Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Writ Petn. No. 4318 of 1965

Advocates

For the Appellant: N.R. Chandran, T. Selvaraj, V.P. Raman, Advocates.

Judges

Kailasam, J.

Acts

Section 4(1) and under Section 17(4) that the provisions of Section 5-A
provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
Clause (c) of sub-section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 17
Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962
Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
SECTION 6 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
provisions of Section 17(1) or 17(2)
sub-section (4) to Section 17,
sub-section (1) of Section 4
Section 4, sub-section (1).4.
Section 4(1) and Section 6
Section 4, sub-section (1).
LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c)
Section 4(1)

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition sought a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the State of Madras relating to G.O. No. 4256, Home, dated 14-9-1965 (published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated 29-9-1965) and for quashing that order.

The Petitioners are the owners of Survey No. 250/28 and S. No. 2491.A in Ariyur Village, Namakkal Taluk, Salem District. The Government issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 14-9-1965. On the same date the Government, invoking sub-section (4) to Section 17, directed that the provisions of Section 5-A would not apply. Also on 14-9-1965 the Governor made a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act that the lands were needed for a public purpose — namely, making provision for house-sites for Harijans of Nadupatti. Both the Section 4(1) notification (with the Section 17(4) dispensation as to Section 5-A) and the Section 6 declaration were challenged in this writ petition.

The matter proceeded by written pleadings and argument. The Court considered the petitioners' objections and relevant authorities and dismissed the writ petition. There was no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a notification under Section 4(1) and a declaration under Section 6 can be published simultaneously where the Government at the same time dispenses with the provisions of Section 5-A under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Whether the Government's satisfaction as to urgency under Section 17(4) is justiciable — i.e., whether a court may review the existence or sufficiency of urgency relied upon by the Government.
Whether acquisition under Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c) (acquisition for house-sites for Harijans) is permissible when Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c) contemplates acquisition for providing houses for the poor and some Harijans may not be poor.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced through Mr. V.P. Raman)

The simultaneous issuance on the same date of (a) the Section 4(1) notification, (b) the order under Section 17(4) dispensing with Section 5-A, and (c) the Section 6 declaration is illegal and contrary to Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act.
The State was not justified in invoking Section 17(4) because there was no urgency as contemplated by that section.
The acquisition said to be under Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c) can only be justified for making provision for houses for the poor; acquiring land for Harijans as a class is impermissible because some Harijans might be rich.

State's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

The objection to simultaneous publication is answered by precedent: where the Government is satisfied that urgency exists and dispenses with Section 5-A, it can make the Section 6 declaration and the Section 4 notification contemporaneously.
The notification in this case was made under Section 17(1) and, on the merits (as shown in the counter-affidavit), the land was required for 24 Harijan families who were in need of house-sites; thus the requirement under Clause (c) of sub‑section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 17 (that land be for providing dwelling houses for the poor) is satisfied.
The Land Acquisition Manual guidance (referred to in the opinion) supports procedural caution but does not invalidate the Government's notifications here; the Manual suggests publishing the declaration a week after the Section 4(1) notification as abundant caution, and suggests listing intended beneficiaries when land is required for Scheduled Castes or similar purposes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Smt. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151	Holds that where the Government, by reason of emergency, dispenses with Section 5-A under Section 17(4), a Section 4(1) notification and a Section 6 declaration can be published on the same day; prior separate publication is not a statutory condition precedent.	The Court followed this decision and rejected the petitioners' contention that the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration could not be made simultaneously.
Raja Anand v. State of U.P., AIR 1967 SC 1081	States that the Government's opinion under Section 17(4) is subjective and ordinarily not open to judicial inquiry; but it can be challenged if the Government never applied its mind or acted mala fide.	The Court relied on this principle to hold that the decision of the Government on urgency is not subject to judicial review except in cases where the Government did not apply its mind or acted mala fide.
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, 72 Ind App 241 : AIR 1945 PC 156	Privy Council authority that a recital of satisfaction in a duly authenticated order is, in the absence of evidence of inaccuracy, accepted by a court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled.	The Court cited and applied this principle to the effect that recitals of satisfaction are normally accepted unless there is evidence to the contrary or other indicia of lacuna/mala fides.
Jaichand Lala Sethia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1967 SC 483	Supports the position that a subjective satisfaction recorded by authorities (in that context Rule 30) is not ordinarily subject to inquiry; accuracy of such recitals can be challenged on grounds of non-application of mind or mala fides.	The Court cited this authority in support of the limited scope of judicial review regarding executive satisfaction about urgency/detention-related grounds and applied the same limited approach to Section 17(4) satisfaction.
A. Natesa Asari v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 481 (1953-2 Mad LJ 684)	Division Bench view that satisfaction of Government under Section 17(4) (existence of urgency) is a matter solely for the Government and not generally subject to judicial review.	The Court followed this Division Bench decision as binding precedent for the proposition that urgency is for the Government to determine and rejected petitions attacking urgency as non-justiciable save for specified exceptions.
Mohd. Habibullah v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, Madras, AIR 1967 Mad 118	Reiterates the principle that whether urgency existed is for the Government and not for judicial review.	The Court relied on this decision (which followed A. Natesa Asari) to support its conclusion that urgency is not ordinarily open to judicial examination.
Nagamalai Colony Formation Association v. State of Madras, ILR 1965-1 Mad 741	Finds that no objective criterion is laid down in Section 17(4) to guide Government satisfaction; expresses concern about hampering swift action if objective investigation were to be prescribed.	The Court cited this decision to show that a Bench of the Court recognized the same limited scope of judicial review regarding urgency and followed that approach.
W.P. No. 1555 of 1964 (Mad)	A Bench of the Court expressed a different view — that the Court should examine whether the Government's decision to invoke Section 17(4) was based on material, objective and not arbitrary or whimsical; suggests a wider scope of review.	The Court noted this different view but declined to follow it, stating its obligation to follow Supreme Court and three Division Bench precedents that limit judicial review of executive satisfaction under Section 17(4).
W.P. No. 795 of 1962 (AIR 1965 Mad 328) and W.P. Nos. 505, etc. of 1961 (Single Judge decisions)	Single Judge decisions expressing a view broader than that of the Supreme Court and Division Benches regarding judicial scrutiny of urgency.	The Court observed these single judge decisions but expressly disagreed with them and followed the Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities instead.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner addressing each of the petitioners' main contentions in turn and relying only on the material and authorities placed before it.

1. Simultaneity of Notifications (Section 4(1) and Section 6 issued together while Section 17(4) dispenses with Section 5-A)

The Court examined the wording of Section 17(4) which permits the Government, where the provisions of Section 17(1) or (2) are applicable, to direct that Section 5-A shall not apply and provides that “a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)”. The petitioners relied on the phrase “at any time after” to contend that prior publication of Section 4(1) was required before a Section 6 declaration could be made.

The Court followed the Supreme Court decision in Smt. Somawanti v. State of Punjab which held that where an emergency exists and the Government dispenses with Section 5-A, the Government necessarily considered the public requirement at the earliest stage and that simultaneous publication does not depart from the law. The opinion consequently rejected the petitioners' objection to simultaneity.

The Court additionally referred to instructions in the Land Acquisition Manual (Madras) indicating that as a matter of caution the Section 6 declaration should be published a week after the Section 4(1) notification to avoid objections, but observed these directions are precautionary and not mandatory legal requirements invalidating simultaneous publication.

2. Justiciability of Government's Satisfaction as to Urgency under Section 17(4)

The Court reviewed relevant authorities, including Supreme Court decisions and Privy Council precedent, and three Division Bench decisions of the Madras High Court:

It noted that the Supreme Court (Raja Anand) acknowledged that the Government's opinion under Section 17(4) is subjective and that courts ordinarily cannot inquire into the sufficiency of the grounds for that opinion.
However, the Court accepted the established exception: the opinion can be challenged if it is shown that the Government never applied its mind to the matter or acted mala fide.
The Court cited the Privy Council principle (Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee) that in the normal case recitals of satisfaction in an authenticated order will be accepted unless proved inaccurate.

Applying these authorities and the Division Bench precedents (A. Natesa Asari, Mohd. Habibullah, Nagamalai), the Court held that the Government's decision as to urgency under Section 17(4) is not normally justiciable. The Court expressly declined to adopt a broader approach (as in W.P. No. 1555 of 1964) that would require courts to assess whether the decision to invoke urgency was based on adequate material and objectively made. The narrower approach was followed: judicial inquiry is limited to whether there is evidence that the Government failed to apply its mind or acted mala fide, or the order contains a lacuna.

3. Application of Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c) (acquisition for house-sites for Harijans)

The Court considered the petitioners' objection that Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c) permits acquisition only for providing houses for the poor and that acquiring land for Harijans as a class is impermissible because some Harijans might be rich.

The State's counter-claim (as reflected in the counter affidavit) was that the notification in this case was under Section 17(1) and that the material showed the land was required for 24 Harijan families who were in need of house-sites and were without houses and poor. The Court noted that on the materials on record it was clear the land was required for providing dwelling houses for Harijans who were without houses and were poor, and therefore the requirement under Clause (c) of sub-section (2)(b)(ii) that the land be for providing dwelling houses for the poor was satisfied.

The Court also reiterated the desirability (though not the legal necessity) of following the Land Acquisition Manual's direction to identify intended beneficiaries and extents in notifications as a preventive measure against such legal objections.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed.

Implications:

The Court rejected all the petitioners' contentions: simultaneous publication of the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration in circumstances where Section 17(4) was invoked is permissible under the cited Supreme Court authority (Smt. Somawanti).
The Court upheld the established principle that the Government's satisfaction as to urgency under Section 17(4) is, in general, not subject to judicial review except where it can be shown that the Government did not apply its mind, acted mala fide, or the order contains a lacuna; applying that principle, the petitioners' challenge to urgency failed.
The Court accepted the State's account on the materials that the land was required for 24 Harijan families in need of house-sites and concluded that the condition in Clause (c) of sub-section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 17 (acquisition for dwelling houses for the poor) was satisfied on the record before it.
Direct effect on the parties: the challenged notifications (G.O. No. 4256, Home dated 14-9-1965 and the related publications) were not quashed and the acquisition process as notified was sustained. There was no order as to costs.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying and following existing Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities; the decision follows prior authority limiting judicial review of governmental satisfaction regarding urgency and therefore does not announce a new precedent beyond those authorities.

Outcome recorded in the opinion: "Petition dismissed." There will be no order as to costs.

Show full summary ...

Sellappa Gounder v. State Of Madras

1. This petition is filed for the Issue of a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the State of Madras relating to G.O No. 4256, Home, dated 14-9-1965 published in Fort St. George Gazette, dated 29-9-1965 and for quashing the same.

2. The Petitioners are the owners of Survey No. 250/28 and S. No. 2491.A in Ariyur Village, Namakkal Taluk, Salem District. Regarding this land, the Government issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 14-9-1965. In the same notification, under sub-section (4) to Section 17, the Governor directed that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. On the same date 14-9-1965, the Governor also made a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act declaring that the lands were needed for public purpose, namely for making provision for house sites for Harijans of Nadupatti. These two notifications are challenged in this writ petition.

3. Mr. V.P Raman, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners raised three contentions. Firstly, he submitted that the notification under Section 4(1), the dispensing of the provisions under Section 5-A and the issuing of declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on the same date are illegal and contrary to Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. Secondly, he submitted that the State was not justified in invoking the provisions under Section 17(4) as there was no urgency as contemplated under the section. Thirdly, he contended that the acquisition of the house under Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c) can only be justified for making provision for houses for the poor and not for Harijans as a class as there may be Harijans who are rich. So far as the objection of the learned Counsel that the notification under Section 4(1) and under Section 17(4) that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply and the declaration under Section 6 cannot be made simultaneously is concerned, the learned Counsel strenuously relied on the wordings of Section 17(4) which reads:—

“In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)”.

4. The procedure under the Land Acquisition Act is to make a preliminary notification under Section 4(1) by the appropriate Government stating that the land in a particular locality is needed for any public purpose. The powers under Section 17(4) can be invoked in the case of urgency. It may be that at the time of the notification under Section 4(1), the Government was satisfied that the land is required urgently and, therefore, may pass an order simultaneously that the Government is satisfied that the provisions of Section 17(1) or 17(2) are applicable and declare that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. So far, there can be no difficulty. Strong reliance is made on the words “a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)”. It was contended that the words “a declaration under Section 6 may be made after the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)” would contemplate an earlier publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) to be followed by a declaration under Section 6, and, therefore, the two notifications cannot be made simultaneously.

5. The Supreme Court in Smt. Soma-wanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 at p. 171, in answering the contention that notifications under Section 4(1) and Section 6 cannot be made simultaneously observed as follows:—

“But it seems to us that where there is an emergency by reason of which the State Government directs under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act that the provisions of Section 5-A need not be complied with, the whole matter, that Is, the actual requirement of the land for a public purpose must necessarily have been considered at the earliest stage itself that is when it was decided that the compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A be dispensed with. It is, therefore difficult to see why the two notifications cannot, in such a case be made simultaneously. A notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is a condition precedent to the making of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6. If the Government, therefore, takes a decision to make such a notification and, thereafter, takes two further decisions, that is, to dispense with compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A, and also to declare that the land comprised in the notification is in fact needed for public purpose, there is no departure from any provision of the law even though the two notifications are published on the same day.”

The Court proceeded to observe that the law does not make the prior publication of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 a condition precedent to the publication of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6. The decision negatives the contention of the learned Counsel. Following the decision, I hold that the objection that the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 cannot be made simultaneously has to be rejected. In this connection it will be useful to refer to the directions given in the Land Acquisition Manual compiled by the Madras Government at page 89. They are as follows:

“In cases in which exemption from the operation of Section 5-A of the Act is recommended and the Collector submits both the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 they may be sent together to the press, but they should not both be published in one issue of the Gazette. The latter should be published a week after the former. The schedule of lands should be published with the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6.”

These directions are by way of abundant caution and if followed would avoid the objections that are raised in the present petition.

6. The next contention of the learned Counsel is that the decision whether there was an urgency or not is justiciable and the Court would be entitled to look into the facts of each case the Supreme Court in Raja Anand v. State of U.P, AIR 1967 SC 1081 at p. 1085 observed:—

“It is true that the opinion of the State Government which is a condition for the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) of the Act is subjective and a Court cannot normally enquire whether there were sufficient grounds or justification of the opinion formed by the State Government under Section 17(4)”.

After citing with approval the decision of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, 72 Ind App 241 : (AIR 1945 PC 156) and referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaichand Lala Sethia v. State of West Bengal, Cri. Appeal No. 110 of 1966, D/- 27-7-1966 = (AIR 1967 SC 483), the Court observed:

“But even though the power of the State Government has been formulated under Section 17(4) of the Act in subjective terms the experience of opinion of the State Government can be challanged as ultra vires in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide.”

The exceptions mentioned in the decision which would enable a party to challenge the opinion of the State Government are that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide.

7. Dealing with the satisfaction of the Government required under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 483 has held that the satisfaction is a subjective satisfaction and that a Court cannot normally enquire whether grounds existed which would have created the satisfaction on which alone the order could have been made in the mind of a reasonable person, if therefore, an authenticated order of detention is on its face regular and in conformity with the language of Rule 30 it is not ordinarily open to a Court to enter into an investigation about the sufficiency of the materials on which the order of detention is based. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the law stated in 72 Ind App 241 at p. 261 : (AIR 1945 PC 156 at p. 161). There the Privy Council stated:—

“In the normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticated order will, in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by a Court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled.”

The Supreme Court in summing up the position held as follows at page 486:

“The accuracy (of a recital) can be challenged in two ways either by proving that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the authorities of the State Government acted mala fide in a normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticated order wall in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by the Court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled. In other words, in a normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticated order that the State Government was satisfied will, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be accepted by the Court as establishing that the State Government was so satisfied. If the order of detention itself suffers from any lacuna, it is open to a Court in a proper case to call for an affidavit from the Chief Minister or other Minister concerned or to call for the relevant file from the State Government in order to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the recital made in the order of detention.”

Thus it will be seen that normally an affidavit or the records will not be called for if the order prima fade discloses that the Government was satisfied. If the order suffers from any lacuna, an affidavit can be called for. The case where the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or where the State Government acted mala fide is different.

8. In A. Natesa Asari v. State Of Madras, 1953-2 Mad LJ 684 : 66 Mad LW 999 : (AIR 1954 Mad 481) a Division Bench of this Court in considering the scope of the challenge to the satisfaction of the Government as to the state of urgency under Section 17(4) held that what was required under Section 17(4) is that the Government must be satisfied that there was such urgency as is contemplated under Section 17(1) and if it was so satisfied it was entitled to pass an order under S. 17(4) dispensing with the application of S. 5-A. The promission that there was no urgency in the case as would justify invoking the provisions under Section 17(1) and that there was no enquiry about such urgency was rejected on the ground whether an urgency existed or not was a matter solely for the determination of the Government and was not a matter for judicial review. A recent decision of a Bench of this Court in Mohd. Habibullah v. Spedal Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition. Madras, AIR 1967 Mad 118 followed the decision in 1953-2 Mad LJ 684 : (AIR 1954 Mad 481) and held whether urgency existed or not is a matter solely for the determination of the Government and it is not a matter for judicial review. In Nagamalai Colony Formation Association v. State of Madras, ILR 1965-1 Mad 741, at page 751 in considering the scope of the Government's satisfaction regarding the urgency, a Bench of this Court has found that no objective criterion is laid down to guide the Government and that the sub-section does not even use the words like, that the Government should be reasonably satisfied as to the existence of the condition. Taking this into consideration that steps will have to be taken under Section 17(4) in cases of urgency, the Court expressed its view that it would be hampering the freedom of swift action if an objective investigation were to be prescribed. The Bench also followed the view expressed in 1953-2 Mad LJ 684 : (AIR 1954 Mad 481).

9. Thus it will be seen that three Division Benches of this Court have taken the view that the question whether urgency exists or not is a matter solely for the determination of the Government and it is not a matter of judicial review. Reading these decisions along with the decisions in AIR 1967 SC 483 and AIR 1967 SC 1081, the position of law is dear that the decision of the Government regarding the urgency is not subject to judicial review except in cases where the order itself suffers from a lacuna or in cases where the Government never applied its mind to the matter or acted mala fide.

A view somewhat different is expressed by a Bench of this Court in W.P No. 1555 of 1964 (Mad). The Court held:

“The question in each case for the Government to consider when it desires to invoke Section 17(4) would be whether facts and conditions exist or require that would not brook the delay which would be caused by applying Section 5-A. A decision on that question will have to be taken on proper material and in an objective manner, other capridously nor whimsically. But when the Court is called upon to see whether the power in invoking urgency provisions has been properly exercised, it has necessarily to examine whether the decision to invoke the provisions was based on material and was other arbitrary nor capricious nor mala fide.”

The scope of the judicial review according to this decision is wider than that as envisaged by the two decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1967 SC 483 and AIR 1967 SC 1081. Ndther the decisions of the Supreme Court nor that of the Privy Count in AIR 1945 PC 156 : 72 Ind App 241 nor the three Division Bench dedsions of this Court in 1953-2 Mad LJ 684 : (AIR 1954 Mad 481), ILR (1965) 1 Mad 741 and AIR 1967 Mad 118 were brought to the notice of the learned Judges. With respect I feel bound by the two decisions of the Supreme Court and the three Division Bench Judgments referred to above and hold that the desion of the Government regarding the existence of the urgency is not justiciable except grounds specified in the decisions. The Court will not be entitled to go into the question whether the decision was taken on proper material and in an objective manner. In this view I am unable to agree with the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in AIR 1965 Mad 328, W.P No. 795 of 1962 and in W.P Nos. 505, etc. of 1961.

10. The next point urged by the learned Counsel is that the notification requiring the lands for the purpose of providing the Harijans with house-sites is not one contemplated under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 which states that the land is required as house-sites for Harijans are illegal. This argument is based on the wording of Section 17(2)(b)(ii)(c) which makes the procedure under Section 17(2) applicable in cases of acquisition for construction of houses for the Harijans need not necessarily be acquisition for providing dwelling houses for the poor for some of the Harijans may be rich. The answer to this contention is twofold by the State. Firstly it is submitted that the notification is one under Section 17(1) and as such may be upheld. It provides that when the Government is satisfied about the existence of urgency, it can invoke the provision under Section 17(4) if the land sought to be acquired is waste or arable land. Section 17(1) is not applicable to lands which are not waste or arable. It is only with regard to the lands which do not fall under the category of arable lands, the question whether the land is intended for dwelling houses for the poor would have to be gone into. It is unnecessary to consider this question at any length in this case for it is clear from the counter affidavit that the notification in this case is under Section 17(1) and on the merits it is seen that the land is required for 24 families who are Harijans badly in need of the house-sites. Thus on the materials on record it is clear that the land is required for providing dwelling houses for Harijans who are without houses and are poor. The requirement under Clause (c) of sub-section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 17 that the land can be acquired under Section 17(2) for providing house-sites for the poor is satisfied. In this connection it is useful to refer to the directions given in the Land Acquisition Manual compiled by the State Government. At page 85 of the Manual it is directed:

“When land is required for providing house-sites for members of the Scheduled Castes or other labouring classes or of a co-operative society, the names of the members to whom it is intended to assign the land when acquired should be given in the notice issued under Sections 4(1) and 5-A together with the extents proposed to be given to each.”

This instruction if followed would avoid the legal contentions that have been put forward in this case. It may not be necessary that in the notifications under Sections 4(1) and 5-A these particulars should be given but it is desirable to follow such a course.

11. In the result all the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the Petitioners are rejected. The Writ Petition is dismissed.

12. There will be no order as to costs.

BDB/D.V.C

13. Petition dismissed.

Sellappa Gounder v. State Of Madras

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced through Mr. V.P. Raman)

State's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sellappa Gounder v. State Of Madras

Comments