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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner applied on 20 October 2009 to the Commissioner of Police (respondent No.1) for a licence to commence a Video Game Parlour at Shop No.13, Sanpada, Navi Mumbai. After more than six months with no consideration, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.3448 of 2010; the Division Bench directed respondent No.1 to decide the application expeditiously and, in any case, within six weeks (order dated 30 April 2010). On 29 June 2010 respondent No.1 declined the licence citing absence of an independent parking space and the risk of a law-and-order situation. The petitioner appealed to the Minister (Home), which was dismissed (communicated 6 February 2012). The petitioner then filed Writ Petition No.3962 of 2012, disposed of on 4 September 2012, wherein the Court recorded that if the petitioner furnished an undertaking and provided appropriate parking arrangements, there would be no reason to deny the licence and directed fresh consideration within two weeks from the date the undertaking was furnished.

The petitioner filed affidavit-cum-undertakings dated 11 September 2012 and 18 October 2012, stating that parking arrangements had been made with the CIDCO "Pay and Park" facility opposite the shop and undertaking to ensure renewal/co-termination with the term of any licence and to prevent parking in no-parking zones. Despite these steps and production of NOCs (including an NOC dated 17 February 2010 and an NOC dated 19 October 2011 from the Traffic Department), respondent No.1 again declined the licence by order dated 1 November 2012, treating the arrangement as temporary (reserved for three months) and not a permanent independent parking facility. The petitioner made multiple representations and, after obtaining no redress, filed the present (third) petition seeking quashal of the 1 November 2012 order and directions to grant the licence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the refusal to grant a Video Game Parlour licence on the sole ground of non-availability of an independent parking facility was sustainable after the petitioner furnished undertakings and demonstrated arrangements (CIDCO Pay and Park) as required by this Court in Writ Petition No.3962 of 2012.
  2. Whether the Licensing Authority (respondent No.1) lawfully exercised its discretion, having regard to relevant materials (affidavits/undertakings, NOCs and Traffic Department inspection) or whether the decision was based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
  3. Whether, in the circumstances of repeated refusals and where relevant materials and Court directions have been ignored, the High Court could issue a mandamus directing the Authority to grant the licence rather than remanding the matter for fresh consideration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The only ground for refusal was parking. This ground had been considered and found to be untenable by this Court in Writ Petition No.3962 of 2012 provided the petitioner made arrangements and filed undertakings; the petitioner had complied with those requirements (paras 15(a), 17, 18).
  • The police and traffic authorities, after inspection, had issued No Objection Certificates (NOCs); those NOCs had been ignored or not properly considered by respondent No.1 (para 15(b), paras 33–34).
  • There is no provision in the Bombay Police Act, 1951 or the Rules making independent parking a pre-condition for grant of a Video Game Parlour licence; insisting on such a requirement without statutory basis infringes the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) (para 15(c), para 17).
  • The petitioner had also undertaken to ensure renewal of the Pay and Park arrangement to be co-terminus with any licence (paras 18–20, para 22).
  • The petitioner contended that remand would risk repeated refusals on extraneous grounds and cause grave and irreparable prejudice given the history since 2009 (para 35).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The earlier writ disposal in Writ Petition No.3962 of 2012 did not direct grant of licence but directed respondent No.1 to take a decision; such decision had now been taken, so there was no breach of the earlier order (para 16).
  • The State Government has framed guidelines that require Authorities to ascertain availability of independent parking and whether parking would obstruct free flow of traffic; the arrangements proposed by the petitioner are temporary and not independent parking arrangements (para 16, para 21).
  • On these grounds the denial was reasonable and germane (para 16).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties v. State of A.P., (2009) 5 SCC 212 Illustrates when a positive mandamus can be issued; writs can be issued to remedy particular situations and to enforce performance where discretion is not properly exercised. Used to show that Article 226 empowers the High Court to issue directions, including mandamus, where discretion is exercised on irrelevant considerations or where a public authority fails to exercise or misuses its discretion (para 37).
Rbf Rig Corporation, Mumbai v. Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Mumbai, (2011) 3 SCC 573 Article 226 relief depends on facts; guiding principle is promotion of justice and prevention of injustice (para 39 quoting the case). Cited to support the proposition that the High Court's exercise of writ powers is fact-sensitive and directed at preventing injustice; invoked in reasoning for issuing direct relief in appropriate cases (para 38–39).
Comptroller and Auditor-General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan, (1986) 2 SCC 679 Affirms that High Courts can issue mandamus where public authorities have failed to exercise discretion or have exercised it mala fide or on irrelevant considerations (para 41 quoting the case). Relied upon to justify the Court's power to compel lawful exercise of discretion and to pass orders or directions that the authority ought to have given (para 41).
Dwarka Nath v. ITO, AIR 1966 SC 81 Article 226 is couched in wide language to enable High Courts to reach injustice wherever found (para 42). Used to reinforce the Court's jurisdictional basis for moulding reliefs to meet peculiar situations (para 42).
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, para 89 (authoritative treatise) Describes the nature of mandamus: to remedy defects of justice and to issue where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy or where alternative remedy is less convenient or effectual (para 44). Quoted to explain the remedial character of mandamus and to support issuance of direct orders when appropriate (para 44).
Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, (1984) 2 SCC 488 Subordinate tribunals/courts are subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226; orders of High Court must be obeyed by inferior authorities (para 46–47). Invoked to underscore that subordinate authorities cannot refuse to carry out directions of the High Court and to justify that the Authority ought not to ignore or circumvent the High Court's directions (para 46–48).
Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Bhopal, (1961) 1 SCR 474 Example where a subordinate authority refused to carry out clear directions and was held to deny justice; supports principle that refusal to carry out clear directions is destructive of hierarchy of Courts (para 47). Referred to as precedent reinforcing that inferior authorities must comply with superior court directions; used to justify remedial action where authorities defy High Court orders (para 47–48).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in structured steps:

  1. Scope of discretion: The Court observed that licensing authorities possess substantial discretion but it is not unfettered. Discretion must be exercised by attending to relevant considerations and avoiding irrelevant ones, guided by reasonableness and proportionality. The Court noted the constitutional backdrop of Article 19(1)(g) (right to carry on trade) subject to reasonable restrictions (Article 19(6)) and the existence of statutory rules (Bombay Police Act, 1951 and Licensing Rules of 1960) that permit consideration of various parameters when deciding licence applications (para 17).
  2. Relevance of parking: The Court held parking facility to be a relevant consideration in licensing decisions for a Video Game Parlour and therefore legitimately considered by Authorities (para 17).
  3. Assessment of compliance: The petitioner had furnished the required undertakings and produced evidence of arrangements with CIDCO Pay and Park opposite the shop. NOCs on record (Senior Police Authority NOC dated 17 Feb 2010 and Traffic Department NOC dated 19 Oct 2011) recorded the existence of the Pay and Park facility opposite the shop and that the Traffic Department had no objection, subject to renewal of arrangements (paras 33–34).
  4. Failure to consider materials: The Court found that respondent No.1 ignored the materials, the petitioner's undertakings and the prior observations of the Court in Writ Petition No.3962 of 2012 when declining the licence on 1 November 2012. The denial was therefore based on no material or on irrelevant/extraneous material and was unsustainable (para 34).
  5. Remedies and moulding relief: The Court acknowledged that normally a writ court would quash the decision and direct reconsideration because licensing is a legitimate function of the Authority. However, having regard to the factual matrix — repeated refusals, compliance by the petitioner with the Court's directions, existence of NOCs and the realistic prospect of the Authority again refusing on extraneous grounds — the Court considered it appropriate to go beyond a mere remand (paras 36, 35).
  6. Authority to issue mandamus: The Court relied on principles from Supreme Court authorities that Article 226 gives High Courts power to issue mandamus or mould reliefs to prevent injustice where public authorities have failed to exercise discretion lawfully or have ignored relevant considerations (paras 37–45). Applying those authorities, the Court concluded that it was empowered to direct issuance of the licence in the present case (paras 37–45).
  7. Balancing of interests: While the Court recognized the Authority's competence to impose reasonable conditions, it concluded that where the only objection had been parking and that objection was demonstrably addressed, remanding the matter would serve no useful purpose and would risk further injustice to the petitioner (paras 21, 35–36).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The impugned order dated 1st November, 2012 is quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to issue a licence to the petitioner for operating the Video Game Parlour within four weeks from the date of the judgment; Rule is made absolute. (paras 25, 49–50).

Direct consequences:

  • The respondents must issue the licence within four weeks (para 25, para 49).
  • The respondents remain at liberty to impose additional conditions in the licence, over and above the usual terms and conditions, for ensuring that the petitioner provides and continues to provide the parking facility during the licence term (para 49).
  • No order as to costs (para 50).

Broader implications noted by the Court:

  • The decision underscores that licensing discretion must be exercised reasonably and by taking into account relevant considerations, including practical arrangements such as parking when supported by evidence and undertakings (paras 17, 31–34).
  • The Court confirmed that, in appropriate cases where authorities have ignored relevant material and prior judicial directions, the High Court may itself mould relief and direct the authority to act (paras 37–45).

Disposition: Rule made absolute. (Final line of the opinion.)

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    Jagdish N. Shetty v. Commissioner Of Police, Navi Mumbai And Others

    1. Rule. Rule is made returnable with the consent of all the parties, forthwith.

    2. This is the third petition filed by the petitioner seeking licence under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 to commence Video Game Parlour at Shop No. 13, Sanpada, Navi Mumbai.

    3. On 20th October, 2009, the petitioner applied to the Commissioner of Police-respondent No. 1 for licence to commence Video Game Parlour. Prescribed/requisite documents were enclosed along with the application. For over six months, there was no consideration of the petitioner's application and therefore the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 3448 of 2010 seeking a writ of mandamus to direct respondent No. 1 to consider the petitioner's application for licence. The petition was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court by a judgment and order dated 30th April, 2010 with directions to respondent No. 1 to dispose of the application expeditiously and in any case within six weeks in accordance with law.

    4. By an order dated 29th June, 2010, respondent No. 1 declined licence to the petitioner on the ground that there is no independent parking space in front of the shop where the Video Game Parlour was proposed to be set up and if licence is granted, probability of law and order situation developing in the locality cannot be ruled out.

    5. The petitioner appealed against the order dated 29th June, 2010 to the Minister (Home), State of Maharashtra, which appeal was dismissed and the appeal dismissal order communicated on 6 February, 2012.

    6. The petitioner thereupon preferred Writ Petition No. 3962 of 2012 before this Court, which was disposed of by the judgment and order dated 4th September, 2012. The relevant extracts from the said judgment are reproduced for the sake of reference:

    “1. ………………………………………

    2. ………………………………………

    3. My attention is invited to the No Objection Certificate from the local Police Station, but what has been stated on affidavit by the State is that the Traffic Police have given a report wherein it is stated that 12 feet road from the petitioner's establishment towards Sanpada highway is declared as no parking and there is no parking place for the Video Game Parlour.

    4. On taking instructions, Ms. Thadhani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, states that the petitioner will give an undertaking to the authorities that if the Video Game Parlour business is allowed to be commenced and carried out, the petitioner will make appropriate parking arrangement of vehicles of those who are visiting the Video Game Parlour and which arrangement shall be made in private property. Further, the petitioner will ensure that the visitors to the Video Game Parlour park their vehicles in the allocated spaces of parking and areas, such as pay and park scheme and shall not cause any obstruction to the smooth flow of vehicles on public road and particularly 12 feet road towards Sanpada highway. She also submits that no parking of vehicles will be permitted by the petitioner in the spaces and areas which are specified as no parking.

    5. In these circumstances if the petitioner furnishes such an undertaking to the authorities and ensures its compliance, then, I see no reason as to why the petitioner should be denied the licence.

    6. If the aforesaid objection is the only one, based on which, the authorities have denied the licence, then, with the aforementioned arrangements there should not be any impediment in quashing and setting aside the orders under challenge. They are, accordingly, quashed and set aside. It is directed that the Commissioner of Police, Navi Mumbai shall consider the petitioner's application afresh and since the petitioner is ready and willing to furnish the above undertaking, the Licensing Authority should take a decision as expeditiously as possible and within a period of two weeks from the date an undertaking is furnished by the petitioner.

    7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner states that such undertaking will be furnished within one week from today. The Licensing Authority shall take a decision on the petitioner's application uninfluenced by any orders passed earlier including the observations in the order of the Appellate Authority which stands quashed and set aside. The Writ Petition is disposed of in these terms. No costs. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this order.”

    7. The petitioner, in compliance with, the statements recorded in the petition, submitted affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 11th September, 2012 and 18th October, 2012.

    8. In the affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 11th September, 2012, the petitioner submitted thus:

    “1. I say that if a Video Game Parlour licence is granted to me, I will make appropriate parking arrangements for vehicles of those who are visiting the Video Game Parlour and the arrangement will be made by me in private property. I will ensure that visitors to the Video Game Parlour park their vehicles in the allocated spaces of parking and areas, such as pay and park scheme and shall not cause any obstruction to the smooth flow of vehicles on public road and particularly 12 feet road towards Sanpada Highway.

    2. I further state that I will not permit any parking of vehicles in the places and areas which are specified as no parking zones.”

    9. In the affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 18th October, 2012, the petitioner submitted thus:

    “1. I say that the area of my shop is 360 Sq. Ft. approximately. I say that I have made arrangements for parking of vehicles for my customers at pay and Parking scheme situated at very opposite to my shop premise. I have made a contract with pay and parking management for a four wheeler and three two wheeler for a period of quarter year, which I will renew it from time to time. I have attached a plan of premise (Shop No. 13) which also indicates the pay and parking area near my shop. I have also attached the plan of my society sanctioned by CIDCO authorities in the year 1990 showing the parking area behind my shop in the society also.

    2. I will ensure that visitors to the Video Game Parlour park their vehicles in the allocated spaces of parking Scheme and shall not cause any obstruction to the smooth flow of vehicles on public road. It will be my responsibility to ensure the correct place for parking the vehicles.

    3. I further state that I will not permit any parking of vehicles in places and areas which are specified as no parking zones.”

    10. Normally, in the light of observations made by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3962 of 2012 and upon verification of the compliances as aforesaid, respondent No. 1 should have issued the necessary licence to the petitioner. It was always open to the respondent No. 1 to impose conditions in such licence for the purpose of ensuring that a reasonable parking facility is at all times maintained and made available for the customers of the Parlour. However, by order dated 1st November, 2012, respondent No. 1 once again declined licence on the same ground. The order dated 1st November, 2012 states that the parking arrangements made by the petitioner with the ‘Pay and Park’ facility established by CIDCO, just opposite the petitioner's shop, is for hardly three months and therefore same cannot regarded as any permanent arrangement.

    11. The petitioner addressed several representations including representations dated 20th November, 2012, 2nd May, 2013, 5th April, 2013 and 22nd August, 2013 urging reconsideration of the matter. The petitioner in his representations pointed out that he was ready and willing to furnish an undertaking that the arrangement with the CIDCO Pay and Park facility would be renewed and made co-terminus with the term of the licence, should the same be granted to him. The petitioner, who in the meanwhile had obtained some documents under the Right to Information, placed reliance upon them to contend that the Police Authorities and the Traffic Police Authorities upon site inspection and consideration of various relevant parameters had issued No Objection Certificate for issuance of licence to the petitioner.

    12. The Maharashtra Video Amusement Parlour Association also addressed a representation dated 16th February, 2013 to respondent No. 1, inter alia pointing out that the requirement of independent parking facility which was being insisted in the case of the petitioner was neither one contemplated under the Rule, nor was the same reasonable. The Association pointed out that normally their members are middle class persons, who set up such Parlours in shops having area of not more than 20 to 30 Square Meters and therefore it is not possible for them to have any independent parking facilities. The Association pointed out that number of customers at such Parlours is also limited and parking will certainly not pose a problem of any great magnitude.

    13. Having secured no redressal, the petitioner for the third time has preferred the present Petition seeking to quash the impugned order dated 1-11-2012 (Exhibit-H to the petition) and for directions to respondent No. 1 to grant the petitioner licence for commencing the Video Game Parlour.

    14. I have heard Mr. Chandnani, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Sawant, learned AGP for the respondents. With their assistance, I have perused the documents and correspondence on record.

    15. Mr. Chandnani appearing for the petitioner made the following submissions in support of the petition:

    (a) The only ground for refusal of the licence was the issue of parking. This ground was considered by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3962 of 2012 and found to be untenable, provided the petitioner makes arrangement for parking and report compliances. The petitioner has done all that was required by him in the judgment and order dated 4th September, 2012;

    (b) The police authorities and the traffic police authorities, upon inspection and examination of various parameters, themselves issued NOC for grant of licence. Such NOCs have either not been considered at all or in any case they have been rejected for no valid or cogent reasons; and

    (c) There are no provisions under the Bombay Police Act, 1951 or the Rules made thereunder, which make requirement of independent parking facility, a pre-condition for grant of licence for Video Game Parlour. In absence of any such specific provisions, the respondents can insist upon the same, particularly as this would constitute infringement of the petitioner's fundamental right to carry out trade, occupation or business as guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

    16. On the other hand, Mr. Sawant appearing for the respondents submitted that this Court whilst disposing of Writ Petition No. 3962 of 2012 did not issue any directions for grant of licence, but the direction was to take a decision in the matter. Such decision has been taken and therefore there is no breach of judgment and order dated 4th April, 2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 3962 of 2012. He further submitted that the State Government has framed guidelines for grant of such licences and one of the guidelines requires the Authorities to ascertain whether independent parking arrangements are available and whether parking would occasion any obstructions to free flow of traffic. The arrangements proposed by the petitioner are only temporary and the same do not amount to independent parking arrangements. In the circumstances, the licence has been denied upon the grounds, which are reasonable as well as germane.

    17. Before, I advert to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, I must observe that whilst the police Authorities have substantial discretion in the matter of grant or refusal of licences of this nature, such discretion, nevertheless is not unfettered. The discretion in such matters has to be exercised by adverting to relevant considerations and eschewing irrelevant ones. In exercising of such discretion, the Authorities are bound by doctrine of reasonableness as well as proportionality. The Authorities have to be alive to the position that the Constitution of India by way of Article 19(1)(g) guarantees every citizen has right to carry on trade, occupation or business. Reasonable restrictions as contemplated by Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India can always be imposed by means of law upon such a right to carry on trade, occupation or business. In this case, there is a law in the form of Bombay Police Act, 1951 and the Licensing Rules of 1960. Although there may be no direct provision in relation to providing of parking places upon reading the provisions of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 and the Rules of 1960 as amended from time to time, in my judgment, there are sufficient provisions which enable the Authorities to advert to various aspects and parameters at the stage of consideration of an application seeking licence to commence a Video Game Parlour. The parking facility, is undoubtedly, a relevant consideration to be taken into account at the stage of deciding the application seeking licence of this nature.

    18. In the present case, the only ground upon which the licence was declined on the first occasion was non-availability of independent parking facility. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 3962 of 2012, in which the petitioner made statements with regard to availability of parking facility, as also steps which the petitioner shall take for the purposes of ensuring that such facility is available. In the light of such statements, this Court observed that in case such facilities are provided by the petitioner and necessary undertakings are furnished for ensuring compliance, there is no reason to deny licence to the petitioner. This Court further proceeded to observe that if the objection with regard to independent parking facility is the only objection on the basis of which the Authorities have declined the licence, then with the arrangement referred to in paragraph 4 of the judgment and order being complied with, “there should not be any impediment in quashing and setting aside the orders under challenge”. Accordingly, the orders declining the licence were quashed and set aside and the Authorities were directed to take final decision in two weeks as the petitioner was ready and willing to furnish undertakings and make arrangements as stated in paragraph 4 of the judgment and order.

    19. In the present case, there is no serious dispute that the petitioner has made arrangement for parking facility. The material produced on record makes it clear that the petitioner has made arrangement for parking of vehicles with the CIDCO Pay and Park facility, which is located just opposite the petitioner's shop. Receipts produced by the petitioner, no doubt, indicate that the petitioner has reserved parking lot and paid fees only for a period of three months. Nevertheless, the petitioner has furnished undertaking that he shall renew of such arrangement, so that the same is co-terminus with the term of the licence. The NOC dated 17th February, 2010 issued by Senior Police Authority and endorsed by the Assistant Police Commissioner records at Clause (10) that CIDCO has provided independent pay and park facility opposite the building which houses petitioner's shop and therefore there will be no obstructions on account of parking of vehicles. The NOC further records that the petitioner's shop is not locatcd in a densely populated area and upon consideration of various other parameters, records that there is no objection for grant of licence to the petitioner. The petitioner has also produced on record yet another NOC dated 19th October, 2011 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Traffic), which records that the petitioner's shop was inspected in order to ascertain whether the petitioner has indeed provided the facilities of the parking as per the assurances given by him to the Court and as recorded in the judgment and order dated 4th September, 2012. The NOC further records that upon inspection it was found that although the petitioner does not have his own independent parking facility, he has made arrangement with the CIDCO Pay and Park facility, which is just opposite to his shop. Though parking fees have been paid for only three months, the petitioner has submitted affidavit/undertaking regards renewal and accordingly the Traffic Department has no objection to the issuance of the licence.

    20. All the aforesaid materials appear to have been completely ignored by respondent No. 1, at the stage of declining the licence to the petitioner on the second occasion. The observations made by this Court in its judgment and order dated 4th September, 2012 to the effect that there should be no reason to deny licence to the petitioner, in case the petitioner furnishes necessary undertakings and ensures compliances, has also been ignored by respondent No. 1. Once there is material on record, which establishes that the petitioner has furnished necessary undertaking and ensured compliances, the observations made by this Court could not have been lightly ignored. All these indicate that the relevant matters have been excluded from the consideration and the denial of licence is based upon no material or in any case based upon irrelevant and extraneous material. In such circumstances, the impugned order dated 1st November, 2012, denying the petitioner licence is unsustainable and is liable to be quashed and set aside.

    21. Mr. Chandnani submitted that in case the matter is once again remanded to the respondents for consideration, there is possibility that the licence is once again refused for extraneous considerations. He submitted that since the licence has been declined only on the ground of lack of parking facility and it was not even case of the respondents at any stage that there was any other reason to decline the licence, upon such ground being demonstrably non-existent, no useful purpose would be served by remand. He submitted that on the contrary grave and irreparable prejudice will occasion the petitioner, who has already been running from pillar to post from the year 2009 to secure a licence. The petitioner was required to approach this Court on no less than three occasions. Despite success on two occasions, the respondents have obstinately declined the licence to the petitioner. In such peculiar facts and circumstances, he submits that this Court should issue directions for grant of licence rather than once again leave the matter to the Authorities for fresh consideration.

    22. Normally, a writ Court upon quashing a decision of the Authority declining a licence issues directions to such Authorities to reconsider the application for grant of licence, in accordance with law. This is because licensing is the legitimate function of the Authorities. It is possible that apart from the reasons which may have not found favour with the Court, there are other reasons and considerations, which the Authorities may deem it fit and proper to consider and decide. It is possible that there may be some other relevant aspects, which were not considered by the Authorities on the first occasion when the licence was declined. It is also possible that the Authorities may want to impose certain additional conditions, depending upon peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. However, this does not mean that the Authorities, upon a direction to reconsider application for grant of licence, can decline licence upon the very ground, which did not find favour with the Court in the first instance. This is precisely what has happened in the present case.

    23. When faced with such a peculiar situation, this Court is not powerless to direct the Authorities to issue licence. Article 226 has been couched in a wide language so as to enable the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found and to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar situation, which may arise before it. The Supreme Court in the case of Destruction of Public and Private Properties, In re v. State of A.P, (2009) 5 SCC 212, whilst analyzing situation in which a positive mandamus can be issued has referred to English as well as Indian judgments, which hold that writs can be issued to remedy particular situations, which arise before a Court. A writ of mandamus may issue where a public authority has failed to exercise discretion conferred upon it by a statute or where exercise of discretion is based upon irrelevant considerations or by ignoring relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate a very object of conferment of discretion. In all such cases, High Court can compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the government or the public authority should have been passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion.

    24. In the context of Commissioner of Customs declining refund of certain amounts despite directions of the High Court to consider the refund claims by taking into consideration essentiality certificates issued by ONGC. The Supreme Court in case of Rbf Rig Corporation, Mumbai v. Commissioner Of Customs (Imports), Mumbai), Mumbai, (2011) 3 SCC 573 observed thus:

    19. Article 226 of the Constitution confers powers on the High Court to issue certain writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution or for any other purpose. The question, whether any particular relief should be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution, depends on the facts of each case. The guiding principle in all cases is promotion of justice and prevention of injustice.

    20. In Comptroller and Auditor-General of India v. K.S Jagannathan, (1986) 2 SCC 679, this Court has held:

    “20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the parties concerned, the Court may itself pass-an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion.”

    21. In Dwarka Nath v. ITO, AIR 1966 SC 81, this Court pointed out that Article 226 is designedly couched in a wide language in order not to confine the power conferred by it only to the power to issue prerogative writs as understood in England, such wide language being used to enable the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found and to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country.

    22. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, para 89, it is stated that the purpose of an order of mandamus

    “89. Nature of mandamus is to remedy defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual”.

    23. The High Court, in the present case, has moulded the relief in such a manner to meet out justice to an aggrieved person. It is not open to the subordinate Tribunal to examine whether a direction issued by the High Court under its writ powers was correct and refuse to carry it out as such amounts to denial of justice and destroys the principle of hierarchy of Courts in the administration of justice.

    24. This Court in Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, (1984) 2 SCC 488, has held:

    “11. It is regrettable that the Board of Revenue failed to realize that like any other subordinate tribunal, it was subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Just as the judgments and orders of the Supreme Court have to be faithfully obeyed and carried out throughout the territory of India under Article 142 of the Constitution, so should be the judgments and orders of the High Court by all inferior Courts and tribunals subject to their supervisory jurisdiction within the State under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. We cannot but deprecate the action of the Board of Revenue in refusing to carry out the directions of the High Court. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Bhopal , (1961) 1 SCR 474, the Income Tax Officer had virtually refused to carry out the clear and unambiguous directions which a superior tribunal like the Income tax Appellate Tribunal had given to him by its final order in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him. The Court held that such refusal was in effect a denial of justice and is furthermore destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is in this country on the hierarchy of Courts. The facts of the present case are more or less similar and we would have allowed the matter to rest at that but unfortunately the judgment of the High Court directing the issue of a writ of mandamus for the grant of a liquor licence to respondents 1 and 2 cannot be sustained.

    25. We hasten to add, if for any reason, the subordinate authority is of the view that the directions issued by the Court is contrary to statutory provision or well established principles of law, it can approach the same Court with necessary application/petition for clarification or modification or approach the superior forum for appropriate reliefs. In the present case, as we have already noticed, the respondents have not questioned the order passed by the High Court, which order has reached finality. In such circumstances, we cannot permit the adjudicating authority to circumvent the order passed by the High Court.

    25. Therefore, the impugned order dated 1st November, 2012 is quashed and set aside. In view of the aforesaid precedents and taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondents are directed to issue licence to the petitioner for operating Video Game Parlour within a period of four weeks from today. It is clarified that the respondents shall always be at liberty to impose additional conditions in the licence, over and above, usual terms and conditions for the purposes ensuring that the petitioner not only provides, but continues to provide the parking facility during the term of the licence.

    26. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs.

    Rule made absolute.
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