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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Act, 1852 (Bombay Act XI of 1952), the Exemptions from Land Revenue (I) of 1863 (Bombay Act No. II of 1863) and Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863),
  • Bombay Act XI of 1852, the Bombay Act II of 1863 and the provisions contained in Article 363 of the Constitution of India,
  • ARTICLE 363 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Bombay Act II of 1852, Bombay Act II of 1863, Bombay Act VII of 1863.
  • provisions of Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act II of 1863),
  • provisions contained in Bombay Act XI of 1852 and Bombay Act II of 1863,
  • provisions contained in Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India.
  • SECTION 9 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Civil Courts. Clause (1) of Schedule-A to the Act XI of 1852
  • section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
  • Clause (1) of sections 6, 9 and 10 of the Bombay Act
  • provisions contained in Act XI of 1852. Section 10
  • Land Revenue (II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863)
  • ARTICLE 363 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1953
  • Bombay Act XI of 1852 and Bombay Act II
  • provision in Bombay Act XI of 1852,
  • section 7 of Bombay Act XI of 1852
  • provisions of this Act. Section 9
  • provisions of the Bombay Act VII
  • Act, 1852 (Bombay Act XI of 1852)
  • provisions of Act XI of 1852
  • provisions of Bombay Act VII
  • provisions of Article 143,
  • Bombay Act XI of 1852
  • Bombay Act II of 1863,
  • section 2(1)(e)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Act, 1852 (Bombay Act XI of 1952), the Exemptions from Land Revenue (I) of 1863 (Bombay Act No. II of 1863) and Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863),
  • Bombay Act XI of 1852, the Bombay Act II of 1863 and the provisions contained in Article 363 of the Constitution of India,
  • ARTICLE 363 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Bombay Act II of 1852, Bombay Act II of 1863, Bombay Act VII of 1863.
  • provisions of Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act II of 1863),
  • provisions contained in Bombay Act XI of 1852 and Bombay Act II of 1863,
  • provisions contained in Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India.
  • SECTION 9 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Civil Courts. Clause (1) of Schedule-A to the Act XI of 1852
  • section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
  • Clause (1) of sections 6, 9 and 10 of the Bombay Act
  • provisions contained in Act XI of 1852. Section 10
  • Land Revenue (II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863)
  • ARTICLE 363 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1953
  • Bombay Act XI of 1852 and Bombay Act II
  • provision in Bombay Act XI of 1852,
  • section 7 of Bombay Act XI of 1852
  • provisions of this Act. Section 9
  • provisions of the Bombay Act VII
  • Act, 1852 (Bombay Act XI of 1852)
  • provisions of Act XI of 1852
  • provisions of Bombay Act VII
  • provisions of Article 143,
  • Bombay Act XI of 1852
  • Bombay Act II of 1863,
  • section 2(1)(e)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Revision Application concerning jurisdiction over "Saranjam Properties")

Factual and Procedural Background

The Civil Revision Application challenges the order dated 22 February 2005 made by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara, which held it had jurisdiction to try Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 2003 instituted by respondent No. 1 (the original plaintiff). The petitioner (original defendant No. 1) filed an application dated 5 July 2003 asserting that the subject properties were "Saranjam Properties" and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was either expressly or impliedly barred by the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852 (Act XI of 1852), Exemptions from Land Revenue (I) of 1863 (Bombay Act II of 1863) and Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863). A preliminary issue was framed under section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code (as applicable in Maharashtra) and the impugned order answered that issue against the petitioner, prompting the present revision. The suit was instituted in 2003; the petitioners raised the jurisdictional objection in the same year, the impugned order was passed in February 2005, and the trial has remained stayed since then. The revision is now adjudicated and results in dismissal of the application with costs and further directions to the trial court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the suit is ousted, expressly or impliedly, by the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852 (Bombay Act XI of 1852), the Exemptions from Land Revenue Act, 1863 (Bombay Act II of 1863) and/or the Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863).
  2. Whether Article 363 of the Constitution of India bars the Civil Courts from entertaining the dispute because it arises out of, or is in respect of rights accruing under, pre-Constitution treaties, agreements, covenants, engagements or sanads to which the Dominion of India or its predecessor and a Ruler of an Indian State was a party.
  3. Whether, on the pleadings (the plaint), the dispute before the Civil Court is a dispute "against the Government" (and hence within the scope of the adjudicatory machinery created by the statutes) or an inter se dispute between private claimants to the properties.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (original defendant No. 1) — submissions by Mr. Patwardhan

  • The plaint itself admits the suit properties are "Saranjam Properties" granted under the Bombay Saranjam, Jahagir and Other Inams of Political Nature Resolution Rules, 1952; disputes as to entitlement must be resolved under Bombay Act II of 1852, Bombay Act II of 1863 and Bombay Act VII of 1863, which either expressly or impliedly bar Civil Court jurisdiction and provide final adjudicatory mechanisms.
  • The suit raises disputes arising out of treaties, agreements or sanads to which the Government of the Dominion of India or its predecessor and the Ruler of an Indian State was a party; therefore Article 363 of the Constitution creates a constitutional bar on municipal Courts entertaining the dispute. Reliance was placed on Dr. Karan Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Draupadi Devi v. Union of India.
  • More specifically, passages and clauses in Act XI of 1852 and in clauses/sections of the 1863 Acts were relied upon to argue that jurisdiction was ousted (the petitioner pointed to the Preamble and certain clauses in schedules/sections of the statutes).

Respondent No. 1 (original plaintiff) — submissions by Mr. Vijay Patil

  • The point under Article 363 of the Constitution was not raised in the petitioners' application for framing the preliminary issue nor argued before the Civil Judge, and was therefore not properly before the Court; in any event the dispute in the plaint does not pertain to rights or obligations arising out of any treaty, agreement or sanad.
  • The "State of Satara" does not satisfy the definition of "Indian State" under Article 363(2)(a); reliance was placed on the "Doctrine of Lapse" to argue that the erstwhile State of Satara merged with the British Dominion and was not recognized before the commencement of the Constitution as an Indian State for Article 363 purposes.
  • The provisions of Bombay Act VII of 1863 do not apply; nothing in Bombay Act XI of 1852 or Bombay Act II of 1863 either expressly or impliedly bars Civil Court jurisdiction in relation to the disputes pleaded in the plaint. The two Acts concern claims against Government and succession/transfer of exempt lands but do not attract to the private inter se claims raised.
  • Reference was made to multiple decisions on the principles for interpreting ouster clauses and on the presumption in favour of civil jurisdiction; the respondent asked the Court to examine those authorities in its analysis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Karan Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2004) 5 SCC 698 Article 363 applies where dispute "arises out of" provisions of an agreement; whether an instrument covers the subject is a factual question that determines applicability of Article 363. The Court explained that the case illustrates how Article 363 applies only if the dispute arises from the pre-Constitution instruments; this precedent was used to show that no analogous factual issue (whether the dispute arises out of such an instrument) exists on the plaint in the present case.
Draupadi Devi v. Union of India, (2004) 11 SCC 425 Held that where a dispute whether a property was recognised as private property of the Ruler arose out of the covenant between the Ruler and Government, Article 363 rendered the matter non-justiciable in municipal Courts. The Court observed that Draupadi Devi is an example where Article 363 applied; it contrasted that situation with the present plaint and concluded that no similar question arises here.
ITI Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 2308 : (2002) 5 SCC 510 The provision of law ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts must be strictly construed; onus is on the party seeking to oust jurisdiction. The Court relied on this principle to affirm that ouster must be clearly established and to conclude that the petitioners had not met the onus to show an ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction.
Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 Support for the proposition that the party asserting ouster of court jurisdiction bears the onus and that ouster is to be strictly construed. The Court cited this authority in support of the strict-construction principle and the burden on the party asserting ouster.
Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma (AIR 1995 SC 2001) : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 286 The expression "civil nature" is wider than "civil proceedings"; section 9 CPC applies where dispute affects civil rights. The Court used this authority to confirm applicability of section 9 principles and to frame the jurisdictional enquiry in terms of "civil nature" of the dispute pleaded.
State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society, AIR 2003 SC 1043 : (2003) 2 SCC 412 Even where part of a claim is excluded from Civil Court jurisdiction, the remainder may be tried; entire suit must be barred for jurisdictional ouster to succeed. The Court invoked this precedent to note that partial exclusion does not bar trial of the remaining civil aspects of a suit, favouring maintenance of jurisdiction unless the whole suit is barred.
Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, AIR 1968 SC 271 Where a jurisdiction vested in the Court is attempted to be ousted, there must be a clear provision or clear legislative intent; in case of doubt, courts lean towards maintaining existing jurisdiction. The Court applied this rule in concluding that statutory provisions cited by petitioners did not clearly demonstrate an intention to oust Civil Court jurisdiction.
Sayed Mohomed Baquir El-Edroos (dead) by LRs. v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 4 SCC 383 : AIR 1981 SC 2016 Even where a statute declares the finality of an administrative decision, that declaration does not automatically exclude jurisdiction of Civil Courts; examination of scheme and adequacy of remedies is relevant. The Court relied on this authority to demonstrate that "finality" language in statutory provisions (or government decisions) does not necessarily oust Civil Court jurisdiction, applying that approach to the Acts relied upon by petitioners.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10 Supportive authority for the proposition that statutory finality clauses do not ipso facto exclude Civil Court jurisdiction; the Court must consider statutory scheme and adequacy of remedies. The Court cited the case as further support for the El-Edroos principle, using it to reinforce that the petitioners' reliance on statutory finality or ouster was insufficient.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the jurisdictional question on the basis of the pleadings: the plaint is the primary material to decide whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted. The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Examination of the plaint and the nature of the dispute: the plaint admitted the suit properties were "Saranjam Properties" but did not challenge the grants to the Government; rather the plaintiff asserted entitlement as co-parceners descended from a royal line and sought declaration of political Saranjam status and related reliefs. The Court therefore characterised the dispute as primarily an inter se dispute between private claimants rather than a suit "against the Government."
  2. Analysis of Bombay Act XI of 1852 (Bombay Rent-free Estates Act): the Court reviewed the Preamble, relevant sections and Schedules. It observed that Act XI was enacted to provide an adjudicatory machinery for claims against Government concerning inams and exempt estates. The Court noted that earlier express ouster provisions (e.g., section 7) had been repealed and that the duties in Schedule-A refer to investigating titles of persons "holding or claiming against Government," a phrase the Court read as confined to claims involving the Government rather than private inter se disputes. On this basis the Court concluded Act XI did not expressly or impliedly oust Civil Court jurisdiction over the present dispute.
  3. Analysis of Bombay Act II of 1863 (Exemptions from Land Revenue): the Court observed from the Preamble that the Act facilitates adjustment of unsettled claims to exemption and regulates succession/transfer in territories within Act XI's operation. It found nothing in the Preamble or in sections 6, 9 and 10 (which concern inquiries, authority of officers and burden of proof) that applied to the present plaint or that amounted to an express or implied bar to Civil Court jurisdiction for the dispute as pleaded.
  4. Analysis of Bombay Act VII of 1863 (Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act): the Court concluded that Act VII applies in areas not subject to Act XI and therefore did not apply to the properties here (which were said to be within Act XI's operation); even the provisions relied upon were extraneous to the dispute.
  5. Consideration of Article 363 of the Constitution: the Court set out Article 363 and stressed its limited scope — it applies only to disputes arising out of or in respect of rights under pre-Constitution instruments (treaties, agreements, sanads) to which the Dominion of India or its predecessor and an Indian State's Ruler was party. The Court found no pleading that the dispute arose out of such an instrument; the petitioners had relied on Rules made in 1952 (post-Constitution), and there were no pleadings showing the erstwhile State of Satara met Article 363(2)(a)'s definition of "Indian State." The Court therefore found Article 363 inapplicable on the pleadings.
  6. Application of doctrinal principles and precedents: the Court emphasised well-settled rules that ouster provisions must be strictly construed, the onus lies on the party asserting ouster, and where doubt exists the Court will lean in favour of maintaining Civil Court jurisdiction. It relied on the cited authorities (e.g., ITI Ltd., Abdul Waheed Khan, El-Edroos, Pabbojan) to conclude the petitioners failed to show a clear legislative intent to oust jurisdiction.
  7. Evaluation of petitioners' conduct and consequences: the Court observed that the preliminary objection, on which petitioners failed before both courts, had the practical effect of delaying the trial for an extended period (the suit instituted in 2003, proceedings stayed since the 2005 order), and found substance in the respondent's submission that the objection was aimed at delay and confusion. For these reasons, the Court ordered exemplary costs.
  8. Disposition: the Court found no excess of jurisdiction or material irregularity in the impugned order (which had answered the preliminary issue against the petitioner) and dismissed the revision application with costs, vacated the interim order and directed the learned Civil Judge to dispose of the suit within two years.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: Revision application dismissed.

Direct consequences and instructions made by the Court (as set out in the opinion):

  • The Civil Revision Application is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 50,000 (Fifty Thousand Rupees) to be paid by the petitioners.
  • The interim order (which had stayed proceedings) stands vacated.
  • The learned Civil Judge is directed to dispose of Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 2003 expeditiously and in any case within two years from the date of this judgment and order.
  • All parties are directed to act on the basis of an authenticated copy of this judgment and order.

Broader implications: The opinion does not articulate a new legal precedent; it applies established principles that ouster clauses must be strictly construed, that the onus lies on the party asserting ouster, and that Article 363 is confined to disputes directly arising from pre‑Constitution instruments. The judgment's practical effect is to restore and preserve Civil Court jurisdiction over the pleaded inter se dispute and to penalise the petitioners for dilatory tactics by way of costs and an instruction for expedited trial.

Final line from the opinion: Application dismissed.

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    Shrimant Chhatrapati Udyanraje Pratapsinhmaharaj Bhosale And Another v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Vijaysinhraje Shahumaharaj Bhosale And Others

    This Civil Revision Application challenges order dated 22 February, 2005 made by Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara, holding that it has jurisdiction to try the suit instituted by the respondent No. 1-original plaintiff.

    2. The petitioner-original defendant No. 1 relying inter alia upon the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852 (Bombay Act XI of 1952), the Exemptions from Land Revenue (I) of 1863 (Bombay Act No. II of 1863) and Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863), by his application dated 5 July, 2003, had urged that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was expressly, or in any case impliedly barred, since the suit properties which form the subject-matter of Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 2003 were ‘Saranjam Properties’ and raised questions as to entitlement thereof. A preliminary issue was framed under section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code (as applicable to the State of Maharashtra) and by the impugned order dated 22 February, 2005, the Civil Court, has answered the same against the petitioner-defendant No. 1. Hence, the present Civil Revision Application.

    3. Mr. Patwardhan, the learned counsel for the petitioners made the following submissions in support of the Civil Revision Application:—

    (A) Since the plaint itself admits that the suit properties are ‘Saranjam Properties’ granted by the State to the father of the petitioner late Maharaja Pratapsinha Raje under the Bombay Saranjam, Jahagir and Other Inams of Political Nature Resolution Rules, 1952, any disputes with regard to adjudication of title to said properties have to be necessarily resolved under the provisions of Bombay Act II of 1852, Bombay Act II of 1863, Bombay Act VII of 1863. The said Acts, which continue in force, not only expressly bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but also provide for adjudicatory mechanism to investigate and determine such issues in respect of ‘Saranjam Properties’. Statutory finality is accorded to the decisions of Authorities under the said Acts. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit of such nature is expressly barred or in any case impliedly barred.

    (B) In any case, the suit as instituted, raises disputes arising out of treaties, agreements or sanads to which the Government of Dominion of India or its predecessor and the Ruler of an Indian State is a party. Therefore, under Article 363 of the Constitution of India, there is a constitutional bar to interference by any Courts to entertain any dispute in respect of any right accruing under such treaty, agreement and sanad. In this regard, reliance was placed upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Dr. Karan Singh v. State of J. and K., (2004) 5 SCC 698 and Draupadi Devi v. Union of India, (2004) 11 SCC 425.

    4. Mr. Vijay Patil, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-plaintiff, at the outset submitted that the submission by reference to Article 363 of the Constitution of India was never raised by the petitioners, either in the application seeking framing of preliminary issue or, in the course of submissions before the learned Civil Judge, which culminated into making of the impugned order dated 22 February, 2005. In any case, Mr. Patil submitted that the dispute as raised in the suit, does not pertain to any rights or obligations arising out of any treaty, agreement or sanad. Further and in any case, the “State of Satara” does not answer the definition of the expression of “Indian State” as contained in Article 363(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Patil made reference to the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’ in this regard. Accordingly, Mr. Patil submitted that there is no question of the bar under Article 363 of the Constitution of India, even remotely being attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case.

    5. Mr. Patil, further submitted that the provisions of the Bombay Act VII of 1863 are not at all applicable to the properties involved in the suit. Further, there is nothing in the provisions contained in Bombay Act XI of 1852 and Bombay Act II of 1863, which, either expressly or impliedly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The Bombay Act XI of 1852 concerns claims against the Government on account of Inams and other Estates wholly or partially exempt from payment of land revenue and Bombay Act II of 1863 regulates succession to and transfer of, lands wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue. The two enactments are not at all attracted to the disputes raised in the suit and in any case, the two enactments bar, neither expressly nor impliedly, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try disputes of the nature raised by the respondent No. 1 in the plaint.

    6. Mr. Patil made reference to several decisions in the matter of determination as to whether there is any express or implied exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and reference shall be made to some such decisions, in the course of this judgment and order.

    7. Rival contentions, now fall for determination.

    8. The issue as to whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit instituted by the respondent No. 1-plaintiff shall have to be decided on the basis of the averments in the plaint. In the plaint, there is no dispute that the suit properties are ‘Saranjam Properties’. In fact in the suit there is no challenge as such to the grants made in respect of the suit properties. The plaint, in fact, relying upon such grants, urges that the same are grants made to the family members-descendants of late Chattrapati Shivaji Maharaj and consequently, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 8 and 9 as co-parceners along with defendant No. 1, are entitled to such properties and shares of profits arising therefrom. In this context, the plaintiff, has inter alia applied for a declaration that the suit properties are political Saranjams of the plaintiff, defendant Nos. 1, 8 and 9 and that the defendant No. 1 is only the head of the family. In the light of the averments set out in the plaint and the relief sought therein, the crucial question is whether the Bombay Act XI of 1852, the Bombay Act II of 1863 and the provisions contained in Article 363 of the Constitution of India, bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, either expressly or impliedly.

    9. The Bombay Rent-free Estates Act, 1852 (Bombay Act XI of 1852) is an Act for adjudication of title to certain estates claimed to be wholly or partially rent free in the Presidency of Bombay. Its Preamble provides that in the territories of Dekkhan, Khandesh and Southern Maxatha Country, and in other Districts more recently annexed to the Bombay Presidency, claims against the Government on account of Inams and other estates wholly or partially exempt from payment of land revenue are excepted from the cognizance of the ordinary Civil Courts and whereas it is desirable that the said claims should be tried and determined without further delay. The expression “and incapable of being justly disposed of under the Rules for the determination of Titles and the Rules of Procedure contained in Chapter IX and X of Regulation XVII of 1827 of the Bombay Code and their Supplements” appearing in Preamble, after the expression “ordinary Civil Courts” was repealed by the repealing Act of 1894.

    10. The Preamble, as aforesaid, indicates that the Bombay Act XI of 1852 was enacted to provide an appropriate adjudicatory machinery to adjudicate claims against the Government on account of Inams and other estates wholly or partially exempt from payment of land revenue. There is no express provision in Bombay Act XI of 1852, which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Such provision was the earlier contained in section 7 of Bombay Act XI of 1852 which provided that no decision or order of the Inam Commissioner or any of his Assistants, or of the Governor in Council under the provisions of the enactment, so long as the same shall be in force under such provisions, shall be questioned or avoided in any Court of Law; and no Commissioner, or Assistant Commissioner, or other person acting under the provisions of the enactment shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act bona fide done, or orderded to be done, by him in pursuance of the provisions of the said enactment. However, by repealing Act of 1876, even this provision contained in section VII of the Act XI of 1852 came to be repealed.

    11. The act xi of 1852, vide section 2 thereof provides that the Provincial Government may appoint in any Zila or other division of the territories subject to the Presidency of Bombay, which were not brought under the general Regulations of Government by Regulation XXVIII of 1827, Inam Commissioner with so many assistants and such subordinate establishment as may be necessary for the purposes mentioned in the enactment. Section 3 provides the duties of each Inam Commissioner and its Assistants shall be discharged in accordance with the rules in Schedule A annexed to the enactment. Section 4 provides that any adjudication of claims to exempt lands or interests therein, the titles of claimants shall be determined by the rules in Schedule B annexed to the enactment. Section 5 provides that each Inam Commissioner and its Assistants shall have the same authority to procure the attendance of witnesses, and to take evidence, as now is, or from time to time may be, by law vested in the ordinary Civil Courts, and so far as concerns the penalties for not giving evidence, for false testimony, for resistance of process, contempts and other like matters connected with cases under cognizance by any of the said officers, his office shall be held to be a Court of civil jurisdiction of the same authority as the superior Civil Court of the Zila or District in which his office from time to time shall be established. The proviso to this section provides that all complaints against, or appeals from, the proceedings of the Inam Commissioner or any of his Assistants in exercise of the authority conferred on them, shall be made under the second rule of Schedule ‘A’ annexed to the enactment and shall not be cognizable by any other authority or in any other manner than as therein specified. Section 6 provides for punishment of misconduct of officers of the commission.

    12. The Schedule-A appended to Act XI of 1852 provides rules for defining the duties of each Inam Commissioner. Clause (1) thereof provides that the duty of the Inam Commissioner and his Assistants shall be to investigate, in the manner prescribed by the said enactment, the titles of persons holding or claiming against the Government the possession or enjoyment of inams or jagirs, or any interest therein, or claiming exemption from the payment of land revenue, and generally to act according to instructions of the Provincial Government in all matters not specifically provided for in the said Act. Clause (2) provides for appeals from orders of Assistant Commissioners or from proceedings of Inam Commissioners to the Tribunal constituted under section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Clauses (3) to (14), provide inter alia, the procedure to be adopted by the Assistant Inam Commissioners or the Inam Commissioners in the proceedings that may be initiated. Schedule-B appended to Act XI of 1852 provides the rules for adjudication of the title to Estate claimed as Inam or exempt from the payment of land revenue.

    13. Mr. Patwardhan, learned counsel for the petitioners, laid particular emphasis upon the Preamble to act xi of 1852 as also clause (1) of schedule-a thereto. The Preamble, as noted earlier, makes reference to the exclusion of cognizance by ordinary Civil Courts in matters of claims against the Government on account of Inams and other Estates wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue and provides that Act XI of 1852 was enacted, because it was desirable that such claims should be tried and determined without any further delay. Thus, the object for enactment of Act XI of 1852 was primarily to try and determine without any delay “claims against the Government” on account of Inams and other Estates wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue, since cognizance of such claims was expected from the ordinary Civil Courts. Clause (1) of Schedule-A to the Act XI of 1852 defines duties of Inam Commissioners and his Assistants. The Clause inter alia provides that the duties of Inam Commissioners and his Assistants shall be to investigate the titles of persons “holding or claiming against Government” the possession or enjoyment of inams of jagirs or any interest therein, or claiming exemption from the payment of land revenue. The expression “holding or claiming”, has to be read and construed in juxtaposition to the following expression namely “against Government”. Such construction, is fortified by the express phraseology employed in the Preamble to Act XI of 1852. Thus, construed, it cannot be said that the provisions contained in Act XI of 1852 either expressly or impliedly bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide the disputes of the nature raised in the suit in the present instance. The disputes as raised in the suit, are primarily, inter se, disputes between two sets of claimants to the suit properties, which may be ‘Saranjam Properties’. Upon holistic as well as meaningful reading of the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff has not raised any claim against the Government on account of Inams and other Estates wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue. In such circumstances, applying the well established principles, in interpreting ouster clauses, to which reference shall be made hereinafter, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Patwardhan that the provisions of Act XI of 1852 either expressly or impliedly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters of disputes of present nature.

    14. Since, Mr. Patwardhan then made reference to the provisions of Exemptions from Land Revenue (No. II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act II of 1863), reference is required to be made to some provisions thereof, in order to examine whether any ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, either expressed or implied, can at all be spelled out in the context of the suit instituted by respondent No. 1. The Bombay Act II of 1863 was an Act to facilitate the adjustment of unsettled claims to exemption from the payment of Government land revenue, and to regulate the succession to, and transfer of, lands wholly or partially exempt from the payment of such revenue in those parts of the Bombay Presidency which were subject to the operation of Act XI of 1852 of the Legislative Council of India. The Preamble provides that it was deemed expedient to provide for the final adjustment, summarily, of unsettled claims to exemption from the payment of land revenue, and to fix the conditions which shall secure, in certain cases, the recognition of titles to such exemption with respect to succession and transfer in those districts of the Bombay Presidency to which the operation of Act XI of 1852 of the Legislative Council of India extends. At least, from the Preamble to Bombay Act II of 1863, it cannot be said that the provisions of the said Act are in any manner concerned with or attracted to the dispute, as raised in the plaint. Besides, there is nothing in the Preamble, which even remotely indicates ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts whether expressly or impliedly to adjudicate into the disputes as raised in the plaint.

    15. Mr. Patwardhan, however, made specific reference to Clause (1) of sections 6, 9 and 10 of the Bombay Act No. II of 1863 to submit that there is indeed ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. The Clause 1st of section 6 provides that when lands are held wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue, upon the title to which exemption there has not been any formal adjudication, the holders asserting a right to such exemption shall be at liberty, on the conditions hereinafter described, to claim a trial of, and adjudication upon, their title, according to Act XI of 1852, so far as the same is not altered, modified or superseded by, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this Act. Section 9 invests Officers to carry out inquiries under the said enactment, with the authority of Inam Commissioners and their Assistants in terms of the provisions contained in Act XI of 1852. Section 10 is concerned with burden of proof in cases of inquiries under section 6. Incidentally, the provisions contained in section 10 provides that whensoever any person, holding lands wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue, upon the title to which exemption, there has not been any formal adjudication, shall demand an inquiry under section 6 into such title, the burden of proof of such title shall, in every instance, lie and be cast exclusively upon the person or persons holding, or claiming to hold, such lands so wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue, notwithstanding any existing usage law, Regulation, Act or Statute in anywise to the contrary and it shall not be lawful for any Civil Court to place the burden of proof upon the Crown or upon the Officer or Officers representing the Crown, of a right to levy the ordinary land revenue upon the lands the subject of any such inquiry as aforesaid, and it shall in every instance be presumed, until the contrary is distinctly proved, that the Crown has the right to levy such ordinary land revenue upon the lands the subject of any such inquiry as aforesaid.

    16. From the aforesaid provisions contained in sections 6, 9 and 10, again, it is clear that the said provisions are in no manner concerned with or apply to the disputes raised in plaint by respondent No. 1. In any case, the provisions neither expressly nor impliedly bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the disputes of the nature as have been raised in the plaint by respondent No. 1. The attempt of the petitioner, perhaps has been to read some stray provisions or phrases from out of the Bombay Act XI of 1852 and Bombay Act II of 1863 and on the said basis confer some degree of respectability to the submission that the jurisdiction of the Court is either expressly or impliedly barred to try and entertain the disputes raised in the plaint. There was, however, hardly any clarity or lucidity in elaborating upon such submissions in the context of two enactments of ancient vintage. It is well settled that the legislative enactments have to be read and construed in a holistic manner and with reference to the context in which they came to be enacted. It is not permissible to make reference to some stray provisions or stray expressions totally unconnected with the context and on the basis of the same to urge that the same apply or that the same oust, the otherwise untrammelled jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain a dispute of civil nature.

    17. Insofar as, the Exemptions from Land Revenue (II) Act, 1863 (Bombay Act VII of 1863) is concerned, the same applies for summary settlement of claims to exempt from the payment of Government land revenue, and for regulating the terms upon which such exemption shall be recognized in the future, in those parts of Bombay Presidency which are not subject to the operation of Act XI of 1852 of the Legislative Council of India. Since, it is case of the petitioners that the properties, which are involved in the present suit are subject to the operation of Act XI of 1852 of the Legislative Council of India, obviously, the bombay act vii of 1863 will not apply. This position, was not seriously disputed by Mr. Patwardhan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, though attempt was made to refer to the provisions contained in Clause 1st which concerns the power to authorise and guarantee the continuance, in perpetuity, of the said land in certain districts to holder on terms and conditions agreed to. Again, the Clause, is totally extraneous to the dispute raised in the plaint by respondent No. 1. Accordingly, there is no merit that the provisions of Bombay Act VII of 1863 in any manner, oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the context of the present suit.

    18. In the application objecting to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the petitioners, had made no reference to the submission based upon Article 363 of the Constitution of India. However, it does appear that some submissions were made before the Civil Court in this regard, which find reflection in the impugned order dated 22 February, 2005. Mr. Patwardhan urged that since this is an issue of law, the petitioners should be permitted to urge the same before this Court as well, particularly since a ground to this effect has been raised in the memo of Revision Application. There is a vague reference to Article 363 of the Constitution of India in ground ‘N’ of the memo of Revision Application.

    19. Mr. Patwardhan may not be right in his submission that the objection as raised constitutes a pure question of law. This is because, there are no pleadings that the erstwhile State of Satara indeed answers the definition of “Indian State” within the meaning assigned to this term under Article 363(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. This is in the context of the submission made by Mr. Patil that by applying doctrine of lapse, the erstwhile State of Satara had merged with the British Dominion and was never recognized before the commencement of the Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of Dominion of India as being such a State. Be that as it may, there is even otherwise no reason to accept the objection premised upon the provisions of Article 363 of Constitution of India.

    20. Article 363 of the Constitution of India, reads thus:

    Article 363. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.

    (2) In this article—

    (a) Indian State means any territory recognised before the commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and

    (b) Ruler includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State.

    21. The bar under Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India is attracted only if the dispute “arises out of” or in any dispute “in respect of” any of the provisions of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instruments, which were entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which a Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Government was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement. In the present case, from the plain reading of the plaint, it cannot be said that the dispute raised therein is one “arising out of” any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument of the type referred to in Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India. Similarly, there is absolutely no material to suggest that the dispute is “in respect of” any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of the Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or similar instrument. In fact, the petitioners, in their application objecting to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts have made reference to the Bombay Saranjams, Jhagirs and Other Inams of Political Nature Resumption Rules 1952. Such Rules, are obviously Rules made after coming into force of the Constitution of India. At the stage of deciding whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted, the basic material to be taken into consideration is the plaint and the dispute raised therein. However, if we are to take into consideration material other than the plaint, even then, it cannot be said that the dispute as raised, is of the type as envisaged under Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India.

    22. In a situation where an individual claims certain civil rights, which are not affected by or are independent of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instruments referred to under Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India, such individual is not barred from enforcing his legal rights in the Court. In the case of Dr. Karan Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was concerned with a writ petition under Article 226 filed by the son of Ex Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir claiming that certain articles in question were the private properties of the Ruler family, since, in the instrument of accession of Jammu and Kashmir executed by the ex-Ruler in the year 1947 and correspondence which ensued in the year 1949 between the ex-Ruler and Union of India, the Ruler had given a list of his private properties without mentioning therein the articles in question. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that such transaction constituted an ‘agreement’ within the meaning of Article 363(1) and therefore, the applicability of bar under Article 363(1) and consequent maintainability of the writ petition would depend upon the finding whether the said agreement covers the articles in question or not. Further, in the case of Dr. Karan Singh (supra), the Apex Court, went on to observe that if, on basis of material on record, the Court comes to the conclusion that the articles in question are not covered by the correspondence, Article 363 would be inapplicable and such factual aspect is required to be considered while examining other questions. No such issue or for that matter issue analogous thereto can be said to be involved in the suit with which we are concerned.

    23. In the case of Draupadi Devi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that dispute whether a particular property was or was not recognised as a private property of the Ruler, was itself a dispute arising out of the terms of the covenant dated 5 May, 1948 entered into between Kapurthala and the Government of India, and therefore, by virtue of Article 363, was not justiciable in municipal Courts. Again, no such issue arises in the present case even if we are to take into consideration the defence of the petitioner.

    24. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the suit as instituted cannot be tried by the Civil Courts or that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try such suit is either impliedly or expressly barred under the enactments referred or for that matter the provisions contained in Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India. It is settled position in law that a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has, independent of any statute, a right to institute a suit in some Courts or the other unless its cognizance is either barred expressly or impliedly. The exclusion of such a right, cannot be easily inferred because there is a strong presumption that civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide all questions of civil nature, therefore, if at all there has to be an inference, the same should be in favour of the jurisdiction of the Court rather than at its exclusion. AIR 2002 SC 2308 : (2002) 5 SCC 510, Iti Ltd./ v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd.. the provision of law ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, is required to be strictly construed. The onus lies on the party, seeking to oust the jurisdiction, to establish his right to do so. AIR 1966 SC 1718, Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani The expression “civil nature” is wider than the expression ‘civil proceedings’. Accordingly, provisions contained in section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code would be available in a case where the dispute has a characteristic of affecting ones rights, which are not only civil but of civil nature. 1995 Supp (4) SCC 286 : AIR 1995 SC 2001, Most. Rev. P.M.A Metropolitan, etc. etc. v. Moran Mar Marthoma etc. etc. Further, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted, unless the entire suit, as brought, is barred. The mere fact that a portion of the claim is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not a bar to the trial, particularly of the remaining portion of the same suit which is not so excluded. AIR 2003 SC 1043 : (2003) 2 SCC 412, State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society Where a jurisdiction which is vested in the Court is attempted to be ousted, there must be a clear provision or clear intentment by the legislature. If there is any doubt about the ouster of a jurisdiction of an existing Courts, the Courts will lean to an interpretation which would maintain the existing jurisdiction. AIR 1968 SC 271 The Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd. Etc. v. Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur

    25. In the case of Sayed Mohomed Baquir El-Edroos (dead) by LRs. v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 4 SCC 383 : AIR 1981 SC 2016, the question arose as to whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking declaration whether a grant under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1953 was a personal Inam. Section 2(e) of the said Act defined the expression “personal inam” and the Explanation-I thereto provided that if any question arises whether any grant is a personal inam, such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government shall be final and the entry, if any, in respect of such grant, in the alienation register kept under section 53 of the code shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly. Despite such provision, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Civil Courts has jurisdiction to decide a question whether the grant in the said case is an inam or not and it is not correct to say the Government alone is competent to decide the question and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is excluded. The Apex Court held that the finality of the decision of the Government as contemplated by the Explanation to section 2(1)(e) cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, particularly as the Act in question did not give details about scope of enquiry by the Government. No appeal had been provided for. Even where there is express bar of jurisdiction of the Court, the examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find out the adequacy or sufficiency of remedies provided may be relevant. In these circumstances, the Apex Court went on to hold that the use of expression “finality of the decision of the Government” in the Explanation to section 2(1)(e) cannot be held, as any bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. To the same effect, are the observations in the case of State Of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam., (1985) 4 SCC 10.

    26. Upon consideration of the disputes as raised in the plaint together with the provisions contained in the enactments on basis of which ouster of Civil Courts jurisdiction was claimed, as discussed earlier, it is clear that there is no such ouster, either express or implied. The preliminary objection raised by the petitioners, which, the petitioners were unable to substantiate either before the Civil Court or this Court, was, therefore, rightly rejected. There does appear to be substance in the submission of Mr. Patil that the sole objective behind raising such objection to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was to create confusion and to unduly delay adjudication of issues arising in the suit. The suit in the present case was instituted in the year 2003. The objection was also raised in the same year, but was decided by the impugned order on 22 February, 2005. From the year 2005, the proceedings in the civil suit have remained stayed. Accordingly, based upon such objection, which the petitioners, have not at all been successful in elaborating, the trial in the suit has been avoided for an unprecedented period of over twelve years, thereby perhaps, achieving the main objective behind raising of such preliminary objection. In such circumstances, it is only appropriate that the petitioners are saddled with exemplary costs.

    27. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the impugned order is in excess of jurisdiction or that the learned Civil Judge, in the exercise of his jurisdiction, has acted with any material irregularity. This revision application is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 50,000/- (Fifty Thousand). The interim order, stands vacated. Further, since the suit relates to the year 2003, the learned Civil Judge is directed to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of two years from the date of this judgment and order.

    28. All parties to act on basis of an authenticated copy of this judgment and order.

    Application dismissed.
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