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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee is Raman & Raman Ltd., a private limited company running motor bus services at Kumbakonam in the Tanjore district. On 9 March 1944 the company, through its managing director, entered into a written agreement to purchase five buses owned by T. D. Balasubramania Pillai for Rs. 31,001. The agreement recorded a payment of Rs. 1,001 on the date of the contract and provided for staged payment of the balance. The buses were delivered to the company and operated on the Kumbakonam–Karaikkal route for about ten days.

The company and the seller signed a joint application on 10 March 1944 to transfer the permits for the five buses into the company's name. The company paid for fitness certificates and taxes. When the company tendered the first instalment due on 15 March 1944, the seller refused the cheque and alleged he had been cheated into the bargain. A third party, Veerappa Pillai, filed suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court (3 October 1944) claiming title and possession of the five buses on the ground that they had allegedly been sold to him by the seller with the authority of the true owner.

The buses were run by the company from 10–3–1944 until 19–3–1944, after which they remained idle in the company's possession. From 14–8–1945 the buses were run by a court-appointed receiver and were in custodia legis during the litigation. The Subordinate Judge found the buses were jointly owned by the seller and another person and decreed possession to the plaintiff; on appeal this Court reversed that decision and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The litigation was not carried to the Supreme Court.

During the relevant accounting year the company incurred legal and other litigation-related expenses amounting to Rs. 1,392-2-0 and claimed this sum as a revenue deduction under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner disallowed the claim, but the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed it. The Commissioner of Income-tax referred the following question to this Court at his instance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the litigation expenses of Rs. 1,392 incurred by the assessee company are allowable as business expenditure under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Commissioner of Income-tax (as presented by Mr. C. S. Rama Rao Sahib)

  • The sum of Rs. 1,392-2-0 was capital expenditure and not deductible under Section 10(2)(xv).
  • The company sought to acquire a capital asset (the five buses) plus the valuable right to ply them on specified routes — a right of practical monopoly and substantial value. The total paid (Rs. 31,001) was for that capital acquisition.
  • The contract, it was contended, did not immediately pass property in the buses to the company; the purchaser had only an inchoate or imperfect title which required perfection (payment of balance, transfer of registry, issue of permits), and the litigation expenses were incurred to acquire title to that asset and therefore formed part of the capital cost of acquisition.
  • By analogy, the Commissioner compared the expenditure to preliminary expenses in connection with company formation or other costs bringing into existence profit-earning machinery, which are regarded as capital.

Observations Recorded About the Company's Position in the Opinion

  • The opinion records that the expenditure was conceded to have been incurred in the course of the company's trade/business. The company had taken possession of the buses, had paid consideration, and ran them for a short period; it therefore considered itself entitled to the assets and took steps to protect that entitlement.
  • The company incurred the expenditure to defend its title and possession of the buses and the practical right to ply them on assigned routes — i.e., to preserve an asset already acquired under the contract.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ushers Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v. Bruce, 1915 A.C. 433 Legal expenses incurred to preserve a business interest (renewal of licences, complaints against tenants, advice about thefts) were deductible — such expenses preserve the brewery’s interest like defending title. The Court cited it as authority that legal expenditure incurred to preserve business interests can be revenue in nature and therefore deductible.
British Insulated & Halsby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton, 1926 A.C. 205 (Lord Cave) Where an expenditure is made with a view to bringing into existence an asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, it is generally attributable to capital. The Court treated this as the leading modern authority delineating capital vs revenue expenditure and used it to frame the general principle against which the present expenditure was tested.
Van den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark, 1935 A.C. 431 Payment upon cancellation of a contract was capital where the contract related to the whole structure of the company's business — i.e., payments that effect a radical alteration of capital assets are capital. Cited to show circumstances where payments are capital; used to contrast with the present case where no such alteration of capital assets occurred.
Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., (1941) 1 K.B. 111 Legal expenses incurred in defending title to property used in the business are revenue expenses and deductible when they do not create or materially improve a capital asset. The Court followed Lawrence J.'s reasoning in this case and held the present facts fall on the same side of the line — the litigation preserved, rather than altered, an existing capital asset and was therefore revenue in character.
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. v. Kerr, (1947) 27 T.C. 103 Approves the reasoning in Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd.; acquisition or addition to goodwill is acquisition of a capital asset. Cited to show judicial treatment of related authorities; used to support the view that Southern's reasoning is sound where applicable.
Mahabir Prasad & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, 1945-13 I.T.B. 340 (Lahore High Court) Expenses of defending a suit for pre-emption in respect of property acquired for storing stock-in-trade were held to be revenue expenditure. Cited as an Indian decision supporting the proposition that litigation to protect assets used in trade can be revenue expenditure.
Kangra Valley State Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1934) 3 I.T.R. 324 Mentioned as an earlier decision subsequently overruled by Mahabir Prasad & Sons. Not applied; mentioned to show the trajectory of Indian authority on similar issues.
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. Central India Spinning, Weaving & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., (1943) II I.T.R. 266 (Nagpur High Court) Legal expenses to restrain a third party's use of a trade mark were deductible as revenue expenditure because the litigation was to protect trade and prevent loss of profits. Cited as an example where protection of a business's trade interest by litigation was treated as revenue expenditure.
Commissioner of Income-tax, B. & O. v. Kameswar Singh of Darbhanga, 1942-2 M.L.J. 261 Litigation expenses incurred by a money-lender in respect of loans advanced (money being stock-in-trade) were deductible as they related to stock-in-trade. Cited to illustrate that litigation to protect stock-in-trade or business operations may be revenue in character.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a two-part analysis: first, whether title to the buses had passed to the purchaser under the contract; second, whether the litigation expenditure was capital (part of the cost of acquiring a capital asset) or revenue (an allowable business deduction).

On the contractual question the Court examined the terms against the Sale of Goods Act. It noted that, although Section 32 (delivery and payment are concurrent in absence of contrary contract) is a general rule, the contract here contained a contrary provision for staged payments. The Court relied on Section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act which provides that where there is an unconditional contract for sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, property passes to the buyer when the contract is made, irrespective of postponed payment.

Applying that principle, the Court concluded there was an unconditional contract for the sale of the five specified buses at Rs. 31,001 and that delivery had occurred. The clause about paying Rs. 20,000 within a week after transfer of registry and permits was construed as a provision to secure the seller's cooperation in obtaining the formal transfer of registry and permits; it did not postpone the passage of title. Thus, the property in the buses passed to the company on the date of the contract and the company had valid title and possession (subject to the later litigation).

Turning to the character of the Rs. 1,392 litigation expenditure, the Court accepted that the sum was incurred in the course of business but asked whether it was capital. The Court observed that the essential inquiry is whether the expenditure created or improved a capital asset (in which case it is capital) or was incurred simply to preserve or maintain an asset already acquired (in which case it is revenue).

The Court held that the expenditure was incurred to defend and preserve an existing capital asset (the buses and the practical right to the assigned routes) already acquired under the contract. The litigation did not create any new asset nor alter the character of the existing capital asset; it merely defended the company's title and possession against hostile claims. The Court considered and followed the reasoning in Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd. that legal expenses incurred to maintain title to property used in business are revenue expenditures. It also balanced authorities (including British Insulated & Halsby Cables and Van den Berghs) that set out the general test distinguishing capital from revenue, and concluded that those authorities pointed to the same practical distinction: expenditures that bring into existence or effect a radical change in capital assets are capital, while expenditures incurred to maintain or protect existing assets used in the business are revenue.

On these grounds, the Court concluded that the Appellate Tribunal was correct to treat the litigation costs as revenue expenditure deductible under Section 10(2)(xv).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The reference is answered in the affirmative: the litigation expenses of Rs. 1,392-2-0 incurred by the assessee company are allowable as business (revenue) expenditure under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act.

Direct implications and consequences:

  • The decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (allowing the deduction) is upheld by this Court.
  • The Commissioner of Income-tax was ordered to pay costs of the reference of Rs. 250 to the assessee.
  • The Court's decision rests on established principles distinguishing capital and revenue expenditure and on authority (particularly Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd.) that legal expenses incurred to defend title to property used in the business are revenue in character when they do not create or improve a capital asset.

The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent; it applies and follows existing authorities in reaching its conclusion.

End of summary (based exclusively on the provided opinion).

    The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras v. Raman And Raman Ltd., Kumbakonam

    1. The following question has been referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax :

    "Whether on the facts & in the circumstances of the case, the litigation expenses of Rs. 1392 incurred by the assesses company are allowable as business expenditure under Section 10(2) (xv), Income-tax Act ? "

    The assessee is Raman & Raman Ltd., a private limited company carrying on business at Kumbakonam in the Tanjore district & will hereafter be referred to as "the company." The company owns a number of motor buses plying for hire in specific routes in the Tanjore district. Another bus service run under the name of Chamundeswari Bus Service had five buses plying between Kumbakonam in the Tanjore district & Karaikkal in the French territory. On 9-3-1944 the company through its Managing Director entered into an agreement for the purchase of the five buses of the Chamundeswari Bus Service with one T.D. Ralasubramania Pillai in whose name the buses were registered & the permits for running the buses on the routes specified therein stood. The material portion of the agreement was in these terms :

    "The five buses owned by T. D. Balasubramania Pillai & detailed below have been purchased by Raman & Raman Ltd. for Rs. 31001; on this date Raman & Raman Ltd. have paid Rs. 1001 to T. D. Balasubramania Pillai. The Managing director P. S. Narayanan has agreed to pay the balance of Rs. 30,000, by giving on 15th March 1944 a sum of Rs. 10,000 the remaining Rs. 20,000 to be paid by him within a week after the transfer of ownership of the said five buses & the relative route permits in his name. These five buses belong solely to T. D. Balasubramania Pillai & nobody else has absolutely any right whatever to these buses. The tin shed in the Post office Road where the fire buses are now parked & which belongs to T. D. Balasubramania Pillai has now been sold for Rs. 700 to Raman & Raman Ltd. .... The spare parts, accessories, lubricating oils, greases, batteries, tools, charcoal etc. relating to the buses of T. D. Balasubramania Pillai will be listed & evaluated according to the current prices & taken over within 3 days by Raman & Raman Ltd. after paying their value. The undermentioned five buses have already been on this date handed over by T. D. Balasubramania Pillai to P. S. Narayanan, the Managing Director of Raman & Raman Ltd."

    Then follows a detailed description of the five buses with their registration numbers & other particulars.

    2. Pursuant to this agreement, the five buses were handed over to the company & they were plying for hire, on the Kumbakonam Karaikkal: route for about ten days. On the day following, the agreement, that is, on 10-3-1944, the Managing; Director of the company & Balasubramania Pillai signed a joint application to the Secretary, Road Traffic Board, Tanjore, for the transfer of G. permits of the five buses to the name of the company. The previous G permit for the buses standing in the name of deft. 3 was delivered over to the company & they ran the bus service in the name of T. D. Balasubramania Pillai pending recognition of the transfer. The company made the necessary payments for the issue of fitness certificates in respect of these buses & byway of taxes. When the sum of Rs. 10,000 the first instalment of the price payable 15-3-1944 was tendered by the company to Balasubramania, Pillai, the latter refused to accept the cheque tendered & put forward the plea that he had been cheated by the company into entering into the bargain. Moreover, one Veerappa Pillai filed a suit on 3-10-1944 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam claiming title to these five buses & seeking to recover possession; of them on the ground that on 10-4-1944 they had been sold to him by Balasubramania Pillai with the consent & express authority of Gnanasundaram Pillai who, according to the pltf. was the real owner of the buses bat who was undergoing imprisonment in jail at Karaikkal. The pltf. in the suit impugned the contract for the sale of these buses to the company entered into by B. T. D. Balasubramania Pillai as not having been authorised by Gnanasundarani Pillai the real owner of the buses. The buses were run by the company from 10-3-1944 till 19-3-1944. Thereafter, the buses remained idle in the possession of the company. From 14-8-1945, the buses were run by Veerappa Pillai as receiver appointed by the Court. The buses, therefore, were in custodia legis till the end of the litigation. The Subordinate Judge found that the five buses belonged both to Balasubramania Pillai & Gnanasundarani Pillai as joint owners & the pltf. Veerappa Pillai was entitled to a decree for possession of the buses. On appeal the decision of the Subordinate Judge was reversed & this Court held that the pltff. had not established that T. D. Balasubramania Pillai was a benamidar or agent for Gnanasundarani Pillai or that he was not the real owner of the buses. This Court, therefore, dismissed the suit of the pltff. on the ground that he was attempting in concert with Balasubramania Pillai to sabotage the contract entered into between the company & Balasubramania Pillai. Further into the merits of the dispute it is unnecessary for us to enter as the litigation has not been carried to the Supreme Court. In defending the above suit & other proceedings.

    Courts connected with the transfer of the buses, the company incurred an expenditure of Rs. 1392-2-0 during the year of account & claimed this sum as revenue expenditure in the course of its assessment of income-tax. The claim of the company for treating this expenditure as revenue expenditure was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal differing from the Income-tax Officer & the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Hence this reference at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax.

    3. Mr. C.S. Rama Rao Sahib for the Commissioner of Income-tax urged that this sum of Rs. 1392-2-0 was a capital expenditure, & therefore not allowable as a deduction under Section 10 (2) (xv), Income-tax Act. He put his case this way: The company sought to acquire capital asset in the shape of five buses, & what was more valuable than the buses themselves, the right to ply these buses for hire along the routes already assigned to them by the Road Traffic Board. The right to ply these buses in the routes designated by the Road Transport Authority is a valuable right & in the nature of a monopoly. For the acquisition of the buses along with this right, the company agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 31001. The company purchased not only the buses but also the garage where they were parked & the accessories, tools & implements. What was sought to be purchased was substantially a new asset for the benefit of the assessee's trade in the way of fixed capital. The contract for sale did not pass the property in the buses to the company, & many things had to be done before the company could acquire an effective title to these buses, namely, the payment of the balance of the consideration, the transfer of permits & so on. In order to acquire a true & clear title to this asset, the company had to spend a sum of Rs. 1392-2-0 & this sum must be deemed, to be a part of the total cost of the acquisition of the capital asset. Even if it was an extension of the existing business of the company by the acquisition of new buses & the right to new routes the same principle would apply. He maintained that the five buses had not become the property of the company under the contract of sale & that it had only an inchoate or imperfect title which had to be perfected by having it established in a Court of law on the suit already referred to. He argued that this was not a case where money had to be spent for the protection of the assessee's title to an existing business asset against hostile litigious attacks but a case where money was spent in the process of acquiring title to a capital asset & it was, therefore, part of the cost of the acquisition of that asset itself. He compared the expenditure in this case to the preliminary expenses in connection with the floatation of a company which are regarded as capital expenditure incurred not earning profits, but in bringing into existence the profit earning machinery. He also referred to some English & Indian decisions which will be noticed presently.

    4. In our view, it is important to consider the rights of the company which flow from the contract. The contention of Mr. Rama Rao Sahib was that the property in the buses would pass to the company only on payment of the remaining consideration of Rs. 30,000 on the due dates. He also maintained that having regard to the object of the contract namely the acquisition of the right to ply the buses along the routes assigned to them, the transfer of registry of these buses in the name of the company & the issue of fresh permits to the company for plying on the routes would be necessary to implement its title to the property agreed to be sold under the contract. We cannot accept this contention. Under Section 32 of the Sale of Goods Act, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, delivery of the goods & payment of the price are concurrent conditions. But here we have got a definite contract to the contrary, namely, that the price was to be paid in specified instalments. Under Section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act, where, as in this case, there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, & it is immaterial whether the time of payment of the price is postponed. In our opinion, there was here an unconditional contract for the sale of the five specified buses for Rs. 31,001 & the contract itself recited, what indeed was a fact, that the buses had been delivered into the possession of the buyer on that date. Mr. Rama Rao Sahib refers to the clause in the contract relating to the payment of Rs. 20 000 within a week after the transfer of ownership of the said five buses & the relative route permits in the name of the company as indicating that the title to the buses was not to pass to the purchaser until the payment of Rs. 20,000 was made, the registry was changed & the route permits also issued in the name of the purchaser. In our opinion, this is not a proper reading of the clause in the contract. All that is indicated by this clause is that the balance of the price, namely, Rs. 20,000 was to be paid by the purchaser to the seller within a week after the transfer of the registry of the buses in the name of the purchaser & the issue of permits in the name of the purchaser for plying these buses along the routes assigned to them. It has to be remembered in this connection that the transfer of the registry & the issue of permits in the name of the purchaser require the co-operation & the joint endeavour of the seller & in order to ensure that the seller would perform his part of the contract the balance of Rs. 20,000 out of the purchase price was agreed to be paid after the registry had been transferred & the route permits also issued in the name of the purchaser. We hold, therefore, on a construction of the contract that the title to the five buses passed to the purchaser on the date of the contract itself & thereafter the property in the buses was in the company. It is no doubt true that for about ten days after the contract the buses plied for hire on the routes assigned to them as if Balasubramania Pillai, the seller, was entitled to ply them for hire. That was because the registry of the buses had not been transferred & the permits for running the buses on the specified routes had not been issued to the purchaser. It was merely in order to avoid a transgression of the Motor Vehicle Rules that this procedure was adopted. But that had nothing to do with the passing of the title in the buses to the purchaser. Thereafter when the vendor himself started criminal proceedings & purported to enter into an agreement for sale of these five buses to Veerappa Pillai, the pltff. In the suit in the Sub-Court, the company had no option but to defend its title to the valuable property which it had acquired under the contract. Not only the buses but also the routes which had been assigned to the buses & which were usually recognised by the Road Transport Authority, not as a matter of law, but in practice, as entitling the purchasers to ply along the routes assigned to the buses, were sought to be taken away from the company by Veerappa Pillai. The company's possession of the buses was not unlawful & it had a right therefore to defend its title as well as possession. As we already stated it is unnecessary now to determine whether Balasubramania Pillai or Ghanasundaram Pillai or both were the real owners of the buses. Suffice it to say that the vendor Balasubramania Pillai was in possession of the buses which had been registered in his name. The permits for plying these buses also stood in his name. The company dealt with them as a person entitled to dispose of the buses, paid valuable consideration & also took possession of the buses & plied them for some time on the routes assigned to these buses. It was in order to defend this right of the company both to the buses & the routes which usually followed the ownership of the buses as a matter of practice, that the company had spent the money.

    5. It is clear that the sum of Rs. 31001 paid by the company to the seller for the five buses together with the prospective advantage of plying these buses on the routes assigned to them was an expenditure incurred in connection with the trade or business of the company. It was clearly a capital expenditure & its deduction is not permitted under Section 10(2) (xv), Income-tax Act. The position is, in our opinion, different with regard to the sum of Rs. 1392-2-0 expended in connection with the litigation. It is conceded that the expenditure was incurred in the course of the business as trade of the company & in its character as trader. The only question is whether or not it was in the nature of a capital expenditure. In oar opinion it is an expenditure incurred for the purpose of retaining the capital asset, something which was vital to the business of the company, something that would enable the company to earn more profits in the future. The company honestly considered it was entitled so to do that it should take steps necessary or proper for protecting its interests & to engage in litigation for the protection or preservation of valuable assets acquired by it for the purpose of its trade or business. If the company succeeded in the litigation the profits from its business would increase & a company which spends money for increasing its profits spends it for the purpose of its business. Litigation is often conducted by business men in order to maintain, preserve or defend an existing right or title to property or to prevent the invasion of such right in future. Legal expenses incurred in such litigation do not create a new capital asset or stock-in-trade but are incurred in the ordinary course of the preserving or maintaining the assets or stock-in-trade of the business. We, therefore, think that such expenses are part of the revenue expenditure of the business & their, deduction is permissible under Section 10 (2) (xv), Income-tax Act. This is our opinion unassisted by authority.

    6. In Ushers Wiltshire Brewery Ld. v. Bruce, 1915 A. C. 433, it was held by the House of Lords reversing the decision of the Court of appeal that a brewery company was entitled to deduct legal expenses incurred in connection with the renewal of licences; preferring of complaints against tenants & obtaining advices as regards thefts of beer, etc , such expenses had the effect of preserving the brewery company's interest just as much as the defending of an action attacking the title of the company to the property in which it carried on its business. The leading modern authority on the subject of what is a business expenditure & what is not, is the judgment of Lord Cave in British Insulated & Halsby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton, 1926 A. C. 205 at p. 213. The learned Lord says :

    "Where an expenditure is made, not only once & for all but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, I think there is very good reason (in the absence of special circumstances leading to an opposite conclusion) for treating such an expenditure as properly attributable not to revenue but to capital,"

    The next decision which need be noticed is Van den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark, 1935 A. C. 431, where the House of Lords held that a sum of money paid upon the cancellation of a contract was a capital expenditure, the contract in that case not being an ordinary contrast entered into in the course of the business but one which related to the whole structure of the company's business, & the totality of its capital assets. The House of Lords held that the payment made was for a radical alteration of those capital assets & was therefore a capital payment.

    7. These decisions were relied on on behalf of the Crown in Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., (1941) 1 K. B. 111, where the question was whether legal expenses incurred by a company in defending its title to a property where its business was partly carried on were admissible deductions in computing its profits. Lawrence J., held that as the land in connection with which the expenditure was incurred was used by the assessee in connection with its business the profits of which were taxed, the expenses incurred in defending title to the property were allowable deductions in computing the profits of the company for income-tax purposes, being in the nature of a revenue expenditure. This decision is very instructive as showing on which side of the line the present case falls. The learned Judge considered that the principle deducible from the cases was that where a sum of money was laid out for the acquisition or the improvement of a fixed capital asset, it was attributable to capital, bat that if no alteration was made in the fixed capital asset by the payment, then it was properly attributable to revenue being in substance a matter of maintenance, the maintenance of capital structure, or the capital asset of the company. In the present case the only way in which it can be said that there was anything like an alteration in the capital assets of the respondent company was that Veerappa Pillai, the pltf. in the suit filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam, was removed from the category of possible litigants who might challenge the title of the company to the buses. In our opinion, it could not be said that this expenditure in any way altered the original character of the capital asset which was acquired by the company. If it had done so, certainly it would be a payment in respect of capital. As the capital assets of the company remained absolutely unaltered & all that was done was to retain the capital assets in the hands of the company by resisting attempts to deprive the company of such assets, the expenses incurred in connection with the defences of a litigation threatening the title to these assets would properly be attributable to revenue. The decision of Lawrence J., was summed up in the last para, of the judgment in these terms :

    "It appears to me that the legal expenses which were incurred by the respondent company did not create any new asset at all, but were expenses which were incurred in the ordinary course of maintaining assets of the company & the fact that it was maintaining the title & not the value of the company's business does not in my opinion make it any the different."

    We respectfully follow this reasoning of the learned Judge & hold that the present case is similar in its facts to the decision in Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., (1941) 1 K. B. 111. The learned advocate for the revenue authority referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. v. Kerr, (1947) 27 T.c. 103 at p. 118. Lord Greene M.R. who delivered the leading judgment in this case quoted with approval the decision of Lawrence J. in Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., (1941) 1 K. B. 111 & observed as follows:

    This decision clearly approves of the reasoning in Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., 1941-1 K. B. 111 & merely decides that acquisition of or addition to goodwill is acquisition of a capitals asset. As regards Indian decisions we need only refer to the decision of the Lahore High Court in Mahabir Prasad & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, 1945-13 I. T. B. 340 overruling an earlier decision of the same Court in Kangra Valley State Co. Ld. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1934) 3 I. T. R. 324. The Court there held that the expenses of defending a suit for pre-emption in respect of property acquired for the purpose of storing its stock-in-trade was a revenue expenditure. It is not necessary that the litigation should be even of a defensive character to enable the assessee to deduct the expenses incurred in connection therewith. In Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. Central India Spinning, Weaving & Manufacturing Co., Ld., (1943) II I. T. R. 266, the Nagpur High Court held that legal expenses incurred in connection with a suit brought by the assessees against another company to restrain the latter from using the trade mark to which the assessee claimed exclusive right was deductible as revenue expenditure. It may be said that at least in the opinion of Digby J. one of the learned Judges who decided that case, the threat was directed not against the capital of the assessee, but against its trade & the object of the litigation was to prevent a drop in the sales & a loss of profits. The attack on trade mark by infringement was treated as an attack not on capital asset but rather as an attack on the existing & future trade & on the value of the stock-in-trade existing & in the course of manufacture & to be manufactured in future. It may be that a trademark is in the nature of a capital asset & expenses incurred in repelling an attack on an existing capital asset must be attributed to revenue. Legal expenses incurred in connection with the acquisition or protection of stock-in- trade are clearly in the nature of revenue expenditure. It is on this ground that litigation expenses incurred by a money-lender in connection with loans advanced or capital invested in the course of his business have been held to be admissible deductions money being his stock-in-trade--See Commissioner of Income-tax, B. & O. v. Kameswar Singh of Darbhanga, 1942-2 M. L. J. 261.

    8. We are unable to accept the contention of the revenue authority that the expenditure in this case was incurred for the acquisition of fixed capital assets. The expenditure, as we already stated, did not create any new asset nor did it alter the character of the capital asset that had been acquired by the company under the con-

    tract, That remained unaltered. The asset, to defend the title to which the expenditure was incurred was an existing asset & was not acquired in consequence of the expenditure. Nor was there any improvement of the capital assets of the company by reason of the litigation. For these reasons we hold that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was correct & that the reference must be answered in the affirmative & in favour of the company. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall pay a sum of Rs. 250 as costs of this reference to the assessee.

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    Comments

    The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras v. Raman And Raman Ltd., Kumbakonam
    (Mar 12, 1951)