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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal on Municipal House-Tax Assessment

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is the owner of a house property bearing door No. 5/7, Imperial Bank Road, Coimbatore. The defendant is the Municipality of Coimbatore (represented by its Commissioner). The plaintiff's case was that the property was liable to a house-tax of Rs. 124-14-0 per half year based on an annual rental value of Rs. 1,665 — a value the plaintiff states was fixed by the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils, based upon a monthly fair rent of Rs. 150 fixed by the District Collector under the House Rent Control Order.

The Municipality adopted an annual value of Rs. 4,440 for determining house-tax. The plaintiff attacked that figure as capricious and unreasonable in view of the Deputy Inspector's and District Collector's orders and sought recovery of amounts collected on the basis of the higher assessment.

The Municipality pleaded that it was not bound by the Collector's/Deputy Inspector's orders and justified the levy under Section 82 of the Madras District Municipalities Act (the Act). The Municipality also contended that because the Act's provisions had been complied with, the civil court's jurisdiction was excluded under Section 354 and the plaintiff should be non-suited.

Procedurally, the learned Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore upheld the Municipality's pleas and dismissed the suit. The learned District Judge on appeal reversed that decision and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. This opinion concerns a second appeal challenging the maintainability of the plaintiff's suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a civil suit by a house-owner challenging a municipal assessment and seeking a refund is maintainable when the municipality has made an assessment under Section 82 of the Madras District Municipalities Act.
  2. Whether Section 354 of the Act operates as an absolute bar to civil jurisdiction in such cases, particularly where the Act provides an internal right of appeal (Schedule IV).
  3. Whether the Municipality was bound to accept the orders of the District Collector and the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils (under the House Rent Control Order and related administrative action) when fixing annual value for house-tax purposes under Section 82(2).
  4. Whether the District Judge's factual finding that the Municipality acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the higher annual value can be challenged in the second appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The property should be assessed at an annual rental value of Rs. 1,665 (monthly fair rent Rs. 150), as fixed by the District Collector under the House Rent Control Order and adopted by the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils.
  • The Municipality's adoption of an annual value of Rs. 4,440 was capricious and unreasonable; amounts collected on that assessment should be refunded.

Municipality's Arguments

  • The Municipality was not bound by the Collector's or Deputy Inspector's orders and the levy was justified under Section 82 of the Madras District Municipalities Act.
  • Section 354 of the Act bars the civil court's jurisdiction where the Act's assessment provisions have been complied with; the plaintiff's remedy was confined to the statutory appeal procedure under the Act (Schedule IV).
  • Reliance on precedents (single-judge decisions) was advanced to support the proposition that where the assessing authority has determined the facts or followed procedure, the civil court should not re-open factual findings but the remedy is an appeal under the statute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya (Viswanatha Sastri J.) Where the municipal authority determines a question of fact on the evidence available, the civil court cannot assume the powers of the assessing authority and re-investigate the facts; if the assessing authority's conclusion on facts is merely erroneous, the remedy is by statutory appeal. Civil courts can, however, declare an assessment invalid if the assessment proceeded on an erroneous statutory basis (i.e., where provisions were not complied with in substance and effect). The court considered the passage relied upon but declined to accept it insofar as it might be read to mean that even arbitrary, capricious or perverse assessments could never be challenged in ordinary civil courts. The court distinguished and limited the precedent: it refused to treat the decision as authority for an absolute exclusion of suits where the assessing authority's action is arbitrary and the Act's provisions have not been complied with in substance and effect.
Commissioner, Municipal Council, Vizagapatam v. Siddeswara Devi (AIR 1949 Mad 189(B)) Where there is a mistake of fact on the part of the Municipality, the remedy is by appeal to the Municipal Council and the civil court has no jurisdiction, provided the provisions of the Act have been complied with in substance and effect. The court noted that this ruling supports the view that civil courts lack jurisdiction only where the Act's provisions have been complied with in substance and effect. It declined to accept the decision as establishing a rule that would exclude suits generally where the municipality has not complied with the Act in substance and effect.
Purnachendra Mala v. President, Taluk Board (113 Ind Cas 560 (Mad)) Under Section 228(2) of the Madras Local Boards Act, where the statutory requisites for tax collection have been followed and there is merely a bona fide mistake of fact by the assessing authority, the aggrieved party's remedy is confined to the statutory appeal. The court referenced this single-judge decision as illustrating the general rule that where statutory procedure has been followed the remedy is statutory; however, the court reiterated its view that where statutory provisions have not been complied with in substance and effect, civil remedies remain available.
Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker v. Secretary of State (AIR 1936 Mad 269) The appeal in such matters may be to an executive body (part of the executive machinery) rather than to an independent judicial tribunal, affecting the nature of the remedy available under the statute. The court invoked this principle to support the proposition that the statutory appeal is to an executive body and therefore does not necessarily oust ordinary civil remedies where the Act's provisions have not been complied with in substance and effect.
Secretary of State v. Allu Jagannadham (AIR 1941 Mad 530) — Full Bench (The opinion refers to this Full Bench ruling but does not extract or state a specific rule from it in the provided text.) The court stated that the Full Bench ruling could be of no assistance to the appellant in the context of the present appeal and therefore did not rely upon it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion proceeds by first treating the principal factual question—whether the annual rent adopted by the Municipality was such as the premises could reasonably be expected to let at (Section 82(2) of the Act)—as a question of fact. The court observed that such a finding by the learned District Judge is generally binding in a second appeal unless vitiated by an error of principle. The court found ample material to support the District Judge's conclusion that the Municipality's adoption of the higher annual value was capricious and arbitrary.

Central to the reasoning is the interpretation and effect of Section 354 of the Act. The court analyzed Section 354 and concluded that its proviso bars civil suits only where the provisions of the Act relating to assessment have been complied with "in substance and effect." Because the Municipality had acted in disregard of the orders of the District Collector and the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils and because the District Judge found that the assessment was arbitrary, the court held that the substance-and-effect requirement of Section 354 was not satisfied in this case. Accordingly, Section 354 did not operate as a bar to the suit.

The court rejected the contention that the mere existence of a statutory right of appeal (Schedule IV of the Act) necessarily ousted the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Relying on Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (asserting civil courts' general jurisdiction over suits of a civil nature unless barred by law), the court held that the statutory appeal did not whittle down the clear language of Section 354, which preserves the right to sue where the Act's provisions have not been complied with in substance and effect.

The opinion considered and distinguished prior single-judge decisions (including Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya and Vizagapatam v. Siddeswara Devi). While acknowledging that such decisions hold that where the assessing authority has determined a question of fact the civil court should not re-examine those findings, the court would not accept those rulings as establishing that suits are wholly excluded even where an assessing authority's conduct was arbitrary, capricious or where statutory procedure was not followed in substance and effect. The court emphasized the difference between (a) an erroneous conclusion on questions of fact properly determined by the assessing authority and (b) an assessment made on an erroneous statutory basis or in breach of the statutory requirements — the latter being open to ordinary civil challenge.

The court also relied on the proposition (attributed to Varadachariar J. in Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker v. Secretary of State) that an appeal to the municipal body is to a body acting as part of the executive machinery and not to an independent tribunal, reinforcing the court's view that statutory appeal does not necessarily supplant all civil remedies.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is dismissed; the suit is competent and maintainable. The court held that the District Judge's finding that the Municipality acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the higher annual value was supported by ample material, that the provisions of the Act had not been complied with in substance and effect, and consequently Section 354 did not bar the plaintiff's suit.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The decree of the learned District Judge in favour of the plaintiff is sustained by implication: the plaintiff's suit was held competent and the second appeal failed.
  • The appellant (Municipality) was ordered to bear costs: the appeal fails "with the costs of the respondents right through."

Broader Legal Implications (as discussed in the opinion):

  • The opinion clarifies that the mere existence of a statutory appeal under the municipal statute does not automatically oust the civil court's jurisdiction; Section 354 bars suits only where the Act's assessment provisions have been complied with in substance and effect.
  • The court rejects an absolutist reading of single-judge precedents that would deny any civil remedy where an assessment is arbitrary or where the statutory requirements have not been followed in substance and effect.

Note: The court expressly considered and rejected the view that a statutory right of appeal alone excludes ordinary civil remedies where the assessing authority's action is arbitrary or where statutory procedure has not been complied with in substance and effect.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion text. No information beyond that text has been added or inferred.

    Coimbatore Municipality v. G.S. Govindayyar

    1. The Interesting question argued In this second appeal is the maintainability of a suit by the owner of a house in a Municipality questioning the assessment in respect thereof by the municipality and seeking a refund of the amount collected by the Municipality on the basis of such assessment. The plaintiff is the owner of a house property bearing door No. 5/7 in the Imperial Bank Road, Coimbatore. The defendant is the municipality of Coimbatore represented by its Commissioner. The case of the plaintiff is that the property is liable to a house-lax only of Rs. 124-14-0 per half year on the basis of an annual rental value of Rs. 1665. That wag the value fixed by the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils on the basis of the monthly rental of Rs. 150 fixed as the fair rent for the house by the District Collector of Coimbatore under the House Rent Control Order. The plaintiff attacks the value of Rs. 4440 adopted by the Municipality for determining the house-tax as being capricious and unreasonable in view of the orders of the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils and of the District Collector of Coimbatore aforesaid. The defendant pleaded that it was not bound by such orders and that the levy was justified under Section 82 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act. It also raised the contention that since the provisions of the Act had been complied with the jurisdiction, of the court stood excluded, and that the plaintiff had accordingly to be non-suited. The learned Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore by whom the suit was tried upheld the pleas of the Municipality and dismissed the action. The learned District Judge on appeal has reversed him and decreed the suit.

    2. It is argued for the Municipality in this second appeal that however erroneous the levy of tax under Section 82 of the Act may be, Section 354 interposes a bar in the way of a suit to question it. It is also contended that the only remedy of the plaintiff was to appeal against the assessment under the Act.

    3. Section 82 of the Act so far as material provides in Sub-section (2) that the annual value of buildings shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which they may reasonably be expected to let from month to month or from year to year, Section 354 so far as material provides as follows :

    The learned District Judge in appeal held that in view of the order of the District Collector under the House Rent Control Order the amount of assessment charged by the defendant was not on the basis of the annual rent at which the premises could reasonably be expected to let from month to month or from year to year within the meaning of Section 82 (2) of the Act, and that in view of the order of the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils based upon the fair rent fixed by the Collector the annual value of the lands for the purpose of that section and that subsection could be what the Municipality adopted in disregard of that order. It followed in the opinion of the learned District Judge that the civil court

    "has jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the action of the defendant was arbitrary and capricious."
    Section 354 of the Act did not, according to the learned District Judge, create a difficulty in the way of the plaintiff apparently because the provisions of the Act relating to assessment were not, in substance and effect, complied with and the proviso to the section did not accordingly stand satisfied.

    4. Whether in terms of Section 82(2) of the Act the annual rent adopted by the Municipality is such as the premises may reasonably be expected to let at from month to month or from year to year is a question of fact. Unless vitiated by any error of principle that finding of the learned District Judge in regard to this matter cannot be challenged in second appeal It was not as if there was no evidence to support his conclusion. On the other hand, the material in support of it is ample. Prima facie, the orders of the Collector & the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils should have been accepted by the Municipality, and the District Judge rightly held that the action of the Municipality in disregard of those orders was something capricious and arbitrary. The provisions of the Act cannot in terms of the proviso to Section 354 be accordingly held to have been complied with by the Municipality in substance or in effect.

    5. There being no bar of suit under the terms of Section 354 of the Act, the question is whether 'de hors' the section there is any such bar. I am not satisfied that there is any. The mere fact of the existence ol a right of appeal under the provisions of the Act against the assessment by the Municipality does not, in my opinion, necessarily oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit in challenge thereof. Reliance is placed by Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon appearing for the Municipality In support of his contention on a recent decision of a single Judge of this court (Viswanatha Sastri J.) reported in --'Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya', (A). There it was held in respect of the property in question that the assessment under Section 81(3) of the Act was rightly made and that, in any event, where the Municipal Council determined the question of fact (whether the site assessed was or was not used exclusively for agricultural purposes) on the evidence and materials available, the civil court cannot assume the powers of the assessing authority and investigate the facts afresh to find out whether its conclusion on the facts is correct.

    The passage in the judgment in that case on which stress has been laid by the learned advocate for the appellant is to be found at page 224 as follows:

    "If the land was used exclusively for agricultural purposes, the assessing authority had to proceed under Section 81(4) and if not, under Section 81(3). It had power to determine and determined the question of fact on the evidence and materials available and its conclusion was that the land in question was not used exclusively for agricultural purposes. It may be that a different view on the facts is possible. All that can be said for the respondents is that the executive authority of the Municipal Council came to a wrong conclusion on a matter of fact which it was within its competence to decide. 'If so, their remedy was by way of an appeal to the Municipal Council.' The civil court cannot assume the powers of the assessing authority and investigate the facts afresh to find out whether its conclusion on the facts is correct. If on the facts found, assumed or admitted by the assessing authority, the assessment is found to have proceeded on an erroneous basis, the civil courts can step in and declare the invalidity of the assessment on the ground that the provisions of the Act have not been in substance and effect complied with. No statutory body can give itself power to impose a tax on citizens by an erroneous interpretation of the taxing provisions in the statute and if it does so, the aggrieved tax payer has a right to get redress in the ordinary courts. In the present case, however, I am of the opinion that the assessment cannot be assailed on this ground. The error, if any, related to the appreciation of the materials available for arriving at a conclusion on a question of fact which the assessing authority had to determine in the course of making an assessment."

    6. The distinction drawn in this passage between cases of an erroneous basis adopted by the Municipality and cases of an erroneous conclusion reached in regard to the existence of the right on statutory basis on the facts found, assumed or admitted by the assessing authority is certainly 'prima facie' in favour of the appellant's contention, and the respondent on the basis of this passage read literally is confined only to the remedy of an appeal to the Municipal Council under the Act and debarred of a suit in the ordinary, courts. I am, however, with respect not prepared to accept this decision as correct if it should be taken as meaning that however arbitrary, capricious or perverse the assessment of the Municipality on the statutory basis may be, the assessee must content himself with an appeal under the Act and cannot resort to a suit for relief. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that,

    "The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have the jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred;"

    The question is whether in respect of a suit of the kind with which we are concerned in the present case, there is any provision of law anywhere which operates as a bar thereto either expressly or impliedly. No bar derived from any other enactment has been suggested, and the only bar in the Act is what is gatherable from Section 354 itself, which comes into being only where the provisions of the Act relating to assessment have been, in substance and effect, complied with. The maintainability of such a suit where there has been no such compliance with the provisions of the Act which is the necessary implication of the section cannot be treated as whittled down or eviscerated by the mere existence of a right of appeal provision in Schedule IV of the Act. While there fs on the one hand, the rule in the schedule which confers on the assessee the right of appeal, we have on the other the plain language of Section 354 in the body of the Act itself which leaves no doubt but that where the provisions of the Act have not been In substance and effect complied with an assessment can well be challenged by reason of a mistake in respect of the amount assessed and that a suit can well be brought to recover any money collected on the basis of such assessment.

    7. Reference is next made by the learned counsel for the appellant to a decision in --'the Commissioner, Municipal Council. Vizagapatam v. Siddfswara Devi', AIR. 1949 Mad 189(B), also of a single Judge. The facts there were that upto 1940 a house and site of about 4 acres had been assessed as if the whole of the 4 acres was adjacent and appurtenant to the house, that in 1940 however on the report of a special officer some 3 acres out of the 4 were excluded from the site held to be appurtenant to the house and were separately taxed, and that when a suit to recover the tax in respect of this land was brought by the Municipality the defendants maintained that they were not liable to pay the tax as the site was appurienant to the house. It was held by the learned Judge (Happen J.) that where there was a mistake of fact on the part of the Municipality the remedy was by way of an appeal to the Municipal Council, and that the civil court had no jurisdiction, provided the provisions of the Act had been in substance and effect complied with. It will be seen that so far the ruling does not carry the learned counsel the whole length required, because it lays down that the civil court has no jurisdiction on the facts, provided the provisions of the Act have been in substance and effect complied with. That as much as to suggest that where they have not been in substance and effect complied with, the civil court may well have jurisdiction. The ruling of the learned Judge proceeds further to the effect that even if the site in question should have been held to be appurtenant to the house, that is merely an error of fact in making the assessment which the Municipality had the power to make. But then again the learned Judge proceeds to hedge in his decision in the winding up of the discussion by the remark,

    ".....and it seems to me clear that there has been no contravention of any express provisions of the Act and no mistaken view of the provisions of the Act. In this view it was not open to the lower courts to go into the question whether the assessment was correct or not."

    If one is to regard this ruling -- as I am not prepared to do-- as going the whole length of laying down that in view of the existence of a right of appeal under the Schedule to the Act the remedy of a suit in cases of non-compliance by the Municipality with the provisions of the Act in substance and in effect stands excluded, I must say that I consider this ruling to be erroneous like the ruling in -- (A)'.

    8. Stress has also been laid by the learned advocate for the appellant upon a case in --Purnachendra Mala v. President, Taluk Board, Chicacole', 113 Ind Cas 560 (Mad) (C), referred to by Happell J. in -- AIR 1940 Mad 189 (B)'. In that case a suit was brought to recover the amount collected on the ground that the person practised a profession within the limits of the Taluk Board whereas in fact she had not done so. Tt was held that the civil court had no jurisdiction. That again is a decision of a single Judge (Jackson J.) which, as the headnote bears, lays down that under Section 228(2) of the Madras Local Boards Act, where the provisions requisite for the collection of the tax have been followed, and there is merely a mistake of fact committed 'bona fide' by the Pssessing authority, the remedy of the aggrieved party is that provided by and confined to the Statute, namely, an appeal to the Local Board itsrlf. In his judgment the learned Judge, it may bp noticed, points out:

    That makes no difference to the view I am taking, as it is perfectly clear to my mind on a scrutiny of Section 354 of the Act that in addition to the right of appeal provided for by and in Schedule IV of the Act the right of suit stands saved in all cases in which the provisions of the Art have not in substance and effect been complied with. After all, in the language of Varadachariar J. in -- 'Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker v. Secretary of State', AIR 1936 Mad 269 at p. 272 (H), the appeal in such a case is only to a body acting as part of the Executive machinery and not to an independent body acting as a special tribunal for settling a dispute between the tax payer and the taxing authority. For this reason the Full Bench ruling of this court in -- 'Secretary of State v. Allu Jagannadham', AIR 1941 Mad 530 (I), too can be of no assistance to the appellant. (10) I am accordingly of opinion that the suit in this case was competent, and that this second appeal must fail with the costs of the respondents right through. No leave.

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    Comments

    Coimbatore Municipality v. G.S. Govindayyar
    (Jul 11, 1950)