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  • Art. 74 or Art. 75 of the Limitation Act.7.
  • Art. 74 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 75 of the Limitation Act
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citation codes
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  • Art. 74 or Art. 75 of the Limitation Act.7.
  • Art. 74 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 75 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff was a stakeholder conducting an auction chit in Madura comprising 100 subscribers contracting to pay Rs. 20 per month for 50 months from 5 December 1941. The chit auctions were to be held on the 20th day of each Tamil month, with the bid commencing at Rs. 1,000. At the eleventh call the defendant, who had subscribed to a half share, bought it for Rs. 343 and executed an instalment bond on 9 October 1942 for Rs. 390 undertaking to pay future subscriptions as they fell due. The bond contained a default clause providing that if default was made in one instalment the whole sum would become payable with 12% interest.

The defendant paid up to the 15th call but defaulted at the 16th call due on 3 March 1943. The plaintiff asserts the defendant later paid Rs. 8 on 6 September 1943. The chit period expired in 1945. The plaintiff sued after expiry of the chit period to recover on the bond. The defendant pleaded the bar of limitation. The Subordinate Judge held the suit barred under Article 75 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the suit with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit on an instalment bond containing a default clause is governed exclusively by Article 75 of the Limitation Act (three years from date of default) so as to bar a later suit for the whole on that basis.
  2. Whether Article 74 (three years in respect of each instalment from the date an instalment becomes payable) remains available to a creditor when a bond contains a default clause and the creditor elects not to enforce the default clause.
  3. Whether the creditor is obliged to prove that he has waived the benefit of the default clause (or conversely, whether waiver must be pleaded by the debtor) in order for a suit more than three years after a particular default to be within time.
  4. What is the effect of a part payment (Rs. 8 credited on 6 September 1943 in this case) on limitation under Articles 74 and 75?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff maintained that the suit could be brought for instalments under Article 74 and was not barred, because the plaintiff had the option to sue for instalments rather than enforce the default clause under Article 75.
  • The ledger entry showing a credit of Rs. 8 on 6 September 1943 was recorded by the stakeholder; the plaintiff treated this as the only post-default payment and contended it did not affect limitation under Articles 74 or 75.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 75 of the Limitation Act — i.e., three years from date of default — and relied on the Subordinate Judge's dismissal on that ground.
  • Implicitly, the defendant relied on earlier authorities holding that Article 75 governs suits on such bonds and that limitation began from the date of default.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jawahar Lal v. Mathura Prasad (Full Bench, Allahabad) Majority held that Article 75 applies to instalment bonds with default clauses so that limitation runs from the date of default, unless the creditor is proved to have waived the default clause. The court discussed the decision, noted the majority view and the dissent by Mukerji J. The present court expressly disagreed with the majority and found Mukerji J.'s approach more persuasive, while distinguishing facts (there was a demand notice in that case which is absent here).
Gopala Menon v. Abdul Azeez (Madhavan Nair J., 1934) Supported the majority view in Jawahar Lal that Article 75 bars such suits (limitation begins from the date of default). The court noted the decision and quoted an observation: “Obviously according to this article unless waiver by the plaintiff is pleaded by the defendant time will start from the date when the default is made.” The present court interpreted that passage as not compelling the creditor to prove waiver but rather as indicating the defendant may plead waiver as a defence.
Gulab Rao v. Ganpati (Nagpur, Bose J.) Decision consistent with the view adopted by the present court regarding the interplay of Articles 74 and 75 (as referenced by the court). The court cited this decision as being in accordance with the view the court adopted — that Article 75 operates only when the creditor elects to enforce the default clause and Article 74 remains available for recovery of instalments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined Articles 74 and 75 of the Limitation Act and construed them together. The steps in the court's reasoning are:

  1. Characterisation of the bond's obligations: The court regarded an instalment bond with a default clause as containing two independent covenants — (a) a covenant by the debtor to pay monthly instalments, and (b) a covenant creating a remedial right for the creditor that, if default occurs and the creditor does not waive the default clause, the whole sum becomes due.
  2. Proper scope of Article 74: Article 74 applies to “a promissory note or bond payable by instalments” and prescribes three years for each instalment from the date the instalment becomes payable. The court held that Article 74 governs suits to recover instalments individually as they become due and before they become time-barred.
  3. Proper scope of Article 75: Article 75 concerns instalment bonds which provide that default in one or more instalments makes the whole due and prescribes three years from the date when the default is made, “unless where the payee or obligee waives the benefit of the provision, and then when fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver.” The court reasoned that Article 75 is triggered only when the creditor elects to enforce the default clause and sues on that basis.
  4. On the question of waiver: The court held that the plea of waiver is a defence that the debtor may raise when the creditor sues to enforce the default clause. It rejected the view that the creditor must establish that he waived the default clause to bring a suit more than three years after an original default. Instead, waiver is a defence for the debtor to show that the creditor condoned a particular default.
  5. Co-existence of remedies: Reading the two Articles together, the court found that the remedies under Articles 74 and 75 co-exist. The creditor has an option: either (i) to wait and sue for instalments in default under Article 74 (with limitation running separately for each instalment), or (ii) to enforce the default clause under Article 75 within three years from the date of default (unless waiver of the benefit is established by the debtor).
  6. Policy and practical considerations: The court emphasised the anomalous and harsh results that would follow from a rule forcing creditors to sue for the whole within three years of any default. The court noted that insisting on such a construction would expose creditors to robotic operation of Article 75 and potentially reward defaulting debtors who plead earlier defaults as a bar.
  7. Distinguishing precedent on facts: The court distinguished Jawahar Lal v. Mathura Prasad because in that case the creditor had given a demand notice claiming the whole had become due on 21 May 1928 and filed suit only on 25 July 1931; in the present case no such demand was made. The court also noted the ledger entry (Ex. P-2) showing a credit of Rs. 8 on 6 September 1943 but held that this credit did not affect the limitation question under Articles 74 or 75.
  8. Consideration of referring to a Full Bench: The court considered but declined to refer the matter to the Chief Justice for a Full Bench because there was no binding Bench decision to which it was strictly subordinate, and counsel had conceded as much.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: The court concluded that Article 75 operates only if the plaintiff elects to enforce the default clause. If the plaintiff does not elect that remedy he retains the ordinary right to sue for instalments under Article 74. Consequently, the present suit (filed 22 June 1946) for instalments due was not time-barred.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed; the suit is not barred by limitation under Article 75 and the plaintiff may recover instalments under Article 74.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The court found that all instalments recoverable under Article 74 as claimed in the plaint on 22 June 1946 can be recovered.
  • The plaint claimed 33 instalments commencing with the instalment payable on 3 May 1943. The court found all instalments claimed in the plaint to be admittedly due (excluding commission and default interest at 12% on which both Advocates agreed).
  • The court directed a decree for Rs. 330 with interest at 6% from the date of the suit and costs to the extent the plaintiff succeeded. The petition was allowed with costs.

Broader implications (as articulated by the court):

  • The remedies under Articles 74 and 75 co-exist; a creditor holding an instalment bond with a default clause may either enforce the default clause (bringing Article 75 into play) or sue for individual instalments under Article 74.
  • Article 75 is not to be read as extinguishing the creditor's option to sue for instalments, nor as obliging the creditor to prove waiver of the default clause to bring a suit more than three years after an earlier default; waiver remains a defence for the debtor where the creditor elects to enforce the default clause.

Signed in the opinion: N.R.R.

    S.K.S Ayyathurai Mudaliar v. Ibramsa Rowther And Another.

    JUDGMENT

    1. This petition raises an interesting point of limitation law applicable to a defaulting member of a chit fund.

    2. The plaintiff was a stakeholder who conducted in Madura what is called an auction chit of the usual type. There were 100 chit subscribers who contracted to pay Rs. 20 a month for a period of 50 months from 5th December 1941. The chit auction was to be held on the 20th day of each Tamil month, the bid commencing from Rs. 1,000. At the eleventh call the defendant who had subscribed only to a half share in the chit bought it for Rs. 343 and executed an instalment bond on 9th October 1942 for Rs. 390 undertaking to pay future subscriptions as they fell due. The bond contained a clause that if default was made in the case of one instalment the whole sum would become payable with 12 per cent interest. The defendant paid up to the 15th call but defaulted at the 16th call due on 3rd March, 1943. The plaintiff's case is that subsequent to this the defendant paid only a further sum of Rs. 8 on 6th September 1943. After the expiry of the chit period in 1945 the plaintiff sued to recover on the bond he had executed. The defendant pleaded the bar of limitation. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was barred by limitation under Art. 75 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the suit with costs.

    3. There are two Articles of limitation applicable to instalment bonds. The first is Art. 74 which applies to “a promissory note or bond payable by instalments.” It prescribes three years in respect of each instalment from the expiry of the respective terms of payment, in other words, three years from the date on which the instalment becomes payable under the bond. Art. 75 provides specifically for an instalment bond payable by instalments, which provides that if default be made in payment of one or more instalments, the whole shall be due.” It prescribes three years from the date “when the default is made, unless where the payee or obligee waives the benefit of the provision, and then when fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver.” Had the matter been res integra I should have had no difficulty or hesitation in construing these Articles as they stand. Different opinions have been however taken in decided case-law in which there is no Bench decision of our High Court or any other decision by which I appear to be bound. I shall refer to these decisions presently; but I should like to give my own reasons why the finding of the Subordinate Judge cannot be sustained, that the suit should be held to be governed solely by Art. 75.

    4. In an instalment bond with a default clause, as it appears to me, there are two covenants independent of each other, one by the debtor to pay monthly a particular sum and the other that if he defaulted and the creditor did not waive the provision of the default clause he was entitled to recover the whole amount due on the bond. It is only in cases where the creditor elects to enforce the default clause and sues to recover the whole sum, as may well happen long before the expiry of the whole instalment period, that Art. 75 becomes operative. It prescribes three years from the date of the default provided that a plaintiff has not waived such default. The plea of waiver has, as it appears to me, obviously to be set up by the debtor who is entitled in defence of such a suit to enforce the default clause, to show that the plaintiff has by his conduct or other circumstances in the case condoned or waived the default committed by him. If the defendant succeeds in proving waiver of a particular default, another suit can be filed under Art. 75 to enforce the default clause within three years of the next default provided again the defendant cannot establish that this default has been waived. This appears to me to be the ordinary meaning to be attached to Art. 75. As I read the two Articles together Art. 75 is no bar to a suit on the instalment bond itself either after or before the expiry of the instalment period for the recovery of the instalments which the debtor has contracted to pay and which have not become themselves time-barred under Art. 74. The two remedies appear to me to be co-existent and open to the creditor and he has his choice either to wait and sue for the instalments in default under Art. 74 or to enforce the default clause in a suit contemplated by Art. 75. A suit filed under Art. 75 may be dismissed on the debtor proving waiver by the creditor of the default which entitles the creditor to file such a suit, in which case the creditor can of course still fall back on his right to sue for instalments within the time limits prescribed by Art. 74. He also has the other alternative of suing to enforce the default clause for a subsequent default which he has not waived within the period prescribed by Art. 75. I find myself unable reading the two Articles together to accept the contention that because the whole amount becomes payable on default, the creditor must sue on the whole bond within three years of such default. This if taken to a logical conclusion will result in somewhat astonishing anomalies, one exemplified in the present case of a debtor pleading his own default in bar of a suit. Another is that a creditor on such instalment bonds containing a default clause which was inserted for the benefit of the creditor will be left with no option, but to sue within three years for the whole amount in the case of any default, although the instalment period itself may cover 10, 15 or 20 years. Otherwise, the creditor would be exposed in suits after or even before the expiry of the instalment period to a defence by a debtor that he had defaulted in an instalment several years before, and as the plaintiff had not sued within three years to enforce the default clause on the basis of that default he was precluded from enforcing his rights under the bond under Art. 75. If this were the legal position it would be disastrous for debtors who under such instalments bond with a default clause will receive no forbearance or mercy from their creditors in the event of any default, which no creditor will under any circumstances waive. It would indeed be regrettable to propound such a legal position at the instance of a defaulting and dishonest debtor such as the defendant undoubtedly is, who having received Rs. 343 from the chit fund now seeks to repudiate liability on this technical bar of limitation.

    5. Art. 75, to my mind, clearly and specifically lays down the right of the payee or obligee to waive the benefit of the provision, namely, the default clause. The argument is that if he does not do so, he is compelled to sue straightaway on the whole bond and is allowed three years' time from such default. If this view is accepted, limitation will depend on the question of waiver, and we shall have the plaintiff desperately trying to establish that he waived a default by the defendant who will plead to the contrary to invoke Art. 75 whereas this article, as I read it, does not contemplate any such contingency and only entitles the defendant to resist a suit to enforce a default clause on the ground that the plaintiff has waived or condoned that particular default. The view that I have taken on the wide construction of the two Articles as they stand therefore without any reference to decided case law, which is in conflict, it is that the plaintiff has the option of enforcing the default clause in Art. 75, and if he does not do so, he must be deemed to have waived the benefit of the provision, and he then can fall back on his ordinary right of suit on the covenant to pay by instalments under Art. 74. The view that I have taken is that taken by Mukerji J. in his dissenting judgment in a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jawahar Lal v. Mathura Prasad (1). The majority opinion of that Bench prevailed which was to the effect that Art. 75 only applied to a case of this kind of an instalment bond with a default clause, and that the only suit that could be filed on such a bond after a default was within three years of such default under this Article, unless the default was waived. With the greatest respect to the majority view I find myself in agreement with Mukerji J. and unable to accept it. The majority view appears to have been based on an obligation on the creditor to show that he waived the benefit of the default clause in order to show that his suit more than three years after the default is in time. This seems to be so from the following observation of King J.:

    “I think that Art. 75 is dearly applicable. This means that limitation began to run from the time when the default was made, unless the creditor is proved to have waived the benefit of the default clause. No waiver is proved.”

    As I have said supra I find it difficult to read into Art. 75 any obligation at all on a creditor to prove waiver in order to bring his suit within time. That is, as it appears to me, only a defence open to the defendant to show that the default on which the suit to enforce the default clause is filed was condoned or waived by the creditor.

    6. There is one material difference in the facts in Jawahar Lal v. Mathura Prasad and the present case, namely, that in the former the creditor gave a notice to the debtors on the 21st May 1928 claiming that on account of the default the whole amount had become due and demanding payment thereof. He filed no suit until 25th July 1931. In the present case however no such demand was made. The stakeholder kept an account of the monies owed by the subscribers, and also in making up the defendant's account gave credit to some commission due to the defendant under the chit fund rules on the basis that he had committed no default. The ledger, Ex. P-2. Shows credit for Rs. 8 on 6th September 1943, the only payment which according to the plaintiff the defendant made subsequent to 3rd April 1943 when he defaulted at the 17th call. A faint attempt was made to rely on this farther payment as bringing the plaint filed on 22nd June 1946 within time on another ground. There are no grounds for doubting the correctness of that credit; nor does that part payment affect the question of limitation either under Art. 74 or Art. 75 of the Limitation Act.

    7. My attention has been drawn to the decision in Gopala Menon v. Abdul Azeez by Madhavan Nair J. (as he then was) sitting singly in 1934 in which he appeared in agreement with the majority view in Jawahar Lal v. Mathura Prasad (2) and held that Art. 75 barred such a suit. In that case the default occurred on 23rd May 1922, and a suit was filed on 3rd January 1927. There is direct support in this decision to the view that I have taken about waiver in the following observation:

    “Obviously according to this article unless waiver by the plaintiff is pleaded by the defendant time will start from the date when the default is made.”

    It was also observed that no decision directly bearing on the question of waiver was brought to notice, and indeed no such decision on the subject of waiver being pleaded in a suit to enforce a default clause on an instalment bond under Art. 75 of the Act has been placed before me. The view I have taken is also in accordance with Gulab Rao v. Ganpati (3) a Nagpur decision by Bose J.

    8. I have considered whether it is necessary to place this case before the learned Chief Justice for reference to a Full Bench; but as there appears to be no Bench decision by which I am strictly bound, as the learned Advocates before me concede, I think I am entitled to decide this matter in accordance with my own opinion. I accordingly find that in a suit on an instalment bond with a default clause Art. 75 will only operate if the plaintiff elects to enforce the default clause which it is always open to him to waive or forego. In such cases his right to recover the instalments as on an ordinary instalment bond within three years prescribed by Art. 74 of the Limitation Act remains unaffected. The suit therefore is, in my opinion, not time barred and all instalments recoverable under Art. 74 on 22nd June 1946 the date on which the suit was filed can be recovered.

    The plaint claimed 33 instalments commencing from that payable on 3rd May 1943. The suit was filed on 22nd June 1946 on the day the Sub Court opened after the recess. All the instalments claimed in the plaint are admittedly due excluding commission and default interest at 12% to which both Advocates agree. On my finding supra plaintiff will have a decree for Rs. 330 with interest at 6 per cent from the date of suit with costs to the extent plaintiff has succeeded. Petition is allowed in the result with costs.

    N.R.R

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    S.K.S Ayyathurai Mudaliar v. Ibramsa Rowther And Another.
    (Dec 2, 1948)