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Case Number

W.P No. 5569 of 2012

Advocates

S.R Narnaware
P.B Patil
Sridhar K. Chari

Judges

B.P Dharmadhikari
P.B Varale, JJ.

Acts

Constitutional provisions contained in Articles 341 and 342, statutory provisions
provisions of section 10 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Verification of) Caste Certificates Act, (Act No. 23 of 2001).6.
provisions of section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001. Mention
section 7(1) of Maharashtra Act No. XXIII of 2001,
ARTICLE 142 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
ARTICLE 141 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
provisions of section 10 of Act No. 23
sub sections (1) and (3) of section 10
section 10 of Act No. 23
section 10 in Act No. 23

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging an order of termination dated 3-11-2009 issued by Respondent No. 2 (Additional General Manager/Engineering LMD, National Aviation Company of India Limited). Although the petition also questioned an order dated 5-11-2012 of the Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur Division, which invalidated the petitioner’s caste claim as belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe, the petitioner expressly limited his claim to a prayer for protection in employment and gave up the status as belonging to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The petitioner relied on several judgments (notably Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra) and a Government of India Office Memorandum dated 10-8-2010 to seek protection of his service.

The Court heard counsel for the petitioner, for Respondent No.1 (Scrutiny Committee) and for Respondent No.2 (Employer), issued Rule and took the petition up for final disposal forthwith. The record shows there was an earlier judgment of this Court dated 16-7-2012 in a writ involving the present petitioner (Rajendra) which remanded the matter and declared that if the Caste Scrutiny Committee rejected his caste claim, the termination order dated 3-11-2009 would revive and stand restored. That earlier judgment had attained finality and, according to the Court, restored the termination order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the order of termination dated 3-11-2009 (terminating the petitioner’s employment) should be quashed and the petitioner’s service protected despite the invalidation of his caste certificate.
Whether the judgments relied upon by the petitioner (including Kavita Solunke and certain Division Bench decisions at Nagpur) permit High Courts to grant protection in service where a caste certificate has been invalidated, especially in the face of section 10 of Maharashtra Act No. 23 of 2001.
Whether a Government of India Office Memorandum dated 10-8-2010 or other executive instruments can override or displace the statutory mandate in section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 concerning consequences of invalidation of caste certificates.
Whether judicially granted protection (as in some Supreme Court judgments) represents law under Article 141 or is relief moulded under Article 142 and therefore not a source of binding law for High Courts to routinely follow.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner (Shri S.R. Namaware)

Submitted that the petitioner’s basic caste certificate (Halba Scheduled Tribe) was not obtained by playing any fraud and therefore was not a false caste certificate.
Relied on Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra and other Division Bench judgments to argue that protection in service should be granted.
Relied on Government of India Office Memorandum dated 10-8-2010 as a policy basis for protecting employees in the petitioner’s position.
Expressly limited the challenge to the termination order and gave up contesting the invalidation of his caste certificate (i.e., sought protection in employment only).

Respondent No. 1 — Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee (Shri P.B. Patil)

Relied on Division Bench authority (Sunil Ingle v. Zilla Parishad) to contend that persons securing employment on the basis of an invalid caste certificate cannot seek protection of their service.
Pointed to findings in the Scrutiny Committee’s order and Vigilance Cell authorities noting old Koshti documents; argued the petitioner’s certificate was false and fraudulent.

Respondent No. 2 — Employer (Shri S.K. Chari)

Submitted that earlier petitions filed by the petitioner and prior judgments (including a 16-7-2012 judgment) preclude the present challenge to the termination order; the continuation in service was conditional upon obtaining validity and the petitioner had acquiesced in the earlier judgment.
Contended that the Office Memorandum dated 10-8-2010 is not binding on Respondent No.2 and is not applicable in the present facts.
Argued that the Office Memorandum cannot override the provisions of section 10 of the Maharashtra Act No. 23 of 2001 which mandate cancellation of benefits when caste certificates are invalidated.
Relied on Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities (including Union of India v. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar, Regional Manager v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir and Ganesh Rambhau Khalale) to submit that protection extended in some Apex Court decisions was exercised under Article 142 and not as a declaration of binding law under Article 141; therefore High Courts cannot grant similar protection contrary to statutory mandates.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra	Two-judge Bench of Supreme Court extended protection in certain cases of settled employment where certificate was invalidated; held facts and circumstances determine protection.	Petitioner relied on it for protection; Court observed that Kavita Solunke involved exercise of remedial power (moulding relief) by the Supreme Court and did not address section 10 of Act No. 23; not decisive here against statutory mandate.
Devidas Vitthalrao Bhonde v. Divisional Controller MSRTC, Amravati	Cited as one of the Division Bench judgments relied on by petitioner for protection of service.	Mentioned as part of petitioner’s authorities; Court noted these Nagpur decisions did not consider section 10 of Act No. 23 and/or Full Bench authority.
Pramod Krushnarao Bayaskar v. Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee	Division Bench judgment relied on by petitioner for service protection.	Noted by Court as among Nagpur decisions that relied on Kavita Solunke but which did not address section 10 and Full Bench precedents.
Tarachand Fakirchand Ninave v. Joint Commissioner and Vice Chairman, (2010(5) Mh.L.J 326)	One of the judgments pressed into service by petitioner for protection.	Cited by petitioner; Court recorded it among authorities relied upon but treated as not overruling Full Bench or statutory provisions.
Sunil Ingle v. Zilla Parishad (2009(2) All MR 867)	Division Bench held State Government resolution (15-6-1995) was invalid where it attempted to protect persons appointed on basis of invalid caste certificate; such protection infringed Articles 14 and 16.	Respondent relied on it to contend protection not available; Court relied on it as authority that executive resolutions cannot override constitutional guarantees and statutory regime.
Union of India v. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar ((2008) 4 SCC 612)	Three-judge Supreme Court held Milind (Constitution Bench) decisions on protection did not apply to employment cases obtained by false caste claims; proper course is cancellation of employment so post may go to eligible candidate.	Relied upon by Respondent; Court used it to support principle that protection in employment is not routinely available and that cancellation is proper remedy.
Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir	Supreme Court observed protection on equity/sympathy is not justified where original appointment rests on a false caste certificate; fraud cannot be rescued by equitable relief.	Cited to show Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of equitable protection where appointment rests on false certificate; Court relied on this as binding principle.
State of Maharashtra v. Milind ((2001) 1 SCC 4)	Constitution Bench granted protection in certain admissions/appointments by moulding relief; Court noted its directions were issued under Article 142 rather than as binding law under Article 141.	Central to Full Bench analysis; Court held Milind’s observations/directions were under Article 142 and not law under Article 141 and therefore limited in application to facts where Supreme Court exercises Article 142.
Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra (Full Bench)	Full Bench concluded that the Milind observations/directions were issued under Article 142, not as binding law under Article 141; High Courts cannot grant protection equivalent to Article 142 relief; protection in employment is fact-specific and Article 23 Act provisions must be respected.	Court followed this Full Bench as controlling: concluded High Court could not grant protection contrary to section 10 of Act No. 23; used it to reject petitioner’s reliance on later Nagpur decisions.
R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala ((2004) 2 SCC 105)	Three-judge Supreme Court judgment considered in Full Bench; followed Milind principle of protection in some cases.	Cited as part of the judicial landscape reviewed by Full Bench; Court noted these decisions did not change the conclusion that Milind relief was Article 142 moulding of relief.
Sanjay Madhusudan Punekar v. State of Maharashtra (2002(2) Mh.L.J 300)	Case where protection to services was accorded despite High Court deciding question of law against appellant; noted by Full Bench.	Noted as an instance where protection was extended on facts; Court recognized it as fact-specific and not altering the Full Bench view on Article 142 limitations.
Central Warehousing Corporation v. Jagdish Kumar (SLP Civil 25644 of 2004)	Facts warranted grant of protection; Supreme Court extended protection.	Referred by Full Bench as example of fact-specific protection by Supreme Court; Court treated it as not altering the principle that such relief is moulded under Article 142.
Punjab National Bank v. Vilas s/o Govindrao Bokade (2007(3) Mh.L.J 805)	Supreme Court found situation distinguishable from Milind and allowed protection to the employee.	Cited by Full Bench and noted that Supreme Court sometimes grants protection on distinguishing facts; Court emphasized these are not general rules to override statute.
Bank of India v. Avinash Mahdivikar ((2005) 7 SCC 690)	Supreme Court held employee who secured appointment by illegitimate means (after three decades’ service) was not entitled to protection; appointment obtained by fraud cannot be sustained.	Used by Full Bench to show Supreme Court’s reluctance to protect employees in many cases even where long service is present; Court relied on it to limit petitioner’s claim.
BHEL Ltd. v. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde (2007(4) Mh.L.J 1)	Supreme Court observations that employee obtaining appointment by false certificate is liable to termination; Constitution Bench in Milind does not lay down a principle that such appointments can be routinely protected.	Referred to by Full Bench to support view that protection is an exercise of discretion under Article 142 and not general law for High Courts to apply.
Union of India v. Dattu s/o Namdeo Thakur ((2012) 1 SCC 549)	Supreme Court decision cited by Nagpur Division Bench in support of service protection in particular facts.	Noted by Court as one of the authorities on which Nagpur benches relied; Court treated these Nagpur decisions as not addressing section 10 of Act No. 23 and Full Bench authority.
Dattu v. State of Maharashtra (three-judge reference in text)	Three-judge Bench preserved benefits already derived despite dismissing SLPs; relief moulded considering intervening circumstances, with direction not to take further advantage and to repay concessions.	Cited as example where Supreme Court preserved accrued benefits under Article 142 moulding relief; Court emphasized such relief does not negate statutory consequences generally.
Apurva Ashok Gokhale v. State of Maharashtra (2013(1) Mh.L.J 139)	Division Bench refused protection after invalidation of caste certificate in view of express statutory provision (section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001).	Court relied on this Division Bench as recent authority upholding section 10 and refusing equitable protection contrary to legislation.
Priyanka Omprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra (2009(4) Mh.L.J 847)	Division Bench held legislative balance struck by section 10 prevents High Court from granting equitable protection contrary to statute; degree/diploma obtained on the basis of a caste claim that is invalidated stands cancelled.	Followed by Court to reinforce that statutory provision governs and High Court should not exercise equitable jurisdiction to subvert statutory intent.
Jagdevi Gurunath Khedgikar v. Scheduled Tribe Certificate Security Committee (Writ Petition 5624 of 2011)	Division Bench followed Panwar and refused protection in view of sections 10(1) and 10(3) of Act No. 23.	Cited to show consistent Division Bench approach refusing protection contrary to statute; Court treated it as persuasive supporting authority.
State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay K. Nimje ((2007) 14 SCC 481)	Supreme Court referred to section 10 of Act No. 23 and held legislative enactment prevails over Government Resolution.	Used by this Court to demonstrate that statutory provision overrides executive circulars or resolutions which attempt to protect persons appointed on false caste claims.
State of Maharashtra v. Raviprakash Babulalsing Parmar ((2007) 1 SCC 80)	Quoted in review judgment context to stress that taking undue advantage of reservation by imposters is fraud on the Constitution and State cannot be helpless.	Referred to by Court as supporting principle that legislation and constitutional protections must be enforced against usurpation.
Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad v. State of Maharashtra ((2010) 6 SCC 592)	Supreme Court noted that once certificate is invalidated by Scrutiny Committee, appointment becomes void ab initio; Government cannot validate a void appointment by subsequent communication; sometimes creation of supernumerary post directed in interest of justice.	Cited by Court to show Supreme Court’s approach: cancellation normally voids appointment, but in some circumstances relief (e.g., supernumerary post) may be directed; Court used it to show discretion is exercised by Supreme Court under Article 142 on facts.
LIC of India v. Sushil ((2006) 2 SCC 471)	Noted that filing of undertaking should not be treated as the ratio of Milind; context-specific directions cannot be generalized as binding precedent.	Used to support proposition that remedial directions in some cases do not become universal doctrine for High Courts.
Ramesh Suresh Kamble v. State of Maharashtra (2007(1) Mh.LJ 423)	Full Bench held that cancellation by Scrutiny Committee under section 7(1) implies certificate was obtained fraudulently; explicit recording of fraud is not necessary.	Invoked by Court to support inference that cancellation implies fraudulent procurement and therefore statutory consequences follow.
Ramesh Rambhauji Majrikar v. State of Maharashtra (2011 (6) BCR 501)	Division Bench considered the effect of production of false and fraudulent certificates.	Cited as supportive Division Bench authority on consequences of false certificates; Court considered it part of consistent jurisprudence.
Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P ((2006) 2 SCC 670)	Supreme Court cautioned courts against legislating from the bench; when statutory words are clear there is no scope to amend or alter the statutory provision.	Cited by Court to underline that it cannot override clear statutory mandate of section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 by exercising equitable jurisdiction.
Swati v. State of Maharashtra (Civil Application No. 7411 of 2010)	Supreme Court dismissed SLP but protected benefits already enjoyed (degree); direction issued that no future benefits to be claimed.	Referred to in discussion of Dattu and Kavita Solunke as an example where Supreme Court moulded relief under Article 142 to preserve accrued benefits.
Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar ((2008) 9 SCC 54)	Explains when a judgment is to be accepted as binding precedent; principles of precedential value in judges’ decisions.	Used by Court to stress distinction between binding precedents and fact-specific remedial orders; Court relied on these principles in evaluating authorities.
Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workman ((2007) 1 SCC 408)	Discussed (paras 41-42) when judgments constitute binding precedent and how later decisions interact.	Cited to support analysis of precedential value and to show the need to respect binding Full Bench and Supreme Court precedents.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by framing the legal background and the competing authorities, then applied statutory and precedential constraints to the facts. The key steps in the Court's analysis, as set out in the opinion, are as follows:

The Court noted the petitioner had expressly limited his challenge to protection in employment and had given up challenging the invalidation of his caste certificate. The petitioner's claim relied primarily on Kavita Solunke and certain Division Bench orders from Nagpur which had extended protection on their facts.
The Court recited that several Supreme Court decisions and a Full Bench of this Court (Ganesh Rambhau Khalale) had examined the legal basis of protections extended in some cases. The Full Bench concluded that the observations/directions in para 36 of Milind were issued under Article 142 and were not law declared under Article 141; thus Article 142 moulded relief applied only when the Supreme Court exercised its plenary powers.
The Court highlighted the distinction between (a) remedial directions or fact-specific protection moulded by the Supreme Court under Article 142, and (b) law declared under Article 141. It relied on the Full Bench (Ganesh Rambhau Khalale) and subsequent Division Bench authorities (e.g., Apurva, Panwar) holding that protections granted by the Supreme Court in some cases were exercises of Article 142 discretion and therefore do not create a general rule that High Courts must or can grant the same protection contrary to statute.
The Court emphasized the statutory regime enacted by the State Legislature — Act No. 23 of 2001 — particularly section 10 which prescribes cancellation of benefits once a caste certificate is invalidated. The Court relied on Supreme Court authorities (e.g., State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay K. Nimje, Raviprakash Parmar) and Division Bench decisions which held that legislative provisions override executive resolutions or memoranda attempting to protect appointments/benefits obtained by false caste claims.
Applying these principles, the Court observed that the Nagpur Division Bench decisions relied upon by the petitioner did not consider the Full Bench analysis or section 10 of Act No. 23, as they had focused on Kavita Solunke. Therefore those decisions could not be treated as authoritatively displacing the Full Bench conclusion or the statutory mandate.
The Court further noted an earlier judgment in the petitioner’s case (16-7-2012) had declared that if the Caste Scrutiny Committee rejected his caste claim, the termination order dated 3-11-2009 would revive and stand restored, and that judgment had attained finality; accordingly the termination order was restored and the present challenge to quash it was misconceived.
Given the foregoing (the statutory mandate of section 10, the Full Bench conclusion on Article 142 vs Article 141, and the prior final judgment reinstating the termination in relevant contingencies), the Court concluded there was no case for interference and dismissed the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is DISMISSED. The Court found no case warranting interference with the termination order and declined to grant protection in service to the petitioner.

Implications (direct consequences for the parties):

The petitioner’s challenge to the termination order dated 3-11-2009 fails; termination stands restored in light of earlier final judgment and the statutory and precedential framework discussed.
The Court recorded that there shall be no order as to costs.
The Court’s decision underscores that High Courts should not grant general protection in employment where a caste certificate is invalidated if a statutory regime (section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001) prescribes cancellation of benefits, and where Supreme Court remedial protection was exercised under Article 142 (a power not available to High Courts) rather than as a binding statement of law under Article 141.
The opinion does not purport to lay down novel law; it applies existing Full Bench and Supreme Court authorities and upholds the statutory consequences of invalidation of caste certificates.

Petition dismissed.

Note: This summary is restricted to the information expressly contained in the provided opinion. No facts or legal conclusions beyond those present in the opinion have been inferred or added.

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Rajendra v. Joint Commissioner And Vice Chairman Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee

B.P Dharmadhikari, J.:— By this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order of termination dated 3-11-2009, passed by Respondent No. 2 - Additional General Manager/Engineering LMD National Aviation Company of India Limited. Though in the petition, order dated 5-11-2012 passed by the Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, invalidating caste claim of the petitioner as belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe, has also been questioned, the petitioner has only claimed protection in employment and expressly restricted his challenge only to the order of termination and has given up the status as belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe. Right to challenge order invalidating caste certificate is given up with knowledge that Respondent Employer as also Caste Scrutiny Committee are opposing the prayer for protection. This protection in service is being claimed on the basis of various judgments, particularly a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2012(5) Mh.L.J (SC) 921, and judgments of Division Bench of this Bench dated 4-11-2012 in Writ Petition No. 2162/2012, Devidas Vitthalrao Bhonde v. Divisional Controller MSRTC, Amravati as also dated 8-11-2012 in Writ Petition No. 4013/2012, Pramod Krushnarao Bayaskar v. Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, a judgment dated 3-11-2012 in Writ Petition No. 402/2012, Tarachand Fakirchand Ninave v. Joint Commissioner and Vice Chairman, 2010(5) Mh.L.J 326 is also pressed into service for said purpose.

2. It is in this background, we have heard Shri S.R Namaware, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Shri P.B Patil, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1 Scrutiny Committee and Shri Sridhar K. Chari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 2 Employer. With their consent, the petition is taken up for final disposal by issuing Rule, making the same returnable forthwith.

3. Shri Namaware, learned Counsel submits that the basic document namely Caste Certificate issued to the petitioner as belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe is not found obtained by playing any fraud and hence, is not a false caste certificate. The law as expounded in the case of Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra (supra), and various other judgments of this Bench of Bombay High Court, therefore, must be applied and the order of termination must be set aside. He points out that Government of India has issued a notification/Office Memorandum on 10-8-2010 protecting the services of employees like present petitioner. The said policy decision must be applied in present facts and order of termination must be quashed and set aside.

4. Shri P.B Patil, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 Scrutiny Committee has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil Ingle v. Zilla Parishad, reported at 2009(2) All MR 867, to submit that similar resolution dated 15-6-1995 issued by the State Government has been found invalid and the Division Bench has held that persons securing employment on the basis of a invalid caste certificate cannot seek protection of their service. He has invited attention to the findings recorded by the Scrutiny Committee in the impugned order to point out how the Vigilance Cell Authorities and the Scrutiny Committee has noted old Koshti documents. He contends that thus certificate obtained by the petitioner is false and fraudulent.

5. Shri S.K Chari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 - Employer submits that in the light of previous petitions filed by the petitioner before the Principal Seat of this Court and at Nagpur, challenge to termination order dated 3-11-2009 is not open and is misconceived. The continuation in service was dependent upon obtaining validity and petitioner has acquiesced in the said judgment of this Court dated 16-7-2012. It is further contended that the Office Memorandum dated 10-8-2010 is not binding upon respondent No. 2, and is not attracted in the present facts. In any case the said Office Memorandum cannot override provisions of section 10 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificates Act, (Act No. 23 of 2001).

6. He has relied upon a judgment in the case of Union of India v. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar, reported at 2008(2) Mh.L.J (SC) 720 : (2008) 4 SCC 612 a judgment delivered by the Hon'ble 3 Judges of Apex Court to show how protection granted by the Constitution Bench in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind, reported at 2001(1) Mh.L.J (S.C) 1 : (2001) 1 SCC 4, is found not applicable as “law” on uniform basis. The judgment in the case of Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir, reported at JT 2008(8) SC 265, is also relied upon by him to submit that such protection is not available in present matter. Lastly, he submits that the protection extended by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments is found to be under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, by the Full Bench of this Court in its judgment in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2009(2) Mh.L.J (FB) 788 : AIR 2009 Bom. 122. The judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra. (supra), does not therefore, carry petitioner's argument further and the Division Bench judgments of this Court at Nagpur extending protection are delivered in ignorance of the said Full Bench judgment. He also points out how this aspect has been considered by this Bench in Writ Petition No. 5836/2012, Gajanan Narayan Gonnade v. The State of Maharashtra and Writ Petition No. 5812/2012, Ravindra Khemraj Kumbhare v. State of Maharashtra on 3-1-2013. He therefore, prays for dismissal of Writ Petition.

7. We find that in Judgment of Hon'ble 2 Judges in the case of Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir (supra), a plea of protection of employment due to long service was pressed and the Hon'ble Apex Court found that it was already rejected in series of its decisions. It has, therefore, found it not necessary to launch an exhaustive dissertation on principles. The Hon'ble Apex Court notes that in a few decisions, admission or appointment were not cancelled because of “peculiar factual matrix obtaining therein, the consensus of judicial opinion is found to be equity, sympathy or generosity has no place where the original appointment rests on a false caste certificate, such a person cannot plead equity, nor the Court is justified in exercising equity jurisdiction in his favour.” It has been observed that “an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something which is otherwise not due, tantamount to fraud”.

8. In Union of India v. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar (supra), the Hon'ble 3 Judges have considered the Constitutional Bench judgment in case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind (supra), and noted that the said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming benefit of reservation meant for Scheduled tribe. It has been laid down that proper course is to cancel the employment obtained on the basis of false certificate so that post may be filled up by a candidate who is entitled to benefit of reservation.

9. In Sunil Ingle v. Zilla Parishad (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has considered this larger Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and also the Government Resolution dated 15-6-1995. By the said government resolution such persons securing employment, if found belonging to Special Backward Classes were given protection from termination. The Division Bench has found that it amounted to entry in service by backdoor and deprived other persons belonging to Special Backward Class, of their fundamental rights. The Division Bench has held “If the State does not have power to make legislation violating or abridging fundamental rights, obviously, it does not have power to issue government resolution which has a ‘result of abridging fundamental rights. We find that this Government Resolution in terms violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the High Court will not be justified in issuing its writ for enforcement of such invalid and infirm Government Resolution.’”

10. It is in this background, that the perusal of Full Bench judgment in case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra (supra), becomes necessary. There the controversy was placed before the Full Bench because of two divergent views of coordinate Benches. In Union of India v. Deepak Y. Gotefode, reported at 2008(1) Mh.L.J 790, the Division Bench has found that appointment was void since inception as it was obtained by playing fraud by producing false, caste certificate. The protection in employment was, therefore, not granted. The later Division Bench judgment in the case of Prashant Haribhau Khawas v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2008(2) Mh.L.J 322, considered similar situation and by drawing support of the same judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court i.e State of Maharashtra v. Milind. (supra), concluded that the protection granted therein to the appointments or admissions that have become final, was under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The question whether the observations or directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in said judgment declared law under Article 141 or were issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 came to be placed before the Full Bench. The Full Bench from para 5 onwards looks into various judgments. In para 5, there is reference to judgment in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, reported at (2004) 2 SCC 105, delivered by the Hon'ble three Judges and Full Bench of High Court noted that there the larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court followed principle of protection in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind. (supra). But then the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court that such person cannot be said to be holding the civil post within the meaning of Article 311 are also noted. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Madhusudan Punekar v. State of Maharashtra, 2002(2) Mh.L.J 300, where though the High Court had decided question of law against the appellant, the protection was accorded to the services of the appellant is also noted. Then the judgment looked into is in the case of Central Warehouse Corporation v. Jagdish Kumar, SLP (Civil) 25644 of 2004 and as facts there warranted grant of protection, the Hon'ble Apex Court accordingly extended it to the employee. In para 8 of its judgment, Full Bench looks into judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Vilas s/o Govindrao Bokade, reported at 2007(3) Mh.L.J 805, and noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court had found that situation of Vilas was hot different than, in Milind (supra) and, therefore, the High Court justified in extending protection to the services of Vilas.

11. From Para 9A onwards, the judgments taking a views of Courts to the contrary are looked into by the Full Bench of this Court. The judgment in the case of Bank of India v. Avinash Mahdivikar, reported at 2005(4) Mh.L.J (SC) 409 : (2005) 7 SCC 690 : AIR 2005 SCC 3395, is lopked into and observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 6 are noted. The employee there had, put in three decades of service and three more years were left for his retirement. In spite of this, the Hon'ble Apex allowed the appeal of Bank of India and held that employee was not permitted or entitled to the benefits of appointment secured by illegitimate means. In para 10, the judgment in the case of BHEL Ltd. v. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde, reported at 2007(4) Mh.L.J 1, is looked into and observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court that such employee is liable to be terminated are noted. Para 7 of BHEL Ltd. v. Suresh considering the judgment of Constitution Bench in State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (supra), has also noted with the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court that law declared by the Constitution Bench does not at all lay down principle of law that where person secures appointment by producing a false caste certificate, his service can be protected by taking undertaking. This Supreme Court judgment in para 8 observes that after interpreting relevant constitution and statutory provisions and laying down law, it is open to the Court to mpuld the relief which may appear to be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Full Bench concluded that protection granted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind (supra), is thus found to be moulding of relief by the Hon'ble Apex Court in exercise of discretion under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

12. In para 11 Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra (supra), considers a three Judges judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar, (supra), has been noted and appreciation of Constitution Bench judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (supra) therein has been elaborately looked into. The moulding of relief in exercise of powers Under Article 142 by the Constitution Bench is again highlighted. It is in this background that the Full Bench then proceeds to apply the law in para 12. In para 13, the following conclusions have been recorded.

“13. Having regard to the legal position that emerges from the above referred judgments we record the following conclusions and answer the question framed:

The observations/directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 36 of the judgment in the case of State v. Milind, reported in 2001(1) Mh.L.J (S.C) 1: ((2001) 1 SCC 4 : AIR 2001 SC 393) is not the ‘law declared by the Supreme Court’ under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

The said observations/directions are issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

The said observations/directions have no application to the cases relating to appointments and are restricted to the cases relating to admissions.

The protection, if any, to be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case would depend upon the exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. As the powers under Article 142 are not available to the High Court, no protection can be sranted by this Court even in cases relating to admissions.”

13. It is important to not here that when Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind. (supra), it was not required to look into the provisions of the Act No. 23 of 2001, particularly the provisions of section 10 which mandate cancellation of all benefits including admission, employment, once a certificate is invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee. The issue of protection has been looked into by the Division Bench at Nagpur in the case of Shailesh s/o Krishnarao Kohad v. Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur, reported at 2010(1) Mh.L.J 790, to which one of us (B.P Dharmadhikari, J.) is a party. After following the above mentioned Full Bench of this Court, request for protection has been turned down The perusal of para 25 of said judgment reveals that the effort made by the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Shailesh to urge that the directions issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court were not under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, has been turned down. The Division Bench of this Court very recently in the case of Apurva v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2013(1) Mh.L.J 139, has again reiterated the same position that too in the light of provisions of section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001. Mention can also be made to the judgment of Division Bench taking similar view and the judgment in the case of Gauri Shekhar Telvane v. Maharashtra University of Health Sciences, reported at 2012(6) AIR Bom. Reports 750, and in the case of Shweta Kesarinath Shivdikar v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2010(2) Mh.L.J 490. In the case of Priyanka Omprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2009(4) Mh.L.J 847, the Division Bench of this Court has again adopted same line. The view expressed by this Court shows that as the reservation is a Constitutional provision, State Government is found not competent to extend any protection by treating persons so recruited as belonging to Special Backward Class. This can be gathered from para 12 of judgment which considers this aspect. The Division Bench in the case of Sunil Ingle v. Zilla Parishad. (supra) has in para 3 expressly noted that when State does not have power to make legislation violating or abridging the fundamental right, such Government Resolution dated 15-6-1995 is invalid and infirm. The Scheduled Tribes are recognized in relation to the State and as held in Madhuri Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 6 SCC 241 : AIR 1995 SC 94, it is obligation of State to verify whether the certificate procured is genuine or not. Act No. 23 of 2001 in Maharashtra takes care of that duty of State of Maharashtra. The above observations of this Court in relation to 15-6-1995 circular also hold good in respect of the Office Memorandum dated 10-8-2010 though issued by the Government of India. A person not found belonging to either Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste in Maharashtra can not be continued as reserved category person even by the Central Government.

14. In the case of Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar, reported at 2009(1) Mh.L.J (S.C) 1 : (2008) 9 SCC 54, particularly in paras 43, 48 and 49, the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained when a judgment can be accepted as a binding precedent, laying down a law. The reference can also be made to its judgment in the case of Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workman, reported at (2007) 1 SCC 408, particularly paras 41 and 42. The perusal of all above judgments which have been looked into by Full Bench clearly show that on account of peculiar facts, the Hon'ble Apex Court has thought it proper to extend protection to the employee/students, as the case may be. though caste certificate were found invalid. Thus, need felt by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its Constitution Bench judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind. (supra), is also felt by the Hon'ble Apex Court in these subsequent judgments. The Hon'ble Apex Court, however, has not altered the law as laid down by Constitution Bench judgment in any way. The said law has been applied consistently by larger Benches in the case of Union of India v. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar (supra) and in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala. (supra). The effect of production of false and fraudulent certificate is looked into by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Rambhauji Majrikar v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2011 (6) BCR 501 and the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ramesh Suresh Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2007(1) Mh.LJ 423. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharati Balkrishna Dhongade v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2012(3) Mh.L.J (SC) 745 : (2012) 1 SCC 566, considers the situation where burden of establishing caste claim is not discharged. In the case of Zilla Parishad v. State of Maharashtra, reported at (2010) 6 SCC 592, para 17, the Hon'ble Apex Court directs creation of supernumerary post for Special Backward Class candidate though the appointment is found to be valid but same is directed to be created as Special Backward Class status is proved.

15. Before proceeding further, we may refer to judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, reported at (2004) 1 SCC 347, where it has been concluded in para 26 that a later judgment delivered in ignorance of a binding precedent of a coordinate Bench needs to be treated as per incuriam and is not a binding law.

16. It is in this background that we have to look into the judgments on which the petitioner has placed reliance. The judgment in Writ Petition No. 2162 of 2012 delivered at Nagpur on 4-11-2012 refers only to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra, (supra) and holds that the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a view that in case of persons settled in employment, service needs to be protected. Because of these observations, the petition has been allowed and protection has been extended by clarifying that the petitioner would not be entitled for any promotion or any other benefit on the basis of his claim as belonging to Scheduled Tribe. In Writ Petition No. 4013 of 2012, the Division Bench at Nagpur on 8-11-2012, has noted the very same judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and judgment in the case of Dattu s/o Namdeo Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2012(3) Mh.L.J (S.C) 179 : (2012) 1 SCC 549 and allowed the petition and protected his services. The petitioner was directed to file an undertaking that neither he nor his progeny would be entitled to claim any benefits as belonging to Scheduled Tribe.

17. In Writ Petition No. 402 of 2012, this Court on 3-11-2012 has noted O.M dated 10-8-2010 issued by the Government of India and extended its benefit to the petitioner subject to the petitioner or his progeny not claiming any benefits as ST candidate. All these judgments follow same line as are delivered by the same Hon'ble Judge of this Court as per assistance received. These judgments on which the petitioner has placed reliance do not refer to earlier Division Bench judgments of this Court where the Full Bench of this Court in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra (supra), has been consistently followed. The provisions of section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 laying down consequences of invalidation of caste certificate are also not pointed out to the Division Benches at Nagpur. The attention of said Bench was invited only to the judgment in the case of Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra. (supra) and the judgment in the case of Dattu v. State of Maharashtra, (supra). The parties did not point out to this Court at that time that protection extended by the Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in its basic judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind (supra), was not under Article 141 of Constitution of India but was under Article 142 thereof. The question, therefore, whether High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction could have ignored or nullified the mandate of section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 was also not required to be gone into by this Court in its judgments dated 4-11-2012, 8-11-2012 or 3-11-2012 (supra).

18. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra, (supra), is delivered by a Bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges. The said Bench has looked into the Constitution Bench judgment and then various other judgments including two larger Bench judgments in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala. (supra) and Union of India v. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar (supra). Thus, the legal provisions which this Court has to keep in mind while exercising writ jurisdiction viz., section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 were not required to be looked into in the said judgment. It is obvious that the Hon'ble Apex Court has exercised its jurisdiction to mould relief in peculiar facts and as that was being done under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the invalidation of caste claim by Scrutiny Committee was not determinative. The observations in para 15 of said judgment reveal that the question of extending the protection is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of Dattu v. State of Maharashtra, (supra), the issue is looked into by the three Hon'ble Judges. Three Hon'ble Judges have looked into its earlier two orders. There the caste certificate issued was invalidated on the ground that they could not substantiate their case as belonging to Thakur - Scheduled Tribe and they also could not establish any affinity. That cancellation was upheld by High Court and then Special Leave Petition came to be filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court. In para 5, the Hon'ble Apex Court accepts the finding of Caste Scrutiny Committee as also findings of High Court but then holds that it cannot ignore various circumstances which intervened between issuance of caste certificate and cancellation thereof. In the light of those developments, the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Swati v. State of Maharashtra, in Civil Application No. 7411 of 2010 decided on 6-9-2010 was pressed into service before this larger Bench. There though a Special Leave Petition filed by Swati was dismissed, benefits already enjoyed and degree of B.D.S obtained by Swati came to be protected. A direction was issued that she would not be entitled to any further benefits under the caste certificate. The Hon'ble larger Bench noted that facts in the case of Dattu before it were similar. It, therefore, proceeded to dismiss all three Special Leave Petitions but then preserved benefits, advantages till then derived by the holders of Caste certificate. It is also clarified by the Hon'ble larger Bench that the petitioner would not be entitled to take any further advantage in future either for studies or employment. The petitioner, however, was directed to make good the amount of concession enjoyed by way of reduction of fees. This judgment, therefore, again shows that consequences flowing from section 10 of Act No. 23 of 200-1 have not been found just and not permitted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the facts and circumstances of the matter before it though it dismissed the SLP as filed. Obviously, again the exercise is of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra, (supra), therefore, cannot be said to have undergone any change because of these judgments.

19. In 2013(1) Mh.L.J 139 : 2012(11) LJSOFT 10, Apurva Ashok Gokhale v. State of Maharashtra, Division Bench has considered the aspect of protection after upholding the order of Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidating the caste certificate. This submission has not been accepted in view of an express provision of law enacted by the State Legislature in the shape of section 10 in Act No. 23 of 2001. Following observations and interpretation by a Division Bench of this Court in Priyanka Omprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra, 2009(4) Mh.L.J 847 : 2008(3) USOFT 79 : 2008(2) Bom.C.R 100 have been relied upon:

“The balance between the equitable consideration of protecting the interest of a student who has pursued his education and the public interest in protecting the reserved categories against the usurpation of their constitutional entitlements by imposters has now been made by the State Legislature. The Court in the exercise of the power of judicial review has due deference to legislative policy. The Court does not prescribe legislative policy nor does it enact law. The Court must assume that the legislature is cognizant of the needs and welfare of society. The legislature was also cognizant of the outlays publicly made on education and the investmeni made by the State in equipping students to become doctors, engineers and other professionals. The Legislature has expressly stipulated that a degree or diploma obtained on the basis of a caste claim which is invalidated shall stand cancelled. In the face of an express legislative provision, this Court shall not be justified in exercising its equitable jurisdiction. Considerations of equity that guide the Court in constitutional adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution must be in accordance with the law enacted by the Legislature. So long as the law continues to be valid, the High Court would not be justified in issuing directions which run contrary to the plain intendment of the Legislature. It is the constitutional duty and obligation of this Court to give a purposive meaning and interpretation to the provisions of the enactment made by the State Legislature in 2000. Stringent provisions have been made to protect the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other reserved categories. To dilute those provisions by importing equitable considerations for a candidate who has usurped benefits Would be to defeat the law. The legislation was in this case conceived in the interests of protecting the constitutional scheme of reservations from usurpation by those who are not entitled. It is the plain duty of the constitutional Court to enforce the law. The doctrine of the separation of powers in a democracy demands no less.”

20. In para 8 in Apurva Ashok Gokhale v. State of Maharashtra, Division Bench has further noted that though the Supreme Court had in certain cases issued directions to protect the admissions granted to a candidate despite the invalidation of the caste certificate having regard to the equities of the case, this was in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. It also notes that this Division Bench judgment of this Court in Panwar's case has been subsequently followed by another Division Bench in Jagdevi Gurunath Khedgikar v. Scheduled Tribe Certificate Security Committee Writ Petition 5624 of 2011 decided on 5 March, 2012. Because of the specific statutory provisions which have been enacted by the State Legislature, in sections 10(1) and 10(3), the request to extend protection has not been accepted. This Bench has observed that the legislature has in its wisdom balanced two competing equities. The first equity is the equity of an individual student, who has undergone a period of study albeit on the basis of a false caste certificate. The second equity which has been regarded as one of overriding or paramount importance in the legislation is the need to protect the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other categories for whom reservations are intended from the usurpation of benefits by imposters who claim a reserved seat in an educational institution on the basis of a false caste claim. The legislature has as a matter of principle specifically laid down in the form of sub sections (1) and (3) of section 10 that despite the conferment of a degree or diploma, upon a subsequent invalidation of a caste claim based on a false caste certificate, the benefit which has accrued to the student shall stand withdrawn. This Court did not find any merit in the Petition.

21. On 16-4-2009 in 2009(4) Mh.L.J 847 : 2009(8) LJSOFT 66 while rejecting review in matter of Priyanka Omprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra, the Division Bench mentions that the effect of the Act 23/2001 enacted by the State Legislature in the year 2000 has been considered in a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay K. Nimje, 2007(3) Mh.LJ (S.C) 795 : 2007(3) USOFT (SC) 50 : (2007) 14 SCC 481. The Supreme Court referred to the provisions of section 10 of the Act which entail the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Legislative enactment in this case, the act 23 of 2001, would prevail over a Government Resolution to the contrary and in the light of the Constitutional provisions contained in Articles 341 and 342, statutory provisions cannot be diluted either by a Government Resolution or otherwise. Following observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Maharashtra v. Raviprakash Babulalsing Parmar, 2007(2) Mh.L.J (SC) 250 : 2006(12) USOFT (SC) 31 : (2007) 1 SCC 80 are quoted by it in this review judgment:

“The Constitution of India provides for protective discrimination and reservation so as to enable the disadvantaged group to come on the same platform as that of the forward community. If and when a person takes an undue advantage of the said beneficent provision of the Constitution by obtaining the benefits of reservation and other benefits provided under the Presidential Order although he is not entitled thereto, he not only plays a fraud on the society but in effect and substance plays a fraud on the Constitution. When, therefore, a certificate is granted to a person who is not otherwise entitled thereto, it is entirely incorrect to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in the matter.”

22. In Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 592, Hon'ble Two Judges of Apex Court notices in para 9 that in spite of the protection given by the Government, Respondent 2 was not reinstated in service. Therefore, he filed Writ Petition No. 1764 of 2003 challenging the order dated 4-5-1998 terminating his services. The Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench allowed it on 31-8-2004, giving rise to the appeal. From the record, Apex Court did not approve the stand of Respondent 1 i.e the State of Maharashtra that Respondent 2 was entitled to the protection of Government Resolution dated 15-6-1995. The well-settled principle of law that once the certificate indicating that a person belongs to the Scheduled Tribe is invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, his appointment becomes void from the beginning is then quoted. It is held that the void appointment could not have been validated by the Government by addressing a communication to the appellant. Hon'ble Apex Court further finds that the Government had passed the Order on 6-2-2002 on the basis of certificate produced by Respondent 2, which indicated that he belonged to Special Backward Class. The record also showed that he had produced a certificate dated 12-6-2002 indicating that he belonged to Special Backward Class before the appointment, but the appellant had not taken any steps to get it verified through the Caste Scrutiny Committee. In view of the non-availability of post belonging to the Special Backward Class category with the appellant, Supreme Court held that interest of justice would be served if the Government is directed to create supernumerary post in Appellant institution to accommodate Respondent 2 with liberty to get the said caste certificate verified through the Caste Scrutiny Committee. In LIC of India v. Sushil, (2006) 2 SCC 471, Hon'ble Two Judges state that filing of the undertaking was not to be treated as the ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of Maharashtra v. Milind. In 2007(1) Mh.L.J 423 : 2007(1) USOFT 56, Ramesh Suresh Kamble v. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Social Welfare Department. Full Bench of this Court has held that it is not necessary for the Caste Scrutiny Committee to record specifically that the Caste Certificate has been obtained by the applicant by making false claim or declaration. Once the Caste Certificate obtained by the candidate under section 4 from the Competent Authority is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee under section 7(1) of Maharashtra Act No. XXIII of 2001, the implicit inference is that such certificate has been obtained by making false claim or declaration bccause the power of the Scrutiny Committee to cancel the caste certificate is founded on such certificate having been obtained fraudulently.

23. In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P, reported at (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Hon'ble two judges have held that a statue is an edict of the Legislature and when words are very clear and there is no obscurity and ambiguity, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provision. The Hon'ble Apex Court has pointed out that there is a very thin line which separates the adjudication from legislation and cautioned that said line should not be crossed. We, therefore, cannot overlook the mandate of section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001. We have to follow the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ganesh Khalale (supra) and various other judgments of co-ordinate Benches of this Court already pointed out above.

24. Even otherwise, the judgment dated 16-7-2012 delivered at Bombay in Writ Petition 7703/2010 filed by present petitioner Rajendra in operative order while remanding the matter back has already declared that if caste scrutiny committee rejected his caste claim, termination order dated 3-11-2009 shall revive and stand restored. It is apparent that termination order is restored because of earlier judgment of this Court which has attained finality. In this backdrop and situation, later petition seeking quashing of that termination or for protection of employment is obviously misconceived.

25. In this situation, we find that claim of the petitioner before this Court for protection on the strength of these later judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court or of the Division Bench of this Court is misconceived. No case is made out warranting interference. Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.