.m. The appellant held a permit for the Vanangupet–Madhuranthakam route with an original start time of 8:05 a.m. The Regional Transport Authority (RTA) changed the appellant's bus timing to 6:40 a.m. by order dated 21 July 1950.

The first respondent appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board (CRTB), which restored the original timing. The appellant then sought revision from the Government under S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government set aside the CRTB order and restored the RTA order. A writ of certiorari to this Court earlier quashed the Government's order on the ground that the Government did not disclose reasons under S. 64-A. After that, the appellant again applied to the Government, which again set aside the CRTB order and restored the RTA order.

The first respondent filed another application before Subba Rao J. The learned judge overruled a preliminary objection that the application for certiorari was not maintainable because the orders were administrative in nature. Subba Rao J. then set aside the Government's order on the ground that the Government's order was a mechanical repetition of S. 64-A and did not state reasons; accordingly he quashed the Government order.

The matter came before the Court (delivered by the Chief Justice) on appeal from Subba Rao J.'s order quashing the Government's action. The Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the CRTB's order was void for want of jurisdiction (because an appeal against a change of timings by the RTA was not maintainable under S. 64), and thereby set aside the learned Judge's order; the writ petition (W.P. No. 171 of 1951) was dismissed. The Court ordered no costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a change in the timing of a stage carriage fixed by the Regional Transport Authority constitutes a "variation of the conditions" of a stage carriage permit so as to make an appeal lie to the Central Road Traffic Board under S. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Whether the first respondent could be regarded as a person "aggrieved" within Clauses (b) or (f) of S. 64 (i.e., whether he had a right of appeal against the timing change imposed in respect of the appellant's permit).
Whether the Government's order passed under S. 64-A required a statement of reasons such that absence of reasons would render the order liable to be quashed (the question raised and acted upon by Subba Rao J.).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar)

Contended that an appeal from the RTA's order changing the timing of the appellant's bus did not lie to the Central Road Traffic Board, so the CRTB had no jurisdiction to set aside the RTA order.
Argued that change of timing cannot be treated as a variation of any of the conditions of a stage carriage permit; therefore Clauses (b) and (f) of S. 64 do not apply.
Maintained that because no appeal lay to the CRTB, the CRTB's purported order setting aside the RTA order was void and the RTA order remained final and lawful; accordingly the Government's act in restoring the RTA order merely maintained a lawful state of affairs.

First Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar)

Suggested that the first respondent might fall within Clause (f) of S. 64, which contemplates a local or police authority or an association or a person providing transport facilities who having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant or by any condition attached thereto.
Contended that particulars required by S. 46, when incorporated in the permit, become conditions of the permit; implicitly, this supports the view that timing fixed when the permit is granted could be a condition and therefore a variation of such timing could attract S. 64.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by close statutory construction of the Motor Vehicles Act provisions and relevant rules quoted in the opinion. The Court identified the materially relevant statutory provisions as Ss. 46, 47, 48, 48-A and 59 and Rules 269, 270 and 208 made under the Act. The reasoning can be summarized stepwise as follows:

Interpretation of S. 46 and particulars: The Court rejected the argument that particulars required in an application under S. 46 (for example, type of vehicle) become conditions of the permit merely by inclusion. S. 46 regulates the application stage and does not in itself define the conditions that may be attached to a permit.
Nature of powers under S. 48: The Court analyzed S. 48 and observed that the powers conferred on the Regional Transport Authority are of different natures but collectively are intended to be exercised in the public interest to provide adequate transport facilities. Among those powers is an express power to "regulate timings of arrival or departure of stage carriages" (S. 48(c)). The Court held that this regulatory power is distinct from the grant of an individual permit and is comprehensive and public‑oriented.
Distinction between "timing" and "conditions of a permit": The Court concluded that the time fixed by the RTA at grant is not one of the conditions attached to a stage carriage permit for the purposes of provisions like S. 59(3) or S. 48(d). The only condition relating to timing that the Court acknowledged is the requirement in S. 48(d)(iii) (quoted in the opinion) that timetable and fare table copies be exhibited on stage carriages and followed; that is a distinct, limited form of condition enforceable under cancellation provisions (S. 60).
Effect of Rules 269 and 270 and Rule 208: The Court noted that rules permit the Transport Authority to prescribe schedules of timings (Rule 269) and require stage carriages to run according to such schedules (Rule 270), except in certain situations. Rule 208 allows variation of permits but prescribes that certain variations that materially change authorized transport facilities be treated procedurally like an original permit application. The Court held that these rules do not convert routine regulation of timings by the RTA into a variation of a permit condition attracting appeal rights under S. 64.
Consequence for S. 48-A and S. 64: Because there was no variation, cancellation or addition to any condition attached to a stage carriage permit—as those terms are used in S. 48-A and S. 59(3)—the Court held S. 48-A and S. 64 are inapplicable to the timing change. Thus an appeal to the CRTB against the RTA's change of timing was not maintainable.
Jurisdictional result and effect on prior orders: The Court concluded that the CRTB's order purporting to set aside the RTA order was void for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Government's action in setting aside the CRTB order and restoring the RTA order merely preserved the lawful RTA order. Given this, the Court found no reason to quash the Government's order and therefore allowed the appeal against Subba Rao J.'s quashing order.
Secondary holding on Clause (b): The Court additionally held—for completeness and as an alternative view—that even if timing were a condition, Clause (b) of S. 64 (relating to "any person aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof") should be read as confined to persons aggrieved in respect of permits granted to them. Thus Clause (b) does not confer a right on one person to appeal against the variation of a condition of a permit granted to another person.
On the point relied on by Subba Rao J. (absence of reasons in the Government's S. 64-A order): the Court did not rest the decision on that ground. The Court allowed the appeal on the jurisdictional issue (non-maintainability of the CRTB appeal) and therefore did not need to decide or rely upon the learned Judge's reasoning that the Government's order was a mechanical repetition of S. 64-A without reasons.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The Court set aside the order of Subba Rao J. quashing the Government's order, and dismissed the writ petition (W.P. No. 171 of 1951). The Court held that the Central Road Traffic Board's order setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's timing order was void for want of jurisdiction because an appeal against the RTA's change of timings was not maintainable under S. 64. The Government's restoration of the RTA order therefore maintained a lawful order.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The Regional Transport Authority's order changing the appellant's bus timing stands; the CRTB's purported setting aside of that order is void; the Government's action restoring the RTA order is sustained by this Court's decision. The application to quash the Government's order (W.P. No. 171 of 1951) is dismissed.
Procedural and legal reach: The decision turns on statutory interpretation of what constitutes a "condition" of a permit and the limits of appealability under S. 64. The Court emphasized the distinction between the RTA's broad regulatory power to fix or regulate timings (exercised in the public interest) and the specific statutory concept of conditions attached to a permit that attract rights of appeal or revision.
No costs were awarded: The Court ordered that there shall be no order as to costs.
Broader precedent: The opinion's reasoning is confined to statutory interpretation and its direct application to the facts; the Court decided the appeal on the jurisdictional point rather than on the absence of reasons in the Government's order. The opinion does not purport to announce broader principles beyond the statutory constructions applied to the provisions and rules expressly cited.

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M. Kali Mudaliar v. A. Vedachala Mudaliar And Others.

(Delivered by the Chief Justice).

This is an appeal against the judgment and order of Subba Rao J. quashing an order of the Government dated 5th July 1951 passed under S, 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The first respondent before us was granted two stage carriage permits for the route from Vanangupet to Madras. The time fixed for starting the two buses, the one from Madras and the other from Vanangupet was 7 am The appellant before us was granted a permit for the route between Vanangupet and Madhuranthakam. The time fixed for starting of his bus was 8-5 am The Regional Transport Authority on an application by the appellant changed the timings for his bus to 6-40 am instead of 8-5 am by his order dated 21st July 1950. Against this order the first respondent herein preferred an appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board which restored the original timings. Thereupon the appellant preferred a revision to the Government under S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. There was an application to this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Government and this Court allowed that application and quashed the order on the ground that the order on the face of it did not disclose why the Government passed the order under S. 64-A. The appellant again moved the Government subsequent to the order of this Court and the Government once again set aside the Central Road Traffic Board's order and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The first respondent again filed another application which came on before Subba Rao J. The learned Judge first heard and overruled a preliminary objection raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the application for a Writ of Certiorari based on the ground that the order of the Regional Transport Authority in fixing the timings was an administrative act and therefore the order of the Central Road Traffic Board made on appeal and the order of the Government passed under S. 64-A in revision were also administrative orders not liable to be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari. The learned Judge then held that viewed as a judicial order, the order of the Government must be set aside because the Government had not assigned any reasons for their conclusion. His conclusion is stated thus:

“In the present case the latest order of the Government is only a mechanical repetition of the words in S. 64-A of the Act. It is not a judicial determination of the conditions laid down in S. 64-A which entitle them to interfere with the order of the subordinate authorities. I have therefore no alternative but to quash the order of the Government.”

In our opinion the appeal must be allowed, but on a ground which apparently did not loom large before the learned Judge, though it cannot be said that the point was not taken at all. It was contended by Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar for the Appellant that an appeal from the order of the Regional Transport Authority changing the timings of his bus did not lie to the Central Road Traffic Board and therefore the Government by restoring the order of the Regional Transport Authority was in effect doing a proper thing, because the order of the Regional Transport Authority had become final. The only provision in the Motor Vehicles Act which confers a right of appeal in certain specified cases is S. 64. The question is whether the first respondent herein could be deemed to fall under any of the Cls. (a) to (g) of that section. The learned Judge (Subba Rao J.) was apparently inclined to take the view that he would fall within Cl. (b) namely any person “aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof.” Before us Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar for the first respondent suggested as an alternative Cl. (f) which runs thus:

“Any person being a local authority or polios authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto.”

We have considerable doubt as to the correctness of the learned Judge's conclusion so far as Cl. (b) is concerned. But it is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter, because we agree with Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar that the change of the timing of the petitioner's bus cannot be held to be variation of any of the conditions of the permit. If it is not, then neither Cl. (b) nor Cl. (f) will apply.

The material provisions of the Act which have any bearing on the question which falls for decision are Ss. 46, 47, 48, 48-A and 59. S. 46 deals with an application for a stage carriage permit. It provides that such an application shall contain certain particulars. Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar contended that all these particulars when incorporated in the permit would become conditions of the permit. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention. One of the particulars which has to be mentioned in the application is the type of the vehicle in respect of which the application is made. Surely it cannot be contended that the mention of the particular type in the permit would amount to imposing a condition in respect of the permit. S. 46 deals with the stage of an application by the owner of the vehicle and does not purport to deal with the conditions which may be imposed by the authority granting the permit. S. 47 prescribes the procedure which the Regional Transport Authority has to follow in considering applications for stage carriage permits. He is enjoined to have regard to certain matters and to take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route may lie or by any association interested in the provision of road transport] facilities. Under S. 47(2) the Regional Transport Authority is bound to refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears from any time table furnished that the provisions of the Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened. S. 48 confers certain powers on the Regional Transport Authority. These powers are not all of the same nature and do not belong to the same category. The only common thing is that these powers are to be exercised in the interests of the public and to provide adequate transport facilities to the public. The powers conferred are: (a) the power to limit the number of stage carriages in any particular region or in any specified area or on any specified route; (b) the power to issue a stage carriage permit in respect of a particular stage carriage or a particular service of stage carriages, (c) the power to regulate timings of arrival or departure of stage carriages whether they belong to a single or more owners; (d) power to attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one or more of the conditions enumerated in Sub-Cls. (i) to (vi) of Cl. (d). The relevant Sub-clause is Sub-Cl. (iii) which runs as follows:

“That copies of the fare table and the time table shall be exhibited on the stage carriage and that the fare table and time table so exhibited shall be observed.”

Under S. 48-A the Provincial Authority is entitled to vary, cancel or add to any conditions attached to a stage carriage permit in pursuance of Cl. (d) of S. 48. S. 59(3) prescribes the conditions to which every permit is subject. They are,

“(a) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are at all times so maintained as to comply with the requirements of Chap V and the rules made thereunder;

(b) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are not driven at a speed exceeding the speed lawful under this Act;

(c) that any prohibition or restriction imposed and any maximum or minimum fares or freights fixed by notification made under S. 43 are observed in connection with any vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates;

(d) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are not driven in contravention of the provisions of S. 72;

(e) that the provisions of this Act limiting the hours of work of drivers are observed in connection with any vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates and

(f) that the provisions of Chap. VIII so far as they apply to the holder of the permit are observed.”

In exercise of the powers conferred on the Government rules have been framed under the Act. Rule 269 relates to the change of timings. It runs thus:

“The transport, from time to time may (i) by a general order prescribe a schedule of timings for stage carriages running on specified routes; or

(ii) by a special order, prescribe a schedule of timings for each stage carriage.”

Rule 270 provides that when a schedule of timings has been prescribed under R. 269, every stage carriage on such a route shall run in accordance with it, except when prevented by accident or other unavoidable cause or when otherwise authorised in writing by the authority granting the permit. R. 208 is in these terms:

“(a) Upon application made in writing by the holder of any permit, the Transport Authority may at any time, in its discretion, vary the permit or any of the conditions thereof subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (b).

(b) If the application is for the variation of the permit by the inclusion of an additional vehicle or vehicles or if the grant of variation would authorise transport facilities materially different from those authorised by the original permit the Transport Authority shall deal with the application as if it were an application for a permit.”

In our opinion, the time fixed by the Regional Transport Authority at the time of the grant of the permit is not one of the conditions of the permit. The Sections above referred to clearly indicate what is meant by a condition attached to a stage carriage permit. S. 59(3) mentions the conditions which should be attached to every permit and S. 48(3) gives power to the Regional Transport Authority to attach to a permit any one or more of the conditions mentioned in Sub-Cl. (i) to (vi) of S. 48(d). There may be also other conditions, but they should be in pari materia with the conditions mentioned above. The Regional Transport Authority is given the power to regulate the timings of arrival and departure of stage carriages whether they belong to a single owner or several owners. This power to regulate has nothing to do with the grant of the permit to individual owners. It is a comprehensive power conferred on the authority to be exercised in the interests of the general public. The only condition in this matter would be a condition that the timing as fixed from time to time should be exhibited on the stage carriage and the timing so exhibited should be observed. For a breach of any of these conditions, a permit may be cancelled, under S. 60 of the Act. We think therefore S. 48-A has no application to this case, because there has been no variation, cancellation or addition to any condition attached to a stage carriage permit. It follows that S. 64 has equally no application. It is only if there is any variation of a condition that Cl. (b) of that section would apply. Cl. (f) also has no application. It cannot be said that the first respondent is a person who had opposed the grant of a permit. It is true that S. 208 provides that if there is an application for the variation of the permit which would authorise transport facilities materially different from those attached to the original permit, the procedure to be followed is the same as that prescribed for considering applications for permit; but we do think that because this procedure applies, the person opposing an application for variation could be deemed to be a person opposing the grant of a permit within S. 64(f). We must therefore hold that an appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority changing the timings to the Central Road Traffic Board was not maintainable. The order of the Central Road Traffic Board purporting to set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority on appeal is therefore void. The result is that the original order of the Regional Transport Authority stands unaffected. This is exactly the result of the order of the Government setting aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board and restoring the order of the Regional Transport Authority. In these circumstances, we see no reason why this Court should quash an order of the Government the result of which has been to maintain a lawful order passed by the Regional Transport Authority which could not be interfered with on appeal and which had been improperly set aside by the Central Road Traffic Board.

Even if the timing can be said to be a condition attached to a permit, we do not agree with the learned Judge that the first respondent could be treated as a person aggrieved by the variation of the conditions of the permit within the meaning of Cl. (b) of S. 64. The expression “the permit” in that clause must obviously refer to the permit mentioned in Cl. (a). That permit is a permit granted to any person by the Transport Authority. We think the proper construction of that clause is to confine its application to persons aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permits granted to them or again aggrieved by any variation of the conditions of such permits granted to them. That clause does not confer a right on one person to appeal against an order varying the condition of a permit granted to another person.

In this view it does not become necessary to examine the correctness of the learned Judge's conclusion on the other important question argued before him as to the nature of the order of the Regional Transport Authority in fixing or regulating the timings. On the merits we hold that the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was void, because there was no appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority.

The appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Judge quashing the order of the Government is set aside and the application (W.P No. 171 of 1951) is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

V.C.S

M. Kali Mudaliar v. A. Vedachala Mudaliar And Others.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar)

First Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

M. Kali Mudaliar v. A. Vedachala Mudaliar And Others.

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