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  • Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1945Madras Act II
  • S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act
  • S. 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act
  • Act the definition in S. 3(2)(d)
  • Madras Estates Land Act.
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citation codes
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  • Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1945Madras Act II
  • S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act
  • S. 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act
  • Act the definition in S. 3(2)(d)
  • Madras Estates Land Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Five second appeals arise from five suits tried together and disposed of by a common judgment by the Deputy Collector of Eluru division. The suits were instituted by persons in possession of lands in Eedulakunta Agraharam, Eluru taluk, West Godavari district, under S. 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act, seeking direction to the defendants to execute pattas in their favour in accordance with draft pattas filed with the plaints. The defendants principally contested jurisdiction, asserting that the lands did not form part of an “estate” within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. The Deputy Collector overruled that plea and decreed the suits. The District Judge of West Godavari affirmed the Deputy Collector's conclusion that the lands were situated in an estate. The defendants brought these second appeals against the District Judge’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lands in suit formed part of an "estate" as defined in S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
  2. If the definition in S. 3(2)(d) is engaged, whether the words "inam village" in that clause should be read with the definition of "village" in S. 3(19) (i.e., whether later revenue recognition of an area as a separate village can render a previous partial grant an "estate").
  3. Whether, on construction of the original grant instrument (the sanad, Ex. D.1), the grant was of a whole village or only a part (a hamlet / khandrika), which determines the Revenue Court's jurisdiction under S. 55.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants / Appellants

  • Main contention: the Revenue Court lacked jurisdiction because the lands in question did not form part of an "estate" within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act (S. 3(2)(d)).
  • The District Judge (as adopted by defendants) relied on the view that the grant fell within S. 3(2)(d) because, by the time of institution of the suits, the area had been designated as a separate village in revenue accounts; this position followed an unreported decision of Shahabuddin, J., that “inam village” in S. 3(2)(d) must be read with S. 3(19).

Plaintiffs / Respondents (persons in possession)

  • Claimed entitlement to pattas under S. 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act by virtue of possession and the draft patta filed with the plaints.
  • Mr. Rajah Aiyar (for the plaintiffs-respondents) advanced an argument founded on the presence of the word "haveli" in the original grant, suggesting Mupparru was a “haveli” (government-managed) village and that Edulakuntapalem (the grant) must have had a separate existence as a village belonging to the zamindar; he also relied on the Privy Council decision in Krishnaswami Aiyangar v. Perumal Goundan.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Secretary of State for India v. Srinivasachariar Cited for the principle that when the terms of an original grant are available, other documents are not evidence as to the effect of the grant; the effect depends on the instrument’s language and the circumstances of the grant. The Court relied on this principle to focus on the language of the original sanad (Ex. D.1) rather than relying primarily on subsequent revenue documents.
Sankaranarayana Pillayan v. H.R.E. Board, Madras Same evidentiary principle as above: the terms of the grant govern and other documents are not determinative of the grant's effect. Used to support the approach of construing the original grant's language to determine whether the grant was of a whole village.
Ramamurthi Sastri v. Ammanna (Raghava Rao, J.) Criticised the incorporation of the S. 3(19) definition of "village" into S. 3(2)(d); set out defects in Shahabuddin J.'s construction and held such incorporation would lead to repugnancy. The Court agreed with Raghava Rao J.’s reasoning and relied on it to reject Shahabuddin J.'s approach of importing S.3(19) into S.3(2)(d).
C.M.A. No. 584 of 1944 and C.M.A. No. 373 of 1945 (Patanjali Sastri and Bell JJ.) — reported as a footnote in Ramamurthi Sastri v. Ammanna Held that a grant originally of a hamlet (not a whole village) which was later recognised as a separate village in revenue accounts could not be treated as a grant of a whole village under S. 3(2)(d). The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that later recognition as a separate village does not convert an original partial grant into an "estate" under S. 3(2)(d).
Unreported decision of Shahabuddin, J. (C.R.P Nos. 1007–1014 of 1942) Held that "inam village" in S. 3(2)(d) must be read along with the definition of "village" in S. 3(19), implying that subsequent revenue recognition could determine estate status. The District Judge had followed this decision; the Court in the present case rejected Shahabuddin J.'s reasoning as erroneous and not sound.
Unreported decision of Panchapagesa Sastri J. (C.R.P Nos. 593–601 of 1947) Dealt with a grant of a "Khandrika" and held that the "Khandrika" was not at the time of the grant a separate village but only a part of the main village. The Court noted and accepted this conclusion as consistent with its view that the grant in the present case was not a grant of a whole village.
Krishnaswami Aiyangar v. Perumal Goundan (Privy Council) On its facts, concerned a grant in 1895 that comprised what was then regarded as an entire village; emphasised that the important fact was that the grant comprised the whole of what was then regarded as an inam village. The Court observed that the Privy Council decision turned on those facts and found it of no assistance to the present case, which must be decided on the construction of the original grant (Ex. D.1).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Identified the principal legal issue as whether the lands constituted an "estate" under S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, noting the statutory definitions of "estate" (S. 3(2)(d)), the Explanation inserted by the 1945 amendment, and the definition of "village" in S. 3(19).
  2. Observed the established meaning of "inam village" in S. 3(2)(d) as referring to a whole village granted in inam, not merely a part of a village.
  3. Examined the District Judge's reliance on Shahabuddin J.'s unreported decision that S. 3(2)(d) should be read with S. 3(19), and rejected that construction. The Court agreed with earlier judges (Raghava Rao J., Patanjali Sastri and Bell JJ.) that importing the definition of "village" from S. 3(19) into S. 3(2)(d) would cause repugnancy in the context and was erroneous.
  4. Having rejected the Shahabuddin J. approach, the Court turned to the question whether the original grant (sanad Ex. D.1) was a grant of a whole village at the time of grant.
  5. Analysed the language of the original grant (a deed of gift of 1678 / 1756 AD) which described the grant as made in respect of "Eedulakuntapalem, hamlet of Kupparu ... a khandrika of 12 khatties ... as a Sarva Agraharam." The Court stressed that when the original grant terms are available they control; other documents are subordinate to the instrument's language and circumstances (citing The Secretary of State for India v. Srinivasachariar and Sankaranarayana Pillayan v. H.R.E. Board).
  6. Interpreted the terms: Edulakuntapalem is described as a hamlet (Sivaru) of a main village (Mupparru), and the subject is described as a "khandrika" (a part or block less than a village). The Court noted judicial and glossary support for the meaning of "khandrika" as a part or allotment less than a village.
  7. Reviewed subsequent documents: some later records treated Edulakuntapalem as a separate village for revenue purposes (including separate chittas, entries in Register of Inams, and appointment of a special revenue officer circa 1911). However, the Court found earlier public documents (survey/settlement maps and registers of 1863, 1866, 1894, 1902) showed the grant area as part of Mupparru village until the beginning of the 20th century.
  8. Concluded that, because the original grant was clearly of a hamlet / khandrika and not a whole village, and given the primacy of the grant's language, the lands were not situated in an "estate" as defined by S. 3(2)(d). Consequently the Revenue Court lacked jurisdiction under S. 55 to entertain the suits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the lands in question are not situated in an estate as defined in S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, and therefore the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits brought under S. 55 of that Act. The second appeals were allowed and the suits dismissed with costs throughout.

Implications and consequences:

  • The District Judge's order upholding Revenue Court jurisdiction (following Shahabuddin J.'s approach) was set aside.
  • The suits instituted under S. 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and costs were awarded against the plaintiffs in those appeals.
  • In the separate revision petition C.R.P. No. 1526 of 1945 (an ejectment suit originally returned for presentation to the Revenue Court on the ground that the lands were situated in an estate), the District Judge's order was set aside and the ejectment suit was remanded to the District Munsif, Eluru, to be tried according to law; the costs of that revision petition were directed to abide the result of the suit.
  • The Court expressly rejected the construction that would import the S. 3(19) definition of "village" into S. 3(2)(d) (disapproving the unreported decision of Shahabuddin, J.) and followed earlier decisions (as noted) that support the Court’s approach. The decision rests on construction of the original grant and the established meaning of the words used in it; it does not purport to introduce an independent new legal principle beyond the construction applied to the statutory definitions and the grant instrument.
N.R.R

    Sishtla Janakirama Sastri And Another v. Jagani Gopalam And Others.

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by the Chief Justice).

    These five second appeals arise out of five suits which were tried together and disposed of by a common judgment by the learned Deputy Collector of Eluru division. They were brought by persons who were in possession of lands in the village of Eedulakunta Agraharam, in Eluru taluk, West Godavari district, against the appellants and others under S. 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act praying that the defendants may be directed to execute pattas in their favour, in accordance with the draft patta filed along with the plaint. The defendants resisted the suits mainly on the ground that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction as the lands did not form part of an estate within the meaning of that Act. Their plea was overruled and the Deputy Collector decreed the suits. The defendants preferred appeals to the District Judge of West Godavari who confirmed the decision of the Deputy Collector that the lands were situated in an estate. These second appeals by the defendants are against the decision of the District Judge.

    The main question for decision in these appeals is whether the lands in suit formed part of an estate as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act. The material statutory provisions in the Act relevant to this question are the following:

    “Sec. 3(2)(d): ‘Estate’ means any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors-in-title of the grantee or grantees.”

    Explanation (1): (inserted by Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1945—Madras Act II of 1945):

    “Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes.”

    Section 3(19): ‘Village’ means any local area, situated in or constituting an estate which is designated as a village in the revenue accounts and for which the revenue accounts are separately maintained by one or more karnams or which is now recognised by the Provincial Government or may hereafter be declared by the Provincial Government for the purposes of this Act to be a village, and includes any hamlet or hamlets which may be attached thereto.”

    It is well established that any inam village in S. 3(2)(d) means “a whole village granted in inam” and not anything less than a village, however big a part it may be of that village.

    The question, therefore, is whether the grant in favour of the appellants' predecessors-in-title which comprised the lands in suits was a grant of a whole village in inam. The learned District Judge was not prepared to hold that the original grant in favour of the defendants' predecessors was a grant of what was a whole village at at the time of the grant, but he held that the grant fell within the definition in S. 3(2)(d) because subsequently and at the time of the institution of the suits the area granted as inam was designated as a separate village in the revenue accounts. He relied upon the definition of ‘village’ in S. 3(19) and held, following the unreported decision of a learned Judge of this Court, Shahabuddin, J. in C.R.P Nos. 1007 to 1014 of 1942 that the expression “inam village” in S. 3(2)(d) must be read along with the definition of “village” in S. 3(19) of the Act.

    The decision of Shahabuddin, J. has never been followed in this Court to our knowledge. On the other hand, the correctness of that decision has been doubted more than once and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court runs contrary to it. The reasoning of Shahabuddin, J. is best expressed by the following extract from his judgment:

    “The word ‘village’ in that Cl. (3)(2)(d) has naturally to be taken in the same sense which it bears in Sub-S. 19 of S. 3 to which reference has already been made. Now under Sub-S. (19) an area which was recognised as a village at the time of the Act or recognised as a village at the time the question arises or which may hereafter be declared as a village by the Provincial Government, is a village for purposes of this Act. It, therefore, appears to me that what Cl. 3(2)(d) says is that any inam which is recognised as a village in Government accounts as defined in Sub-S. (19) of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, constitutes an estate….It could not have been the intention of the Legislature that ‘village’ mentioned in clause (d) of Sub-S. (2) to S. 3 should bear a connotation different from that in Sub-S. (19) and if once the definition of ‘village’ in Sub-S. 19 applies to clause (d) of Sub-S. (2) to S. 3, then the determination of the question whether a particular area of inam land is an estate or not depends solely on whether that area at present comes within the definition of ‘village’ in Sub-S. 19 irrespective of its character at the time of the grant.”

    The defects in this construction of the expression ‘village’ in S. 3(2)(d) are pointed out in detail by Raghava Rao J. in Ramamurthi Sastri v. Ammanna(1) and it is unnecessary to repeat them as we are in entire agreement with that learned Judge. Though the decision of Shahabuddin J. is not referred to by them, the decision of Patanjali Sastri and Bell JJ. in C.M.A No. 584 of 1944 and C.M.A No. 373 of 1945 reported in as a footnote to the case in Ramamurthi Sastri v. Ammanna goes against it. In that case what was granted originally was at the time of the grant a hamlet of an adjoining village, but it came to be recognised subsequently as a separate village and treated as such in the revenue accounts. It was contended that as the grant comprised a local area which was recognised by the Government to be a village at the commencement of the Act the definition in S. 3(2)(d) applied. But the learned Judges repelled the contention observing that S. 3(19) refers only to a village situated in or constituting an estate and “to import that definition into sub-clause (d) to S. 3(2) which itself defines one category of estates, would lead to repugnancy in the context”. With respect, we are in full agreement with the reasoning of Patanjali Sastri and Bell JJ., and Raghava Rao J. In our opinion the definition of “village” in S. 3(19) cannot be incorporated into the definition of an “estate” in S. 3(2)(d) of the Act. The view of Shahabuddin J. cannot be accepted as sound.

    The learned District Judge in view of the decision of Shahabuddin J. which he followed considered it unnecessary to decide the other question whether the grant even at its inception was of a whole village as contended by the plaintiffs. In the view we have taken that the decision of Shahabuddin J. was erroneous, it is now necessary to decide that question.

    The terms of the original grant are available to us as the sanad granted to the ancestors of the defendants has been produced (Ex. D.1). It runs as follows:

    “Bhudana Dharma Sasana Patrika (deed of gift in respect of land) executed and delivered in the year 1678 of the Salivahana era, corresponding to the 15th Vysakha Suddah of the current year Dhara (1756) in favour of Sishtla Narasimha Garu by Jagannatha Appa Rayanim Garu fasli 1165.

    Eedulakuntapalem, hamlet of Kupparu relating to Haveli Ellore taluk-tank, 4 Khatties and land of 8 khatties all round the tank, wherein wet cultivation is carried on by transplantation, in all, a khandrika of 12 khattits has been granted to you, in the name of God Sri Rama, as a Sarva Agraharam.

    Therefore, growing crops therein every year you may enjoy the produce therein every year you may enjoy the produce thereof hereditarily from son to grandson and so on and live happily.”

    There can be no doubt that when the terms of the grant are available other documents are not evidence as to the effect of the grants, which must depend upon the language used in the instrument and the circumstances of the grant itself. [See The Secretary of State for India v. Srinivasachariar(2) and Sankaranarayana Pillayan v. H.R.E Baord, Madras (3)]. The language of a grant we have perused the Telugu original also—leaves no room for doubt, and we have no hesitation in finding that the grant was not of a whole village. It is quite clear that the main village is Mupparru. Edulakuntapalem is described as a hamlet (Sivaru). This menas that Edulakuntapalem was not itself a separate village. The grant is described to be of a “Khandrika of 12 khatties”. The word “Khandrika appears to us to be very significant. It is derived from the Sanskrit word “Khandam” which means “a piece” or “a part”. The Judicial Committee accepted the meaning of the expression “Khandrika given to it in Maclean's Manual of the Administration in the Madras Presidency, Vol III as “a block of land granted as inam, less than a village, but much larger than an ordinary inam”. The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Mallayya . According to Wilson's Glossary ‘Khandrika’ is ‘an allotment of privileged land not exceeding four or five Katties, or from 50 to 70 acres; it may be either rent free or subject to quit rent”. It is impossible to hold, having regard to the description of Edulakuntapalem as a hamlet and the description of the area granted as “Khandrika” that the original grant comprised a whole village.

    In the case already referred to in another connection, decided by Patanjali Sastri and Bell JJ. the subject matter of the grant was described as Patha Pentapadu, hamlet of Pentapadu village. This description was held to clearly show that what was granted as inam was not a whole village but only a portion of the village. In the other case decided by Raghava Rao J. [Ramamurthi Sastri v. Ammanna ] the grant was of a hamlet adjoining a main village and the learned Judge came to a similar conclusion that it could not be deemed to be a grant of a whole village.

    Our attention was drawn to an unreported decision of Panchapagesa Sastri J. in C.R.P Nos. 593 to 601 of 1947 which dealt with a grant of a “Khandrika” and the learned Judge held that the “Khandrika” was not at the time of the grant a separate village but was only a part of the main village.

    As the language of the original grant is clear and does not admit of any ambiguity, we do not think much useful purpose will be served by an elaborate discussion of the subsequent documents. Though there are some documents in which the Edulakuntapalem Agraharam has been treated as a separate village without reference to Mupparru village, there are other documents of great probative value which confirm the view taken by us of the original grant. There is a farmana of the year 1791 from one William Warren, acting evidently on behalf of the East India Company, addressed to the Circar servants and Haveli servants of Paragana Haveli Ellore taluk. In this the grant is described as “a khandrika of 12 khathies” consisting of tank of 4 kathies and land of 8 kathies all round the tank, wherein wet cultivation is carried on by transplantation in the hamlet, Edulakuntapalem, Motirije Mupparru……” This description does not carry us any further than the original grant itself.

    The extract from the Inam Fair Register relating to the grant in question is Ex. P. 26 but there is nothing in any of the columns on which much reliance could be placed by the respondents. The heading is “Register of Inams in the village of Edulagunta Agraharam in the taluk of Ellore, in the district of Godavari.” This cannot in any way affect the scope or character of the original grant.

    As a consequence of the grant to the appellants' ancestors of a fairly large block of land which had a defined identity as a hamlet, it is not surprising that there should be separate chittas and other revenue papers. Exs. P. 23 and P.23(a) are two such faisala chittas for the years 1842-1843 and 1850-1851. On the same ground we find a separate entry of Edulakuntapalem Agraharam in the Regiater of Inams (Ex. P. 26 already referred to and Ex. P. 24 of 1860 and Ex. P. 25 of 1885). It is common ground that in or about 1911 a special triune officer was appointed for the Edulakuntapalem village and thereafter the village was recognised as a revenue village. It is, therofore, unnecessary to refer to the documents subsequent to 1911. Nor is it necessary to refer to the documents filed on behalf of the respondents, documents to which the appellants or their predecessors were parties in which Eedulakantapalem is described as a village without reference to the main village Mupparru.

    On the other hand, there are public documents of great Value which unmistakeably lead to the inference that Eedulakuntapalem until the beginning of this century was being treated as a part of the village of Mupparru though, of course it was treated as inam. In Ex. D.12, the tracing from a map prepared in the survey of 1863 in Ex. D an extract from the survey and settlement register of Mupparru village of the year 1866, the area covered by the grant in question was shown as covered by Survey Number 339 in the village of Mupparru. Again, in Ex. D.7, a plan of Mupparru, prepared at the re-survey of 1894 and Ex. D.5 re-survey and settlement register of that village prepared in 1902 the area of the grant is shown as a part of Mupparru village. It is on a consideration of these documents that the learned District Judge remarked:

    “……it might have to be conceded in favour of the landlords that down to 1902, since the inam was treated as a survey number of Mupparru village, it could not be said that Idulagunta was treated as a separate village by itself.”

    Mr. Rajah Aiyar for the plaintiffs-respondents tried to found an argument on the mention of the word “haveli” which qualifies Ellore in the original grant. He suggested that Mupparru was a “Haveli” village, that is, Government village and Eedulakuntapalem which was granted to the appellants' ancestors by the zamindar must have been a separate yillager belonging to the zamindar. There is no basis in fact for this suggestion. The word “haveli” does not necessarily mean that Mupparru was a Government village, that is, a village in the possession of that East India Company. We find from Wilson's Glossary that villages formerly retained under the management of the officers of the Nawab of the Carnatic were generally known as “haveli” villages. There is nothing in the original grant to support the inference that the grantor owned the hamlet but did not own the main village, and, therefore, the hamlet had a separate existence at an entire village.

    Mr. Rajah Aiyar referred us to the recent decision of the Privy Council in Krishnaswami Aiyangar v. Perumal Goundan . That case related to a grant by the British Government in 1895. It was a grant of what was regarded as an entire village at the time. There was evidence that the village so granted had once formed part of a larger village. Their Lord, ships pointed out that in 1895 the Government granted on inam tenure the whole village that is, “the whole village which for the past 100 years had been recognised as an inam village’ and that the important fact was that the grant comprised the whole of what was then regarded as an inam village. We fail to see how the decision on such facts can be of any help to decide the question before us which must be decided on the construction of the terms of the original grant, Ex. D-1.

    We find in conclusion that the lands in the suits are not situated in an estate as defined in S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits which purported to have been instituted under S. 55 of that Act.

    The second appeals are allowed and the suit dismissed with costs through, out.

    C.R.P No. 1526 of 1945:—This revision petition arises out of a suit filed by the landlords in ejectment in the Court of the District Munsif of Eluru and relates to lands comprised in the same grant as we have dealt with in the above second appeals. The plaint was returned for presentation to the Revenue Court on the ground that the lands were situated in an estate. Now that we have held that this view is wrong the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

    The order of the learned District Judge is hereby set aside and the suit is remanded to the District Munsif, Eluru, to be tried and disposed of according to law. The costs of the revision petition will abide the result of the suit.

    N.R.R

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    Comments

    Sishtla Janakirama Sastri And Another v. Jagani Gopalam And Others.
    (Feb 23, 1951)